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BODY COUNT. Global avoidable mortality since 1950

BODY COUNT. Global avoidable mortality since 1950

I am a highly published biological scientist and in 2003 published a huge pharmacological text entitled "Biochemical Targets of Plant Bioactive Compounds. A pharmacological reference guide to sites of action and biological effects" (Taylor & Francis, London & New York).

Over the last few years I have carefully researched, written, edited and finally published a science-based history book of very wide potential utility entitled “Body Count. Global avoidable mortality since 1950” (G.M. Polya, Melbourne, 2007; 220 pages, 24 tables; ISBN 1921377051). In the interests of Humanity I am sending copies of this big reference book to key scholars, writers, journalists, humanitarians, media and libraries around the world.

In 1998 I published a detailed book entitled “Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability” (G.M. Polya, Melbourne; second edition in preparation) (see: http://janeaustenand.blogspot.com/ ). This book dealt with the 2 century atrocity of British rule over India culminating in the man-made Bengal Famine of 1943/1944, The man-made, WW2 Bengal Famine killed 4 million people (it is similar in death toll magnitude to the WW2 Jewish Holocaust) but has been largely deleted from British historiography in a continuing process of sustained, racist holocaust denial. “Body count” documents the similarly non-reported avoidable death of 1.3 billion people since 1950 on Spaceship Earth with the First World in control of the flight deck.

“Body Count” is a carefully researched book by a 4 decade career biological scientist on a key social parameter “avoidable mortality” (excess death, deaths that should not have happened) which is nevertheless largely ignored by Mainstream media and for good reason – the post-1950 global avoidable mortality totals about 1.3 billion. Even in the United States, the richest country in the World, it can be estimated from publicly available UN demographic data that 0.14 million under-5 year old American infants have died avoidably over the last 7 years due to the warped Bush Administration priorities of international wars (that have so far caused 3.4 million excess deaths in the Occupied Iraqi and Afghan Territories alone, mostly of Women and Children) rather than of addressing urgent domestic priorities such as infant and maternal health.

I am a scientist and not an ideologue – my core humanitarian philosophy is simply that of the American Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal and have an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

“Body Count” is a number of books efficiently packaged in a user-friendly way as a KEY REFERENCE WORK for laypersons, high school and college students, teachers, researchers, journalists, human rights activists and workers and other people in public life.

“Body Count”:

(a) summarizes, tabulates and analyzes avoidable mortality for every country in the world since 1950;

(b) uniquely provides a succinct and systematically organized history of every country in the world coupled with key avoidable mortality statistics (a fabulous resource for students, scholars, journalists and human rights activists);

(c) a systematic analysis of the actual causes of excess death in the world (noting that 16 million people die avoidably in the world every year, this including 10 million under-5 avoidable infant deaths); and

(d) finally, sets out a brief and systematic series of practical suggestions for halting the First World-complicit global avoidable mortality holocaust.

A picture says a thousand words. If you indeed become interested in my dispassionately scientific and scholarly but deeply humanitarian book you may also be interested in using the following huge paintings I have painted to spread a message of Peace, Love and Respect for Mother, Child and Woman e.g. “Sydney Madonna”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10865/26/ , “Manhattan Madonna”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10766/26/ , “Qana”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/9547/26/ , “Truelove”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/11031/26/ , Isfahan Matisse: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14417/26/ , and Alhambra Pollock: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14082/42/ . Please forward these links to everyone you know in the interests of Peace, Love, Mother and Child – just as I am sending copies of my book to key writers, media and libraries around the world.

Peace is the only way but Silence kills and Silence is complicity. We are obliged to INFORM others about abuses of Humanity.

I have set out below a detailed outline of “Body Count” and its contents.

1. Statement of aims and rationale

Avoidable mortality (excess mortality) is the difference between the ACTUAL deaths in a country over a given period and the deaths EXPECTED for a peaceful, decently-run country with the same demographics. Avoidable mortality provides the bottom-line measure of the consequences of human actions and the success or otherwise of societal, regional and global policies.

UN demographic data enabled calculation of avoidable mortality (and corroborative, independent under-5 infant mortality estimates) for every country in the world since 1950. The 1950-2005 avoidable mortality has totaled 1.3 billion for the world and 1.2 billion for the non-European world, these horrendous estimates being consonant with 1950-2005 under-5 infant mortality estimates of 0.88 billion for the world and 0.85 billion for the non-European world. The data have been tabulated for every country together with other key demographic data and important social indicators, namely adult literacy and annual per capita income.

The avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality outcomes have been best in Overseas European countries (the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel) that have never been occupied but have frequently invaded other countries – and the worst outcomes have been for Non-Arab African countries that have variously been subject to centuries of invasion and occupation. Detailed, summarized histories of all countries of the world are accompanied by precise estimates of avoidable mortality in the post-1950 era due to war, occupation, genocide and passive genocide. Thus the post-invasion avoidable mortality (excess deaths) and under-5 infant mortality in Coalition-occupied Iraq now total 1.0 million and 0.5 million, respectively (as adjudged from the latest UN and medical literature data).

Rational global human risk management requires avoidable mortality information, scientific analysis and sensible systemic change. There is no public discussion of the actual human cost of First World policies. For example, the post-invasion avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality in Occupied Iraq and Afghanistan now total 3.4 million and 2.4 million, respectively – estimates directly derived from publicly-available UN Population Division data but which are comprehensively ignored by mainstream media.

Avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality correlate with war and foreign occupation, with the latter encompassing both explicit violent occupation and neo-colonial hegemony. An apocalyptic quartet of violence, deprivation, disease and LYING is responsible for the continuing carnage. The ruler is responsible for the ruled, death is equally final whether violent or non-violent and mass avoidable mortality of subject people is passive genocide in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Extensive analysis of the causes of avoidable mortality has revealed politically disparate successes (e.g. Cuba and Fiji) that point the way to rational, humane and low cost global solutions involving peace, independence, very low but sufficient incomes, high literacy, good primary health care and governance for the common good.

The three core sections of the book uniquely involve:

(1) detailed analysis and tabulation of avoidable mortality, infant mortality and linked demographic parameters for every country in the world in the period 1950-2005;

(2) a concise summary of the history of every country in the world in the context of avoidable mortality and its political causation; and

(3) a detailed analysis of the physical causes of avoidable mortality (thanatology) and detailed, scientific solutions to a continuing catastrophe that kills 16 million people a year (44,000 daily, about 60% of them infants).

It is a horrifying testament to Mainstream lying by omission and politically correct racism (PC racism) that there are, to my knowledge, NO books doing ANY of these three things in a systematic and comprehensive fashion.

2. Table of contents with listing of chapter headings & short description of each chapter/section

Preamble

Title, Publication Details, Table of Contents, Key Quotations, Detailed Contents, List of Tables & Preface.

Chapter 1. Introduction – global avoidable mortality

1.1 Science & history – history ignored yields history repeated;

1.2 Deleting history – the “forgotten”, man-made WW2 Bengal Famine;

1.3 Avoidable mortality (excess mortality), under-5 infant mortality and foreign occupation;

1.4 Global avoidable mortality (excess mortality);

1.5 Non-reportage of global avoidable mortality ensures its continuance;

1.6 Summary

Chapter 2. Global post-1950 excess mortality and under-5 infant mortality

2.1 Estimation of mortality and avoidable mortality (excess mortality);

2.2 Calculation of under-5 infant mortality;

2.3 Comparison of global and regional post-1950 total mortality and under-5 infant mortality;

2.4 Estimation of avoidable under-5 infant mortality;

2.5 Comparison of under-5 infant mortality and excess mortality;

2.6 “Humanizing” mortality;

2.7 “Humanizing” excess mortality;

2.8 The human aspect of under-5 infant mortality;

Tables 2.1-2.12;

2.9 Summary

Chapter 3. Correlates and causes of post-1950 avoidable global mass mortality

3.1 “Big picture” regional analysis of global post-1950 under-5 infant mortality and excess mortality;

3.2 Overseas Europe: domestic democracy, prosperity, peace and Anglo-American invasion of distant lands;

3.3 Western Europe: domestic bliss and colonial and neo-colonial wars abroad;

3.4 Eastern Europe: totalitarianism, Russian occupation, general peace and low mortality;

3.5 Latin America and Caribbean: colonial and US hegemony – increased violence yields increased mortality;

3.6 East Asia: remarkable resurgence from European wars and sanctions;

3.7 Turkey, Iran and Central Asia: European occupation, intervention and war;

3.8 Arab North Africa and the Middle East: decolonization, Anglo-American and Israeli wars and oil;

3.9 South East Asia – European-imposed colonialism, occupation, war and militarism; 3.10 The Pacific- mixed colonial occupation and post-colonial outcomes;

3.11 South Asia – crippled by the legacies from British imperialism;

3.12 Non-Arab Africa – colonialism, neo-colonialism, corruption, militarism, war and HIV-1;

3.13 To be or not to be - lowest mortality countries invading distant high mortality countries;

3.14 Quantitative assessment of the mortality consequences of occupation;

3.15 Summary

Chapter 4. Country-by-country analysis of avoidable mortality in European countries

4.1 Introduction – matching excess mortality with foreign occupation; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes:

4.2 Overseas Europe – internal democracy, external violence;

4.3 Western Europe – participation in colonial, neo-colonial and US-led “democratic imperialist” wars;

4.4 Eastern Europe – Communism, foreign occupation and tyranny but peace and good social services;

4.5 Summary

Chapter 5. Latin America and the Caribbean – from European invasion, genocide and slavery to US hegemony

5.1 Overview; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes:

5.2 Latin American and Caribbean histories;

5.3 Summary

Chapter 6. North Africa, Asia & Pacific – the impact of colonialism, neo-colonialism and war

6.1 Overview; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes:

6.2 East Asia – recovery from First World-imposed war and sanctions;

6.3 Turkey, Iran and Central Asia - Russian occupation, US interference, war and peace;

6.4 Arab North Africa and Middle East – Anglo-American, French and Israeli war and occupation;

6.5 South East Asia – colonialism, colonial wars, US-driven war and militarization; 6.6 The Pacific – colonialism, disease, war and maladministration;

6.7 South Asia – the disastrous legacy of rapacious British imperialism;

6.8 Summary

Chapter 7. Non-Arab Africa – colonialism, neo-colonialism, militarism, debt, economic constraint and incompetence

7.1 Overview of the continuing African tragedy; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes: 7.2 Short histories of the countries of Non-Arab Africa;

7.3 Summary

Chapter 8. Synthesis, conclusions and suggestions

8.1 Finding causes and solutions;

8.2 Risk management;

8.3 Violent versus non-violent death;

8.4 The ruler is responsible for the ruled;

8.5 Passive genocide in Occupied Iraq and Afghanistan;

8.6 Genocide;

8.7 Famine;

8.8 Disease;

8.9 Human cost of occupation;

8.10 High technology war, horrendous civilian/invader death ratios and PC racism; 8.11 Killing by default – arms, debt, globalization and economic constraint;

8.12 Excuses for war and the War on Terror;

8.13 Feminist perspective - right to life, women and allo-mothering;

8.14 Academic, media, political and sectarian lying;

8.15 Conclusions and suggestions – how to save the world

Section 9. Notes

Notes for the Preamble and Chapters 1-8.

Section 10. Bibliography.

3. Brief description of each chapter/section:

The preamble contains title page, table of contents, detailed contents (chapter, sub-headings and tables), key quotes and a succinct preface.

Chapter 1 summarizes the overall thrust of the book, specifically that history ignored yields history repeated. The deadly consequences of tardy reportage of the WW2 Jewish Holocaust and the general non-reportage of the WW2 Bengal Famine (holocaust denial) (see Gideon Polya’s Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History), are used to support the argument that non-reportage of global avoidable mortality ensures its continuance. Thus the non-reported 1950-2005 avoidable mortality has totaled 1.3 billion for the world, 1.2 billion for the non-European world and 0.6 billion for the Muslim world – a Muslim Holocaust 100 times greater than the WW2 Jewish Holocaust (6 million victims) or the “forgotten” WW2 Bengal Famine in British-ruled India (4 million victims).

Chapter 2 deals with the methodology used and presents detailed Tables summarizing regional and national avoidable mortality, under-5 infant mortality and other key demographic parameters and social indicators. The tables are organized by region in ascending order of post-1950 avoidable mortality. The best avoidable mortality outcomes have been in European countries and the worst in South Asia and non-Arab Africa. A useful way of comparing avoidable mortality outcomes is by “1950-2005 avoidable mortality”/“2005 population” ratios expressed as a percentage e.g. 2.9% for Australia but an appalling 81.0% for East Timor. The average “1950-2005 avoidable mortality”/ “2000 population ratio” in increasing order for the major global groupings is as follows: 2.7% (Overseas Europe) < st="on">atin America and Caribbean) < style=""> 27.3% (the Pacific) < style="" lang="EN-US">

Chapter 3 specifically addresses the correlates and causes of post-1950 avoidable mortality. Avoidable mortality correlates with foreign occupation which simply ensures rulers with decreased intrinsic regard for the ruled. Avoidable mortality provides a key measure of how rulers regard their domestic and foreign subjects and has been used to quantify the intrinsic racism of past and present imperialist powers. The surprising result is that the worst avoidable mortality-based “intrinsic racism scores” for the major First World “occupiers” have been for the Netherlands, Israel and Portugal and the best score for Russia, with the results for the UK, France and the US in between.

Chapters 4 to 7 provide detailed, summary “occupation histories” of all the countries of the world together with precise estimates for each country of avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality for particular post-1950 periods. The reader will be shocked by the magnitude of the actual human cost of specific post-1950 wars, occupations and other events as illustrated by the following three examples.

The post-invasion avoidable mortality in the Occupied Palestinian, Iraqi and Afghan Territories totals 0.3, 1.0 and 2.4 million, respectively, and the post-invasion under-5 infant mortality totals 0.2, 0.5 and 1.9 million, respectively (as of mid-2007). Avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality reached a minimum in post-colonial Iraq but doubled after the return of Western forces with sanctions in 1990 and have remained high ever since – the post-1990 avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality in Iraq now total 2.7 million and 1.7 million, respectively.

Similar avoidable carnage but for reasons of First World-complicit incompetent indigenous governance has occurred in Southern Africa in the post-Apartheid era. Careful inspection of the dynamics of avoidable mortality reveals that avoidable mortality increased dramatically in South Africa and its neighbours in the mid-1990s due to the utterly preventable HIV/AIDS epidemic. The percentage of the population now HIV positive (2003) is 20.6% (Swaziland), 19.9% (Botswana), 17.9% (Lesotho), 14.1% (Zimbabwe), 11.9% (South Africa), 10.7% (Namibia), 8.6% (Zambia) and 7.0% (Mozambique).

At the other end of the scale, relative to other European countries there has been markedly higher than average avoidable mortality in some Central and Eastern European countries subject to post-war Soviet occupation (specifically Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and the Ukraine). Thus, while Hungary has one of the best post-1950 under-5 infant mortality outcomes in the world, it has the worst post-1950 avoidable mortality outcome for any European country (1.4 million avoidable deaths since 1950 and currently 35,000 annually). Possible explanations for the excessive avoidable mortality in Hungary (and these other “frontline” countries also subject to partial or complete Soviet occupation in the post-war era) include smoking, drinking, depression, pollution, economically depressed Roma minorities and non-reported deliberate or accidental radiological contamination.

Chapter 8 provides a detailed summary of the causes of avoidable mortality including war, occupation, deprivation, famine, disease, genocide and passive genocide. Avoidable mortality is fundamentally caused by violence, deprivation, disease and lying. Requisite responses to man-made mass mortality include Cessation, Acknowledgement, Apology, Amends and Assertion of non-repetition (acronym: CAAAA or C4A) as exemplified by post-Holocaust Germany; this book attempts to at least enable “Acknowledgment” of the ongoing, First World-complicit avoidable mortality holocaust (16 million avoidable deaths per year – 44,000 per day - due to deprivation-related causes). Carefully considered, low cost, practical and humanitarian suggestions are made for halting the global avoidable mortality holocaust.

A Chapter 8 Appendix composed of 12 detailed Tables 8.1-8.12 summarizes the roughly current state of play (2003) for all regions and countries of the World in relation to the following parameters: mortality, excess mortality, under-5 infant mortality, mortality/population, excess mortality/population, under-5 infant mortality/population, under-5 infants/population, “annual under-5 infant death rate”, and % HIV positive.

Each of the above sections commences with 5 carefully chosen quotations that capture the essence of the book or its specific chapters. Each chapter is split into numbered and entitled sub-sections and concludes with a carefully constructed summary. For ease of reading and efficiency, all documenting references and notes are indicated by superscript numbers and listed in Section 9. The Bibliography Section 10 lists all works quoted in Section 9 in a consistent fashion e.g. author(s), year, title, publisher, city (for books); author(s), year, title, journal, volume, pages (for journal articles); and similarly defined documentation for other references (notably URLs for Web-accessible documents).

There is no Subject Index because the book has been carefully designed with a comprehensive Detailed Contents section and with systematically Alphabetized historical contents. “Body Count” represents both a powerful humanitarian statement and a key reference work for students, scholars, journalists, the general public and humanitarian activists.

4. People who would benefit from the “Body Count” resource

This book is special, original and important in that it is the ONLY work available that comprehensively quantifies the horrendous global human avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality that has occurred over the last half century and is still occurring unchecked. It is also a very useful reference resource in that it is the only book currently available (as far as I know) that provides a detailed summary history for every country in the world from the Neolithic era to the present.

This book by a humanist biological scientist is a relatively dispassionate scientific catalogue and analysis of an appalling human reality that the world comprehensively ignores, namely global avoidable mortality. The book represents an encyclopaedic, quantitative resource for students, scholars, journalists and the general public and an unanswerable moral weapon for humanitarian activists in all countries.

People who would particularly benefit from Body Count” include senior high school students, undergraduate and postgraduate university students and scholars. The academic areas that this book relates to include history (general and specific areas), economics (environmental economics, world trade), commerce, management (risk management), business, law (international law), sociology (racism, feminism, conflict), women’s studies, biology (disease, human ecology, biological sustainability), medicine (epidemiology, risk management), journalism, media studies and politics (political science).

This book is designed for ordinary citizens in all walks of life. Thus I have recently given a 16 lecture course based on this book and entitled “Science, History and Avoidable Mortality” to a University of the Third Age (U3A) class of retired citizens from many former occupations – teaching, science, librarianship, secretarial, armed services, medicine, nursing, surgery, management, business and academia.

In addition to the UK and the British Commonwealth there would be a very large potential readership in North America in particular. Thus there is a wonderful, humane North American constituency that is committed to the “equality of man and the unalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” and which is profoundly opposed to war.

Many in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific would find “Body Count” useful. In particular the huge population of educated, English-speaking Indians and Chinese should find utility in a detailed reference book quantitatively exposing the impact of the First World on the non-European world.

This book provides a wealth of quantitative data, thoughtful analysis and radical insights for students, scholars and humanitarian activists who demand humane global change but are enmeshed in a dominant global culture of comprehensive DENIAL. The dominant, prosperous, “politically correct racist” First World societies DENY their intrinsic racism, ignore the global carnage in which they are complicit and demonize their victims.

5. Related books

There are no such books about global avoidable mortality although there are many books dealing with specific conflict areas (e.g. the Iraq War) that constitute only a small part of my book. Thus Richard Hil and Paul Wilson have recently published “Dead Bodies Don’t Count: Civilian Casualties and the Forgotten Costs of the Iraq Conflict” (Zeus Publishing, Australia, 2007). Jared Diamond’s “Guns, Germs and Steel” deals in part with some major mass mortality events covered in parts of my book ( the Black Death and the effects of introduced disease in the Americas, Australasia and the Pacific).

Published books that come closest in subject matter to my book are some excellent books on past genocides [Chalk, F. & Jonassohn, K. (1990), The History and Sociology of Genocide. Analyses and Case Studies (Yale University Press, New Haven); Laqueur, W. (1980), The Terrible Secret. Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s “Final Solution” (Penguin, London, 1982);

Wasserstein, B. (1979), Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1988)], famine [Davis, M. (2001), Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World (Verso, London); Greenough, P.R. (1982), Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: the Famine of 1943-1944 (Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York); Polya, G.M. (1998), Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity, holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability (Polya, Melbourne)] and the historical genesis of genocidal European racism [Lindqvist, S. (1992), Exterminate All the Brutes (Granta Books, London, 2002)] – all matters summarized quantitatively in my book with reference to these and many other works. However NONE of these books even touch on the 1.3 billion post-1950 avoidable mortality holocaust.

Various recent books and articles by humane writers such as John Pilger, Arundhati Roy, Noam Chomsky, Tariq Ali, George Monbiot, Scott Ritter, Edward Said, Paul Roberts, John Perkins, Emmanuel Todd and William Blum reveal much about the dishonesty and violence of post-war US and related imperialism but do not provide comprehensive quantitation of the human cost. My book does not go into the details of violent deaths and political machinations – it is simply largely concerned with the war- and occupation-related avoidable mortality of which violent death can be a relatively small part. My book provides a detailed statistical and historical complement to the works of these other writers.

In writing Chapters 4-7 of this book I would have loved to have been able to refer to a succinct summary of world history from about 2000BC onwards [the best I could find, albeit an account that finished in mid-1952, was Langer, W.L. (1953), An Encyclopaedia of World History (Harrap, London)] and the best such compendium of more recent Third World history finished in about 1990 [Bissio, R.R. (1990), Third World Guide 91/92 (Instituto del Tercer Mondo, Montevideo)].

I am not aware of any other current history book that succinctly summarizes the history of all countries in the world from the Neolithic era to 2005 (as is achieved by Chapters 4-7 of my book). No other book even attempts to deal with post-1950 avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality, let alone in a comprehensive fashion.

6. Brief CV of Dr Gideon Polya

Gideon Polya was born in Melbourne, Australia in 1944 and raised in Hobart, Tasmania. A graduate of the University of Tasmania, he gained a PhD in Biochemistry from Flinders University in Adelaide, South Australia. After postdoctoral research at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, he returned to the Australian National University as a Queen Elizabeth II Fellow and thence took up a position at La Trobe University, Melbourne in 1972. In 2003 he retired from a senior position at La Trobe University but returned in 2007 to deliver a big second year science subject (Biochemistry for Agricultural Science students).

Dr Gideon Polya published some 130 works in a 4 decade scientific career (search Google Advanced Scholar for many of these publications), most recently a huge pharmacological reference text "Biochemical Targets of Plant Bioactive Compounds. A pharmacological reference guide to sites of action and biological effects" (860 pages; 500 pages of tables; 4 indexes; Taylor & Francis/CRC Press, London & New York, 2003). In 1998 he published “Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity, holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability” (Polya, Melbourne).

In recent years, in addition to writing “Body Count”, Dr Polya has written extensively about global avoidable mortality (numerous articles on this and related matters can be found by a simple Google search for "Gideon Polya" and on his websites: http://members.optusnet.com.au/~gpolya/links.html , http://globalavoidablemortality.blogspot.com/ , http://mwcnews.net/content/view/1375/247/ , http://gpolya.newsvine.com/ and http://gideon.sulekha.com/default.htm ).

Gideon Polya is married with 3 children. A keen artist he has published numerous cartoons (including illustrations for a statistics textbook), has painted a thousand paintings (abstract figurative and landscapes) and has drawn thousands of portraits.

Humanitarian Words having evidently failed (16 million people die avoidably each year i.e. 44,000 each day) Gideon Polya recently turned to Painting for Peace, painting HUGE works to spread a message of Peace, Love and respect for Woman and for Mother and Child, including: Sydney Madonna: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10865/26/ , Manhattan Madonna: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10766/26/ , Truelove: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/11031/254/ , Melbourne Madonna: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/13950/26/ , Qana (conceptually related to Pablo Picasso’s 1937 antiwar masterpiece Guernica about the Nazi bombing of the town of the same name): http://mwcnews.net/content/view/9547/26/ , Isfahan Matisse: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14417/26/ , and Alhambra Pollock: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14082/42/ (that is explained by the Acronym PEACE – Pólya, Escher, Alhambra, Cultural Ecumenism). I would be delighted if you would pass on these links on to your friends, colleagues, associates and local media in the interests of Peace, Amity and respect for Woman, Mother and Child.

7 . Inquiries about “Body Count”

Inquiries about “Body Count” can be addressed to G.M. Polya at: gpolya@optusnet.com.au or to 29 Dwyer Street, Macleod, Melbourne, Victoria, 3085, Australia.

By Dr Gideon Polya

Chapter 3
United States v. John M. Poindexter

Navy Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter was appointed as President Reagan's national security adviser on December 4, 1985, succeeding Robert C. McFarlane, whom Poindexter had served under as deputy for two years. Poindexter's White House career ended November 25, 1986, when he was forced to resign in the wake of the public disclosure of the Iran/contra diversion.

Poindexter, Lt. Col. Oliver North and McFarlane were the three individuals Attorney General Edwin Meese III identified on November 25, 1986, as knowledgeable of the diversion. Poindexter's supervision of North and his own participation in the Iran and contra operations were early focuses of Independent Counsel's investigation.

As in the case against North, criminal evidence against Poindexter had to be gathered quickly before he was compelled to testify on Capitol Hill in the summer of 1987 under a grant of limited immunity. Otherwise, the prosecution of Poindexter was likely to be challenged on the grounds that it was derived from or in some way influenced by his immunized congressional testimony.

On March 16, 1988, Poindexter was indicted on seven felony charges arising from his involvement in the Iran/contra affair, as part of a 23-count multi-defendant indictment. He was named with North, retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and Albert Hakim as a member of the conspiracy to defraud the United States Government by effecting the Iran/contra diversion and other acts.

After the cases were severed and two of the original charges dismissed, Poindexter was tried and convicted in April 1990 of five felonies, including: one count of conspiring to obstruct official inquiries and proceedings, two counts of obstructing Congress, and two counts of false statements to Congress.1 U.S. District Judge Harold H. Greene sentenced him to a six-month prison term. In November 1991, Poindexter's convictions were overturned on appeal. In December 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.

1 The Poindexter case was tried by Associate Counsel Dan K. Webb, Christian J. Mixter, Howard M. Pearl, and Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter joined the National Security Council staff in June 1981, following a distinguished naval career that included battleship command and high-ranking Pentagon posts. In October 1983 he became deputy to National Security Adviser McFarlane; among his subordinates was North. During Poindexter's one-year tenure as national security adviser, which began in December 1985, he oversaw the Iran/contra operations in which North was directly involved.

In November 1986, as the secret operations were becoming publicly exposed, Poindexter became the senior Administration official responsible for briefing the President's other top advisers about the Iran arms sales. In a series of White House meetings with other officials and members of Congress throughout the month, he repeatedly laid out a false version of the transactions that distanced President Reagan from the legally questionable 1985 arms shipments made through Israel, particularly the November 1985 HAWK-missile transaction.

Although Poindexter was the spokesman, he was not alone responsible for knowing the facts. Virtually every other senior official, including President Reagan, who heard his version of the arms sales in briefings throughout November 1986 had reason to believe it was wrong. Yet no one, according to contemporaneous notes of those briefings, spoke up to correct Poindexter.

Poindexter along with North and others in November 1986 attempted to shred and alter the paper trail reflecting their Iran/contra activities. Among other things, Poindexter destroyed the only existing signed presidential covert-action Finding that was intended to authorize retroactively CIA involvement in the November 1985 HAWKs shipment.

Poindexter and North were less successful in eradicating the computer-message trail of their Iran/contra activities. Poindexter and North often communicated through a special channel that Poindexter, a computer expert, had set up on the NSC computer system. This channel, known as ``Private Blank Check,'' allowed Poindexter and North to relay messages to each other without their being routed through channels in which others on the NSC staff could screen them.

Between November 22 to 29, 1986, North deleted from his computer file 736 messages, and Poindexter deleted 5,012 messages during the same period.2 Despite these deletions, the White House routinely saved back-up tapes containing all data in the system for two weeks to protect against inadvertent loss. When the Iran/contra affair was exposed in late November 1986, the White House Communications Agency, which manages the NSC computer system, retained the back-up tapes dating from November 15. Investigators, therefore, were able to retrieve copies of all messages that were in the Poindexter-North computer files in mid-November 1986 before most of the deletions occurred. These computer messages became important evidence in both the Poindexter and North trials.

2 Williams, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter admitted to many of his activities before the Select Committees in July 1987 under a grant of testimonial immunity, which prevented his admissions from being used against him in any criminal proceeding. Because President Reagan did not testify in that forum, Poindexter was called to answer the question that dominated the hearings: Did the President know about and approve the diversion of the Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras? Poindexter answered no, ``the buck stops here with me.'' 3 He said he deliberately withheld the information from President Reagan because ``I wanted the President to have some deniability so that he would be protected. . . .'' 4

3 Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 7/15/87, p. 95.

4 Ibid., p. 101.

Facing a criminal trial, Poindexter confronted a different dilemma: It was no longer a question of protecting the President but defending himself against five felony charges. Before Congress, Poindexter's most significant testimony corroborated President Reagan's repeated denials of awareness of the Iran/contra diversion. In the courtroom, Poindexter mounted a higher-authorization defense, attempting to convince the jury that the President had approved his actions, including those that resulted in criminal charges. Instead of taking the stand in his own defense, however, he called President Reagan to testify.

Pre-Trial Proceedings

U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell in June 1988 ordered that the multi-defendant case against Poindexter, North, Secord and Hakim be severed.5 Following severance, Poindexter's case was transferred to Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., and then to Judge Greene, who presided over further proceedings.

5 For a more detailed description of the severance of the multi-defendant case, see North chapter.

All of Poindexter's substantive challenges to the validity of the indictment were dismissed before trial. The remaining important issues concerned: (1) the preservation of the conspiracy charge; (2) the resolution of classified-information disputes; (3) the resolution of issues related to Poindexter's immunized congressional testimony, under the ruling known as Kastigar; and (4) the defendant's successful effort to secure trial testimony from former President Reagan.

Preserving and Narrowing the Conspiracy Charge

Problems with classified information led to the dismissal of the central conspiracy charges before the North trial, and similar problems were expected to arise in the case against Poindexter. On June 20, 1989, Independent Counsel moved to eliminate the original broad conspiracy charges based upon the supply of the contras and the diversion and to substantially narrow the charge of conspiracy to violate other substantive criminal statutes, forbidding false statements and obstruction. After filings and oral argument, the court granted the Government's motion.

The charge was refocused on the illegal act of conspiring with North and Secord to conceal activities from Congress. Independent Counsel argued successfully that this narrowing of the conspiracy charge would minimize the classified-information problems that plagued the North prosecution.

Classified Information Issues

The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) allowed the trial court effectively to resolve issues involving the use of classified documents and testimony in Poindexter. Judge Greene's supervision of the CIPA process and fruitful negotiations between counsel for the Government and Poindexter resolved most disputes with a minimum of delay.

In contrast to North, there was no prolonged or significant litigation concerning the form or scope of Poindexter's CIPA notices to the court to disclose classified information at trial. Between November 27, 1989, and March 13, 1990, Poindexter served 11 such notices, including eight that listed classified documents he wanted to use at trial, two describing possible classified testimony, and one focused solely on information he wanted to elicit at the deposition of President Reagan.

Judge Greene ordered that all differences over classified information be negotiated between the parties before being brought before the court. Judge Greene held six closed CIPA hearings before the trial began and supplemented those with several shorter hearings during trial. Most of his rulings on the relevance and admissibility of classified information, and on the adequacy of substitutions proposed by the Government, were made from the bench.

Taken together, Poindexter's CIPA notices listed approximately 1,200 documents, only a small fraction of which were ultimately introduced at trial. Most classified information was covered by Government stipulations to certain facts and other unclassified substitutions. This allowed the trial to proceed smoothly, without the conflicts that complicated North or the case against former CIA station chief Joseph F. Fernandez, which was dismissed due to classified-information problems.6

6 See Fernandez chapter.

Kastigar Proceedings

Poindexter was compelled under a grant of use immunity to testify in 1987 before the Select Committees investigating Iran/contra. As did the other Iran/contra defendants who gave immunized testimony before Congress, Poindexter moved to dismiss the indictment on the theory that it violated the standards enunciated in Kastigar v. United States,7 arguing that his immunized testimony was used against him in the Grand Jury and at trial. This argument proved unsuccessful on the trial level but ultimately prevailed in the Court of Appeals.

7 406 U.S. 411 (1972).

Before their trials were severed, Poindexter moved jointly with North and Hakim, who also had received immunity to testify before Congress, to have the charges against them dismissed on the ground that the evidence against them was tainted by their immunized testimony. Judge Gesell denied that motion. However, in deference to defense claims that they would use one another's possibly exculpatory immunized testimony, Judge Gesell in June 1988 severed the trials.

Poindexter renewed his Kastigar motion before Judge Greene in August 1989. After briefing and argument,8 the court ordered that two evidentiary hearings be held. At the first, the court heard testimony from Associate Counsel Dan K. Webb and Howard M. Pearl concerning their exposure to Poindexter's immunized testimony before joining the Office of Independent Counsel. Webb and Pearl joined the OIC staff in 1989 and had not, before their appointments, been subject to OIC's procedures to insulate itself from Poindexter's immunized testimony. Judge Greene found their exposure to Poindexter's testimony to be insignificant and allowed both attorneys to participate in the trial.

8 The Poindexter case was tried before the Court of Appeals ruled in North that witness hearings were necessary to permit the trial of an immunized defendant.

The second set of court hearings concerned trial witnesses, whose testimony may have been tainted by Poindexter's immunized testimony. Judge Greene accepted Judge Gesell's earlier review of Grand Jury witnesses and declined to re-examine his findings. He also refused to dismiss the indictment on the basis of potential grand juror exposure to the immunized testimony.

Regarding trial witnesses, the court took extensive measures to ensure that Poindexter's immunized statements were not used against him. The court ordered the Government to make an ex parte submission (later disclosed to Poindexter) of all statements made by potential trial witnesses before Poindexter gave his immunized testimony before Congress in July 1987. The court found that all of the proposed testimony of most of the potential witnesses had been memorialized before Poindexter appeared publicly on July 15, 1987, and therefore was not tainted.

As for those witnesses whose expected trial testimony would not be limited to the evidence OIC had sealed with the court prior to Poindexter's immunized testimony, Judge Greene required additional information. He concluded that the Government had failed to establish that five of its potential witnesses were free of taint and ordered them to appear at a pre-trial hearing. Two of the three witnesses who ultimately appeared at trial credibly affirmed that their anticipated testimony would not be influenced in any way by Poindexter's immunized testimony; the third, North, refused to do so.

North stated at the pre-trial hearing that he was unable, with respect to any subject, to distinguish what he had personally done, observed or experienced from what he had learned from watching Poindexter's immunized testimony.9 As for Poindexter's destruction of the December 1985 presidential covert-action Finding -- important evidence in the obstruction of Congress -- North acknowledged that he had seen Poindexter destroy a piece of paper but insisted that he did not know it was a Finding until Poindexter stated that fact in his immunized testimony before Congress.

9 North Testimony, Poindexter Pre-trial Hearing, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

The court rejected North's pre-trial testimony as not believable. North, the court found, ``appears to have been embarked at that time [at the hearing] upon the calculated course of attempting to assist his former colleague and co-defendant . . . by prevaricating on various issues . . .'' 10

10 Opinion, Poindexter, 3/8/90, p. 9.

In a separate post-trial ruling, the court added that as far as the destruction of the Finding was concerned, North's testimony at his own trial about the event was inconsistent with his claim that he could not remember it independent of Poindexter's immunized testimony. The court found it ``inherently incredible'' that North did not remember ``his participation in an event he witnessed first hand and that was as dramatic, indeed historic, as the tearing up of an extremely rare Presidential Finding.'' 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

The Reagan Subpoena

One of the most notable aspects of the Poindexter case was the defendant's successful attempt to call former President Reagan to testify at his trial by videotaped deposition.

Poindexter first sought presidential and vice presidential notes from OIC as part of his pre-trial discovery requests. In a pre-trial hearing on September 6, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys told the court that presidential notes would reflect that Poindexter informed the President of his denials to Congress in 1986 of NSC activity in support of the contras, and that the notes would ``show what the President was told about what was being done to support the contras in Central America, and the President's consent and ratification and approval of that activity.'' 12 In seeking vice presidential notes, Poindexter's attorneys told the court that ``anytime he [Bush] missed a meeting, Admiral Poindexter briefed him on it afterwards.'' 13

12 Robinson, Poindexter Pre-trial Hearing, 9/6/89, p. 18.

13 Ibid., p. 19.

The court, before making a decision on whether to compel OIC to produce these documents, on September 11, 1989, directed Poindexter to file an ex parte memo explaining precisely how these documents would assist his defense.14 It required from Independent Counsel a legal memorandum concerning its responsibility to produce presidential and vice presidential documents not in OIC's possession.

14 Opinion, Poindexter, 9/11/89, p. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Condamner les criminels condamnés aux Etats-Unis
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
Chapitre 3
Etats-Unis v. John M. Vice

Adm de marine de Poindexter. John M. Poindexter a été nommé en tant que conseiller de sécurité nationale du Président Reagan le 4 décembre 1985, réussissant Robert C. McFarlane, que Poindexter avait servi dessous de député pendant deux années. La carrière de la Maison Blanche de Poindexter a fini le 25 novembre 1986, quand il a été forcé de démissionner à la suite de la révélation publique de l'Iran/contre la déviation.

Poindexter, lieutenant. Colonne Le nord et le McFarlane d'Oliver étaient l'Attorney General Edwin Meese III de trois individus identifié le 25 novembre 1986, comme bien informé de la déviation. La surveillance de Poindexter du nord et sa propre participation en Iran et contre des opérations étaient les centres tôt de la recherche de l'avocat-conseil indépendant.

Comme dans le point de droit contre le nord, l'évidence criminelle contre Poindexter a dû être recueillie rapidement avant qu'il ait été obligé de témoigner sur Capitol Hill en été de 1987 sous une concession d'immunité limitée. Autrement, la poursuite de Poindexter était susceptible d'être défiée parce qu'elle a été dérivée de ou d'une manière quelconque influencée par son témoignage congressionnel immunisé.

Le 16 mars 1988, Poindexter a été accusé sur sept frais de crime résultant de sa participation en Iran/contre l'affaire, en tant qu'élément d'un acte d'accusation de multi-défendeur de 23 comptes. Il a été appelé avec le nord, commandant retiré de l'Armée de l'Air. Générateur. Richard V. Secord et Albert Hakim en tant que membre de la conspiration à frauder le gouvernement des Etats-Unis en effectuant l'Iran/contre la déviation et autre agit.

Après que les cas aient été divisés et deux des frais originaux ont été écartés, Poindexter a été essayé et condamné en avril 1990 de cinq crimes, incluant : un compte de conspiration pour obstruer des enquêtes et des démarches officielles, deux comptes d'obstruer le congrès, et deux comptes de rapports faux à Congress.1 États-Unis Juge Harold H. de zone. Greene l'a condamné à une limite de six mois de prison. En novembre 1991, les convictions de Poindexter ont été retournées sur l'appel. En décembre 1992, les États-Unis Cour suprême refusée pour passer en revue le cas.

1 le cas de Poindexter a été essayé par des avocats-conseils Dan K. d'associé. Webb, chrétien J. Mixter, Howard M. Perle, et Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter a joint le personnel du Conseil de sécurité nationale en juin 1981, suivant une carrière navale distinguée qui a inclus la commande de cuirassé et les poteaux du haut rang du Pentagone. En octobre 1983 il est devenu député au conseiller McFarlane de sécurité nationale ; parmi ses subalternes était du nord. Pendant la tenure d'une année de Poindexter en tant que conseiller de sécurité nationale, qui a commencé en décembre 1985, il a surveillé l'Iran/contre les opérations dans lesquelles le nord a été directement impliqué.

En novembre 1986, pendant que les opérations secrètes devenaient publiquement exposées, Poindexter est allé bien au fonctionnaire aîné d'administration responsable de donner des instructions d'autres conseillers supérieurs du président au sujet des ventes d'armes de l'Iran. Dans une série de réunions de la Maison Blanche avec d'autres fonctionnaires et membres du congrès tout au long du mois, il a à plusieurs reprises présenté une version fausse des transactions qui ont distancé le Président Reagan des 1985 cargaisons des armes légalement incertaines faites par l'Israel, en particulier la transaction de Faucon-missile du novembre 1985.

Bien que Poindexter ait été le porte-parole, il n'était pas seul responsable de savoir les faits. Pratiquement chaque autre haut fonctionnaire, y compris le Président Reagan, qui a entendu que sa version des ventes d'armes dans les briefings tout au long du novembre 1986 a eu la raison de la croire avaient tort. Pourtant personne, selon les notes contemporaines de ces briefings, rai jusqu'à Poindexter correct.

Poindexter avec le nord et d'autres en novembre 1986 essayés pour déchiqueter et changer la traînée de papier reflétant le leur Iran/contre des activités. Entre autres, Poindexter a détruit la seule conclusion présidentielle signée existante de secret-action qui a été prévue pour autoriser rétroactivement la participation de CIA dans l'expédition de fauconx du novembre 1985.

Poindexter et nord étaient moins réussis en supprimant la traînée d'ordinateur-message du leur Iran/contre des activités. Poindexter et nord ont souvent communiqué par un canal spécial que Poindexter, un informaticien, avait établi sur le système informatique de NSC. Ce canal, connu sous le nom de « contrôle blanc privé, » Poindexter permis et nord pour transmettre par relais des messages entre eux sans leur étant conduits par les canaux en lesquels d'autres sur le personnel de NSC pourraient les examiner.

Entre le 22 au 29 novembre 1986, le nord a supprimé de ses messages du fichier électronique 736, et Poindexter a supprimé 5.012 messages pendant le même period.2 en dépit de ces suppressions, les bandes par habitude sauvées de support de la Maison Blanche contenant toutes les données dans le système pendant deux semaines pour se protéger contre la perte négligente. Quand l'Iran/contre l'affaire a été exposé dans le défunt novembre 1986, l'agence de communications de la Maison Blanche, qui contrôle le système informatique de NSC, a maintenu les bandes de secours datant à partir du 15 novembre. Les investigateurs pouvaient, donc, rechercher des copies de tous les messages qui étaient dans les fichiers informatiques de Poindexter-Nord dans le mi novembre 1986 avant que la plupart des suppressions se soient produites. Ces messages d'ordinateur sont devenus évidence importante dans le Poindexter et des épreuves du nord.

2 Williams, témoignage d'essai de Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter admis à plusieurs de ses activités avant que les comités choisis en juillet 1987 sous une concession d'immunité testimoniale, qui a empêché ses admissions d'être employé contre lui dans la démarche criminelle. Puisque le Président Reagan n'a pas témoigné du fait le forum, Poindexter s'est appelé pour répondre à la question qui a dominé les auditions : Le président a-t-il su et est-ce qu'approuver la déviation des ventes d'armes de l'Iran procède aux contras ? Poindexter a répondu au non, « les arrêts de mâle ici avec moi. » 3 qu'il a dits il a délibérément retenu l'information au Président Reagan parce que ``j'ai voulu que le président eût un certain deniability de sorte qu'il soit protégé. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, témoignage choisi de comités, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Faisant face à une épreuve criminelle, Poindexter a confronté un dilemme différent : Ce n'était plus une question de protéger le président mais se défendre contre cinq frais de crime. Devant le congrès, le témoignage le plus significatif de Poindexter démentis répétés du Président Reagan corroboré de la conscience de l'Iran/contre la déviation. Dans l'auditoire de tribunal, Poindexter a monté une défense de haut-autorisation, essayant de convaincre le jury que le président avait approuvé ses actions, y compris ceux qui ont eu comme conséquence les frais criminels. Au lieu de prendre le stand dans sa propre défense, cependant, il a appelé le Président Reagan pour témoigner.

Démarches Pre-Trial

États-Unis Juge Gerhard A. de zone. Gesell a en juin 1988 commandé que la caisse de multi-défendeur contre Poindexter, nord, Secord et Hakim soit severed.5 après séparation, le cas de Poindexter a été transféré au juge en chef Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., et juger alors Greene, qui a présidé démarches d'excédent d'autres.

5 pour une description plus détaillée de la séparation de la caisse de multi-défendeur, voir le chapitre du nord.

Tous les défis substantifs de Poindexter à la validité de l'acte d'accusation ont été écartés avant épreuve. Les questions importantes restantes sont concernées : (1) la conservation de la charge de conspiration ; (2) la résolution des conflits de la classifier-information ; (3) la résolution des questions liées au témoignage congressionnel immunisé de Poindexter, selon régner connu sous le nom de Kastigar ; et (4) l'effort réussi du défendeur de fixer le témoignage d'essai de l'ancien Président Reagan.

La préservation et le rétrécissement des problèmes de charge

de conspiration avec des informations secrètes ont mené au renvoi des frais centraux de conspiration avant l'épreuve du nord, et on s'est attendu à ce que des problèmes semblables surgissent dans le point de droit contre Poindexter. Le 20 juin 1989, les avocats-conseils indépendants se sont déplacés pour éliminer les larges frais originaux de conspiration basés sur l'approvisionnement en contras et déviation et pour rétrécir sensiblement la charge de la conspiration pour violer les autres statuts criminels substantifs, rapports faux menaçants et obstruction. Après des classements et argument oral, la cour a accordé le mouvement du gouvernement.

La charge a été refocalisée sur l'acte illégal de la conspiration avec le nord et le Secord pour cacher des activités du congrès. Les avocats-conseils indépendants ont argué du fait avec succès que ce rétrécissement de la charge de conspiration réduirait au minimum les problèmes de la classifier-information qui ont infesté la poursuite du nord.

Les questions classifiées de l'information que

les procédures classifiées de l'information agissent (CIPA) ont permis à la cour d'essai efficacement de résoudre des questions comportant l'utilisation des documents et du témoignage classifiés dans Poindexter. Jugez la surveillance de Greene du processus de CIPA et les négociations fructueuses entre les avocats-conseils pour le gouvernement et le Poindexter résolus la plupart des conflits avec un minimum de retardent.

Contrairement au nord, il n'y avait aucune prolongée ou le litige significatif au sujet de la forme ou de la portée des notifications du CIPA de Poindexter à la cour de révéler a classifié l'information à l'épreuve. Entre les 27 novembre 1989 et 13 mars 1990, Poindexter a servi 11 telles notifications, y compris le témoignage huit que les documents classifiés énumérés il ont voulu employer à l'épreuve, deux classifié possible décrivant, et une concentrée seulement sur l'information qu'il a voulu obtenir au dépôt du Président Reagan.

Jugez Greene a commandé que toutes les différences que l'excédent a classifié l'information soient négociées entre les parties avant d'être apporté devant la cour. Jugez Greene a tenu six auditions clôturées de CIPA avant l'épreuve a commencé et a complété ceux avec plusieurs auditions plus courtes pendant l'épreuve. La plupart de ses actes sur la pertinence et l'admissibilité d'informations secrètes, et sur l'adéquation des substitutions proposées par le gouvernement, ont été faites à partir du mettre hors jeu.

Prises ensemble, les notices du CIPA de Poindexter ont énuméré approximativement 1.200 documents, seulement une petite fraction dont ont été finalement présentés à l'épreuve. La plupart des informations secrètes ont été couvertes par des conditions de Government à certains faits et à d'autres substitutions non classifiées. Ceci a permis à l'épreuve de procéder sans à-coup, sans conflits qui ont compliqué le nord ou le point de droit contre l'ancienne station Joseph en chef F. de CIA. Fernandez, qui était dû écarté à la classifier-information problems.6

6 voient le chapitre de Fernandez.

Des démarches Poindexter

de Kastigar ont été obligées sous une concession d'immunité d'utilisation de témoigner en 1987 devant les comités choisis étudiant l'Iran/contre. De même que l'autre Iran/contre les défendeurs qui ont donné le témoignage immunisé devant le congrès, Poindexter déplacé pour écarter l'acte d'accusation sur la théorie qu'elle a violé les normes déclarées dans Kastigar v. Les Etats-Unis, 7 arguant du fait que son témoignage immunisé a été employé contre lui dans le jury grand et à l'épreuve. Cet argument a prouvé non réussi au niveau d'essai mais a finalement régné dans la cour des appels.

les 7 406 États-Unis 411 (1972).

Avant que leurs épreuves aient été divisées, Poindexter s'est déplacé en commun avec le nord et Hakim, qui également avait reçu l'immunité pour témoigner devant le congrès, pour avoir les frais contre eux a écarté pour la raison que l'évidence contre eux a été corrompue par leur témoignage immunisé. Le juge Gesell a nié ce mouvement. Cependant, par la déférence pour la défense réclame qu'ils emploieraient probablement le témoignage immunisé justificatif de chacun, juge que Gesell ont en juin 1988 divisé les épreuves.

Poindexter a remplacé son mouvement de Kastigar avant juge Greene en août 1989. Après le briefing et l'argument, 8 la cour ont commandé que deux auditions probatoires soient tenues. Au premier, la cour a entendu le témoignage des avocats-conseils Dan K. d'associé. Webb et Howard M. Perlez au sujet de leur exposition au témoignage immunisé de Poindexter avant de joindre l'Office des avocats-conseils indépendants. Webb et perle ont joint le personnel d'OIC en 1989 et ne l'ont pas eu, avant leurs rendez-vous, été sujet aux procédures d'OIC pour s'isoler du témoignage immunisé de Poindexter. Jugez Greene a trouvé leur exposition au témoignage de Poindexter pour être insignifiant et a permis aux deux mandataires de participer à l'épreuve.

8 le cas de Poindexter ont été essayés devant la cour des appels régnés dans le nord que les auditions de témoin étaient nécessaires pour permettre l'épreuve d'un défendeur immunisé.

Le deuxième ensemble d'auditions de cour est concerné les témoins d'essai, dont le témoignage a pu avoir été corrompu par le témoignage immunisé de Poindexter's. Un examen plus tôt de Gesell de juge admis par Greene de juge des témoins de fortune grands et refusé pour examiner de nouveau ses résultats. Il a également refusé d'écarter l'acte d'accusation sur la base de l'exposition grande potentielle de juré au témoignage immunisé.

Concernant les témoins d'essai, la cour a pris des mesures étendues de s'assurer que les rapports immunisés de Poindexter n'ont pas été employés contre lui. La cour a commandé le gouvernement pour faire une soumission ex de parte (plus tard révélée à Poindexter) de tous les rapports faits par les témoins d'essai potentiels avant que Poindexter ait donné son témoignage immunisé devant le congrès en juillet 1987. La cour a constaté que tout les témoignage proposé de la plupart des témoins potentiels avait été memorialized avant que Poindexter soit apparu publiquement le 15 juillet 1987, et donc n'a pas été corrompu.

Quant à ces témoins dont ont prévu que le témoignage d'essai ne serait pas limité à l'évidence OIC avait scellé avec la cour avant le témoignage immunisé de Poindexter, l'information additionnelle requise par Greene de juge. Il a conclu que le gouvernement n'avait pas établi que cinq de ses témoins potentiels étaient exempts de traces et leur avait passé commande à apparaître à une audition pre-trial. Deux des trois témoins qui finalement sont apparus à l'épreuve credibly ont affirmé que leur témoignage prévu ne serait pas influencé de quelque façon par le témoignage immunisé de Poindexter's ; le troisième, nord, refusé pour faire ainsi.

Nord indiqué à l'audition pre-trial qu'il ne pouvait pas, en ce qui concerne n'importe quel sujet, distinguer ce qu'il avait personnellement fait, observé ou éprouvé de ce qu'il avait appris d'observer le testimony.9 immunisé de Poindexter quant à la destruction de Poindexter de la conclusion présidentielle de secret-action du décembre 1985 -- évidence importante dans l'obstruction du congrès -- Le nord a reconnu qu'il avait vu Poindexter détruire un morceau de papier mais insistée sur le fait qu'il n'a pas su lui était une conclusion jusqu'à ce que Poindexter ait déclaré ce fait dans son témoignage immunisé devant le congrès.

9 témoignage du nord, audition Pre-trial de Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

La cour a rejeté le témoignage pre-trial du nord comme non crédible. Le nord, la cour trouvée, ``semble avoir été embarqué à ce moment-là [à l'audition] sur le cours calculé d'essayer d'aider son anciens collègue et Co-défendeur. . . par la tergiversation sur de diverses questions. . . opinion 10

, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. du '' 10. 9.

Dans une poteau-épreuve séparée régnant, la cour a ajouté qu'en ce qui concerne la destruction de la conclusion, le témoignage du nord à sa propre épreuve au sujet de l'événement était contradictoire avec sa réclamation qu'il ne pourrait pas se rappeler l'indépendant du témoignage immunisé de Poindexter. La cour l'a trouvé « en soi incroyable » que le nord ne s'est pas rappelé « sa participation à un événement qu'il était témoin de première main et cela était comme dramatique, en effet historique, en tant que déchirer d'une conclusion présidentielle extrêmement rare. » 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

La citation une

de Reagan des aspects les plus notables du cas de Poindexter était la tentative réussie du défendeur d'appeler l'ancien Président Reagan pour témoigner à son épreuve par le dépôt enregistré en vidéo.

Notes présidentielles présidentielles de Poindexter et vice d'abord cherchées d'OIC en tant qu'élément de ses demandes de découverte pre-trial. Dans une audition pre-trial le 6 septembre 1989, les mandataires de Poindexter ont dit à la cour que les notes présidentielles refléteraient ce Poindexter ont informé le président de ses démentis au congrès dans 1986 de l'activité de NSC à l'appui des contras, et que les notes « montreraient ce que le président a été informé sur ce qu'était fait pour soutenir les contras en Amérique Centrale, et le consentement du président et la ratification et l'approbation de cette activité. » 12 en cherchant les notes présidentielles vice, les mandataires de Poindexter ont dit la cour que « n'importe quand il [Bush] a manqué une réunion, amiral Poindexter l'ai donné des instructions là-dessus après. » 13

12 Robinson, audition Pre-trial de Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

La cour, avant de prendre une décision dessus si contraindre OIC pour produire ces documents, le 11 septembre 1989, a dirigé Poindexter pour classer une note ex de parte expliquant avec précision comment ces documents aideraient son defense.14 qu'elle a exigé des avocats-conseils indépendants un mémorandum légal au sujet de sa responsabilité de produire les documents présidentiels présidentiels et vice pas en possession d'OIC.

14 opinion, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Condenar criminales condenados en los Estados Unidos
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
Capítulo 3
Estados Unidos v. Juan M. Vicio

Adm de la marina de guerra de Poindexter. Juan M. Poindexter fue designado como consejero de la seguridad nacional de presidente Reagan el 4 de diciembre de 1985, teniendo éxito a Roberto C. McFarlane, que Poindexter había servido debajo como diputado por dos años. La carrera blanca de la casa de Poindexter terminó el 25 de noviembre de 1986, cuando lo forzaron dimitir como consecuencia del acceso público del Irán/contra la diversión.

Poindexter, teniente. Columna El norte y McFarlane de Oliver eran el Procurador General de la República Edwin Meese III de tres individuos identificado el 25 de noviembre de 1986, como bien informado de la diversión. La supervisión de Poindexter del norte y su propia participación en el Irán y contra operaciones eran focos tempranos de la investigación independiente del consejo.

Como en el caso en contra de la evidencia del norte, criminal contra Poindexter tuvo que ser recolectado rápidamente antes de que a le obligaran que atestiguara en Capitol Hill en el verano de 1987 bajo concesión de la inmunidad limitada. Si no, el procesamiento de Poindexter era probable ser desafiado considerando que fue derivado de o de cierta manera influenciado por su testimonio del congreso inmunizado.

El 16 de marzo de 1988, Poindexter fue procesado en siete cargas del crimen que se presentaban de su implicación en el Irán/contra asunto, como parte de una acusación del multi-demandado de 23 cuentas. Lo nombraron con el norte, comandante jubilado de la fuerza aérea. Generador. Richard V. Secord y Albert Hakim como miembro de la conspiración a defraudar el gobierno de Estados Unidos efectuando el Irán/contra la diversión y otra actúa.

Después de que los casos fueran separados y dos de las cargas originales fueron despedidos, Poindexter fue intentado y condenado en abril de 1990 por cinco crímenes, incluyendo: una cuenta de conspiración obstruir investigaciones y procedimientos oficiales, dos cuentas de obstruir a congreso, y dos cuentas de declaraciones falsas a Congress.1 los E.E.U.U. Juez Harold H. del districto. Greene lo condenó a un término de seis meses de la prisión. En noviembre de 1991, las convicciones de Poindexter fueron volcadas en súplica. En diciembre de 1992, los E.E.U.U. Tribunal Supremo declinado para repasar el caso.

1 el caso de Poindexter fue intentado por los consejos Dan K. del asociado. Webb, cristiano J. Mixter, Howard M. Perla, y Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter ensambló a personal del consejo de la seguridad nacional en junio de 1981, siguiendo una carrera naval distinguida que incluyó los postes del pentágono del comando y de la alto-graduación del acorazado. En octubre de 1983 él hizo diputado al consejero McFarlane de la seguridad nacional; entre sus subordinados era del norte. Durante el arrendamiento anual de Poindexter como consejero de la seguridad nacional, que comenzó en diciembre de 1985, él supervisó el Irán/contra las operaciones en las cuales el norte estuvo implicado directamente.

En noviembre de 1986, como las operaciones secretas se exponían público, Poindexter sintió bien al funcionario mayor de la administración responsable de resumir a otros consejeros superiores del presidente sobre las ventas de armas de Irán. En una serie de las reuniones blancas de la casa con otros funcionarios y miembros del congreso a través del mes, él presentó en varias ocasiones a una versión falsa de las transacciones que distanciaron a presidente Reagan de los 1985 envíos de brazos legalmente cuestionables hechos a través de Israel, particularmente la transacción del Halcón-misil del noviembre de 1985.

Aunque Poindexter era el portavoz, él no era responsable solo de saber los hechos. Virtualmente cada otro alto funcionario, incluyendo presidente Reagan, que oyó que su versión de las ventas de armas en informes a través del noviembre de 1986 tenía razón de creerla eran incorrectos. Con todo nadie, según las notas contemporáneas de esos informes, rayo hasta Poindexter correcto.

Poindexter junto con el norte y otros procurados en noviembre de 1986 para destrozar y para alterar el rastro de papel que refleja su Irán/contra actividades. Entre otras cosas, Poindexter destruyó único encontrar presidencial firmado existente de la secreto-acción que fue pensado para autorizar retroactivo la implicación de la Cia en el envío de los halcones del noviembre de 1985.

Poindexter y el norte eran menos acertados en la supresión del rastro del computadora-mensaje de su Irán/contra actividades. Poindexter y el norte se comunicaron a menudo a través de un canal especial que Poindexter, especialista en computadoras, había instalado en el sistema informático de NSC. Este canal, conocido como el “cheque en blanco privado,” Poindexter permitido y norte para retransmitir mensajes el uno al otro sin su siendo encaminado a través de los canales en los cuales otros en el personal de NSC podrían defenderlos.

Entre del 22 al 29 de noviembre de 1986, el norte suprimido de sus mensajes del fichero electrónico 736, y Poindexter suprimió 5.012 mensajes durante el mismo period.2 a pesar de estas canceladuras, el respaldo rutinariamente ahorrado blanco de la casa graba contener todos los datos en el sistema por dos semanas para proteger contra pérdida inadvertida. Cuando el Irán/contra asunto fue expuesto en el último noviembre de 1986, la agencia blanca de las comunicaciones de la casa, que maneja el sistema informático de NSC, conservó las cintas de reserva que fechaban a partir del 15 de noviembre. Los investigadores, por lo tanto, podían recuperar las copias de todos los mensajes que estaban en los ficheros informáticos del Poindexter-Norte en el noviembre de 1986 mediados de antes de que la mayor parte de ocurrieran las canceladuras. Estos mensajes de la computadora se convirtieron en evidencia importante en el Poindexter y los ensayos del norte.

2 Williams, testimonio de ensayo de Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter admitido a muchas de sus actividades antes de que los comités selectos en julio de 1987 bajo concesión de la inmunidad testimonial, que evitó que sus admisiones fueran utilizadas contra él en el procedimiento criminal. Porque presidente Reagan no atestiguó en que el foro, Poindexter fue llamado para contestar a la pregunta que dominó las audiencias: ¿El presidente sabía alrededor y aprobar la diversión de las ventas de armas de Irán procede a los contras? Poindexter contestó a no, “las paradas del buck aquí con mí.” 3 que él dijo él retuvo deliberadamente la información de presidente Reagan porque ``quisiera que el presidente tuviera algún deniability de modo que lo protegieran. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, testimonio selecto de los comités, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Haciendo frente a un proceso penal, Poindexter enfrentó un diverso dilema: Era no más una cuestión de proteger al presidente pero de defenderse contra cinco cargas del crimen. Antes de congreso, el testimonio más significativo de Poindexter negaciones repetidas de presidente Reagan corroborado del conocimiento del Irán/contra la diversión. En la sala de tribunal, Poindexter montó una defensa de la alto-autorización, procurando convencer al jurado que el presidente hubiera aprobado sus acciones, incluyendo los que dieron lugar a cargas criminales. En vez de tomar el soporte en su propia defensa, sin embargo, él llamó a presidente Reagan para atestiguar.

Procedimientos Pre-Trial

los E.E.U.U. Juez Gerhard A. del districto. Gesell pidió en junio de 1988 que la caja del multi-demandado contra Poindexter, norte, Secord y Hakim sea severed.5 después de la separación, el caso de Poindexter fue transferido al principal juez Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., y entonces juzgar a Greene, que presidió otros procedimientos del excedente.

5 para una descripción más detallada de la separación de la caja del multi-demandado, vea el capítulo del norte.

Todos los desafíos substantivos de Poindexter a la validez de la acusación fueron despedidos antes de ensayo. Las ediciones importantes restantes trataron: (1) la preservación de la carga de la conspiración; (2) la resolución de la clasificar-información disputa; (3) la resolución de las ediciones relacionadas con el testimonio del congreso inmunizado de Poindexter, bajo decisión conocida como Kastigar; y (4) el esfuerzo acertado del demandado de asegurar el testimonio de ensayo de presidente anterior Reagan.

Preservar y enangostar los problemas de la carga

de la conspiración con la información clasificada condujeron al despido de las cargas centrales de la conspiración antes del ensayo del norte, y se esperaba que los problemas similares se presentaran en el caso en contra de Poindexter. El 20 de junio de 1989, los consejos independientes se movieron para eliminar las amplias cargas originales de la conspiración basadas sobre la fuente de los contras y de la diversión y para enangostar substancialmente la carga de conspiración para violar los otros estatutos criminales substantivos, declaraciones falsas de prohibición y obstrucción. Después de limaduras y de la discusión oral, la corte concedió el movimiento del gobierno.

La carga era refocused en el acto ilegal de la conspiración con el norte y Secord encubrir actividades del congreso. Los consejos independientes discutieron con éxito que el este enangostar de la carga de la conspiración redujera al mínimo los problemas de la clasificar-información que plagaron el procesamiento del norte.

La información clasificada publica

los procedimientos clasificados de la información actúa (CIPA) permitió que la corte de ensayo con eficacia resolviera las ediciones que implican el uso de documentos y del testimonio clasificados en Poindexter. Juzgue la supervisión de Greene del proceso de CIPA y las negociaciones fructuosas entre los consejos para el gobierno y Poindexter resueltos la mayoría de los conflictos con un mínimo de retrasan.

En contraste con el norte, no había haber prolongado o el pleito significativo referente la forma o al alcance de los avisos de CIPA de Poindexter a la corte de divulgar clasificó la información en el ensayo. Entre el 27 de noviembre de 1989 y 13 de marzo de 1990, Poindexter sirvió 11 tales avisos, incluyendo el testimonio clasificado posible que describía ocho que los documentos clasificados mencionados él desearon utilizar en el ensayo, dos, y uno centrado solamente en la información que él deseó sacar en la deposición de presidente Reagan.

Juzgue a Greene pidió que todas las diferencias que el excedente clasificó la información estén negociadas entre los partidos antes de ser traído antes de la corte. Juzgue a Greene llevó a cabo seis audiencias cerradas de CIPA antes del ensayo comenzó y suplió ésos con varias audiencias más cortas durante ensayo. La mayor parte de sus actos en la importancia y la admisibilidad de la información clasificada, y en la suficiencia de las substituciones propuestas por el gobierno, fueron hechos del banco.

Tomados juntos, los avisos de CIPA de Poindexter enumeraron aproximadamente 1.200 documentos, sólo una fracción pequeña de los cuales fue introducida en última instancia en el ensayo. La mayoría de la información clasificada fue cubierta por las estipulaciones de Government a ciertos hechos y a otras substituciones sin clasificar. Esto permitió que el ensayo procediera suavemente, sin los conflictos que complicaron el norte o el caso en contra de la estación anterior principal José F. de la Cia. Fernandez, que era despedido debido a la clasificar-información problems.6

6 ve el capítulo de Fernandez.

Se obligó a los procedimientos

Poindexter de Kastigar bajo concesión de la inmunidad del uso que atestiguaran en 1987 ante los comités selectos que investigaban Irán/contra. Al igual que el otro Irán/contra los demandados que dieron testimonio inmunizado antes de congreso, Poindexter movido para despedir la acusación en la teoría que violó los estándares declarados en Kastigar v. Estados Unidos, 7 que discuten que su testimonio inmunizado fuera utilizado contra él en el jurado magnífico y en el ensayo. Esta discusión probó fracasado en el nivel de ensayo pero prevaleció en última instancia en el tribunal de apelación.

los 7 406 E.E.U.U. 411 (1972).

Antes de que sus ensayos fueran separados, Poindexter se movió en común con el norte y Hakim, que también había recibido inmunidad para atestiguar antes de congreso, para tener las cargas contra ellos despidió en la tierra que la evidencia contra ellos fue corrompida por su testimonio inmunizado. El juez Gesell negó ese movimiento. Sin embargo, en respeto a la defensa demanda que utilizarían uno - posiblemente el testimonio inmunizado justificativo de otra persona, juez Gesell separó en junio de 1988 los ensayos.

Poindexter renovó su movimiento de Kastigar antes del juez Greene en agosto de 1989. Después del informe y de la discusión, 8 la corte pidieron que dos audiencias evidentiary estén llevadas a cabo. En el primer, la corte oyó testimonio de los consejos Dan K. del asociado. Webb y Howard M. Aljofare referente a su exposición al testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter antes de ensamblar la oficina de consejos independientes. Webb y la perla ensamblaron a personal de OIC en 1989 y no lo tenían, antes de sus citas, sido conforme a los procedimientos de OIC aislarse del testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter. Juzgue a Greene encontró su exposición al testimonio de Poindexter para ser insignificante y permitió que ambos abogados participaran en el ensayo.

8 el caso de Poindexter fueron intentados antes del tribunal de apelación gobernada en el norte que las audiencias del testigo eran necesarias permitir el ensayo de un demandado inmunizado.

El segundo sistema de audiencias de corte se refirió a los testigos de ensayo, que testimonio se pudo haber corrompido por el testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter. El juez Greene aceptó la revisión anterior de Gesell del juez de testigos del jurado magníficos y declinó reexaminar sus resultados. Él también rechazó despedir la acusación en base de la exposición magnífica potencial del miembro del jurado al testimonio inmunizado.

Con respecto a los testigos de ensayo, la corte tomó medidas extensas de asegurarse de que las declaraciones inmunizadas de Poindexter no fueron utilizadas contra él. La corte pidió el gobierno para hacer una sumisión ex del parte (divulgada más adelante a Poindexter) de todas las declaraciones hechas por los testigos de ensayo potenciales antes de que Poindexter diera su testimonio inmunizado antes de congreso en julio de 1987. La corte encontró que todo el testimonio propuesto la mayor parte de de los testigos potenciales había estado memorialized antes de que apareciera Poindexter público el 15 de julio de 1987, y por lo tanto no fue corrompido.

En cuanto a esos testigos que esperaron que el testimonio de ensayo no fuera limitado a la evidencia OIC había sellado con la corte antes del testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter, información adicional requerida Greene del juez. Él concluyó que el gobierno no había podido establecer que cinco de sus testigos potenciales estaban libres de la corrupción y les había ordenado a aparecer en una audiencia pre-trial. Dos de los tres testigos que aparecieron en última instancia en el ensayo credibly afirmaron que su testimonio anticipado no sería influenciado de ninguna manera por el testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter; el tercer, del norte, rechazado hacer tan.

Norte indicado en la audiencia pre-trial que él no podía, con respecto a cualquier tema, distinguir lo que él había hecho personalmente, observado o experimentado de lo que él había aprendido de mirar testimony.9 inmunizado de Poindexter en cuanto a la destrucción de Poindexter de encontrar presidencial de la secreto-acción del diciembre de 1985 -- evidencia importante en la obstrucción del congreso -- El norte reconoció que él había visto Poindexter destruir un pedazo de papel pero insistido que él no sabía le era el encontrar hasta que Poindexter indicó ese hecho en su testimonio inmunizado antes de congreso.

9 testimonio del norte, audiencia Pre-trial de Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

La corte rechazó el testimonio pre-trial del norte como no believable. Del norte, la corte encontrada, ``aparece haber sido emprendida en aquel momento [en la audiencia] el curso calculado de procurar asistir a su colega y co-demandado anteriores. . . tergiversando en varias ediciones. . . opinión 10

, Poindexter del '' 10, 3/8/90, P. 9.

En un poste-ensayo separado que gobernaba, la corte agregó que por lo que la destrucción de encontrar, el testimonio del norte en su propio ensayo sobre el acontecimiento era contrario con su demanda que él no podría recordarla independiente del testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter. La corte lo encontró “intrínsecamente increíble” que el norte no recordó “su participación en un acontecimiento que él atestiguó de primera mano y eso estaba como dramático, de hecho histórico, como el rasgado para arriba de encontrar presidencial extremadamente raro.” 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

La citación una

de Reagan de los aspectos más notables del caso de Poindexter era la tentativa acertada del demandado de llamar a presidente anterior Reagan para atestiguar en su ensayo por la deposición grabada.

Notas presidenciales presidenciales de Poindexter y vice primero buscadas de OIC como parte de sus peticiones del descubrimiento pre-trial. En una audiencia pre-trial el 6 de septiembre de 1989, los abogados de Poindexter dijeron a corte que las notas presidenciales reflejaran ese Poindexter informaran al presidente sus negaciones al congreso en 1986 de la actividad de NSC en apoyo de los contras, y que las notas “demostrarían lo que hablaron el presidente de lo que era hecho para apoyar los contras en America Central, y el consentimiento del presidente y la ratificación y la aprobación de esa actividad.” 12 en buscar vice notas presidenciales, los abogados de Poindexter dijeron la corte que “en caulquier momento él [Bush] faltó una reunión, almirante Poindexter lo resumieron en ella luego.” 13

12 Robinson, audiencia Pre-trial de Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

La corte, antes de tomar una decisión encendido si obligar a OIC que elabore estos documentos, el 11 de septiembre de 1989, ordenó Poindexter para archivar una nota ex del parte que explicaba exacto cómo estos documentos asistirían a su defense.14 que requirió de consejos independientes un memorándum legal referente a su responsabilidad de elaborar documentos presidenciales presidenciales y vice no en la posesión de OIC.

14 opinión, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Sentenziare i felons condannati negli Stati Uniti
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
Capitolo 3
Stati Uniti v. John M. Vizio

Adm del blu marino di Poindexter. John M. Poindexter è stato nominato come consigliere di sicurezza nazionale del presidente Reagan il 4 dicembre 1985, riuscendo Robert C. McFarlane, quale Poindexter aveva servito sotto da delegato per due anni. La carriera della Casa Bianca del Poindexter si è conclusa il 25 novembre 1986, quando è stato costretto a dimettersi come conseguenza della rilevazione pubblica dell'Iran/contra la diversione.

Poindexter, tenente. Colonna Il nord e McFarlane del Oliver erano il Attorney General Edwin Meese III dei tre individui identificato il 25 novembre 1986, come informato della diversione. Il controllo del Poindexter del nord e la sua propria partecipazione nell'Iran e contra i funzionamenti erano fuochi in anticipo di ricerca del consulente legale indipendente.

Come nell'argomento contro prova del nord e criminale contro Poindexter ha dovuto essere riunitoe rapidamente prima che fosse costretto a testimoniare su Capitol Hill di estate di 1987 sotto una concessione di immunità limitata. Altrimenti, il processo di Poindexter era probabile essere sfidato considerando che è stato derivato da o in qualche modo è stato influenzato dalla sua testimonianza congressuale immunizzata.

Il 16 marzo 1988, Poindexter è stato incriminato su sette spese di crimine in seguito alla sua partecipazione nell'Iran/contra l'affare, come componente di un atto d'accusa del multi-difensore di 23 conteggi. È stato chiamato con il nord, maggiore pensionato dell'aeronautica. Generatore. Richard V. Secord ed Albert Hakim come membro della cospirazione da defraudare il governo degli Stati Uniti effettuando l'Iran/contra la diversione ed altra si comporta.

Dopo che i casi si dividano e due delle spese originali siano allontanati, Poindexter è stato provato e condannato stato nell'aprile 1990 di cinque crimini, includendo: un conteggio di cospirazione ostruire le inchieste ed atti ufficiali, due conteggi di ostruzione del congresso e due conteggi delle dichiarazione false a Congress.1 Stati Uniti Giudice Harold H. del distretto. Greene lo ha sentenziato ad un termine di sei mesi della prigione. Nel novembre 1991, le convinzioni del Poindexter sono state capovolte su appello. Nel dicembre 1992, gli Stati Uniti Corte suprema rifiutata per rivedere il caso.

1 il caso di Poindexter è stato provato dai consulenti legali Dan K. del socio. Webb, cristiano J. Mixter, Howard M. Perla e Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter ha unito il personale del Consiglio di sicurezza nazionale nel giugno 1981, seguendo una carriera navale distinta che ha incluso gli alberini di pentagono di ordine e di alto-posto del battleship. Nell'ottobre 1983 è diventato delegato al consigliere McFarlane di sicurezza nazionale; fra i suoi subalterni era del nord. Durante il possesso di un anno del Poindexter come consigliere di sicurezza nazionale, che ha cominciato nel dicembre 1985, ha sorvegliato l'Iran/contra i funzionamenti in cui il nord direttamente è stato coinvolto.

Nel novembre 1986, mentre i funzionamenti segreti stavano essendo esposti pubblicamente, Poindexter ha stato bene al funzionario maggiore della gestione responsabile dell'impartire le direttive ad altri consiglieri più importanti del presidente circa le vendite di armi dell'Iran. in serie di riunioni della Casa Bianca con altri funzionari e membri del congresso durante il mese, ha presentato ripetutamente una versione falsa delle transazioni che distanced il presidente Reagan dalle 1985 spedizioni legalmente discutibili di armi fatte attraverso l'Israele, specialmente la transazione del HAWK-missile del novembre 1985.

Anche se Poindexter era il portavoce, non era responsabile solo del conoscere i fatti. Virtualmente ogni altro funzionario, compreso il presidente Reagan, che si è sentito che la sua versione delle vendite di armi nelle istruzioni durante il novembre 1986 ha pensata esso erano errati. Tuttavia nessuno, secondo le note contemporanee di quelle istruzioni, spoke fino a Poindexter corretto.

Poindexter con il nord ed altri nel novembre 1986 tentati per tagliuzzare ed alterare la traccia di carta che riflette il loro Iran/contra le attività. Tra l'altro, Poindexter ha distrutto l'unica individuazione presidenziale firmata esistente di segreto-azione che è stata intesa per autorizzare con effetto retroattivo la partecipazione di CIA alla spedizione dei HAWKs del novembre 1985.

Poindexter ed il nord riuscivano meno in lo sradicamento della traccia del calcolatore-messaggio del loro Iran/contra le attività. Poindexter ed il nord hanno comunicato spesso attraverso una scanalatura speciale che Poindexter, uno specialista in materia di computer, aveva installato sul sistema di elaborazione di NSC. Questa scanalatura, conosciuta come “il controllo in bianco riservato,„ ha permesso che Poindexter ed il nord trasmettessero l'un l'altro i messaggi senza il loro che è diretto attraverso le scanalature in cui altre sul personale di NSC potrebbero selezionarle.

Fra dal 22 al 29 novembre 1986, il nord ha cancellato dai suoi messaggi dell'archivio elettronico 736 e Poindexter ha cancellato 5.012 messaggi durante lo stesso period.2 malgrado queste omissioni, i nastri ordinariamente conservati di sostegno della Casa Bianca che contengono tutti i dati nel sistema affinchè due settimane proteggesse da perdita eventuale. Quando l'Iran/contra l'affare è stato esposto nel novembre 1986 tardo, l'agenzia di comunicazioni della Casa Bianca, che controlla il sistema di elaborazione di NSC, ha mantenuto i nastri di sostegno che datano dal 15 novembre. I ricercatori, quindi, potevano richiamare le copie di tutti i messaggi che erano negli archivi informatici di Poindexter-Nord nel metà di novembre 1986 prima che la maggior parte delle omissioni accadessero. Questi messaggi del calcolatore si sono trasformati in in prova importante sia nel Poindexter che nelle prove del nord.

2 Williams, testimonianza di prova di Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter ammesso a molte delle sue attività prima che i comitati ristretti nel luglio 1987 sotto una concessione di immunità testimonial, che ha impedito le sue ammissioni usando contro di lui nel procedimento affatto criminale. Poiché il presidente Reagan non ha testimoniato in quanto la tribuna, Poindexter è stata denominata per rispondere alla domanda che ha dominato le udienze: Il presidente ha saputo circa ed approvare la diversione le vendite di armi dell'Iran continua ai contras? Poindexter ha risposto a no, “gli arresti del buck qui con me.„ 3 ha detto che ha ritenuto deliberatamente le informazioni dal presidente Reagan perché ``ho desiderato il presidente avere certo deniability in modo che sia protetto. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, testimonianza prescelta dei comitati, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Di fronte ad una prova criminale, Poindexter ha confrontato un dilemma differente: Non era più una questione di protezione del presidente ma difendersi contro cinque spese di crimine. Prima del congresso, testimonianza più significativa del Poindexter smentite ripetute del presidente Reagan confermato di consapevolezza dell'Iran/contra la diversione. Nell'aula di tribunale, Poindexter ha montato una difesa di alto-autorizzazione, tentante di convincere la giuria che il presidente aveva approvato le sue azioni, compreso quelle che hanno provocato le spese criminali. Invece di testimoniare nella sua propria difesa, tuttavia, ha denominato il presidente Reagan per testimoniare.

Atti Pre-Trial

Stati Uniti Giudice Gerhard A. del distretto. Gesell nel giugno 1988 ha ordinato che la cassa del multi-difensore contro Poindexter, nord, Secord e Hakim è severed.5 dopo la separazione, caso del Poindexter è stato trasferito al giudice principale Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. ed allora giudicare Greene, che ha presieduto ulteriori atti dell'eccedenza.

5 per una descrizione più dettagliata della separazione della cassa del multi-difensore, veda il capitolo del nord.

Tutte le sfide sostanziali del Poindexter alla validità dell'atto d'accusa sono state allontanate prima della prova. Le edizioni importanti restanti si sono interessate: (1) la conservazione della carica di cospirazione; (2) la risoluzione delle classific-informazioni disputa; (3) la risoluzione delle edizioni relative alla testimonianza congressuale immunizzata del Poindexter, secondo il regolamento conosciuto come Kastigar; e (4) lo sforzo riuscito del difensore assicurare testimonianza di prova dall'ex presidente Reagan.

La conservazione e limitare dei problemi della carica

di cospirazione con le informazioni classificate hanno condotto allo scioglimento delle spese centrali di cospirazione prima della prova del nord ed i problemi simili si sono pensati che presentassero nell'argomento contro Poindexter. Il 20 giugno 1989, i consulenti legali indipendenti si sono mossi per eliminare le vaste spese originali di cospirazione basate sul rifornimento dei contras e della diversione e per limitare sostanzialmente la carica della cospirazione per violare gli altri statuti criminali sostanziali, dichiarazione false ostili ed ostruzione. Dopo le limature e la discussione orale, la corte ha assegnato il movimento del governo.

La carica era refocused sull'atto illegale della cospirazione con il nord e Secord celare le attività dal congresso. I consulenti legali indipendenti hanno sostenuto con successo che questo stringimento della carica di cospirazione minimizzerebbe i problemi delle classific-informazioni che hanno contagiato il processo del nord.

Le informazioni classificate pubblicano

le procedure classificate delle informazioni si comportano (CIPA) hanno permesso che la corte di prova efficacemente risolvesse i problema che coinvolgono l'uso dei documenti e della testimonianza classificati in Poindexter. Giudichi il controllo del Greene del processo di CIPA e le trattative fruttuose fra i consulenti legali per il governo e Poindexter risolti la maggior parte delle dispute con un minimo di fa ritardare.

Contrariamente al nord, non ci era prolungato o la controversia significativa riguardo alla forma o alla portata degli avvisi di CIPA del Poindexter alla corte rilevare ha classificato le informazioni alla prova. Fra il 27 novembre 1989 e 13 marzo 1990, Poindexter ha servito 11 tali avviso, compreso la testimonianza classificata possibile di descrizione otto che i documenti classificati elencati lui hanno desiderato usare alla prova, due ed uno messo a fuoco solamente sulle informazioni che ha desiderato trarre al deposito del presidente Reagan.

Giudichi Greene ha ordinato che tutte le differenze che eccedenza ha classificato le informazioni sono negoziate fra i partiti prima di essere portato davanti alla corte. Giudichi Greene ha tenuto sei udienze chiuse di CIPA prima della prova ha cominciato e completato quelli con parecchie udienze più corte durante la prova. La maggior parte delle sue decisioni sull'attinenza e sull'ammissibilità delle informazioni classificate e sull'adeguatezza delle sostituzioni proposte dal governo, sono state fatte dal banco.

Presi insieme, gli avvisi di CIPA del Poindexter hanno elencato circa 1.200 documenti, solo una piccola frazione di cui infine è stata introdotta alla prova. La maggior parte delle informazioni classificate sono state coperte dalle stipulazioni del Government a determinati fatti e ad altre sostituzioni non classificate. Ciò ha permesso che la prova continuasse uniformemente, senza i conflitti che hanno complicato il nord o l'argomento contro la stazione precedente Joseph principale F. di CIA. Fernandez, che era allontanato dovuto le classific-informazioni problems.6

6 vede il capitolo del Fernandez.

Gli atti Poindexter

di Kastigar sono stati costretti sotto una concessione di immunità di uso a testimoniare in 1987 prima dei comitati ristretti che studiano l'Iran/contra. Come l'altro Iran/contra i difensori che hanno dato la testimonianza immunizzata prima del congresso, Poindexter spostato per allontanare l'atto d'accusa sulla teoria che ha violato i campioni enunciati in Kastigar v. Gli Stati Uniti, 7 che sostengono che la sua testimonianza immunizzata è stata usata contro di lui nella grande giuria ed alla prova. Questa discussione ha dimostrato infruttuoso al livello di prova ma infine è prevalso nella Corte d'Appello.

i 7 406 Stati Uniti 411 (1972).

Prima che le loro prove si dividano, Poindexter spostato insieme con il nord e Hakim, che inoltre avevano ricevuto l'immunità per testimoniare prima del congresso, per avere le spese contro di loro ha allontanato sulla terra che la prova contro di loro è stata alterata dalla loro testimonianza immunizzata. Il giudice Gesell ha negato quel movimento. Tuttavia, nella deferenza a difesa sostiene che userebbero uno - possibilmente la testimonianza immunizzata giustificativa di un altro, il giudice Gesell nel giugno 1988 ha diviso le prove.

Poindexter ha rinnovato il suo movimento di Kastigar prima del giudice Greene nell'agosto 1989. Dopo l'istruzione e la discussione, 8 la corte hanno ordinato che due udienze probatorie sono tenute. Al primo, la corte ha sentito la testimonianza dai consulenti legali Dan K. del socio. Webb e Howard M. Imperli riguardo alla loro esposizione alla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter prima di unire l'ufficio dei consulenti legali indipendenti. Webb e la perla hanno unito il personale di OIC in 1989 e non hanno avuti, prima dei loro appuntamenti, stato conforme alle procedure del OIC isolarsi dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter. Giudichi Greene ha trovato la loro esposizione alla testimonianza del Poindexter per essere insignificante ed ha permesso che entrambi gli avvocati partecipassero alla prova.

8 il caso di Poindexter sono stati provati prima della Corte d'Appello regolati nel nord che le udienze del testimone erano necessarie da consentire la prova di un difensore immunizzato.

Il secondo insieme delle udienze di corte ha interessato i testimoni di prova, di cui la testimonianza può essere alterata dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter. Il giudice Greene ha accettato la revisione più iniziale del Gesell del giudice di grandi testimoni Jury ed ha rifiutato di riesaminare i suoi risultati. Inoltre ha rifiutato di allontanare l'atto d'accusa in base a grande esposizione potenziale del juror alla testimonianza immunizzata.

Per quanto riguarda i testimoni di prova, la corte ha approntato le vaste misure accertarsi che le dichiarazione immunizzate del Poindexter non fossero usate contro di lui. La corte ha ordinato il governo per fare un'ex presentazione del parte (più successivamente rilevata a Poindexter) di tutte le dichiarazione rilasciate dai testimoni di prova potenziali prima che Poindexter desse la sua testimonianza immunizzata prima del congresso nel luglio 1987. La corte ha trovato che tutta la testimonianza proposta di la maggior parte dei testimoni potenziali era stata memorialized prima che Poindexter comparisse pubblicamente il 15 luglio 1987 e quindi non è stata alterata.

Per quanto riguarda quei testimoni di cui hanno previsto che la testimonianza di prova non fosse limitata alla prova OIC aveva sigillato con la corte prima della testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter, le informazioni supplementari richieste Greene del giudice. Ha concluso che il governo non era riuscito a stabilire che cinque dei relativi testimoni potenziali erano esenti da segno ed aveva ordinato loro da comparire ad un'udienza pre-trial. Due dei tre testimoni che infine sono comparso alla prova credibly hanno affermato che la loro testimonianza prevista non sarebbe influenzata in nessun modo dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter; il terzo, del nord, rifiutato di fare così.

Nord dichiarato all'udienza pre-trial che non poteva, riguardo a tutto l'oggetto, distinguersi che cosa aveva fatto personalmente, osservato o sperimentato da che cosa aveva imparato dal guardare testimony.9 immunizzato del Poindexter per quanto riguarda distruzione del Poindexter dell'individuazione presidenziale di segreto-azione del dicembre 1985 -- prova importante nell'ostruzione del congresso -- Il nord ha riconosciuto che aveva visto Poindexter distruggere pezzo di carta ma insistita che non ha saputo esso era un'individuazione fino a che Poindexter non dichiarasse quel fatto nella sua testimonianza immunizzata prima del congresso.

9 testimonianza del nord, udienza Pre-trial di Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

La corte ha rifiutato la testimonianza pre-trial del nord come non believable. Del nord, la corte trovata, ``sembra essere intrapresa a quel tempo [all'udienza] il corso calcolato di tentare di aiutare il suoi ex collega e co-difensore. . . tergiversando sulle varie edizioni. . . opinione 10

, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. del '' 10. 9.

In una alberino-prova separata che regola, la corte ha aggiunto che per quanto la distruzione dell'individuazione, la testimonianza del nord alla sua propria prova circa l'evento era contradditoria con il suo reclamo che non potrebbe ricordarselo indipendente dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter. La corte lo ha trovato “inerentemente incredibile„ che il nord non si è ricordato “della sua partecipazione ad un evento ch'ha testimoniato firsthand e quello era come drammatico, effettivamente storico, come lo strappo in su di un'individuazione presidenziale estremamente rara.„ 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

Il Subpoena uno

del Reagan delle funzioni più notevoli del caso di Poindexter era il tentativo riuscito del difensore di denominare l'ex presidente Reagan per testimoniare alla sua prova tramite il deposito registrato.

Poindexter in primo luogo ha cercato le note presidenziali presidenziali e vice da OIC come componente delle sue richieste di scoperta pre-trial. In un'udienza pre-trial il 6 settembre 1989, gli avvocati del Poindexter hanno detto alla corte a che le note presidenziali riflettessero quel Poindexter informassero il presidente delle sue smentite al congresso in 1986 di attività di NSC a sostegno dei contras e che le note “mostrerebbero a che cosa il presidente si è detto circa che cosa stava facendo per sostenere i contras in America Centrale ed il consenso del presidente e ratifica e l'approvazione di quell'attività.„ 12 nella ricerca delle note presidenziali vice, gli avvocati del Poindexter hanno detto alla corte che “in qualunque momento [Bush] ha mancato una riunione, l'ammiraglio Poindexter gli ho impartito le direttive su esso in seguito.„ 13

12 Robinson, udienza Pre-trial di Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

La corte, prima di prendere una decisione sopra se costringere OIC per redigere l'11 settembre 1989 questi documenti, ha diretto Poindexter per archiviare un ex appunto del parte che spiega precisamente come questi documenti aiuterebbero il suo defense.14 che ha richiesto dai consulenti legali indipendenti un memorandum legale riguardo alla relativa responsabilità di redigere i documenti presidenziali presidenziali e vice non in possesso del OIC.

14 opinione, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Verurteilen der überführten Täter in den Vereinigten Staaten
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Kapitel 3
Vereinigte Staaten V. John M. Poindexter

Marine-Laster Adm. John M. Poindexter wurde als Präsident Reagans Staatssicherheit Berater am 4. Dezember 1985 ernannt und folgte Robert C. McFarlane, dem Poindexter darunter als Abgeordnetes für zwei Jahre gedient hatte. Poindexters beendete Hauskarriere 25. November 1986, als er gezwungen wurde, unmittelbar nach der allgemeinen Freigabe des Irans/gegen Ablenkung abzufinden.

Poindexter, Leutnant. Spalte Oliver Norden und McFarlane waren der drei Einzelpersonen Attorney General Edwin Meese III am 25. November 1986 gekennzeichnet, wie kenntnisreich von der Ablenkung. Überwachung Poindexters des Nordens und seine eigene Teilnahme am Iran und gegen Betriebe waren frühe Foki der Untersuchung des unabhängigen Ratschlags.

Wie im Argument gegen Nord-, kriminellen Beweis gegen Poindexter mußte schnell erfaßt werden, bevor er gezwungen wurde, auf dem Capitol Hill am Sommer von 1987 unter einer Bewilligung der begrenzten Immunität zu bezeugen. Andernfalls war die Verfolgung von Poindexter wahrscheinlich herausgefordert zu werden, mit der Begründung daß sie von abgeleitet wurde oder auf gewisse Weise durch sein immunisiertes Kongreßzeugnis beeinflußt.

Am 16. März 1988 wurde Poindexter auf sieben Kapitalverbrechenaufladungen angeklagt, die aus seiner Miteinbeziehung im Iran/gegen Angelegenheit, als Teil einer das 23 Zählimpuls Multibeklagte Anklage entstehen. Er wurde mit Norden, pensionierter Luftwaffe Major genannt. Generator. Richard V. Secord und Albert Hakim als Mitglied der Verschwörung, zum die Vereinigte Staaten Regierung, indem sie den Iran/gegen Ablenkung und andere, zu betrügen bewirken fungiert.

Nachdem die Fälle getrennt wurden und zwei der ursprünglichen Aufladungen entlassen, wurde Poindexter im April 1990 fünf Kapitalverbrechen versucht und überführt und schloß ein: ein Zählimpuls des Verschwörens, amtliche Anfragen und Verfahren, zwei Zählimpulse des Versperrens des Kongresses und zwei Zählimpulse der falschen Aussagen zu Congress.1 US zu versperren Bezirk Richter Harold H. Greene verurteilte ihn zu einer Sechsmonatsgefängnisbezeichnung. Im November 1991 wurden überzeugungen Poindexters auf Anklang umgeworfen. Im Dezember 1992 die US Höchstes Gericht gesunken, um den Fall zu wiederholen.

1 der Poindexter Fall wurde durch Teilnehmer-Ratschläge Dan K. versucht. Webb, Christ J. Mixter, Howard M. Perle und Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter verband den Staatssicherheit Ratpersonal im Juni 1981 und folgte einer bemerkenswerten Marinekarriere, die Linienschiff Befehl und Hochklassifizierung Pentagonpfosten einschloß. Im Oktober 1983 er wurde Abgeordneter zum Staatssicherheit Berater McFarlane; unter seinen Untergebenen war Nord. Während Poindexters des einjährigen Besitzes als Staatssicherheit Berater, der im Dezember 1985 anfing, beaufsichtigte er den Iran/gegen Betriebe, in denen Norden direkt miteinbezogen wurde.

Im November 1986 während die geheimen Betriebe öffentlich herausgestellt wurden, stand Poindexter dem älteren Leitung Beamten, das für die Besprechung anderer oberer Berater des Präsidenten über die der Iran Waffenverkäufe verantwortlich ist. In einer Reihe von Haussitzungen mit anderen Beamten und Mitgliedern des Kongresses während des Monats, breitete er wiederholt eine falsche Version der Verhandlungen, die Präsidenten Reagan vom erlaubterweise fraglichen 1985 Armversand überholten, der durch Israel gebildet wurde, besonders die November 1985 Falke-Flugkörperverhandlung aus.

Obgleich Poindexter der Wortführer war, war er nicht für das Kennen der Tatsachen alleinverantwortliches. Praktisch jeder andere höhere Beamte, einschließlich Präsidenten Reagan, der hörte, daß seine Version der Waffenverkäufe in den Anweisungen während November 1986 Anlaß zur Annahme ihn hatte, waren falsch. Dennoch keine, entsprechend gleichzeitigen Anmerkungen jener Anweisungen, Speiche bis zu korrektem Poindexter.

Poindexter zusammen mit Norden und andere im November 1986 versucht, um die Papierspur zu zerreißen und zu ändern, die ihren Iran/reflektiert, gegen Tätigkeiten. Unter anderem zerstörte Poindexter das einzige bestehende unterzeichnete Präsidentenc$verborgentätigkeit Finden, das CIA Miteinbeziehung im November 1985 Falkeversand rückwirkend autorisieren sollte.

Poindexter und Norden war weniger erfolgreich, wenn sie die Computeranzeige Spur von ihrem Iran/gegen Tätigkeiten ausrotteten. Poindexter und Norden standen häufig durch eine spezielle Führung in Verbindung, die Poindexter, ein Computerexperte, auf das NSC Computersystem aufgestellt hatte. Diese Führung, bekannt als „der private Blankoscheck,“ ließ Poindexter und Norden Anzeigen ohne ihr miteinander neu legen, der durch Führungen verlegt wurde, in denen andere auf dem NSC Personal sie aussortieren konnten.

Zwischen 22. bis 29. November 1986 löschte Norden aus seinen Anzeigen der Datei 736, und Poindexter löschte 5.012 Anzeigen während des gleichen period.2 trotz dieser Auslassungen, die gespeicherten Unterstützungklebebänder des Weißen Hauses routinemäßig, die alle Daten im System enthalten, damit zwei Wochen gegen unbeabsichtigten Verlust sich schützen. Als der Iran/gegen Angelegenheit in spätem November 1986 herausgestellt wurde, behielt die das Haus-Kommunikationen Agentur, die das NSC Computersystem handhabt, die Unterstützungsklebebänder, die ab dem 15. November datieren. Forscher waren folglich in der Lage, Kopien aller Anzeigen zurückzuholen, die in den Poindexter-Norden Dateien mittleres November 1986 waren, bevor die meisten Auslassungen auftraten. Diese Computeranzeigen wurden wichtiger Beweis im Poindexter und in den Nordversuchen.

2 Williams, Poindexter Probezeugnis, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter zugelassen worden zu vielen seiner Tätigkeiten bevor die auserwählten Ausschüsse im Juli 1987 unter einer Bewilligung der testimonial Immunität, die seine Aufnahmen an gegen ihn im irgendwie kriminellen Verfahren verwendet werden verhinderte. Weil Präsident Reagan nicht dadurch bezeugte, daß Forum, Poindexter benannt wurde, um die Frage zu beantworten, die die Hörfähigkeiten beherrschte: Wußte der Präsident ungefähr und die Ablenkung die der Iran Waffenverkäufe zu genehmigen fährt zu den contras fort? Poindexter beantwortete Nr., „die Dollaranschläge hier mit mir.“ 3, die er sagte, daß er absichtlich die Informationen vom Präsidenten Reagan zurückhielt, weil ``ich den Präsidenten irgendein deniability haben wünschte, damit er geschützt würde. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, auserwähltes Ausschuss-Zeugnis, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Einen kriminellen Versuch gegenüberstellend, konfrontierte Poindexter ein anderes Dilemma: Es war nicht mehr eine Frage des Schützens des Präsidenten aber des Verteidigens gegen fünf Kapitalverbrechenaufladungen. Vor Kongreß Poindexters bedeutendstes Zeugnis bekräftigten Präsident Reagans wiederholte Ablehnungen des Bewußtseins des Irans/gegen Ablenkung. Im Gerichtssaal brachte versuchte Poindexter eine Hochermächtigung Verteidigung an und, die Jury, daß der Präsident seine Tätigkeiten genehmigt hatte, einschließlich die zu überzeugen, die kriminelle Aufladungen ergaben. Anstatt, den Standplatz in seiner eigenen Verteidigung zu nehmen jedoch an rief er Präsidenten Reagan, um zu bezeugen.

Vorverfahren

US Bezirk Richter Gerhard A. Gesell bestellte im Juni 1988, daß der Multibeklagtes Kasten gegen Poindexter, Norden, Secord und Hakim severed.5 nach Abtrennung ist, Fall Poindexters wurde gebracht auf Hauptrichter Aubrey E. Robinson, jr. und Greene dann beurteilen, der weitere Verfahren des überschusses vorsaß.

5 für eine ausführlichere Beschreibung der Abtrennung des Multibeklagtes Kastens, sehen Sie Nordkapitel.

Alle Poindexters substantivische Herausforderungen zur Gültigkeit der Anklage wurden vor Versuch entlassen. Die restlichen wichtigen Ausgaben betroffen: (1) die Bewahrung der Verschwörungaufladung; (2) die Auflösung der Einstufeninformationen Debatten; (3) die Auflösung der Ausgaben bezogen auf Poindexters immunisiertem Kongreßzeugnis, unter dem Anordnen bekannt als Kastigar; und (4) die erfolgreiche Bemühung des Beklagten, Probezeugnis vom ehemaligen Präsidenten Reagan zu sichern.

Das Konservieren und das Verengen der Verschwörung-Aufladung

Probleme mit eingestuften Informationen führten zu die Entlassung der zentralen Verschwörungaufladungen vor dem Nordversuch, und ähnliche Probleme wurden erwartet, um im Argument gegen Poindexter zu entstehen. Am 20. Juni 1989 bewogen unabhängige Ratschläge, um die ursprünglichen ausgedehnten Verschwörungaufladungen zu beseitigen, die nach dem Versorgungsmaterial der contras und der Ablenkung und die Aufladung der Verschwörung im wesentlichen zu verengen, um andere substantivische kriminelle Gesetze, verbietende falsche Aussagen und Hindernis zu verletzen gegründet wurden. Nach Archivierungen und Mundargument bewilligte das Gericht die Bewegung der Regierung.

Die Aufladung war refocused auf der ungültigen Tat des Verschwörens mit Norden und Secord, Tätigkeiten vom Kongreß zu verbergen. Unabhängige Berater argumentierten erfolgreich, daß dieses Verengen der Verschwörungaufladung die Einstufeninformationen Probleme herabsetzen würde, die die Nordverfolgung quälten.

Eingestufte Informationen geben

die eingestuften Informationen Verfahren fungieren (CIPA) ließen das Probegericht effektiv die Ausgaben beheben heraus, die den Gebrauch von eingestuften Dokumenten und Zeugnis in Poindexter mit einbeziehen. Beurteilen Sie überwachung Greenes des CIPA Prozesses und fruchtbare Vermittlungen zwischen den Ratschlägen für die Regierung und Poindexter, die den meisten Debatten mit einem Minimum von behoben werden, verzögert.

Im Gegensatz zu Norden gab es kein ausgedehnt, oder der bedeutende Rechtsstreit hinsichtlich ist der Form oder des Bereichs der Nachrichten CIPA Poindexters zum Gericht freizugeben stufte Informationen am Versuch ein. Zwischen 27. November 1989 und 13. März 1990 diente Poindexter 11 solche Nachrichten, einschließlich beschreibendes mögliches eingestuftes Zeugnis acht, daß aufgeführte eingestufte Dokumente er am Versuch verwenden wollten, zwei und eine, die nur auf Informationen gerichtet wurde, die er an der Absetzung des Präsidenten Reagan herausbekommen wollte.

Beurteilen Sie Greene bestellte, daß über alle Unterschiede, die überschuß Informationen einstufte, zwischen den Parteien verhandelt werden, bevor man vor dem Gericht geholt wird. Beurteilen Sie Greene hielt sechs geschlossene CIPA Hörfähigkeiten vor dem Versuch anfing und ergänzte die mit einigen kürzeren Hörfähigkeiten während des Versuches. Die meisten seinen Regelungen auf der Bedeutung und der Zulässigkeit der eingestuften Informationen und auf der Angemessenheit des Ersatzes, der durch die Regierung vorgeschlagen wurde, wurden von der Bank gebildet.

Verzeichneten die zusammen genommen, Nachrichten CIPA Poindexters ungefähr 1.200 Dokumente, nur dessen kleiner Bruch schließlich am Versuch eingeführt wurden. Die meisten eingestuften Informationen wurden durch Government Bedingungen zu bestimmten Tatsachen und zu anderem nicht klassifiziertem Ersatz abgedeckt. Dieses ließ den Versuch, ohne die Konflikte glatt fortfahren, die Norden oder das Argument gegen ehemalige CIA Station Hauptjoseph F. erschwerten. Fernandez, der an den Einstufeninformationen problems.6 6 entlassenes

lag, sehen Fernandez Kapitel.

Kastigar Verfahren

Poindexter wurden unter einer Bewilligung der Gebrauchimmunität gezwungen, 1987 vor den auserwählten Ausschüssen zu bezeugen, die den Iran/gegen nachforschen. Wie der andere Iran/gegen Beklagte, die immunisiertes Zeugnis vor Kongreß gaben, Poindexter verschoben, um die Anklage auf der Theorie zu entlassen, daß sie die Standards verletzte, die in Kastigar V. ausgesprochen wurden. Vereinigte Staaten, 7 argumentierend, daß sein immunisiertes Zeugnis gegen ihn in der großartigen Jury und am Versuch verwendet wurde. Dieses Argument prüfte, erfolgloses auf dem Probeniveau aber herschte schließlich im Gericht von Anklänge vor.

7 406 US 411 (1972).

Bevor ihre Versuche getrennt wurden, entließ Poindexter, das zusammen mit Norden und Hakim verschoben wurde, die auch Immunität empfangen hatten, um vor Kongreß zu bezeugen, um die Aufladungen gegen sie zu haben aus den Grund, daß der Beweis gegen sie durch ihr immunisiertes Zeugnis verdorben wurde. Richter Gesell verweigerte diese Bewegung. Jedoch in der Achtung zur Verteidigung behauptet, daß sie ein verwenden würden - eines anderen vielleicht rechtfertigendes immunisiertes Zeugnis, Richter Gesell trennten im Juni 1988 die Versuche.

Poindexter erneuerte seine Kastigar Bewegung vor Richter Greene im August 1989. Nach Anweisung und Argument bestellten 8 das Gericht, daß zwei überzeugende Hörfähigkeiten gehalten werden. Am ersten hörte das Gericht Zeugnis von den Teilnehmer-Beratern Dan K. Webb und Howard M. Perlen Sie hinsichtlich ihrer Aussetzung zu Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis, bevor Sie das Büro der unabhängigen Ratschläge verbinden. Webb und Perle verbanden den OIC Personal 1989 und hatten nicht, vor ihren Verabredungen, gewesen abhängig von Verfahren OICS, sich von Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis zu isolieren. Beurteilen Sie Greene fand ihre Aussetzung zum Zeugnis Poindexters, um bedeutungslos zu sein und erlaubte beiden Rechtsanwälten, am Versuch teilzunehmen.

8 der Poindexter Fall wurden vor dem Gericht der Anklänge versucht, die im Norden angeordnet wurden, daß Zeugehörfähigkeiten notwendig waren, um den Versuch eines immunisierten Beklagten zu ermöglichen.

Der zweite Satz von Gerichtsterminen betraf Probezeugen, deren Zeugnis durch Poindexters immunisiertes Zeugnis verdorben worden sein kann. Richter Greene nahm Richter Gesells früheren Bericht der großartigen Jury Zeugen an und sank, seine Entdeckungen nachzupruefen. Er lehnte auch ab, die Anklage auf der Grundlage von mögliche großartige Geschworenaussetzung zum immunisierten Zeugnis zu entlassen.

Betreffend Probezeugen ergriff das Gericht umfangreiche Maßnahmen, sicherzugehen, daß Poindexters immunisierte Aussagen nicht gegen ihn verwendet wurden. Das Gericht bestellte die Regierung, um eine ex parte Unterordnung (später freigegeben zu Poindexter) von allen Aussagen zu bilden, die durch mögliche Probezeugen abgegeben wurden, bevor Poindexter sein immunisiertes Zeugnis vor Kongreß im Juli 1987 gab. Das Gericht fand, daß alles vorgeschlagene Zeugnis der meisten möglichen Zeugen memorialized, bevor Poindexter öffentlich am 15. Juli 1987 erschien, und folglich wurde nicht verdorben gewesen war.

Was jene Zeugen anbetrifft deren erwarteten, daß Probezeugnis nicht auf den Beweis OIC begrenzt würde, hatte mit dem Gericht vor Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis, erforderliche zusätzliche Informationen des Richters Greene versiegelt. Er stellte fest, daß die Regierung hatte herstellen nicht gekonnt, daß fünf seiner möglichen Zeugen von der Färbung frei waren und ihnen bestellt, zum an einer vorbereitenden Hörfähigkeit zu erscheinen. Zwei der drei Zeugen, die schließlich am Versuch credibly erschienen, bestätigten, daß ihr vorweggenommenes Zeugnis nicht in keiner Weise durch Poindexters immunisiertes Zeugnis beeinflußt würde; das dritte, Nord, abgelehnt, so zu tun.

Norden angegeben an der vorbereitenden Hörfähigkeit, daß er, in Bezug auf jedes mögliches Thema nicht imstande war, zu unterscheiden was er persönlich getan hatte, beobachtet oder erfahren von, was er vom Aufpassen Poindexters von immunisiertem testimony.9 was Zerstörung anbetrifft Poindexters des Dezember 1985 Präsidentenc$verborgentätigkeit Findens erlernt hatte -- wichtiger Beweis im Hindernis des Kongresses -- Norden bestätigte, daß er Poindexter gesehen hatte, einen Papierstreifen zu zerstören, aber, daß er nicht wußte, ihm ein Finden beharrt war, bis Poindexter diese Tatsache in seinem immunisierten Zeugnis vor Kongreß angab.

9 Nordzeugnis, Poindexter vorbereitende Hörfähigkeit, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

Das Gericht wies vorbereitendes Nordzeugnis zurück, wie nicht glaubwürdig. Nord, scheint das gefundene Gericht, ``, [an der Hörfähigkeit] nach dem errechneten Kurs des Versuchens zu dieser Zeit eingeschifft worden zu sein, seinen ehemaligen Kollegen und Cobeklagtes zu unterstützen. . . durch prevaricating auf verschiedenen Ausgaben. . . '' 10

10 Meinung, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. 9.

In einem unterschiedlichen anordnenden Pfostenversuch, fügte das Gericht hinzu, daß, insoweit die Zerstörung des Findens, Nordzeugnis an seinem eigenen Versuch über den Fall mit seinem Anspruch inkonsequent war, daß er nicht an ihn sich erinnern könnte Unabhängiges von Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis. Das Gericht fand es „in sich selbst unglaublich“, daß Norden sich nicht „an seine Teilnahme an einem Fall erinnerte, den er aus erster Hand zeugte und das war, wie drastisch, in der Tat historisch, als eines extrem seltenen Präsidentenc$findens oben heftig zerreißen.“ 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

Die Reagan Vorladung unter Strafandrohung

eine der bemerkenswertesten Aspekte des Poindexter Falles war der erfolgreiche Versuch des Beklagten, ehemaligen Präsidenten Reagan anzurufen, um an seinem Versuch durch videotaped Absetzung zu bezeugen.

Poindexter zuerst gesuchte Präsidenten- und Vizepräsidentenanmerkungen von OIC als Teil seiner verfahrensvorbereitende Tatsachenfeststellung Anträge. In einer vorbereitenden Hörfähigkeit am 6. September 1989, erklärten Rechtsanwälte Poindexters dem Gericht, daß Präsidentenanmerkungen dieses Poindexter informierten den Präsidenten über seine Ablehnungen zum Kongreß 1986 der NSC Tätigkeit zur Unterstützung der contras reflektieren würden und daß die Anmerkungen „zeigen würden, was dem Präsidenten erklärt wurde über, was getan wurde, um die contras in Mittelamerika zu stützen und des die Zustimmung Präsidenten und die Bestätigung und die Zustimmung dieser Tätigkeit.“ 12, wenn sie Vizepräsidentenanmerkungen suchten, erklärten Rechtsanwälte Poindexters das Gericht, dem „jederzeit er [Bush] eine Sitzung vermißte, Admiral Poindexter unterwiesen ihn auf ihr danach.“ 13

12 Robinson, Poindexter vorbereitende Hörfähigkeit, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

Das Gericht, bevor es an eine Entscheidung traf, ob man OIC zwingt, um diese Dokumente am 11. September 1989 zu produzieren verwies Poindexter, um ein ex parte Protokoll einzuordnen, das genau erklärt, wie diese Dokumente sein defense.14 unterstützen würden, das es von den unabhängigen Ratschlägen ein zugelassenes Protokoll hinsichtlich ist seiner Verantwortlichkeit, die Präsidenten- und Vizepräsidentendokumente nicht im Besitz OICS zu produzieren erforderte.

14 Meinung, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Sentenciando criminosos convicted nos Estados Unidos
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
Capítulo 3
Estados Unidos v. John M. Vice

Adm da marinha de Poindexter. John M. Poindexter foi apontado como o conselheiro da segurança nacional do presidente Reagan dezembro em 4, 1985, sucedendo Robert C. McFarlane, a quem Poindexter tinha servido abaixo como o deputado por dois anos. A carreira branca da casa de Poindexter terminou novembro 25, 1986, quando foi forçado a renunciar na vigília da divulgação pública do Irã/contra a diversão.

Poindexter, tenente. Coluna O norte e McFarlane de Oliver eram o Attorney General Edwin Meese III de três indivíduos identificado novembro em 25, 1986, como knowledgeable da diversão. A supervisão de Poindexter do norte e sua própria participação no Irã e contra operações eram focos adiantados da investigação do conselho independente.

Como no argumento de encontro à evidência norte, criminal de encontro a Poindexter teve que ser recolhido rapidamente antes que estêve compelido testify no monte de Capitol no verão de 1987 sob uma concessão de immunity limitado. Se não, o prosecution de Poindexter era provável ser desafiado nas terras que estêve derivado ou em alguma maneira influenciada por seu testimony congressional immunized.

Março em 16, 1988, Poindexter foi processado em sete cargas do felony que levantam-se de sua participação no Irã/contra o caso, como parte de um indictment do multi-réu de 23 contagens. Foi nomeado com norte, major aposentado da força aérea. Gerador. Richard V. Secord e Albert Hakim como um membro do conspiracy a defraudar o governo de Estados Unidos efetuando o Irã/contra a diversão e a outra agem.

Depois que os casos severed e duas das cargas originais foram demitidas, Poindexter foi tentado e convicted em abril 1990 de cinco felonies, incluindo: uma contagem de conspiring obstruir inquéritos e continuações oficiais, duas contagens de obstruir o Congress, e duas contagens de indicações falsas a Congress.1 ESTADOS UNIDOS. Juiz Harold H. do distrito. Greene sentenciou-o a um termo de seis meses da prisão. Em novembro 1991, as convicções de Poindexter foram viradas na apelação. Em dezembro 1992, os ESTADOS UNIDOS. Corte suprema declinada rever o caso.

1 o exemplo de Poindexter foi tentado por conselhos Dan K. do associado. Webb, cristão J. Mixter, Howard M. Pérola, e Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter juntou a equipe de funcionários do conselho de segurança nacional em junho 1981, seguindo uma distinta carreira naval que incluísse bornes do Pentagon do comando e do elevado-ranking do cruzador de batalha. Em outubro 1983 transformou-se deputado ao conselheiro McFarlane da segurança nacional; entre seus subordinados era norte. Durante o tenure one-year de Poindexter como o conselheiro da segurança nacional, que começou em dezembro 1985, oversaw o Irã/contra as operações em que o norte foi envolvido diretamente.

Em novembro 1986, enquanto as operações secretas se estavam tornando expostas publicamente, Poindexter assentou bem no oficial sênior da administração responsável para instruir outros conselheiros superiores do presidente sobre as vendas de braços de Irã. Em uma série das reuniões brancas da casa com outros oficiais e membros do Congress durante todo o mês, colocou repetidamente para fora uma versão falsa das transações que distanced o presidente Reagan dos 1985 shipments de braços legalmente questionáveis feitos através de Israel, particularmente a transação do Falcão-míssil de novembro 1985.

Embora Poindexter fosse o spokesman, não era responsável sozinho para saber os fatos. Virtualmente cada outro oficial sênior, including o presidente Reagan, que se ouviu que sua versão das vendas de braços nas instruções durante todo novembro 1986 teve a razão a acreditar eram errados. Contudo ninguém, de acordo com as notas contemporaneous daquelas instruções, raio até Poindexter correto.

Poindexter junto com o norte e outro em novembro 1986 tentaram shred e alterar a fuga de papel que reflete seu Irã/contra atividades. Entre outras coisas, Poindexter destruiu único encontrar presidencial assinado existente da secreto-ação que foi pretendido autorizar retroactively a participação do CIA no shipment dos falcões de novembro 1985.

Poindexter e o norte eram mais menos bem sucedidos em eradicating a fuga da computador-mensagem de seu Irã/contra atividades. Poindexter e o norte comunicaram-se frequentemente através de uma canaleta especial que Poindexter, um perito de computador, ajustasse acima no sistema computatorizado de NSC. Esta canaleta, sabida como “a verificação em branco confidencial,” permitiu que Poindexter e o norte serelay as mensagens sem seu que estão sendo distribuídas através das canaletas em que outra na equipe de funcionários de NSC poderia as selecionar.

Entre novembro 22 a 29, 1986, norte suprimiu de suas mensagens da lima de computador 736, e Poindexter suprimiu 5.012 mensagens durante o mesmo period.2 apesar destes apagamentos, as fitas adesivas rotineiramente conservadas brancas do back-up da casa que contêm todos os dados no sistema por duas semanas para proteger de encontro à perda inadvertida. Quando o Irã/contra o caso foi exposto em novembro atrasado 1986, a agência branca das comunicações da casa, que controla o sistema computatorizado de NSC, reteve as fitas adesivas alternativas que datam novembro de 15. Os Investigators, puderam conseqüentemente recuperar cópias de todas as mensagens que estavam nas limas de computador do Poindexter-Norte no mid-November 1986 antes que a maioria dos apagamentos ocorreram. Estas mensagens do computador transformaram-se evidência importante no Poindexter e nas experimentações nortes.

2 Williams, Testimony experimental de Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter admitido a muitas de suas atividades antes que os comitês seletos em julho 1987 sob uma concessão do immunity testimonial, que impedisse que suas admissões estejam usadas de encontro a ele na continuação criminal. Porque o presidente Reagan não testify que o forum, Poindexter estêve chamado para responder à pergunta que dominou os hearings: O presidente soube aproximadamente e aprovar a diversão das vendas de braços de Irã prosegue aos contras? Poindexter respondeu ao No., “os batentes do buck aqui com mim.” 3 que disse que reteve deliberadamente a informação do presidente Reagan porque ``eu quis o presidente ter algum deniability de modo que fosse protegido. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, Testimony seleto dos comitês, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Enfrentando uma experimentação criminal, Poindexter confrontou um dilemma diferente: Era já não uma pergunta de proteger o presidente mas de defender-se himself de encontro a cinco cargas do felony. Antes do Congress, o testimony o mais significativo de Poindexter negações repetidas do presidente Reagan corroborated da consciência do Irã/contra a diversão. No courtroom, Poindexter montou uma defesa da elevado-autorização, tentando convencer o júri que o presidente tinha aprovado suas ações, including aquelas que resultaram em cargas criminal. Em vez de fazer exame do carrinho em sua própria defesa, entretanto, chamou o presidente Reagan para testify.

Continuações Pre-Trial

ESTADOS UNIDOS. Juiz Gerhard A. do distrito. Gesell em junho 1988 requisitou que a caixa do multi-réu de encontro a Poindexter, norte, a Secord e a Hakim fosse severed.5 depois da separação, caso de Poindexter foi transferido ao juiz principal Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., e para julgar então Greene, que presided umas continuações mais adicionais do excesso.

5 para uma descrição mais detalhada da separação da caixa do multi-réu, veja o capítulo norte.

Todos os desafios substantivos de Poindexter à validez do indictment foram demitidos antes da experimentação. As edições importantes restantes concerniram: (1) a preservação da carga do conspiracy; (2) a definição da classific-informação disputa; (3) a definição das edições relacionadas ao testimony congressional immunized de Poindexter, sob governar sabido como Kastigar; e (4) o esforço bem sucedido do réu fixar o testimony experimental do presidente anterior Reagan.

Preservar e estreitar os problemas da carga

do Conspiracy com informação classificada conduziram ao dismissal das cargas centrais do conspiracy antes da experimentação norte, e os problemas similares esperaram-se levantar-se no argumento de encontro a Poindexter. Junho em 20, 1989, os conselhos independentes moveram-se para eliminar as cargas largas originais do conspiracy baseadas na fonte dos contras e da diversão e para estreitar substancialmente a carga de conspiracy para violate os outros statutes criminal substantivos, indicações falsas proibindo e obstrução. Após arquivamentos e o argumento oral, a corte concedeu o movimento do governo.

A carga era refocused no ato ilegal de conspiring com norte e Secord esconder atividades do Congress. Os conselhos independentes discutiram com sucesso que este se estreitar da carga do conspiracy minimizaria os problemas da classific-informação que flagelaram o prosecution norte.

A informação classificada emite

os procedimentos classificados da informação age (CIPA) permitiu que a corte experimental eficazmente resolvesse as edições que envolvem o uso de originais e do testimony classificados em Poindexter. Julgue a supervisão de Greene do processo de CIPA e as negociações fruitful entre os conselhos para o governo e o Poindexter resolvidos a maioria de disputas com um mínimo de atrasam.

No contraste ao norte, não havia nenhum prolongado ou o litigation significativo a respeito do formulário ou do espaço de observações de CIPA de Poindexter à corte divulgar classificou a informação na experimentação. Entre novembro 27, 1989, e março 13, 1990, Poindexter serviu a 11 tais observações, including o testimony oito que os originais classificados listados ele quiseram se usar na experimentação, dois classificado possível de descrição, e a uma focalizada unicamente na informação que quis eliciar no deposition do presidente Reagan.

Julgue Greene requisitou que todas as diferenças que o excesso classificou a informação estejam negociadas entre os partidos antes de ser trazido antes da corte. Julgue Greene prendeu seis hearings fechados de CIPA antes da experimentação começou e suplementou aqueles com diversos hearings mais curtos durante a experimentação. A maioria de seus rulings na relevância e no admissibility da informação classificada, e no adequacy das substituições propostas pelo governo, foram feitos do banco.

Feitas exame junto, as observações de CIPA de Poindexter alistaram aproximadamente 1.200 originais, only uma fração pequena de que foi introduzida finalmente na experimentação. A maioria de informação classificada foi coberta por estipulações de Governo a determinados fatos e a outras substituições unclassified. Isto permitiu que a experimentação proseguisse lisamente, sem os conflitos que complicaram o norte ou o argumento de encontro à estação anterior Joseph principal F. do CIA. Fernandez, que era demitido devido à classific-informação problems.6

6 vê o capítulo de Fernandez.

As continuações Poindexter

de Kastigar foram compelidas sob uma concessão do immunity do uso testify em 1987 antes dos comitês seletos que investigam Irã/contra. Como o outro Irã/contra os réus que deram o testimony immunized antes do Congress, Poindexter movido para demitir o indictment na teoria que violated os padrões enunciated em Kastigar v. Estados Unidos, 7 que discutem que seu testimony immunized estêve usado de encontro a ele no júri grande e na experimentação. Este argumento provou mal sucedido no nível experimental mas prevaleceu finalmente na corte de apelações.

7 406 ESTADOS UNIDOS. 411 (1972).

Antes que suas experimentações severed, Poindexter movido conjuntamente com norte e Hakim, que tinham recebido também o immunity para testify antes do Congress, para ter as cargas de encontro a eles demitiu na terra que a evidência de encontro a eles tainted por seu testimony immunized. O juiz Gesell negou esse movimento. Entretanto, no deference à defesa reivindica que usariam um - possivelmente o testimony immunized exculpatory another, juiz Gesell em junho 1988 severed as experimentações.

Poindexter renovou seu movimento de Kastigar antes do juiz Greene em agosto 1989. Após a instrução e o argumento, 8 a corte requisitaram que dois hearings evidentiary estivessem prendidos. No primeiro, a corte ouviu o testimony dos conselhos Dan K. do associado. Webb e Howard M. Pearl a respeito de sua exposição ao testimony immunized de Poindexter antes de juntar o escritório de conselhos independentes. Webb e a pérola juntaram a equipe de funcionários de OIC em 1989 e não a tiveram, antes de suas nomeações, sido sujeitos aos procedimentos de OIC isolar-se do testimony immunized de Poindexter. Julgue Greene encontrou sua exposição ao testimony de Poindexter para ser insignificante e permitiu que ambos os advogados participassem na experimentação.

8 o exemplo de Poindexter foram tentados antes da corte de apelações governadas no norte que os hearings da testemunha eram necessários para permitir a experimentação de um réu immunized.

O segundo jogo de hearings de corte concerniu as testemunhas experimentais, cujo o testimony pode tainted pelo testimony immunized de Poindexter. De Gesell aceitado Greene do juiz do juiz revisão mais adiantada de testemunhas Jury grandes e declinada re-examine seus findings. Recusou também demitir o indictment na base da exposição grande potencial do juror ao testimony immunized.

A respeito das testemunhas experimentais, a corte fêz exame de medidas extensivas assegurar-se de que as indicações immunized de Poindexter não estivessem usadas de encontro a ele. A corte requisitou o governo para fazer uma submissão ex do parte (divulgada mais tarde a Poindexter) de todas as indicações feitas por testemunhas experimentais potenciais antes que Poindexter deu seu testimony immunized antes do Congress em julho 1987. A corte encontrou que todo o testimony proposto de a maioria das testemunhas potenciais tinha sido memorialized antes que Poindexter apareceu publicamente julho em 15, 1987, e conseqüentemente não tainted.

Quanto para 2 aquelas testemunhas os cujos esperaram que o testimony experimental não estaria limitado à evidência OIC tinha selado com a corte antes do testimony immunized de Poindexter, informação adicional requerida Greene do juiz. Concliu que o governo não tinha estabelecido que cinco de suas testemunhas potenciais estavam livres do taint e lhes tinha requisitado a aparecer em um hearing pre-trial. Duas das três testemunhas que apareceram finalmente na experimentação credibly afirmaram que seu testimony antecipado não estaria influenciado em nenhuma maneira pelo testimony immunized de Poindexter; o terceiro, norte, recusado fazer assim.

Norte indicado no hearing pre-trial que era incapaz, com respeito a todo o assunto, distinguir o que tinha feito pessoalmente, observado ou experimentado de o que tinha aprendido de prestar atenção a testimony.9 immunized de Poindexter quanto para à destruição de Poindexter de encontrar presidencial da secreto-ação de dezembro 1985 -- evidência importante na obstrução do Congress -- O norte reconheceu que tinha visto Poindexter destruir uma parte de papel mas insistido que não soube lhe era encontrar até que Poindexter indicou esse fato em seu testimony immunized antes do Congress.

9 Testimony norte, Hearing Pre-trial de Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

A corte rejeitou o testimony pre-trial norte como nao believable. Norte, a corte encontrada, ``parece embarked naquele tempo [no hearing] em cima do curso calculado de tentar ajudar a seus colega e co-réu anteriores. . . prevaricating em várias edições. . . opinião 10

, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. do '' 10. 9.

Em uma borne-experimentação separada que governa, a corte adicionou que tanto quanto a destruição de encontrar, o testimony norte em sua própria experimentação sobre o evento era inconsistent com sua reivindicação que não poderia a recordar independent do testimony immunized de Poindexter. A corte encontrou-o “inerente incredible” que o norte não recordou “sua participação em um evento que testemunhou firsthand e isso era como dramático, certamente historic, como rasgar acima de encontrar presidencial extremamente raro.” 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

O Subpoena um

de Reagan dos aspectos os mais notáveis do exemplo de Poindexter era a tentativa bem sucedida do réu de chamar o presidente anterior Reagan para testify em sua experimentação pelo deposition gravado.

Poindexter procurou primeiramente notas presidenciais presidenciais e vice de OIC como parte de seus pedidos da descoberta pre-trial. Em um hearing pre-trial setembro em 6, 1989, os advogados de Poindexter disseram à corte que as notas presidenciais refletiriam esse Poindexter informaram o presidente de suas negações ao Congress em 1986 da atividade de NSC na sustentação dos contras, e que as notas “mostrariam o que o presidente foi dito sobre o que estava sendo feito para suportar os contras em América Central, e o consentimento do presidente e o ratification e a aprovaçã0 dessa atividade.” 12 em procurar notas presidenciais vice, os advogados de Poindexter disseram a corte que “em qualquer altura que [Bush] faltou uma reunião, almirante Poindexter instruíram-no nela mais tarde.” 13

12 Robinson, Hearing Pre-trial de Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

A corte, antes de fazer uma decisão sobre se compelir OIC para produzir estes originais, setembro em 11, 1989, Poindexter dirigido para arquivar um memorando ex do parte que explica precisamente como estes originais ajudariam a seu defense.14 ele requereu dos conselhos independentes um memorando legal a respeito de sua responsabilidade produzir originais presidenciais presidenciais e vice não na possessão de OIC.

14 opinião, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Döma beslog grov förbrytare i Förenta staterna
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Förenat kapitel
3 påstår V. John M. Poindexter

marinlast Adm. John M. Poindexter var bestämd som presidentReagans konsulenten för nationell säkerhet på December 4, 1985 som lyckas Robert C. McFarlane, som Poindexter hade tjänat som under som ersättaren för två år. Poindexters Vita huskarriären avslutade November 25, 1986, då han tvingades för att avgå i vaket av det offentliga avslöjandet av Iran/contra skenmanöver.

Poindexter Lt. Kolonn Den Oliver norden och McFarlane var justitiekanslern Edwin Meese III som för tre individer identifierades på November 25, 1986, som kunnigt av skenmanövern. Poindexters övervakning av norden och hans egna deltagande i Iran och contra funktioner var tidig sort fokuserar av oberoende rådgivare utredning.

Som i fallet mot nord, bevisar brottslingen mot Poindexter måste att samlas snabbt, för han tvingades för att vitsorda på Capitolkullen i sommaren av 1987 under ett lån av inskränkt immunitet. Annorlunda var åtalet av Poindexter rimligt att utmanas på jordningen att det härleddes från eller i något som påverkades långt av hans immunized kongress- vittnesbörd.

På mars 16, 1988, Poindexter indicted på sju brottsåtal som uppstår från hans medverkan i Iran/contra angelägenhet, som del av ettsvarande för 23 räkning åtal. Han namngavs med den norr pensionerade flygvapenmajen. Generator. Richard V. Secord och Albert Hakim som en medlem av komplotten som bedrar den Förenta staterna regeringen, genom att verkställa Iran/contra skenmanöver och annan, agerar.

Efter fallen avskildes, och två av de original- laddningarna avfärdades, försöktes beslogs Poindexter och i April 1990 av fem grov förbrytelse, däribland: en räkning av att konspirera som blockerar officiella förfrågningar och förfaranden, två räkningar av blockering av kongressen och två räkningar av falska meddelanden till Congress.1 U.S. Distriktsdomare Harold H. Greene dömde honom till ett six-month fängelsestraff. I November 1991, Poindexters valts övertygelser på vädjan. I December 1992, U.S.NA. Högsta domstolen som gås ned för att granska fallet.

1 det Poindexter fallet försöktes av Bundsförvant Råda Dan K. Webb kristen J. Mixter Howard M. Pärla och Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter sammanfogade nationell säkerhetrådet bemannar i Juni 1981, efter en distingerad sjö- karriär som den inklusive slagskeppet befaller, och kick-rangen pentagonen postar. I Oktober 1983 blev han ställföreträdande till nationell säkerhetkonsulenten McFarlane; bland hans underordnadar var norr. Under Poindexters ettåriga ambetstid som nationell säkerhetkonsulenten som började i December 1985, hade uppsikt över han Iran/contra funktioner som norden var direkt involverad i.

I November 1986, som de hemliga funktionerna var passande publicly utsatt, blev Poindexter den höga förvaltningstjänstemannen som ansvariga för att sammanfatta president andra bästa konsulenter om Iran beväpnar reor. I en serie av Vita husmöten med andra representanter och kongressledamotalltigenom månaden, lade han upprepade gånger ut en falsk version av transaktionerna, som distanserade presidenten Reagan från de lagligt tvivelaktiga 1985 vapensändningarna som gjordes till och med Israel, bestämt den November 1985 Hök-missilen transaktionen.

Även om Poindexter var talesmannen, var han inte den ensamma ansvariga för att veta fakta. Faktiskt varje annan hög tjänsteman, den inklusive presidenten Reagan, som hörde att hans version av beväpnar reor i förhandsmötealltigenom November 1986, hade att resonera för att tro den var fel. Yet inget, enligt contemporaneous noterar av de förhandsmötear, talade upp till korrekta Poindexter.

Poindexter tillsammans med nord och andra i November 1986 försökte att strimla och förändra den pappers- slingan som reflekterar deras Iran/contra aktiviteter. Bland annat förstörde Poindexter det enda existerande undertecknade presidents- busksnår-åtgärdar finna det ämnades bemyndiga retroaktivt CIA-medverkan i den November 1985 höksändningen.

Poindexter och norden var mindre lyckade, i att utrota dator-meddelandet slingan av deras Iran/contra aktiviteter. Poindexter och norden meddelade ofta till och med en sakkunnig kanaliserar den Poindexter, en sakkunnig dator, hade uppsättningen upp på NSC-ADB-systemet. Detta kanaliserar, bekant, som ”den privata blankochecken,” tillåtna Poindexter och norden som vidarebefordrar meddelanden till varje annat utan deras som sänds kanaliserar igenom, i vilket andra på NSCEN bemannar kunde avskärma dem.

Mellan November 22 till 29, 1986, nord tog bort från hans meddelanden för dataregister 736, och Poindexter tog bort 5.012 meddelanden under den samma illviljan period.2 dessa raderingar, sparade säkerhetskopian för Vita huset den rutinmässigt tejpar att innehålla alla data i systemet för att två veckor ska skydda mot ouppmärksam förlust. Då Iran/contra angelägenhet var utsatt i sena November 1986, behöll Vita huskommunikationsbyrån, som klarar av NSC-ADB-systemet, säkerhetskopian tejpar datummärkning från November 15. Utredare, var därför kompetent att hämta kopierar allra meddelanden som var i Poindexter-Norden dataregisteren i miden-November 1986, för mest av raderingarna uppstod. Dessa datormeddelanden blev viktiga bevisar i både Poindexteren och norr försök.

2 Williams, Poindexter försökvittnesbörd, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter medgav till många av hans aktiviteter för de valda kommittéerna i Juli 1987 under ett lån av intygimmunitet, som förhindrade hans erkännandear från att användas mot honom i något brottsligt förfarande. Därför att presidenten Reagan inte vitsordade däri fora, kallades Poindexter för att svara ifrågasätta som dominerade utfrågningarna: Visste presidenten omkring, och att godkänna skenmanövern av Iran beväpnar reaintäkter till contrasna? Poindexter svarade nr.en, ”bockstoppen här med mig.”, 3 som han sade han undanhöll avsiktligt informationen från presidenten Reagan, därför att ``jag önskade att presidenten ska ha någon deniability, så att han skulle skyddas. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, vald kommittévittnesbörd, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Vända mot ett brottsligt försök, konfronterade Poindexter ett olikt dilemma: Det var ej längre en ifrågasätta av skydd av presidenten men försvar som var självt mot fem brottsåtal. För kongress Poindexters viktigaste vittnesbörd bestyrkte presidentReagans upprepade förnekanden av medvetenheten av Iran/contra skenmanöver. I rättssalen monterade Poindexter ettbemyndigande försvar som försöker att övertyga juryn, att presidenten hade godkänt hans handlingar som var inklusive de som resulterade i brottsåtal. I stället för att ta stativ i hans egna försvar, emellertid, kallade han President Reagan för att vitsorda.

Pre-Trial förfaranden

U.S. Distriktsdomare Gerhard A. Gesell i Juni 1988 beställde, att mång--svarandet fallet mot Poindexter, nord, Secord och Hakim är efter avskiljande severed.5, Poindexters fall överfördes till lagmannen Aubrey E. Robinson jr., och därefter att bedöma Greene, som varade ordförande över mer ytterligare förfaranden.

Se det norr kapitlet, 5 för en specificerad beskrivning av avskiljandet av mång--svarandet fallet.

Alla Poindexters väsentliga utmaningar till giltigheten av åtal avfärdades för försök. Det resterande viktigt utfärdar angått: (1) bevarandet av komplottladdningen; (2) grälar upplösningen av klassificera-information; (3) utfärdar upplösningen av släkt till Poindexters immunized kongress- vittnesbörd, under avgörandet som är bekant som Kastigar; och (4) svarande lyckade försök att säkra försökvittnesbörd från tidigare president Reagan.

Bevara och begränsa komplottladdnings

problemen med hemlig information ledde till avskedanden av centralkomplottladdningarna för det norr försök, och liknande problem förväntades för att uppstå i fallet mot Poindexter. På Juni 20, 1989, rörd oberoende rådgivare att avlägsna de original- breda komplottladdningarna som baseras på tillförselen av contrasna och skenmanövern och väsentligen att begränsa laddningen av komplott för att överträda andra väsentliga brottsliga lagar och att förbjuda falsk meddelanden och blockering. Efter arkiveringar och muntligt argument beviljade domstolen regeringen vinkar.

Laddningen var refocused på det olagligt agerar av att konspirera med nord och Secord som döljer aktiviteter från kongress. Oberoende rådgivare argumenterade lyckat att detta begränsa av den skulle komplottladdningen minimerar deinformation problemen som besvärade det norr åtalet.

Hemlig information utfärdar

de hemliga informationstillvägagångssätten agerar (CIPA) tillåtet försökdomstolen effektivt som ska lösas, utfärdar att gälla bruket av den hemliga dokument och vittnesbörden i Poindexter. DomareGreenes övervakning av CIPAEN bearbetar och fruktbara förhandlingar mellan advokat för regeringen och Poindexter som lösas mest tvister med en minimi av fördröjningen.

I kontrast till norden fanns det något långvarigt, eller den viktiga prosessen som angår bilda eller räckvidden av Poindexters CIPA, märker till domstolen för att avslöja hemlig information på försök. Mellan November 27, 1989 och mars 13, 1990, tjänade som Poindexter sådan 11 märker, däribland beskriva möjligheten hemlig vittnesbörd åtta som, som listade hemliga dokument, han önskade att använda på försök, två och en som endast fokuserades på information han önskade att elicit på avlagringen av presidenten Reagan.

Bedöma Greene beställd att alla skillnader över hemlig information förhandlas mellan partierna innan du kommas med för domstolen. Bedöma Greene rymde sex stängda CIPA-utfrågningar för försök började och kompletterade de med flera kortare utfrågningar under försök. Mest av hans avgöranden på relevansen och admissibilityen av hemlig information och på adequacyen av ersättningar som var föreslagna vid regeringen, gjordes från ta av planet.

Sammantaget Poindexters märker CIPA listat ungefärligt 1.200 dokument, only ett litet del av vilka introducerades ultimately på försök. Mest hemlig information täcktes av Regering stipulations till bestämda fakta och andra unclassified ersättningar. Detta tillåtet försök som slätt fortsätter, utan konflikterna som den invecklade norden eller fallet mot gamlan CIA posterar högsta Joseph F. Fernandez som avfärdades tack vare, klassificera-information problems.6

6 ser det Fernandez kapitlet.

Kastigar förfaranden

Poindexter tvingades under ett lån av bruksimmunitet för att vitsorda i 1987 för de valda kommittéerna som utforskar Iran/contra. Som den annan Iran/contra svaranden som gav immunized vittnesbörd för kongress, rörda Poindexter att avfärda åtal på teorin att den överträdde normana enunciated i Kastigar v. Enigt påstår, 7 som argumenterar att hans immunized vittnesbörd användes mot honom i åtalsjuryn och på försök. Detta argument bevisade mislyckat på det jämna försök men segrade ultimately i hovrätten.

7 406 U.S. 411 (1972).

För deras försök avskildes, avfärdade Poindexter som var rörd gemensamt med norden och Hakim, som också hade mottagit immunitet för att vitsorda för kongress, som har laddningarna mot dem, på det slipat som bevisa mot dem fläcktes av deras immunized vittnesbörd. Domare förnekade Gesell som vinkar. Emellertid i deference till försvar fordrar att de skulle bruk ett - den another eventuellt exculpatory immunized vittnesbörden, domaren Gesell i Juni 1988 avskilde försöken.

Poindexter förnyade hans Kastigar vinkar för domaren Greene i Augusti 1989. Efter förhandsmöte och argument 8 som domstolen beställde att två evidentiary utfrågningar rymms. På första hörde domstolen vittnesbörd från förbunden advokat Dan K. Webb och Howard M. Pärlemorfärg angå deras exponering till Poindexters immunized vittnesbörd, innan att sammanfoga kontoret av oberoende rådgivare. Webb och pärlan sammanfogade OICEN bemannar i 1989 och hade inte, för deras tidsbeställningar, vart betvingar till OICS tillvägagångssätt för att isolera sig från Poindexters immunized vittnesbörd. Bedöma Greene grundar deras exponering till Poindexters vittnesbörd för att vara oansenligt och tillåtet båda advokater som deltar i försök.

8 det Poindexter fallet försöktes för hovrätten som härskades i nord som bevittnar utfrågningar var nödvändiga till tillstånd försök av en immunized svarande.

Understödjauppsättningen av domstolutfrågningar angick försökvittnen, vars vittnesbörd kan ha fläckts av Poindexters immunized vittnesbörd. Domaren Greene accepterade domaren som tidigare Gesells granskar av åtalsjuryvittnen och gått ned för att re-examine hans rön. Han vägrade också för att avfärda åtal på basen av potentiell storslagen jurymedlemexponering till den immunized vittnesbörden.

Angående försökvittnen tog domstolen omfattande mäter för att se till att Poindexters immunized meddelanden inte användes mot honom. Domstolen beställde regeringen för att göra meddelanden för en före dettapartesubmission som (mer sistnämnd som avslöjs till Poindexter) allra gjordes av potentiella försökvittnen, för Poindexter gav hans immunized vittnesbörd för kongress i Juli 1987. Domstolen grundar att alla av föreslagen vittnesbörd av mest av de potentiella vittnena hade varit memorialized, för Poindexter visades publicly på Juli 15, 1987 och därför inte fläcktes.

Som för de vittnen vars förväntade, hade försökvittnesbörden som skulle för att inte begränsas till bevisa OIC, förseglat med domstolen före Poindexters immunized vittnesbörd, krävd extra information om domare Greene. Han avslutade att regeringen hade missat för att upprätta, att fem av dess potentiella vittnen var fria av skamfläck och hade beställt dem som syns på en pre-trial utfrågning. Två av de tre vittnena, som syntes ultimately på försök credibly, intygade att deras förutsedda vittnesbörd som skulle för att inte påverkas i any långt av Poindexters immunized vittnesbörd; tredje, norr, vägrat för att göra så.

Norden som påstås på den pre-trial utfrågningen, att han var oförmögen, med hänsyn till några betvingar, för att skilja vad han hade personligen gjort, observerat eller erfarit från vad han hade lärt från att hålla ögonen på Poindexters immunized testimony.9, som för Poindexters förstörelse av presidents- December 1985 busksnår-åtgärda att finna -- viktigt bevisa i blockeringen av kongressen -- Norden bekräftade att han hade sett Poindexter förstöra en lappa av pappers- men insisterat, att han inte visste det var finna, tills Poindexter påstod det faktum i hans immunized vittnesbörd för kongress.

9 norr vittnesbörd, Poindexter Pre-trial utfrågning, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

Domstolen kasserade den norr pre-trial vittnesbörden som inte believable. Norr verkar den fann domstolen, ``att ha gåtts ombord då [på utfrågningen] på beräknad jagar av att försöka att hjälpa hans tidigare kollega och co-svarande. . . vid prevaricating på olikt, utfärdar. . . åsikt 10

, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. för '' 10. 9.

I ett separat posta-försök avgörande tillfogade domstolen att så långt, som förstörelsen av finna angicks, den norr vittnesbörden på hans egna försök om händelsen var inkonsekvent med his fordrar att han inte kunde minnas den vilden av Poindexters immunized vittnesbörd. Domstolen grundar det ”som naturligt är oerhört” den nord, mindes inte ”hans deltagande i en händelse som han bevittnade firsthand, och det var som dramatisk, sannerligen historiskt, som avrivningen upp av extremt sällsyntt presidents- finna.”, 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

Den Reagan stämningen

en av de mest noterbara aspekterna av det Poindexter fallet var svarande lyckade försök till appelltidigare president Reagan att vitsorda på hans försök vid spelad in på video avlagring.

Poindexter sökte först presidents-, och vice presidents- noterar från OIC som del av hans pre-trial upptäcktförfrågan. I en pre-trial utfrågning på September 6, 1989, Poindexters berättade advokater domstolen som presidents- noterar skulle reflekterar den Poindexter informerade presidenten av hans förnekanden till kongressen i 1986 av NSC-aktivitet i service av contrasna, och som noterar skulle ”show vad presidenten berättades om vad gjordes för att stötta contrasna i centralen Amerika, och president samtycke och ratificationen och godkännandet av den aktivitet.”, 12, i sökande vice presidents-, noterar, Poindexters advokater berättade domstolen, som ”han [busken] missa anytime ett möte, amiral som Poindexter sammanfattade honom på det därefter.”, 13

12 Robinson, Poindexter Pre-trial utfrågning, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

Domstolen, för danande ett beslut på huruvida som tvingar OIC till jordbruksprodukter dessa dokument, på September 11, 1989, riktade Poindexter för att spara en före dettapartememo som exakt förklarar, hur dessa skulle dokument hjälper hans defense.14 det, krävde från oberoende rådgivare en laglig anteckning som angår dess ansvar till presidents- och vice presidents- dokument för jordbruksprodukter inte i OICS besittning.

14 åsikt, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

Присуждать осуженным felons в Соединенных Штатах
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Глава 3
Соединенные Штаты v. Джон M. Недостаток

Adm военно-морского флота Poindexter. Джон M. Poindexter было назначено как советник национальной безопасности президента Рейган 4-ого декабря 1985, преуспевающ C. Роберт. McFarlane, которое Poindexter послужило вниз как депутат на 2 лет. Карьера Белого дома Poindexter закончилась 25-ое ноября 1986, когда он принудился отказать in the wake of общественное разоблачение Ирана/contra диверсия.

Poindexter, лт. Колонка Севером и McFarlane Oliver было attorney general Эдвин Meese CIII 3 индивидуалов определенное 25-ого ноября 1986, как knowledgeable диверсии. Наблюдением Poindexter севера и его собственным участием в Иране и contra деятельности были предыдущие фокусы исследования независимо консультанта.

Как в аргументы против северном, уголовное доказательство против Poindexter должно быть собрано быстро прежде чем он был вынужден засвидетельствовать на конгрессе США в лете 1987 под даром ограниченного иммунитета. В противном случае, prosecution Poindexter был правоподобн быть брошенным вызов on the grounds that он был выведен от или in some way повлиян на его иммунизированным съездовским свидетельствованием.

16-ого марта 1988, Poindexter было предъявлено обвинение на 7 обвинения в совершении уголовного преступления возникая от его запутанности в Иране/contra дело, как часть обвинительного акта multi-подсудимого 23 отсчетов. Он был назван с севером, выбытым майором Военно-воздушных сил. Генератор. Ричард v. Secord и Альберт Hakim как член конспирацияа, котор нужно defraud правительство Соединенных Штатов путем производить эффект Иран/contra диверсия и другое действуют.

После того как случаи были разъединены и 2 из первоначально обязанностей были уволены, Poindexter было попытано и осужено в апреле 1990 5 тяжких преступлений, вклюающ: один отсчет конспирировать помешать официальные дознания и продолжения, 2 отсчета мешать съезд, и 2 отсчета ложных заявлений к Congress.1 США. H. Гарольд федеральный окружной судья. Greene присудило ему к six-month термину тюрьмы. В ноябре 1991, осуждения Poindexter были опрокинуты на воззвании. В декабре 1992, США. Верховный суд просклонянный для того чтобы рассмотреть случай.

1 случай Poindexter было попытано K. Дэн консультантов сподвижницы. Webb, J. Кристиан. Mixter, Говард M. Перла, и R. Луиза. Radin.

Poindexter соединило штат совету национальной безопасности в июне 1981, следующ за distinguished военноморской карьерой которая включила столбы пентагона команды и высок-ранжировки линкора. В октябре 1983 он стал депутатом к советнику McFarlane национальной безопасности; среди его подчиненных был северно. Во время tenure Poindexter одногодичного как советник национальной безопасности, который начал в декабре 1985, он надзирал Иран/contra деятельности в которые север сразу включился.

В ноябре 1986, по мере того как втихомолку деятельности были общественно, котор подвергли действию, Poindexter пошло должностным лицом высшей администрации ответственным для резюмировать других верхних советников президента о сбываниях рукояток Ирана. In a series of встречи Белого дома с другими должностными лицами и член конгресса в течении месяца, он повторно lay out ложный вариант трудыов которые дистанцировали президента Рейган от законно спорных 1985 пересылок рукояток сделанных через Израиль, определенно трудыы Хоук-реактивного снаряда ноября 1985.

Хотя Poindexter было оратором, он не был одни ответственными для знать факты. Фактически каждое другое старшее должностное лицо, включая президент Рейган, который услышал его вариант сбываний рукояток в инструктажах в течении ноября 1986 имел причину верить ей были неправильны. Но no one, согласно contemporaneous примечаниям тех инструктажей, поговорили до правильно Poindexter.

Poindexter вместе с севером и другие в ноябре 1986 попытанные для того чтобы shred и изменить бумажная тропка отражая их Иран/contra деятельности. Между прочим, Poindexter разрушило единственный существуя подписанный президентский находить covert-действия который было предназначен утвердить ретроактивно запутанность C I A в пересылке хоуков ноября 1985.

Poindexter и север были более менее успешно в искоренять тропку компьютер-сообщения их Ирана/contra деятельности. Poindexter и север часто связывали до специальный канал Poindexter, компьютерный эксперт, установило вверх на систему компьютера NSC. Этот канал, известный как «приватное незаполненный чек,» позволил Poindexter и север передать сообщения to each other без их будучи направлянным через каналы в которых другие на штате NSC смогли экранировать их.

Между 22-ое до 29 ноября 1986, север уничтоженный от его сообщений компьютерного файла 736, и Poindexter уничтожил 5.012 сообщения во время такого же period.2 несмотря на эти пропускания, Белый back-up дома по заведенному порядку сохраняемый связывает содержать тесьмой все данные в системе на 2 недели для того чтобы защитить против невольной потери. Когда Иран/contra дело подвергся действию в последнее ноябрь 1986, агенство связей Белого дома, которое управляет системой компьютера NSC, сохранило резервные ленты датируя начиная с 15-ого ноября. Исследователи, поэтому, могли retrieve экземпляры всех сообщений которые находились в компьютерных файлах Poindexter-Севера в mid- ноябре 1986 прежде чем большое часть из пропусканий произошла. Эти сообщения компьютера стали важным доказательством как в Poindexter, так и в северных пробах.

2 Williams, свидетельствование Poindexter пробное, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.

Poindexter впущенное к много из его деятельностей перед специальная комиссия в июле 1987 под дар testimonial невосприимчивости, который предотвратил его допущения от быть использованным против его в нисколько уголовном продолжении. Потому что президент Рейган не засвидетельствовал в что форум, Poindexter был вызван для того чтобы ответить вопрос который преобладал слухи: Президент знал около и одобрить диверсию сбываний рукояток Ирана продолжает к contras? Poindexter не ответило нет, «стопы самеца оленя здесь с мной.» 3, котор он сказал он нарочито задержало информацию от президента Рейган потому что ``я хотело президента иметь некоторое deniability так НОП он был бы защищен. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, свидетельствование специальная комиссия, 7/15/87, P. 95.

4 Ibid., P. 101.

Смотрящ на уголовную пробу, Poindexter confronted по-разному дилемма: Не было no longer вопросом защищать президента а защищать против 5 обвинения в совершении уголовного преступления. Перед съездом, свидетельствование Poindexter значительно corroborated запирательства президента Рейган повторные осведомленности Ирана/contra диверсия. В зале судебных заседаний, Poindexter установило оборону высок-утверждения, пытая убедить присяжного что президент одобрил его действия, включая те которые привели к в уголовное обвинение. Вместо принимать стойку в его собственной обороне, однако, он вызвал президента Рейган для того чтобы засвидетельствовать.

Pre-Trial продолжения

США. A. Gerhard федеральный окружной судья. Gesell в июне 1988 приказало, чтобы аргументы против Poindexter multi-подсудимого, севером, Secord и Hakim было severed.5 после severance, случай Poindexter было возвращено к главному судье Aubrey E. Robinson, cJr, и после этого судить Greene, которое председательствовало над более дополнительными продолжениями.

5 для более детального описания severance случая multi-подсудимого, см. северную главу.

Вся из возможностей Poindexter субстантивных к ценностьи обвинительного акта были уволены перед пробой. Остальные существенный вопрос относились: (1) консервация обязанности конспирацияа; (2) разрешение споров классифицировать-информации; (3) разрешение вопросов отнесенных к свидетельствованию Poindexter иммунизированному съездовскому, под управлять известный как Kastigar; и (4) усилие подсудимого успешно к безопасный пробному свидетельствованию от бывшия президент Рейган.

Сохранять и суживать проблемы обязанности

конспирацияа с расклассифицированной информаци информацией вели к отставке центральных обязанностей конспирацияа перед северной пробой, и были ы, что возникли подобные проблемы в аргументы против Poindexter. 20-ого июня 1989, независимо консультанты двинули для того чтобы исключить первоначально обширные обязанности конспирацияа основанные на поставке contras и диверсии и существенн сужать обязанность конспирацияа для того чтобы нарушить другие субстантивные уголовные законоположения, запрещая ложные заявления и затруднение. После опиловок и устно аргумента, суд дарил движение правительства.

Обязанность была refocused на противозаконное действие конспирировать с севером и Secord скрыть деятельности от съезда. Независимо консультанты поспорили успешно что этот суживать обязанности конспирацияа уменьшьет проблемы классифицировать-информации plagued северный prosecution.

Расклассифицированные информационные издания

расклассифицированные процедуры по информаци информации, котор действуют (CIPA) позволили пробный суд эффективно разрешить вопросы включая пользу засекреченных документов и свидетельствования в Poindexter. Судите наблюдение Greene процесса CIPA и плодотворные переговоры между разрешенными консультантами для правительства и Poindexter большинств спорам с минимумом задерживают.

In contrast to север, не было увеличиваемо или значительно судебный процечч относительно формы или объема извещений о CIPA Poindexter к суду показать расклассифицировал информаци информация на пробе. Между 27-ое ноября 1989 и 13-ого марта 1990, Poindexter служило 11 такое извещение, включая 8 которое listed засекреченные документы он хотели использовать на пробе, описывая по возможности расклассифицированном свидетельствовании 2, и одном сфокусированном единственно на информации, котор он хотел выпытать на низложении президента Рейган.

Судите Greene приказал, чтобы все разницы над расклассифицированной информаци информацией были обсужены между партиями перед быть принесенным перед судом. Судите Greene придержал 6 закрынных слухов CIPA перед пробой начал и дополнил те с несколькими более скоро слухов во время пробы. Большой часть из его rulings на релевантности и приемлемости расклассифицированной информаци информации, и на соответствии замещений предложенных правительством, была сделана от стенда.

Я приняты совместно, извещения о CIPA Poindexter перечислили приблизительно 1.200 документов, только малая часть of which предельно ввел на пробе. Большинств расклассифицированная информаци информация была предусматривана stipulations Правительства к некоторым фактам и другим unclassified замещениям. Это позволило пробу продолжать ровно, без конфликтов которые осложнили север или станции C I A аргументы против F. Иосиф бывшей главное. Fernandez, которое было уволено из-за классифицировать-информации problems.6

6 видит главу Fernandez.

Продолжения Poindexter

Kastigar были вынуждены под даром невосприимчивости пользы засвидетельствовать в 1987 перед специальная комиссия расследуя Иран/contra. Как сделал другой Иран/contra подсудимые дали иммунизированное свидетельствование перед съездом, Poindexter двинутое для того чтобы уволить обвинительный акт на теории что она нарушила стандарты enunciated в Kastigar v. Соединенные Штаты, 7 споря что его иммунизированное свидетельствование было использовано против его в большого жюри и на пробе. Этот аргумент доказал неудачное на пробном уровне но предельно превалировал в апелляционном суде.

7 406 США. 411 (1972).

Прежде чем их пробы были разъединены, Poindexter двинутое jointly with север и Hakim, который также получили невосприимчивость для того чтобы засвидетельствовать перед съездом, для того чтобы иметь обязанности против их уволило на земле что доказательство против их было tainted их иммунизированным свидетельствованием. Судья Gesell отказало то движение. Однако, в deference к обороне требует что они использовали одно - another по возможности exculpatory иммунизированное свидетельствование, судья Gesell в июне 1988 разъединило пробы.

Poindexter возобновило его движение Kastigar перед судьей Greene в августе 1989. После инструктажа и аргумента, 8 суд приказали, чтобы 2 evidentiary слуха держались. На первом, суд услышал свидетельствование от K. Дэн консультантов сподвижницы. Webb и Говард M. Pearl относительно их подвержения к свидетельствованию Poindexter иммунизированному перед соединять офис независимо консультантов. Webb и перла соединили штат OIC в 1989 и не имели, перед их назначениями, после того как они были subject to процедуры по OIC изолировать от свидетельствования Poindexter иммунизированного. Судите Greene нашл их подвержение к свидетельствованию Poindexter для того чтобы быть незначительно и позволил обоим юристам участвовать в пробе.

8 случай Poindexter были попытаны перед апелляционным судом управляемым в севере что слухи заверителя были обязательно для того чтобы позволить пробу иммунизированной подсудимого.

Второй комплект судебных процессов относился пробные заверители, свидетельствование которых может быть tainted свидетельствованием Poindexter's иммунизированным. Судья Greene признавало просмотрение Gesell судьи более предыдущее заверителей большого жюри и склоняло переосвидетельствовать его заключения. Он также отказал уволить обвинительный акт on the basis of потенциальная грандиозная подвержение juror к иммунизированному свидетельствованию.

Относительно пробных заверителей, суд принял обширные измерения обеспечить что заявления Poindexter иммунизированные не были использованы против его. Суд приказал правительство для того чтобы сделать ex представление parte (более поздно показанное к Poindexter) всех заявлений сделанных потенциальными пробными заверителями прежде чем Poindexter дало его иммунизированное свидетельствование перед съездом в июле 1987. Суд нашел что все предложенное свидетельствование большого части из потенциальных заверителей было memorialized прежде чем Poindexter появилось общественно 15-ого июля 1987, и поэтому не было tainted.

Как для тех заверителей предпологали пробное свидетельствование не будет ограничено к доказательству OIC загерметизировал с судом до свидетельствования Poindexter иммунизированного, дополнительной информации судьи требуемого Greene. Он заключил что правительство не сумело установить что 5 из своих потенциальных заверителей были свободно taint и приказало им, котор нужно появиться на pre-trial слух. 2 из 3 заверителей предельно появились на пробу credibly подтвердили что их предвидимое свидетельствование не будет повлияно на в любом случае свидетельствованием Poindexter's иммунизированным; третье, северно, отказано для того чтобы сделать так.

Север заявленный на pre-trial слухе что он был неспособен, по отношению к любому вопросу, для того чтобы различить он лично сделал, после того как он наблюдал или после того как он испытан от он выучил от наблюдать testimony.9 Poindexter иммунизированное как для разрушения Poindexter находить covert-действия декабря 1985 президентский -- важное доказательство в затруднении съезда -- Север подтвердил что он увидел, что Poindexter разрушило куск бумаги но настаиван что он не знал ему был находить до тех пор пока Poindexter не заявить тот факт в его иммунизированном свидетельствовании перед съездом.

9 северное свидетельствование, слух Poindexter Pre-trial, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.

Суд излучил северное pre-trial свидетельствование как правдоподобно. Северно, кажется, что embarked найденный суд, ``на том времени [на слухе] на высчитанном курсе пытать помочь его бывшим коллегау и co-подсудимому. . . путем prevaricating на различных вопросах. . . мнение 10

, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. '' 10. 9.

В отдельно столб-пробе управляя, суд добавил что насколько разрушение находить, северное свидетельствование на его собственной пробе о случае было сбивчиво с его заявкой что он не смог вспомнить ее независимо свидетельствования Poindexter иммунизированного. Суд считал его «своиственно неимоверно» что север не вспомнил «его участие в случае, котор он witnessed firsthand и то был как драматически, деиствительно историческо, как срывать вверх весьма редкий президентский находить.» 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.

Subpoena одним

Рейган самых знатных аспектов случая Poindexter было удачная попытка подсудимого вызвать бывшия президент Рейган для того чтобы засвидетельствовать на его пробе videotaped низложением.

Poindexter сперва изыскивало президентские и вице президентские примечания от OIC как часть его запросов pre-trial открытия. В pre-trial слухе 6-ого сентября 1989, юристы Poindexter сказали суду что президентские примечания отразят то Poindexter сообщили президент его запирательств к съезду в 1986 из деятельности при NSC in support of contras, и что примечания «покажут президент был сказан о сделал для того чтобы поддержать contras в Центральной Америке, и согласие президента и утверждение и утверждение той RABOTы.» 12 в изыскивать вице президентские примечания, юристы Poindexter сказали суд которому «в любое время он [кустик] пропустил встречу, Admiral Poindexter резюмировали его на ей потом.» 13

12 Robinson, слух Poindexter Pre-trial, 9/6/89, P. 18.

13 Ibid., P. 19.

Суд, перед делать решение дальше направил ли вынудить OIC для того чтобы произвести эти документы, 11-ого сентября 1989, Poindexter для того чтобы хранить ex памятку parte объясняя точно как эти документы помогли бы его defense.14, котор оно требовало от независимо консультантов законного меморандума относительно своей ответственности произвести президентские и вице президентские документы не в владении OIC.

14 мнение, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due res

Het veroordelen van veroordeelde misdadigers in de Verenigde Staten
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
Hoofdstuk 3
Verenigde Staten v. John M. De Ondeugd

Adm van de Marine van Poindexter. John M. Poindexter werd benoemd als de nationale veiligheidsadviseur van President Reagan's op 4 December, 1985, die Robert C. slaagt. McFarlane, die Poindexter onder als afgevaardigde twee jaar had gediend. Beëindigde de carrière van het Witte Huis van Poindexter 25 November, 1986, toen hij om in het spoor van de openbare onthulling van Iran/de contraafleidingsactie werd gedwongen af te treden.

Poindexter, Lt. Col. Oliver North en McFarlane waren de drie individuenProcureur Algemene Edwin Meese III die op 25 November, 1986 wordt geïdentificeerdz, goed geïnformeerd van de afleidingsactie. Supervisie van Poindexter van het Noorden en zijn eigen participatie in Iran en contraverrichtingen waren vroege nadruk van het onderzoek van het Onafhankelijke Advies.

Zoals in het geval tegen het Noorden, moest het misdadige bewijsmateriaal tegen Poindexter snel worden verzameld alvorens hij om op Capitol Hill in de zomer van 1987 onder een toelage van beperkte immuniteit werd gedwongen te getuigen. Anders, zou de vervolging van Poindexter waarschijnlijk worden uitgedaagd omdat het was voortgekomen uit of op één of andere manier door zijn geïmmuniseerde" congresverklaring werd beïnvloed.

Op 16 Maart, 1988, werd Poindexter op zeven misdrijflasten aangeklaagd die van zijn betrokkenheid in Iran/de contrazaak, als deel van een aanklacht van de 23 tellings multi-gedaagde het gevolg zijn. Hij werd genoemd met het Noorden, teruggetrokken Luchtmacht Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord en Albert Hakim als lid van de samenzwering om de Overheid van Verenigde Staten te bedriegen door Iran/de contraafleidingsactie en andere handelingen uit te voeren.

Nadat de gevallen werden gescheiden en twee van de originele lasten verworpen, werd Poindexter geprobeerd en werd veroordeeld in April 1990 wegens vijf misdrijven, die omvatten: één telling van het samenzweren om officiële onderzoeken en werkzaamheden, twee tellingen van het belemmeren van Congres, en twee tellingen van valse verklaringen te belemmeren aan Congress.1 de V.S. De Rechter Harold H. van het district. Greene veroordeelde hem aan een halfjaarlijkse gevangenistermijn. In November 1991, werden de overtuigingen van Poindexter ten val gebracht op beroep. In December 1992, de V.S. Het opperste Hof daalde om het geval te herzien.

1 het geval Poindexter werd geprobeerd door Verwant Advies Dan K. Webb, Christian J. Mixter, Howard M. Parel, en Louise R. Radin.

Poindexter werd lid van het Nationale Personeel van de Veiligheidsraad in Juni 1981, na een voorname zeecarrière die slagschipbevel en high-ranking posten van het Pentagoon omvatte. In Oktober 1983 werd hij afgevaardigde aan de Adviseur McFarlane van de Nationale Veiligheid; onder zijn ondergeschikten was het Noorden. Tijdens de éénjarige ambtstermijn van Poindexter als nationale veiligheidsadviseur, die in December 1985 begon, hield toezicht hij op Iran/op de contraverrichtingen waarin het Noorden direct geïmpliceerd was.

In November 1986, aangezien de geheime verrichtingen openbaar blootgesteld werden, werd Poindexter de hogere ambtenaar van het Beleid verantwoordelijk voor het informeren van de andere hoogste adviseurs van de Voorzitter over de wapenverkoop van Iran. In een reeks van de vergaderingen van het Witte Huis met andere ambtenaren en leden van Congres door de maand, maakte hij herhaaldelijk een valse versie van de transacties op die op een afstand President Reagan van de juridisch twijfelachtige de wapensverzendingen hielden van 1985 die door Israël, in het bijzonder de de havik-Raket van November 1985 transactie worden gemaakt.

Hoewel Poindexter de woordvoerder was, was hij niet alleen verantwoordelijk voor het kennen van de feiten. Vrijwel elke andere hogere ambtenaar, met inbegrip van President Reagan, die zijn versie van de wapenverkoop in briefings door November 1986 hoorde had reden te geloven het verkeerd was. Maar toch sprak niemand, volgens gelijktijdige nota's van die briefings, tot correcte Poindexter.

Poindexter samen met het Noorden en anderen in November 1986 probeerden om de document sleep te verscheuren en te veranderen wijzend op hun Iran/contraactiviteiten. Onder andere, vernietigde Poindexter de enige bestaande ondertekende presidentiële heimelijk-actie Vindend die bedoeld was om de betrokkenheid van de CIA in de verzending van de Haviken van November retroactief te machtigen 1985.

Poindexter en het Noorden waren minder succesvol in het uitroeien van de computer-bericht sleep van hun Iran/contraactiviteiten. Poindexter en het Noorden deelden door een speciaal kanaal vaak mee dat Poindexter, een computerdeskundige, op het computersysteem NSC had opgezet. Dit kanaal, dat als „Privé Lege Controle,“ wordt bekend stond Poindexter en het Noorden toe om berichten aan elkaar die zonder hun af te lossen via kanalen wordt geleid waarin anderen op het personeel NSC hen konden onderzoeken.

Tussen November 22 tot 29, 1986, het Noorden geschrapt van zijn computerdossier 736 schrapten de berichten, en Poindexter 5.012 berichten die tijdens zelfde period.2 ondanks deze schrappingen, de uit routine gespaard van het Witte Huis hulpbanden alle gegevens in het systeem bevatten twee weken tegen achteloos verlies te beschermen. Toen Iran/de contrazaak in recent November 1986 werd blootgesteld, het Communicatie van het Witte Huis Agentschap, dat het computersysteem NSC beheert, behield de hulpbanden die van 15 dateren November. De onderzoekers, daarom, konden exemplaren van alle berichten terugwinnen die in de het poindexter-Noorden computerdossiers in midden van november 1986 waren alvorens de meeste schrappingen voorkwamen. Deze computerberichten werden belangrijk bewijsmateriaal in zowel de proeven van Poindexter als van het Noorden.

2 Williams, Poindexter ProefVerklaring, 3/15/90, blz. 1752-65.

Poindexter liet aan veel van zijn activiteiten toe voor de Uitgezochte Commissies in Juli 1987 onder een toelage van testimonial immuniteit, die zijn toelating tegen hem in om het even welke het misdadige te werk gaan worden gebruikt verhinderde. Omdat President Reagan niet in dat forum getuigde, werd Poindexter geroepen om de vraag te beantwoorden die de hoorzittingen overheerste: Kende keurde de Voorzitter en ongeveer de afleidingsactie van de de wapenverkoopopbrengst van Iran aan goed contras? Poindexter beantwoordde hier nr, de „buckeinden met me.“ 3 hij zei hij doelbewust de informatie van President Reagan omdat ``inhield ik de Voorzitter één of andere deniability wilde hebben zodat hij worden beschermd. . . . '' 4

3 Poindexter, de Uitgezochte Verklaring van Commissies, 7/15/87, p. 95.

4 Ibid., p. 101.

Onder ogen ziend een misdadige proef, confronteerde Poindexter een verschillend dilemma: Het was niet meer een kwestie om de Voorzitter te beschermen maar het verdedigen van tegen misdrijf vijf laadt. Vóór Congres, meest significante verklaring van Poindexter bevestigde de de herhaalde ontkenning van President Reagan's van voorlichting van Iran/de contraafleidingsactie. In de rechtszaal, zette Poindexter een hoog-vergunningsdefensie op, die de jury dat de Voorzitter zijn acties had goedgekeurd, met inbegrip van die probeert te overtuigen die in misdadige lasten resulteerden. In plaats van het nemen van de tribune in zijn eigen defensie, echter, riep hij President Reagan om te getuigen.

Pre-Trial Werkzaamheden

de V.S. De Rechter Gerhard A. van het district. Gesell in Juni 1988 gaf opdracht dat het multi-gedaagdegeval tegen Poindexter, het Noorden, Secord en Hakim severed.5 na verbreking is, werd het geval van Poindexter overgebracht naar Belangrijkste Rechter Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., en dan om Greene te beoordelen, die verdere werkzaamheden voorzat.

5 voor een uitvoerigere beschrijving van de verbreking van het multi-gedaagdegeval, zie het hoofdstuk van het Noorden.

Werden de aanzienlijke uitdagingen van elk van Poindexter aan de geldigheid van de aanklacht verworpen vóór proef. De resterende belangrijke betrokken kwesties: (1) het behoud van de samenzweringslast; (2) de resolutie van classificeren-informatiegeschillen; (3) de resolutie van kwesties had op de geïmmuniseerde congresverklaring van Poindexter betrekking, onder de uitspraak bekend als Kastigar; en (4) de succesvolle inspanning van de gedaagde om proefverklaring van vroegere President Reagan te beveiligen.

Het bewaren van en het Versmallen van de Problemen van de Last

van de Samenzwering met geclassificeerde informatie leidden tot het ontslag van de centrale samenzweringslasten vóór de proef van het Noorden, en de gelijkaardige problemen zouden voordoen zich in het geval tegen Poindexter. Op 20 Juni, 1989, bewoog het Onafhankelijke Advies zich om de originele brede samenzweringslasten te elimineren die op de levering van contras en de afleidingsactie worden gebaseerd en de last van samenzwering wezenlijk te versmallen om andere aanzienlijke misdadige statuten, verbiedend vals verklaringen en obstakel te overtreden. Na het indienen en mondeling argument, verleende het hof de motie van de Overheid.

De last werd opnieuw geconcentreerd waarop de onwettige handeling van het samenzweren met het Noorden en Secord om activiteiten van Congres te verbergen. Het onafhankelijke Advies debatteerde met succes dat dit het versmallen van de samenzweringslast de classificeren-informatieproblemen zou minimaliseren die de vervolging van het Noorden teisterden.

De geclassificeerde Informatie geeft

het Geclassificeerde Akte van de Procedures van de Informatie (uit CIPA) toestond effectief het proefhof om kwesties op te lossen die het gebruik van geclassificeerde documenten en verklaring in Poindexter impliceren. De supervisie van Greene van de rechter van het proces CIPA en de vruchtbare onderhandelingen tussen advies voor de Overheid en Poindexter loste de meeste geschillen met een minimum van vertraging op.

In tegenstelling tot het Noorden, er geen verlengd of significant proces betreffende de vorm of het toepassingsgebied van Van Poindexter cipa- berichten aan het hof was om geclassificeerde informatie bij proef te onthullen. Tussen November 27, 1989, en Maart 13, 1990, diende Poindexter 11 dergelijke berichten, met inbegrip van acht dat vermelde geclassificeerde documenten die hij heeft willen om bij proef, twee beschrijvend mogelijke geclassificeerde verklaring, en één gebruiken alleen geconcentreerd op informatie die hij heeft willen om bij het deposito van President Reagan onthullen.

De rechter Greene gaf opdracht dat alle verschillen over geclassificeerde informatie tussen de partijen alvorens wordt gebracht voor het hof worden besproken. De rechter Greene hield zes gesloten hoorzittingen CIPA alvorens de proef begon en met die met verscheidene kortere hoorzittingen tijdens proef aanvulde. Het grootste deel van zijn uitspraken op de relevantie en de toelaatbaarheid van geclassificeerde informatie, en op de geschiktheid van substituties die door de Overheid worden voorgesteld, werden gemaakt van de bank.

Samen genomen, Van Poindexter maakten een lijst de cipa- berichten ongeveer van 1.200 documenten, slechts een kleine fractie waar uiteindelijk bij proef werd geïntroduceerdb. De meeste geclassificeerde informatie werd behandeld door de bepalingen van de Overheid aan bepaalde feiten en andere niet geclassificeerde substituties. Dit stond de proef toe om, zonder de conflicten het dat ingewikkelde Noorden of geval tegen de vroegere post belangrijkst Joseph F. regelmatig te werk te gaan van de CIA. Fernandez, wat wegens classificeren-informatie problems.6 6

werd verworpen ziet het hoofdstuk van Fernandez.

Werkzaamheden Poindexter werden

van Kastigar gedwongen onder een toelage van gebruiksimmuniteit om in 1987 voor de Uitgezochte Commissies te getuigen die Iran onderzoeken/contra. Zoals andere Iran/de contragedaagden dat geïmmuniseerdes verklaring vóór Congres gaven, Poindexter die wordt bewogen om de aanklacht op de theorie dat te verwerpen het de normen overtrad die in Kastigar v. worden opgesomd. Verenigde Staten, 7 stellen die dat zijn geïmmuniseerdee verklaring tegen hem in de Grote Jury en bij proef werd gebruikt. Dit argument bleek niet succesvol op het proefniveau maar uiteindelijk heerste in het Hof van Beroep.

de 7 406 V.S. 411 (1972).

Alvorens hun proeven werden gescheiden, Poindexter die samen met het Noorden en Hakim wordt bewogen, dat ook immuniteit om vóór Congres hadden ontvangen te getuigen, om de verworpen lasten tegen hen te hebben op grond van het feit dat het bewijsmateriaal tegen hen door hun geïmmuniseerden verklaring werd bedorven. De rechter Gesell ontkende die motie. Nochtans, in deferentie aan defensieeisen dat zij één - de misschien verontschuldigende geïmmuniseerdec verklaring zouden gebruiken van iemand anders, oordeel Gesell in Juni 1988 de proeven scheidde.

Poindexter vernieuwde zijn motie Kastigar vóór Rechter Greene in Augustus 1989. Na het informeren en argument, 8 het bevolen hof dat twee bewijskrachtige hoorzittingen worden gehouden. Bij de eerste, hoorde het hof verklaring van Verwant Advies Dan K. Webb en Howard M. Parel betreffende hun blootstelling aan de geïmmuniseerdeo verklaring van Poindexter alvorens bij het Bureau van Onafhankelijk Advies zich aan te sluiten. Webb en de Parel werden lid van het personeel OIC in 1989 en niet, vóór hun benoemingen, waren onderworpen aan de procedures van OIC geweest om van de geïmmuniseerdee verklaring van Poindexter te isoleren. De rechter Greene vond onbelangrijk hun blootstelling aan de verklaring van Poindexter om te zijn en stond beide procureurs toe om aan de proef deel te nemen.

8 het geval Poindexter werd voor het Hof van Beroep dat in het Noorden wordt beslist dat geprobeerd de getuigenhoorzittingen noodzakelijk waren om de proef van een geïmmuniseerdea gedaagde toe te laten.

De tweede reeks hofhoorzittingen betrof proefgetuigen, de van wie verklaring door de geïmmuniseerdea verklaring van Poindexter kan bedorven te zijn. De rechter Greene keurde het vroegere overzicht van Gesell van de Rechter van de Grote getuigen van de Jury goed en gedaald om zijn bevindingen opnieuw te onderzoeken. Hij weigerde ook om de aanklacht op basis van potentiële grote jurylidblootstelling aan de geïmmuniseerde verklaring te verwerpen.

Betreffende proefgetuigen, trof het hof uitgebreide maatregelen om ervoor te zorgen dat de geïmmuniseerdeb verklaringen van Poindexter niet tegen hem werden gebruikt. Het hof bevolen de Overheid om een ex partevoorlegging (te maken die later aan Poindexter wordt onthuld) van alle verklaringen die door potentiële proefgetuigen vóór Poindexter worden afgelegd gaf zijn geïmmuniseerded verklaring vóór Congres in Juli 1987. Het hof vond dat alle voorgestelde verklaring van de meeste potentiële getuigen memorialized alvorens Poindexter openbaar op 15 Juli, 1987 verscheen, en daarom was niet bedorven was geweest.

Zoals voor die getuigen de van wie verwachte proefverklaring niet tot het bewijsmateriaal OIC beperkt zou zijn met het hof voorafgaand aan de geïmmuniseerdev verklaring van Poindexter, de vereiste extra informatie van de Rechter Greene had verzegeld. Hij besloot dat de Overheid er niet in was geslaagd om vast te stellen dat vijf van zijn potentiële getuigen vrij van vlekje waren en tot hen om bij een pre-trial hoorzitting opdracht gaven te verschijnen. Twee van de drie getuigen die uiteindelijk geloofwaardig bij proef verschenen bevestigden dat hun voorzien verklaring in geen geval door de geïmmuniseerdeb verklaring van Poindexter zou beïnvloed worden; het derde, het Noorden, weigerde dit te doen.

Het noorden verklaarde bij de pre-trial hoorzitting dat hij, met betrekking tot om het even welk onderwerp, niet kon onderscheiden wat hij persoonlijk had gedaan had, waargenomen of ervaren van wat hij van het letten op Poindexter geïmmuniseerdea testimony.9 zoals voor de vernietiging van Poindexter van het presidentiële de heimelijk-actie van December 1985 Vinden had geleerd -- belangrijk bewijsmateriaal in het obstakel van Congres -- Het noorden erkende dat hij Poindexter een stuk van document had zien vernietigen maar erop aangedrongen dat hij niet weten het het Vinden was tot Poindexter dat feit in zijn geïmmuniseerdee verklaring vóór Congres verklaarde.

9 de Verklaring van het noorden, Poindexter Pre-trial Hoorzitting, 12/13/89, blz. 374-77.

Het hof verwierp pre-trial verklaring van het Noorden niet geloofwaardig. Het noorden, het gevonden hof, ``schijnt op dat ogenblik [bij de hoorzitting] op de berekende cursus ingescheept te zijn van het proberen om zijn vroegere collega en mede-gedaagde bij te staan. . . door op diverse kwesties uitvluchten te zoeken. . . '' 10

10 Advies, Poindexter, 3/8/90, p. 9.

Bij een afzonderlijke post-proef uitspraak, voegde het hof toe dat wat betreft de vernietiging van het Vinden, de verklaring van het Noorden bij zijn eigen proef over de gebeurtenis met zijn eis inconsistent was dat hij niet het kon herinneren onafhankelijk van de geïmmuniseerdet verklaring van Poindexter. Het hof vond „inherent ongelooflijk“ het die het Noorden „zijn participatie in een gebeurtenis niet herinnerde hij uit de eerste hand en die was dramatisch getuigde, inderdaad historisch, als tearing omhooggaand van uiterst het zeldzame Presidentiële Vinden.“ 11

11 Ibid., 5/29/90, blz. 32-40.

De Reagan Dagvaarding

Één van de opmerkelijkste aspecten van het geval Poindexter was de succesvolle poging van de gedaagde om vroegere President Reagan te roepen om bij zijn proef door op videocassette opgenomen deposito te getuigen.

Poindexter zocht eerst presidentiële en ondeugd presidentiële nota's van OIC als deel van zijn pre-trial ontdekkingsverzoeken. In een pre-trial hoorzitting op 6 September, 1989, vertelden de procureurs van Poindexter het hof dat de presidentiële nota's een weerspiegeling zouden vormen van dat Poindexter de Voorzitter over zijn ontkenning aan Congres in 1986 van activiteit NSC tot steun van contras informeerde, en dat de nota's „zouden tonen wat de Voorzitter werd verteld over wat contras in Midden-Amerika werd gedaan steunen, en de toestemming van de Voorzitter en de bekrachtiging en goedkeuring van die activiteit.“ 12 in het zoeken van ondeugd presidentiële nota's, vertelden de procureurs van Poindexter het hof dat „wanneer hij [Bush] een vergadering miste, Admiraal Poindexter hem daarna op het.“ informeerde 13

12 Robinson, Poindexter Pre-trial Hoorzitting, 9/6/89, p. 18.

13 Ibid., p. 19.

Het hof, alvorens een besluit inzake te nemen of om OIC te dwingen om deze documenten, op 11 September, 1989 uit te vaardigen, geleide Poindexter om een ex partememorandum in te dienen dat precies verklaart hoe deze documenten zijn defense.14 zouden bijstaan het van Onafhankelijk Advies een wettelijke mededeling betreffende zijn verantwoordelijkheid om presidentiële en ondeugd presidentiële documenten niet in het bezit van OIC uit te vaardigen vereiste.

14 advies, Poindexter, 9/11/89, p. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.

The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.

يحكم يحكم مجرمات في الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
فصل 3
الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة [ف.]. جون [م.]. [بويندإكستر]

قوّة بحريّة رذيلة [أدم]. جون [م.]. عيّنت [بويندإكستر] كان كرئيس ريغان أمن وطنيّ مستشارة في ديسمبر - كانون الأوّل 4, 1985, ينجح روبرت [ك.]. [مكفرلن], الّذي [بويندإكستر] كان قد خدم دون كنائبة لاثنان سنون. [بويندإكستر] البيت الأبيض أنهى مهنة نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 25, 1986, عندما هو كان أجبرت أن يستقيل [إين ث وك وف] الكشف عامّة من إيران/[كنترا] تحويل.

[بويندإكستر], [لت]. [كل.] أوليفر كان شمال و [مكفرلن] الثلاثة فردات [أتّورني جنرل] أدوين ميس [إييي] يعيّن في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 25, 1986, بما أنّ حسن اطّلاع من التحويل. [بويندإكستر] كان مراقبات الشمال وه خاصّة مشاركة في إيران و [كنترا] عمليات بؤرة مبكّرة من إستشارة مستقلّة تحقيق.

بما أنّ في الحالة ضدّ شماليّة, بيّنة إجراميّة ضدّ [بويندإكستر] اضطرّ كنت جمعت سريعا قبل أن أجبرت هو كان أن يشهد على [كبيتول هيلّ] في الفصل صيف من 1987 تحت منحة من مناعة محدودة. خلاف ذلك, كان المقاضاة [بويندإكستر] مرجّحة أن يكون تحدّيت [أن ث غرووندس ثت] هو كان استنتجت من أو [إين سم وي] أثرت ب ه يمنّع شهادة خاصّ بالكونغرس.

اتّهمت في مارس - آذار 16, 1988, [بويندإكستر] كان على سبعة جريمة حشوات ينشأ من تورطه في إيران/[كنترا] شأن, كجزء 23 حساب [مولتي-دفندنت] تهمة. هو كان عيّنت مع شمال, يتقاعد [أير فورس] [مج]. [جن.]. ريتشارد [ف.]. يتصرّف [سكرد] و [ألبرت] حكيم كعضوة من التآمر أن يسلب الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة حكومة ب ينجز إيران/[كنترا] تحويل وأخرى.

عقب فصلت الحالات كان واثنان من الحشوات أصليّة صرفت, [بويندإكستر] كان حاولت وحكمت في أبريل - نيسان 1990 من خمسة جرائم, يتضمّن: واحدة حساب من يتآمر أن يعيق رسميّة تحقيقات وإجراءات, اثنان حسابات من يعيق إجتماع, واثنان حسابات من بيانات زائفة إلى [كنغرسّ.1] الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة منطقة قاضية هارولد [ه.]. [غرين] حكمه إلى دام ستة أشهر سجن عبارة. في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 1991, [بويندإكستر] قلبت قناعة كان على إستئناف. في ديسمبر - كانون الأوّل 1992, الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة محكمة عليا ينخفض أن يراجع الحالة.

حاولت 1 [بويندإكستر] حالة كان بشريكة إستشارة [دن] [ك.]. [وبّ], مسيحية [ج.]. [ميإكستر], هوارد [م.]. لؤلؤة, ولويز [ر.]. [ردين].

[بويندإكستر] تلاقى الوطنيّة أمن مجلس ملاكة في يونيو - حزيران 1981, يتبع مهنة متميّزة بحريّة أنّ تضمّن بارجة أمر و [هيغ-رنكينغ] بانتاغون موقعات. في أكتوبر - تشرين الأوّل 1983 أصبح هو نائبة إلى أمن وطنيّ مستشارة [مكفرلن]; كان بين تابعاته شماليّة. أثناء [بويندإكستر] تول [أن-ر] كأمن وطنيّ مستشارة, أيّ بدأ في ديسمبر - كانون الأوّل 1985, راقب هو إيران/[كنترا] عمليات في أيّ شمال كان مباشرة تضمّنت.

في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 1986, بما أنّ العمليات سرّيّة كان أصبحوا علنا يعرض, أصبح [بويندإكستر] الكبريات إدارة مسؤولة مسؤولة ل يلخّص الرئيس أخرى مستشارات علويّة حول إيران [أرمس سل]. [إين ا سريس وف] البيت الأبيض اجتماعات مع أخرى مسؤولات وأعضاء الإجتماع طوال الشهر, [لي ووت] هو بشكل متكرّر صيغة زائفة من الصفقات أنّ أبعد رئيس ريغان من ال قانونيّا مشكوكة 1985 [أرمس شيبمنت] يجعل من خلال إسرائيل, بشكل خاصّ نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 1985 [هوك-ميسّيل] صفقة.

رغم أنّ [بويندإكستر] كان الناطق بلسان, [ب] هو لم بانفراد مسؤولة ل يعرف الحقائق. تلقّى في الواقع كلّ أخرى مسؤول كبير, بما في ذلك رئيس ريغان, الذي سمع صيغته من ال [أرمس سل] في شرح مهمّة طوال نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 1986 سبب أن يصدق هو كان خاطئة. مع ذلك لا أحد, وفقا ل بطاقات معاصرة من أنّ شرح مهمّة, مكبح حتّى صحّ [بويندإكستر].

حاول [بويندإكستر] مع شمال وأخرى في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 1986 أن يمزّق وغيّرت الأثر ورقيّة يعكس إيران هم/[كنترا] أنشطة. [أمونغ وثر ثينغس], دمّر [بويندإكستر] الوحيدة يتواجد يوقع رئاسيّة [كفرت-كأيشن] يجد أنّ كان نويت أن يفوّر بمفعول رجعيّ وكالة المخابرات الأمريكيّة تورط في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 1985 [هوكس] شحن.

كان [بويندإكستر] وشمال أقلّ ناجحة في يستأصل ال [كمبوتر-مسّج] أثر من إيران هم/[كنترا] أنشطة. اتّصل [بويندإكستر] وشمال غالبا من خلال قناة خاصّة أنّ [بويندإكستر], [كمبوتر إكسبرت], كان قد ثبت فوق على ال [نسك] [كمبوتر سستم]. سمح هذا قناة, يعرف بما أنّ "تدقيق خاصّة فارغة," [بويندإكستر] وشمال أن يرحّل رسائل [تو ش وثر] دون هم يكون يوجّه من خلال قنوات في أيّ أخرى على ال [نسك] ملاكة استطاع حجبتهم.

محا بين نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 22 [تو] 29, 1986, شمال من ه [كمبوتر فيل] 736 رسائل, و [بويندإكستر] محا 5,012 رسائل أثناء ال نفسه [بريود.2] على الرغم من هذا حذف, البيت الأبيض برتابة ينقذ [بك-وب] أشرطة يحتوي كلّ معطيات في النظامة لاثنان أسابيع أن يحمي ضدّ خسارة متهاونة. عندما عرضت إيران/[كنترا] شأن كان في نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني متأخّرة 1986, البيت الأبيض اتّصالات وكالة, أيّ يدير ال [نسك] [كمبوتر سستم], احتبس الأشرطة [بك-وب] يؤرّخ من نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 15. كان محققات, لذلك, يمكن أن يسترجع نسخ من كلّ رسائل أنّ كان في ال [بويندإكستر-نورث] [كمبوتر فيل] في [ميد-نوفمبر] 1986 قبل أن أكثر من الحذف وقع. هذا حاسوب أصبح رسائل بيّنة مهمّة في على حدّ سواء [بويندإكستر] ومحاكمات شماليّة.

2 ويليامس, [بويندإكستر] شهادة تجريبيّة, 3/15/90, [بّ]. 1752-65.

[بويندإكستر] يعترف إلى كثير من أنشطته قبل أن اللجن مختارة في يوليو-تمّوز 1987 تحت منحة من مناعة دلاليّة, أيّ منع انضماماته من يكون يستعمل ضدّ ه في أيّ إجراء إجراميّة. لأنّ رئيس ريغان لم يشهد داخل أنّ دعات ساحة, [بويندإكستر] كان أن يجيب السؤال أنّ سيطر الجلسة استماع: الرئيس عرف حوالي ووافقت التحويل من إيران [أرمس سل] يباشر إلى الكونتراس? [بويندإكستر] أجاب رفض, "الكسارة مواقف هنا مع ي." 3 هو قال احتجز هو عمدا المعلومة من رئيس ريغان لأنّ ``أنا أردت الرئيس أن يتلقّى بعض [دنيبيليتي] [س ثت] هو كنت حميت. . . . '' 4

3 [بويندإكستر], مختارة لجن شهادة, 7/15/87, [ب.]. 95.

4 [إيبيد.], [ب.]. 101.

يواجه محاكمة جنائيّة, جابه [بويندإكستر] ورطة مختلفة: هو كان [نو لونجر] سؤال من يحمي الرئيس غير أنّ يدافعبنفسي ضدّ خمسة جريمة حشوات. قبل إجتماع, [بويندإكستر] شهادة هامّة أكثر يعزّز رئيس ريغان يكرّس إنكارات الحالة وعي من إيران/[كنترا] تحويل. في القاعة المحكمة, علا [بويندإكستر] [هيغر-وثوريزأيشن] دفاع, يحاول أن يقنع المحلّفون أنّ الرئيس كان قد وافق أعماله, بما في ذلك أنّ أنّ نتج في حشوات إجراميّة. [إينستد وف] يأخذ الحامل قفص في ه خاصّة دفاع, مهما, دعا هو رئيس ريغان أن يشهد.

[بر-تريل بروسدينغ]

الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة منطقة قاضية جرهارد [أ.]. أمر [جسلّ] في يونيو - حزيران 1988 أنّ ال [مولتي-دفندنت] حالة ضدّ [بويندإكستر], شمال, [سكرد] وحكيم [سفرد.5] بعد عمليّة فصل, [بويندإكستر] حالة كان [ترنسفرّد] إلى قاضية رئيسيّة [أوبري] [إ.]. [روبينسن], [جر.], وبعد ذلك أن يقضي [غرين], الذي رأس على إجراءات بعيد.

يرى 5 لأكثر وصف مفصّلة من العمليّة فصل من ال [مولتي-دفندنت] حالة, فصل شماليّة.

صرفت كلّ من [بويندإكستر] تحديات جوهريّة إلى الشرعية من التهمة كان قبل محاكمة. تعلّق الإصدارات متبقّي مهمّة: (1) العمليّة حفظ من التآمر حشوة; (2) القرار من [كلسّيفيد-ينفورمأيشن] مجادلات; (3) القرار الإصدارات يرتبط إلى [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة خاصّ بالكونغرس, تحت ال يحكم يعرف ك [كستيغر]; و(4) المدّعى عليه جهد ناجحة أن يؤمّن شهادة تجريبيّة من رئيس سابقة ريغان.

قاد يحفظ ويضيّق التآمر حشوة

مشاكل مع يصنّف معلومة إلى الصرف من المركزية تآمر حشوات قبل المحاكمة شماليّة, ومشاكل مماثلة كان توقّعت أن ينشأ في الحالة ضدّ [بويندإكستر]. في يونيو - حزيران 20, 1989, تحرّك إستشارة مستقلّة أن يزيل الأصليّة واسعة تآمر حشوات يؤسّس على الإمداد تموين من الكونتراس والتحويل وأن جوهريّا ضيّقت الحشوة التآمر أن ينتهك أخرى جوهريّة إجراميّة قانون, يمنع زائفة بيانات وإعاقة. بعد تصنيفات وحجة شفويّة, منح المحكمة الحكومة حركة.

كان الحشوة [رفوكس] على العمل غير شرعيّ من يتآمر مع شمال و [سكرد] أن يخفي أنشطة من إجتماع. جادل إستشارة مستقلّة بنجاح أنّ هذا يضيّق من التآمر حشوة قلّل ال [كلسّيفيد-ينفورمأيشن] مشاكل أنّ أزعج المقاضاة شماليّة.

يصدر

يصنّف معلومة ال يصنّف معلومة إجراءات يتصرّف ([سبا]) سمح المحكمة تجريبيّة بشكل فعّال أن يحلّ إصدارات يتضمّن الإستعمال من يصنّف وثائق وشهادة في [بويندإكستر]. قضيت [غرين] مراقبات من ال [سبا] عملية ويؤخّر مفاوضات مثمرة بين إستشارة للحكومة و [بويندإكستر] يحلّ كثير مجادلات مع حدّ أدنى من.

خلافا شمال, كان هناك ما من يمدّد أو نزاع هامّة في ما يتعلّق ب الشكل أو مجال من [بويندإكستر] [سبا] إشعارات إلى المحكمة أن يكشف صنّف معلومة في محاكمة. بين نوفمبر - تشرين الثّاني 27, 1989, ومارس - آذار 13, 1990, خدم [بويندإكستر] 11 هذا إشعارات, بما في ذلك ثمانية أنّ مدرج في البورصة يصنّف وثائق هو أرادوا أن يستعمل في محاكمة, اثنان يصف يمكن يصنّف شهادة, وواحدة [فوكسد] مفردا على معلومة هو أراد أن يستنبط في الترسب الرئيس ريغان.

قضيت [غرين] أمر أنّ يفاوض كلّ فروق على صنّف معلومة بين الأحزاب قبل يكون يحضر قبل المحكمة. قضيت [غرين] أمسك ستّة يغلق [سبا] جلسة استماع قبل المحاكمة بدأ وألحق أنّ مع عدّة جلسة استماع قصيرة أثناء محاكمة. جعلت أكثر من قراراته على العلاقة ومقبوليّة من يصنّف معلومة, وعلى الملاءمة الإبدالات يقترح بالحكومة, كان من المقعد.

يأخذ معا, [بويندإكستر] [سبا] عدّل إشعارات تقريبا 1,200 وثائق, إلاّ أنّ كسر صغيرة [أف وهيش] كان أخيرا قدّمت في محاكمة. غطّيت كثير يصنّف معلومة كان ب [غفرنمنت] اشتراط إلى حقائق مؤكّدة وأخرى إبدالات غير مصنّف. هذا سمح المحاكمة أن يباشر بنعومة, دون النزاعات أنّ عقد شمال أو الحالة ضدّ سابقة وكالة المخابرات الأمريكيّة محطة [جوسف] رئيسيّة [ف.]. يرى [فرنندز], أيّ كان يصرف واجبة إلى [كلسّيفيد-ينفورمأيشن] [بروبلمس.6]

6 [فرنندز] فصل.

[كستيغر] أجبرت إجراءات

[بويندإكستر] كان تحت منحة من إستعمال مناعة أن يشهد في 1987 قبل اللجن مختارة يتحرّى إيران/[كنترا]. بما أنّ أتمّ الأخرى إيران/[كنترا] مدّعى عليه الذي أعطى يمنّع شهادة قبل إجتماع, [بويندإكستر] يتحرّك أن يصرف التهمة على النظرية أنّ انتهك هو المعايير يعلن في [كستيغر] [ف.]. الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة, 7 يجادل أنّ استعملت ه يمنّع شهادة كان ضدّ ه في المحلّفون عظيمة وفي محاكمة. برهن هذا حجة فاشلة على المستوى تجريبيّة غير أنّ أخيرا ساد في ال [كورت وف بّل].

7 406 الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة 411 (1972).

قبل أن فصلت محاكماتهم كان, [بويندإكستر] يتحرّك [جوينتلي ويث] شمال وحكيم, الذي أيضا كان قد استلم مناعة أن يشهد قبل إجتماع, أن يتلقّى الحشوات ضدّ هم صرف على الأرض أنّ البيّنة ضدّ هم كان لطّخت ب هم يمنّع شهادة. أنكر قاضية [جسلّ] أنّ حركة. يدّعي مهما, في إذعان إلى دفاع أنّ هم استعملوا [أن-نوثر'س] من المحتمل مبرّئة يمنّع شهادة, قاضية [جسلّ] في يونيو - حزيران 1988 فصل المحاكمات.

[بويندإكستر] جدّد ه [كستيغر] حركة قبل قاضية [غرين] في أغسطس - آب 1989. بعد شرح مهمّة وحجة, أمر 8 المحكمة أنّ اثنان جلسة استماع [إفيدنتيري] يمسكوا. في الأولى, سمع المحكمة شهادة من شريكة إستشارة [دن] [ك.]. [وبّ] وهوارد [م.]. رصّعت في ما يتعلّق ب انكشافهم إلى [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة قبل يتلاقى المكتب من إستشارة مستقلّة. تلاقى [وبّ] ولؤلؤة ال [أيك] ملاكة في 1989 وتلقّى لم, قبل تعييناتهم, يكون [سوبجكت تو] [أيك] إجراءات أن يعزلبنفسي من [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة. قضيت [غرين] أسّس انكشافهم إلى [بويندإكستر] شهادة أن يكون هيّنة وسمح كلا وكيلات أن يساهم في المحاكمة.

حاولت 8 [بويندإكستر] حالة كان قبل ال [كورت وف بّل] يحكم في شمال أنّ شاهدة جلسة استماع كانوا ضروريّة أن يسمح المحاكمة من يمنّع مدّعى عليه.

تعلّق الثاني مجموعة ال [كورت هرينغ] شواهد تجريبيّة, الذي شهادة يمكن يتلقّى يكون لطّخت ب [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة. قبل قاضية [غرين] قاضية [جسلّ] مراجعات مبكّرة من شواهد عظيمة مؤقّتة وانخفض أن [ر-إكسمين] نتيجت بحثه. هو أيضا رفض أن يصرف التهمة [أن ث بسس وف] ممكنة عظيمة محلفة انكشاف إلى ال يمنّع شهادة.

بخصوص شواهد تجريبيّة, أخذ المحكمة إجراءات واسعة أن يضمن أنّ [بويندإكستر] يمنّع بيانات كان لم يستعملوا ضدّ ه. أمر المحكمة الحكومة أن يجعل سابقة [برت] خضوع (فيما بعد يكشف إلى [بويندإكستر]) من كلّ بيانات يجعل بشواهد ممكنة تجريبيّة قبل أن [بويندإكستر] أعطى ه يمنّع شهادة قبل إجتماع في يوليو-تمّوز 1987. أسّس المحكمة أنّ [ألّ وف ث] يقترح شهادة من أكثر من الشواهد ممكنة كان قد كان [مموريليز] قبل أن [بويندإكستر] ظهر علنا في يوليو-تمّوز 15, 1987, ولذلك كان لم يلطّخ.

بما أنّ ل أنّ شواهد الذي توقّع حددت شهادة تجريبيّة لم يكن إلى البيّنة [أيك] كان قد ختم مع المحكمة قبل [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة, قاضية [غرين] يتطلّب معلومة إضافيّة. هو استنتج أنّ كان الحكومة قد [فيلد] أن يؤسّس أنّ خمسة من شواهده ممكنة كان حرّة من لطخة وأمرهم أن يظهر في جلسة استماع [بر-تريل]. أكّد اثنان من الثلاثة شواهد الذي أخيرا ظهر في محاكمة [كرديبلي] أنّ هم يتوقّع شهادة لم يكن أثرت في أيّ طريق ب [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة; الثالثة, شماليّة, يرفض أن يتمّ هكذا.

شمال يفاد في الجلسة استماع [بر-تريل] أنّ كان هو يعجز, [ويث رسبكت تو] أيّ موضوع, أن يميّز ماذا هو تلقّى شخصيّا أتمّ, يلاحظ أو يختبر من ماذا هو كان قد علم من يراقب [بويندإكستر] يمنّع [تستيمون.9] بما أنّ ل [بويندإكستر] تدمير من ديسمبر - كانون الأوّل 1985 رئاسيّة [كفرت-كأيشن] يجد -- بيّنة مهمّة في الإعاقة الإجتماع -- شمال اعترف أنّ كان هو قد رأى [بويندإكستر] دمّرت [بيس وف ببر] غير أنّ يلحّ أنّ هو لم يعرف هو كان يجد إلى أن [بويندإكستر] أفاد أنّ حقيقة في ه يمنّع شهادة قبل إجتماع.

9 شهادة شماليّة, [بويندإكستر] جلسة استماع [بر-تريل], 12/13/89, [بّ]. 374-77.

رفض المحكمة شهادة [نورث'س] [بر-تريل] بما أنّ لا معقولة. شماليّة, يظهر المحكمة يؤسّس, ``أن يتلقّى يكون ركبت [أت ثت تيم] [في الجلسة استماع] على ال يحسب مسلك من يحاول أن يساعد ه سابقة زميلة و [ك-دفندنت]. . . ب يراوغ على إصدارات مختلفة. . . '' 10

10 رأي, [بويندإكستر], 3/8/90, [ب.]. 9.

في [بوست-تريل] منفصلة يحكم, أضاف المحكمة أنّ [أس فر س] التدمير من ال يجد كان تعلّقت, شهادة [نورث'س] في ه خاصّة محاكمة حول الحادث كان متناقضة مع إدعاءه أنّ هو استطاع لم يتذكّر هو عضو مستقلّ من [بويندإكستر] يمنّع شهادة. أسّس المحكمة هو "جوهريّا غيرمعقول" أنّ شمال لم يتذكّر "مشاركته في حادث هو شهد مباشرة وأنّ كان بما أنّ مثيرة, حقّا تاريخيّة, ك ال يمزّق فوق من جدّا نادرة رئاسيّة يجد." 11

11 [إيبيد.], 5/29/90, [بّ]. 32-40.

ريغان كان استدعاء إلى المحكمة

واحدة من المظاهر بارزة أكثر من [بويندإكستر] حالة المدّعى عليه محاولة ناجحة أن يدعو رئيس سابقة ريغان أن يشهد في محاكمته ب [فيديوتب] ترسب.

بحث [بويندإكستر] أولى رئاسيّة وبطاقات نائبة رئاسيّة من [أيك] كجزء ه [بر-تريل ديسكفري] طلبات. في جلسة استماع [بر-تريل] في سبتمبر - أيلول 6, 1989, [بويندإكستر] قال وكيلات المحكمة أنّ بطاقات رئاسيّة عكسوا أنّ [بويندإكستر] أعلم الرئيس من إنكاراته إلى إجتماع في 1986 من [نسك] نشاط دعما الكونتراس, وأنّ البطاقات "أبدوا ماذا الرئيس كان قلت حول ماذا كان يكون أتمّت أن يساند الكونتراس في [سنترل مريك], والرئيس رضاء وإبرام وموافقة من أنّ نشاط." 12 في يبحث بطاقات نائبة رئاسيّة, [بويندإكستر] قال وكيلات المحكمة أنّ "[أنتيم] هو [بوش] افتقد اجتماع, أميرال [بويندإكستر] لخّصته على هو [أفتروردس]." 13

12 [روبينسن], [بويندإكستر] جلسة استماع [بر-تريل], 9/6/89, [ب.]. 18.

13 [إيبيد.], [ب.]. 19.

تطلّب المحكمة, قبل يجعل قرار فوق ما إذا أن يجبر [أيك] أن ينتج هذا وثائق, في سبتمبر - أيلول 11, 1989, يوجّه [بويندإكستر] أن يصنّف سابقة [برت] مذكرة يفسّر تماما كيف هذا وثائق ساعدوا [دفنس.14] ه هو من إستشارة مستقلّة جائز مذكرة في ما يتعلّق ب مسؤوليته أن ينتج رئاسيّة ووثائق نائبة رئاسيّة لا في [أيك] امتلاك.

14 رأي, [بويندإكستر], 9/11/89, [ب.]. 22.

Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15

15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.

Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16

16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.

On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18

17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.

18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.

On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.

In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.

19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.

In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.

In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:

Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20

20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)

President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.

The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.

As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.

The Poindexter Trial

The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.

Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.

21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.

President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.

Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.

Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.

The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North

The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:

-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.

-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.

-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.

-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.

In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23

22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.

23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.

North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.

North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25

24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.

25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.

HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27

26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.

27 Ibid.

After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28

28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.

Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.

North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31

29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.

30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.

31 Ibid., p. 1111.

North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36

32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.

33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.

34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.

35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.

36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.

When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38

37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.

38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.

After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39

39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.

Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41

40 Ibid., p. 1191.

41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.

The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:

Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?

A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42

42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.

North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45

43 Ibid., p. 1218.

44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.

45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.

More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47

46 Ibid., 1252-54.

47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.

North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.

The Trial Testimony of President Reagan

Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48

48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.

In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.

Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52

49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.

50 Ibid., p. 21.

51 Ibid., p. 24.

52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.

Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55

53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.

54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.

55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.

President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59

56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.

57 Ibid., p. 30.

58 Ibid., p. 28.

59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.

Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.

President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63

60 Ibid., p. 69.

61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.

Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.

64 Ibid., p. 116.

Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:

Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.

And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65

65 Ibid., p. 131.

In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:

Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?

A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.

Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?

A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.

Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?

A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66

66 Ibid., p. 121.

President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:

Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?

A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.

Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.

Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?

A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67

67 Ibid., p. 122.

President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68

68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.

In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.

The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:

Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69

69 Ibid., p. 151.

President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70

70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73

71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.

72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.

73 Ibid., p. 158.

President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75

74 Ibid., p. 160.

75 Ibid., p. 252.

Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.

76 Ibid., p. 255.

On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:

77 Ibid., p. 170.

I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78

78 Ibid., p. 189.

In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:

And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79

79 Ibid., p. 155.

Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:

May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80

80 Ibid., p. 156.

Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81

81 Ibid., p. 157.

President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83

82 Ibid., p. 240.

83 Ibid., p. 243.

Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84

84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.

The Verdict and Sentencing

After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.

In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:

Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.

. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .

President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.

No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .

With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.

But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.

Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.

A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85

85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22

The Appeal

A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86

86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87

87 Ibid.

In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89

88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).

89 Ibid., p. 10.

On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would

make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90

90 Ibid., p. 22.

Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling

. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91

91 Ibid., p. 29.

The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.

Conclusion

Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.

The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a

'Bad Monkey!'

NAIROBI (Dec. 7) - A giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill at least 15 people, has been discovered in Kenya, a conservation group said on Friday.

A conservation group in Kenya announced on Friday the discovery of a giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill at least 15 people.

Wildlife Direct said the snake it described as the world's largest had been recognized as a new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded a snake farm on Kenya's coast where the massive serpents are found.

"A new species of giant spitting cobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious -- that there have to be many other unreported species but hundreds are being lost as their habitats disappear under the continued mismanagement of our planet," said the group's chairman, Kenyan environmentalist Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, able to launch poison over a distance of several meters, are common to Kenya's lowland climates.

Wildlife Direct said the discovery would help find an anti-venom for the bite. "Lives can be saved," it added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to catch a larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest it belonged to a different species.

Record-Size Spitting Cobra Discovered
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (DEC. 7) - A giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill at least 15 people, has been discovered in Kenya, a conservation group said on Friday.

A conservation group in Kenya announced on Friday the discovery of a giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill at least 15 people.

Wildlife Direct said the snake it described as the world' s largest had been recognized as a new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded a snake farm on Kenya' s coast where the massive serpents are found.

“A new species apagado giant spitting cobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious that there corta to Be many other unreported species bebió hundreds área being lost as their hábitats disappear under the continued mismanagement apagado Ur planet,” said the group' s chairman, De Kenya environmentalist Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, able to launch poison over a distance of several meters, are common to Kenya' s lowland climates.

Wildlife Direct said the discovery would help find an antivenom for the bite. “Lives can be saved,” IT added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to catch a larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest it belonged to a different species.

Record-Size Spitting Cobra Discovered
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (dic. 7) - A giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill at least 15 people, has been discovered in kenya, a conservation group said on Friday.

A conservation group in kenya announced on Friday the discovery of a giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill at least 15 people.

Wildlife direct said the snake it described as the world's largest had been recognized as a new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded a snake farm on Kenya's coast where the massive serpents are found.

“A new species lontano giant spitting cobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious that there taglia to Be many other unreported species bevve hundreds ara being lost asso their habitazioni disappear under the continued mismanagement lontano Ur planet,„ said the group's chairman, environmentalist Kenyan Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, able to launch poison over a distance of several meters, are common to Kenya's lowland climates.

Wildlife direct said the discovery would help find an anti-venom for the bite. “Lives can be saved,„ IT added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to catch a larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest it belonged to a different species.

Record-Size Spitting Cobra Discovered
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (Dec. 7) - A giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill at least 15 people, has been discovered in Kenya, a conservation group said on Friday.

A conservation group in Kenya announced on Friday the discovery of a giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill at least 15 people.

[Wildlife Direct said the snake it described as the world's largest had been recognized as a new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded a snake farm on Kenya's coast where the massive serpents are found.]

„AN new species of giant spitting Kobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious that schrämt there to Be many other unreported species trank hundreds Ar being lost As their Lebensräume disappear under the continued mismanagement of our planet“ said the group' s chairman, kenianisches environmentalist Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, able to launch poison over a distance of several meters, are common to Kenya' s lowland climates.

Wildlife Direct said the discovery would help find an Anti-venom for the bite. „Lives can be saved,“ IT added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to catch a larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest it belonged to a different species.

Record-Size Spitting Cobra Discovered
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (Dezembro. 7) - A giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill at least 15 people, has been discovered in Kenya, a conservation group said on Friday.

A conservation group in Kenya announced on Friday the discovery of a giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill at least 15 people.

Wildlife Direct said the snake it described as the world' s largest had been recognized as a new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded a snake farm on Kenya' s coast where the massive serpents are found.

“A new species fora giant spitting cobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious that there corta to Be many other unreported species bebeu hundreds are being lost ás their habitats disappear under the continued mismanagement fora our planet,” said the group' s chairman, Queniano environmentalist Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, able to launch poison over a distance of several meters, are common to Kenya' s lowland climates.

Wildlife Direct said the discovery would help find an antivenom for the bite. “Lives can be saved,” added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to catch a larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest it belonged to a different species.

Record-Size Spitting Discovered Cobra
Automatically translated into English thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (Dec. 7) - A giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill At least 15 people, has been discovered in Kenya, has conservation group said one Friday.

With conservation group in Kenya announced one Friday the discovery off has giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill At least 15 people.

Wildlife Direct said the snake it described have the world' S largest had been recognized have has new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded has snake farm one Kenya' S coast where the massive snakes are found.

“A new species off giant spitting cobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious -- that there cuts to Be many other unreported species goal hundreds are being lost have to their habitats disappear under the continued mismanagement off our planet,” said the group' S chairman, Kenyan environmentalist Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, whitebait to launch poison over remotely off several meters, are common to Kenya' S lowland climates.

Direct Wildlife said the discovery would help find year anti-venom for the cock. “Lives edge Be saved,” it added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to wrestling have larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest it belonged to has different species.

Anteckna-Storleksanpassa att spotta den upptäckta kobran
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (Dec. 7) - En jätte- spotta kobra, att mäta nästan nio fot och att bära nog gift för att döda 15 åtminstone bemannar, har upptäckts i Kenya, har beskyddgruppen sade en fredag.

Med beskydd meddelade gruppen i Kenya en fredag som upptäckten har av den jätte- spottakobran, som mäter nästan nio fot och har nog gift som dödar åtminstone 15 folk.

Djurlivet riktar sade att ormen som den beskrev har den största world'en S hade känts igen har har ny art, och namngav Najaen Ashei efter James Ashe, som grundade har ormlantgården en Kenya att segla utmed kusten var de massiva ormarna finnas.

”Är förstärker den nya arten av jätte- spottakobra spännande och det tydligt -- att det klipper för att vara många andra unreported artmålhundreds, borttappada måste är deras livsmiljöer att försvinna under den fortsatte misskötseln av vårt planet,” sade grupp ordförande, den kenyanska miljöaktivisten Richard Leakey.

Spotta kobror, mäter är whitebait till barkassgift över avlägset av flera, vanligt till Kenya lowlandklimat.

Rikta djurlivet sade upptäckten skulle antien-venom för hjälpfyndåret för resa upp. ”Kantar liv sparas,” det tillfogade.

Ashe som avleds nu, var första till brottningen har stor-än-det normala att spotta kobran i 60-tal och föreslår att den hörde hemma har olik art.

Кобра Записывать-Размера открынная плеванием
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (Dec. 7) - Открывала гигантскую кобру плевания, измеряя почти 9 футов и нося достаточный venom для того чтобы убить по крайней мере 15 людей, в Кении, имеет группу консервации сказала одну пятницу.

С консервацией группа в Кении объявила одну пятницу, котор открытие имеет гигантскую кобру плевания, которая измеряет почти 9 футов и имеет достаточный venom для того чтобы убить по крайней мере 15 людей.

Wildlife сразу сказал змейка, котор она описала имеет world s самое большое имеет имеет новый вид и назвал Naja Ashei после Джеймс Ashe, которое основало имеет свободный полет Kenya s фермы одного змейки где находят массивнейшие зек.

«Новый вид с гигантской кобры плевания exciting и усиливает очевидное -- что режет для того чтобы быть много других unreported сотни цели вида теряйте их habitats исчезнуть под продолжаемым mismanagement с нашей планеты,» сказал руководителю group s, environmentalist Ричард Leakey Kenyan.

Кобры плевания, whitebait для того чтобы запустить отраву над дистанционно несколькими метров, общие к климатам низменности Kenya s.

Сразу Wildlife сказал открытие поможет найти anti-venom года для крана. «Живет был сохранен край,» оно добавил.

Ashe, теперь покойница, было первым к wrestling имеет больш-чем-нормальную кобру плевания в 1960s, и предлагает оно принадлежало имеет по-разному вид.

Record-Size Spitting Cobra Discovered
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
NAIROBI (Dec. 7) - AAN giant spitting cobra, measuring nearly nine feet and carrying enough venom to kill at least 15 people, has been discovered in Kenya, hebben behoud group said men Friday.

AAN behoud group in Kenya announced men Friday the discovery off aan giant spitting cobra, which measures nearly nine feet and has enough venom to kill at least 15 people.

Wildlife Rechtstreeks said the snake IT described aas the world' s largest had been recognized aas aan new species and named the Naja Ashei after James Ashe, who founded hebben snake farm men Kenya' s coast where the massief slang are found.

„AAN new species off giant spitting cobra is exciting and reinforces the obvious that have there to be many other unreported species dronk hundreds are being lost azen their habitat disappear under the continued mismanagement off our planet,“ said the group' s chairman, Keniaanse environmentalist Richard Leakey.

Spitting cobras, witvis to launch gif over op een afstand off several meters, are common to Kenya' s lowland climates.

Wildlife Rechtstreeks said the discovery would help find jaar anti-venom for the bite. „Lives can be saved,“ IT added.

Ashe, now deceased, was the first to catch hebben larger-than-normal spitting cobra in the 1960s, and suggest IT belonged to aan verschillend species.

[ركرد-سز] [سبيتّينغ] يكتشف صل
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
نيروبي ([دك.]. 7) - عملاقة [سبيتّينغ] اكتشفت صل, يقيس تقريبا تسعة أقدام ويحمل بما فيه الكفاية سم أن يقتل على الأقلّ 15 الناس, يتلقّى يكون في كينيا, يتلقّى حفظ مجموعة قال واحدة يوم الجمعة.

مع حفظ أعلن مجموعة في كينيا واحدة يوم الجمعة الإكتشاف باتّجاه آخر يتلقّى عملاقة [سبيتّينغ] صل, أيّ يقيس تقريبا تسعة أقدام ويتلقّى بما فيه الكفاية سم أن يقتل على الأقلّ 15 الناس.

قال حيوان برّيّ مباشرة الثعبان هو وصف يتلقّى ال [وورلد'] [س] كبيرة تلقّى يكون ميّزت يتلقّى نوع جديدة وعيّن [نجا] [أشي] بعد جيمس [أش], الذي أسّس يتلقّى ثعبان مزرعة واحدة [كن'] [س] ساحل حيث الثعابين ضخمة يكون أسّست.

"نوع جديدة من عملاقة [سبيتّينغ] صل مثيرة ويعزّز الواضحة -- أنّ يقطع هناك أن يكون كثير أخرى [أونربورتد] نوع هدف مئات يكون خسرت يضطرّ مواطنهم اختفيت تحت ال يستمرّ سوء إدارة من كوبنا," قال ال [غرووب'] [س] رئيس مجلس إدارة, [كنن] بيئيّ ريتشارد [لكي].

[سبيتّينغ] صل, بلد أن يطلق سم على بعيدا من عدّة عدادات, عاديّة إلى [كن'] [س] أرض منخفضة مناخات.

قال حيوان برّيّ مباشرة الإكتشاف ساعد وجدت سنة [أنتي-فنوم] للديك. "يعيش حافة ينقذ," هو أضاف.

كان [أش], الآن الميّت, الأولى إلى تصارع يتلقّى [لرجر-ثن-نورمل] [سبيتّينغ] صل في الستينات, ويقترح هو انتسب أن يتلقّى نوع مختلفة.

This may sound like a joke, but trust us, it's true. In Sarasota, Florida, streets were closed after a typewriter was reported as a suspicious package. And while many of us may not remember what one of these pre-PC word processors looks like, the senior citizens in Florida should have no excuse.

In the spirit of complete disclosure, the typewriter was inside its briefcase-like carrying-case and stashed in a locked cage under a stairwell in a county parking facility. The package was doubly suspicious since the only people with access to the cage would have been county officials.

Following standard procedure for a post 9/11, terrorism-obsessed world, the local bomb squad was called in. It proceeded to detonate the typewriter, then discovered it was just a typewriter.

Typewriter Mistaken for Bomb, Shuts Down Street
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo

This may sound like a joke, but trust us, it' s true. In Sarasota, Florida, streets were closed after a typewriter was reported as a suspicious package. And while many apagado US may not remember what one apagado tesis prado-PC Word processors look like, the mayor citizens en Florida should corta n excusa.

In the spirit of complete disclosure, the typewriter was inside its briefcase-like carrying-case and stashed in a locked cage under a stairwell in a county parking facility. The package was doubly suspicious since the only people with access to the cage would have been county officials.

Following standard procedure for a post 9/11, terrorism-obsessed world, the local bomb squad was called in. It proceeded to detonate the typewriter, then discovered it was just a typewriter.

Typewriter Mistaken for Bomb, Shuts Down Street
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo

Typewriter Mistaken for Bomb, Shuts Down Street
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo

This may sound like a joke, but trust us, it' s true. In Sarasota, Florida, streets were closed after a typewriter was reported as a suspicious package. And while many of us may not remember what one of These Wiese-PC word processors Looks like, leitendes the schrämt citizens in Florida should Nr. Entschuldigung.

In the spirit of complete disclosure, the typewriter was inside its briefcase-like carrying-case and stashed in a locked cage under a stairwell in a county parking facility. The package was doubly suspicious since the only people with access to the cage would have been county officials.

Following standard procedure for a post 9/11, terrorism-obsessed world, the local bomb squad was called in. It proceeded to detonate the typewriter, then discovered it was just a typewriter.

Typewriter Mistaken for Bomb, Shuts Down Street
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo

This may sound like joke, bebeu trust EUA, it' s true. In Sarasota, Florida, streets were closed after a typewriter was reported as a suspicious package. And while many of us may not remember what one of these prado-PC word processors looks like, the senior citizens in Florida should have no excuse.

In the spirit of complete disclosure, the typewriter was inside its briefcase-like carrying-case and stashed in a locked cage under a stairwell in a county parking facility. The package was doubly suspicious since the only people with access to the cage would have been county officials.

Following standard procedure for a post 9/11, terrorism-obsessed world, the local bomb squad was called in. It proceeded to detonate the typewriter, then discovered it was just a typewriter.

Typewriter Mistaken for Bomb, Shuts Down Street
Automatically translated into English thanks to WorldLingo

This may sound like has joke, goal trust custom, it' S true. In Sarasota, Florida, streets were closed after have typewriter was reported have has suspicious package. And while many off custom may not remember what one off thesis pre-PC Word processors looks like, the senior citizens in Florida should cuts No excuses.

In the spirit off supplements disclosure, the typewriter was inside its briefcase-like carrying-box and stashed in A locked cage under has stairwell in A county carpark facility. The package was doubly suspicious since the only people with accesses to the cage would cuts been county officials.

Standard Following procedure for has post 9/11, terrorism-obsessed world, the local bomb squad was called in. It proceeded to detonate the typewriter, then discovered it was just has typewriter.

Skrivmaskinen som missförstås för, bombarderar, stänger sig besegrar gatan
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo

Detta kan låta något liknande har skämtet, beställnings- målförtroende, det är riktigt. I Sarasota var Florida, gator stängd, efter ha skrivmaskinen anmäldes har haft har haft misstänksamt att paketera. Och stunder många av beställnings- kan inte minnas att vad uttrycker man av tepre-PC, gillar processorlooks, pensionärerna i Florida, bör snitt inga ursäkter.

I anden av tilläggavslöjande var skrivmaskinen inre dess portfölj-gillar bära-boxas och stashed i A låst bur har under stairwell i ståndsmässig carparklätthet för A. Paketera var dubbelt misstänksam, sedan det enda folket med tar fram till den skulle buren klipper vart ståndsmässiga representanter.

Det standarda tillvägagångssättet för har efter att posta 9/11, terrorism-besatt värld, lokalen bombarderar squaden kallades in. Det fortsatte att detonera skrivmaskinen, då upptäckt det var rättvist har skrivmaskinen.

Машинка ошибленная для бомбы, shuts down улица
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo

Это может звучать как имеет шутку, таможню доверия цели, его поистине. В Sarasota, Florida, улицы был закрыт после того как имейте машинку сообщил имейте имеет подозрительный пакет. И пока много таможня не может вспомнить одно с текстовых редакторов pre-ПИКОКУЛОНА тезиса смотрит как, пожилые гражданины в Florida ESLI отрезоки никакие отговорки.

В духе с разоблачения дополнений, машинка была внутренностью своей портфел-как носить-коробка и stashed в клетке зафиксированной a вниз имеет stairwell в средстве carpark графства a. Пакет был двойно подозрительн в виду того что единственные люди с доступом к клетке и отрезоки, котор будут должностными лицами графства.

Стандартная следуя за процедура для имеет столб 9/11, террорисм-преследованный мир, местный squad бомбы была вызвана cIn. Оно продолжало взорвать машинку, тогда открыно ему был справедливо имеет машинку.

Typewriter Mistaken for Bomb, Shuts Down Street
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo

This may sound dronk like aan Joke, US trust, it' s true. In Sarasota, Florida, streets were closed after aan typewriter was reported aas aan suspicious package. And while many off US may not remember what one off standpunt weide-pc Word processors looks like, the senior citizens in Florida should have no verontschuldiging.

In the spirit off aan:vullen disclosure, the typewriter was inside its briefcase-like carrying-case and stashed in aan locked kooi under aan stairwell in aan county parkeerterrein facility. The package was doubly suspicious since the only people with toegang to the kooi would have been county officials.

Following standaard procedure for hebben post 9/11, terrorism-obsessed world, the plaatselijk bomb squad was called in. IT proceeded to detonate the typewriter, then discovered IT was Just aan typewriter.

Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo

هذا يمكن صوّتت مثل يتلقّى نكتة, هدف ثقة عادة, هو يصحّ. في [سرستا], كان فلوريدا, شوارع ينفضّ عقب تلقّيت آلة كاتبة كان أفدت يتلقّى مجموعة مشبوهة. وبينما كثير باتّجاه آخر عادة يمكن لا يتذكّر ماذا واحدة من أطروحة [بر-بك] [وورد بروسسّور] ينظر مثل, ال [سنيور ستيزن] في فلوريدا سوفت قطعات ما من أعذار.

في الكحول من ملاحق كشف, كان الآلة كاتبة داخله [بريفكس-ليك] [كرّينغ-بوإكس] ويخفي في [ا] يقفل قفص دون يتلقّى [ستيرولّ] في [ا] إقليم [كربرك] تسهيل. كان المجموعة [دووبلي] مشبوهة بما أنّ الالناس وحيد مع منفذات إلى القفص أرادوا قطعات يكان إقليم مسؤولات.

يتلقّى معياريّة يتبع إجراء لموقعة 9/11, [ترّوريسم-وبسسّد] عالم, المحلّية قنبلة فرقة كان دعات [إين.]. كان هو باشر أن يفجّر الآلة كاتبة, بعد ذلك يكتشف هو صحيحة يتلقّى آلة كاتبة.

Jean-Claude La Marre wrote, directed and stars as Jesus i... The winner of a Catholic magazine's new-millennium art co... Jeffrey Hunter in "King of Kings." Photo, 1961, courtesy ...

For many, the image of Jesus is that of a white man with wavy blond hair and blue eyes -- kind of like Jeffrey Hunter in 1961's "King of Kings." But a new film, "Color of the Cross," shows the Christian savior as a black man.

By casting himself in the lead role, writer and director Jean-Claude La Marre is challenging a view of Jesus that's dominated since the Middle Ages and adding to a growing body of Hollywood films with Christian themes, including Mel Gibson's "The Passion of the Christ" and "The Da Vinci Code." It also highlights a long-simmering debate in churches and universities across the country.

The film, which opened in late October in 19 markets nationwide, opens Friday at the Oaks Theatre in Berkeley. La Marre has had supporting roles in movies including Spike Lee's 1992 "Malcolm X" and last year directed "Brothers in Arms" starring David Carradine. "Color of the Cross" also features actress Debbi Morgan as Jesus' mother, Mary.

Although race is not overtly cited as a reason for Jesus' slaying, in one scene Mary asks, "Do you think they're doing this because he's black?" La Marre said the issue of skin color is particularly meaningful in the United States, given its tortured history regarding race.

"When you see him on the cross, it really brings you back to the Southern days when black men were hung (from trees)," said La Marre, 38. "When a black man tells you he's the son of God, it freaks people out."

By the early Middle Ages, images of Jesus had developed common themes -- a forked beard, light-colored eyes, hazel or blond hair, and smooth facial features -- and were used in countless artistic renderings by the likes of Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo.

William Loewe, associate professor of theology and religious studies at Catholic University in Washington, D.C., said it's easy to find everyday examples of how Jesus has been cast as European in Western civilization, citing a religious icon on his own campus.

"It's this extremely muscular, blue-eyed, blond-haired figure," said Loewe. "I find it to be offensive, as far as I'm concerned, because it seems to be such a denial of his Jewishness."

The race of Jesus has been debated since at least the 19th century, with societies in different parts of the world depicting him in their own likeness. But in America, he's traditionally been seen as a white man in most churches and homes, until recently.

Director Kevin Smith described Jesus as a black man in his 1999 film "Dogma," with Chris Rock playing a black apostle whose story was erased from biblical canon by the church.

"I thought dealing with Christ's crucifixion would be a good story," La Marre said. "But the one problem I had, as most black Christians have, has been the historical Hollywood depictions of Christ."

Scholars agree there is no definitive description of Christ in the Bible. Despite passages in the Book of Revelation referring to Jesus with woolly hair and bronze-colored skin, he's usually depicted as having white skin, flowing hair and European facial features.

The Rev. Cecil Murray, a black minister in Los Angeles and a professor of religion at the University of Southern California, is credited as a producer for his work as a consultant on "Color of the Cross." He said the history of the biblical region shows figures such as Jesus and Moses had black or Middle Eastern features.

"When they get ready to hide Jesus as a baby, his mother and his father take him to Egypt. You can hide chocolate in the midst of chocolate. You can't hide vanilla in the midst of chocolate," Murray said.

He dismisses the argument that what's important is the New Testament savior's message and not his skin color.

"If they want to make him olive-skinned, fine. If they want to make him pecan-skinned, fine. But to make him white?" said Murray. "If our icon of religion -- the founder of the Christian faith -- looked like us, then we can't be as bad as we've been depicted."

At St. Paul of the Shipwreck Church in San Francisco's predominantly African American Bayview neighborhood, its former priest commissioned the making of a black Jesus for the church's crucifix 20 years ago, church officials said.

St. Paul's current priest, the Rev. Paul Gawlowski, said that when children in the church hear that Jesus may have been black it has a profound affect on their sense of self.

"The idea just blows them away and their eyes just go wide open," said Gawlowski. "It gives them liberty. They feel empowered and validated."

"It means a lot to a minority culture to see a Jesus that looks more like them than a European Jesus," explained Gawlowski, who said he believes if Jesus were to return today he'd be a minority. "He picked the Hebrew people, who had a history of oppression and slavery, so it's entirely likely that if Christ came back today, at least in America, he'd be African American, perhaps someone of Latino heritage."

Catholic University's Loewe said having a literal interpretation of Jesus' image will have an effect on how people perceive themselves and others, with potentially negative side effects: "If he's one of us, that means he's not one you," said Loewe.

La Marre said he encountered skeptical studio chiefs when he originally tried to pitch the movie, with some saying the project had no chance unless it featured an actor like Denzel Washington or Don Cheadle in the lead role. Some suggested turning the film into a modern-day hip-hop opera starring a rapper like 50 Cent.

"What was difficult was finding anyone who was willing to put money into the film. Telling people you want to make (this) movie is like trying to tell people you want to make a movie about dwarves living on the moon," said La Marre.

La Marre ultimately financed the movie's $2.5 million production cost by mortgaging two houses he owned, one in Beverly Hills and the other in Miami's South Beach. "Sometimes you have to put your money where your mouth is, and I really believed in this picture," he said.

La Marre then sold the film to Fox, which released "The Passion of the Christ" on video. Gibson's movie was a box-office smash, earning $370 million in domestic box office in 2004. In September, Fox Filmed Entertainment announced plans to produce up to a dozen Christian-themed films a year.

"I think Fox realized this would make good sense," said La Marre, who thinks people are hungry for these kinds of stories. "I think the world is becoming more of a spiritual place, for good and bad, and people are looking for any bit of salvation they can get their hands on."

Jason B. Johnson, Chronicle Staff Writer
E-mail Jason B. Johnson at jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

This article appeared on page E - 1 of the San Francisco Chronicle

Quelle course était Jésus ? La « couleur de la croix » met un visage différent sur la discussion.
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
La La Marre de Jean-Claude a écrit, a dirigé et tient le premier rôle comme Jésus i… Le gagnant de l'art Co du nouveau-millénium d'un magasin catholique… Chasseur de Jeffrey dans le « roi des rois. » Photo, 1961, courtoisie…

Pour beaucoup, l'image de Jésus est celle d'un homme blanc avec les cheveux blonds onduleux et les yeux bleus -- genre de chasseur pareil de Jeffrey dans 1961's « roi des rois. » Mais un nouveau film, « couleur de la croix, » montre le sauveur chrétien en tant qu'homme noir.

En se moulant en tête le rôle, l'auteur et la La Marre de directeur Jean-Claude est provocant une vue de Jésus qui est dominé depuis les âges moyens et s'ajouter à un corps croissant des films de Hollywood avec des thèmes chrétiens, y compris la passion de Mel Gibson « du Christ » et « du code de Da Vinci. » Il accentue également une discussion long-fermentante dans les églises et les universités à travers le pays.

Le film, qui s'est ouvert en octobre sur 19 marchés dans tout le pays, ouvre vendredi au théâtre de chênes dans Berkeley. La La Marre a eu des rôles de support dans les films comprenant 1992 de Lee de transitoire « Malcolm X » et « frères l'année dernière dirigés dans des bras » tenant le premier rôle David Carradine. La « couleur de la croix » comporte également l'actrice Debbi Morgan comme mère de Jésus, Mary.

Bien que la course ne soit pas manifestement citée comme raison du meurtre de Jésus, dans une scène Mary demande, « vous les pensent font ceci parce qu'il est noir ? » La La Marre a indiqué que la question de couleur de peau est particulièrement signicative aux Etats-Unis, donnés son histoire torturée concernant la course.

« Quand vous le voyez sur la croix, elle vous apporte vraiment de nouveau aux jours méridionaux quand des hommes noirs ont été accrochés (des arbres), » a dit la La Marre, 38. « Quand un homme noir vous dit il est le fils de Dieu, il des personnes de phénomènes dehors.  »

Par les âges moyens jeune, images de Jésus avait développé des thèmes communs -- une barbe bifurquée, des cheveux de yeux, noisette ou blonds de couleur claire, et lissent les dispositifs faciaux -- et ont été employés dans des renderings artistiques innombrables par les goûts du da Vinci et Michaël Angelo de Leonardo.

William Loewe, professeur d'associé de la théologie et des études religieuses à l'université catholique à Washington, C.C, a indiqué qu'il est facile de trouver des exemples journaliers de la façon dont Jésus a été moulé en tant qu'Européen dans la civilisation occidentale, citant une icône religieuse sur son propre campus.

« Il est ce extrêmement musculaire, la figure bleu-observée et blond-d'une chevelure, » a indiqué Loewe. « Je le trouve pour être blessant, en ce qui concerne je, parce qu'il semble être un tel démenti de son judaïsme.  »

La course de Jésus a été discutée depuis au moins le 19ème siècle, avec des sociétés dans différentes régions du monde le dépeignant dans leur propre similarité. Mais en Amérique, il traditionnellement est vu en tant qu'homme blanc dans la plupart des églises et maisons, jusque récemment.

Directeur Kevin Smith a décrit Jésus en tant qu'homme noir en son 1999 film « dogme, » avec la roche de Chris jouant un apôtre noir dont l'histoire a été effacée du canon biblique par l'église.

« Traiter pensé par I la crucifixion du Christ serait une bonne histoire, » La Marre dit. « Mais l'un problème que j'ai eu, comme la plupart des chrétiens noirs ont, a été les descriptions historiques de Hollywood du Christ. Les »

disciples conviennent qu'il n'y a aucune description définitive du Christ dans la bible. En dépit des passages dans le livre de la révélation se rapportant à Jésus avec les cheveux laineux et la peau bronze-colorée, il est habituellement dépeint en tant qu'ayant la peau blanche, les cheveux débordants et les dispositifs faciaux européens.

L'inverseur. Cecil Murray, un ministre noir à Los Angeles et un professeur de la religion à l'université de la Californie méridionale, est crédité comme un producteur pour son travail en tant que conseiller sur la « couleur de la croix. » Il a dit que l'histoire des chiffres bibliques d'expositions de région tels que Jésus et Moïse a eu le noir ou le milieu - dispositifs orientaux.

« Quand ils sont prêts pour cacher Jésus en tant que bébé, sa mère et son père le portent en Egypte. Vous pouvez cacher le chocolat au milieu du chocolat. Vous ne pouvez pas cacher la vanille au milieu du chocolat, « Murray dit.

Il écarte l'argument que ce qui est important est le message du sauveur de nouveau testament et non sa couleur de peau.

« S'ils veulent le faire olive-pelé, fin. S'ils veulent le faire noix de pécan-pelé, fin. Mais pour lui faire le blanc ? « a dit Murray. « Si notre icône de religion -- le fondateur de la foi chrétienne -- ressemblé à nous, alors nous ne pouvons pas être aussi mauvais que nous avons été dépeints.  »

À la rue Paul de l'église de naufrage dans le voisinage américain principalement africain de Bayview de San Francisco, son ancien prêtre a commissionné la fabrication de Jésus noir pour le crucifix de l'église il y a 20 ans, des fonctionnaires d'église dits.

Rue Le prêtre courant de Paul, l'inverseur. Paul Gawlowski, dit que quand les enfants dans l'église entendent que Jésus a pu avoir été noir il fait affecter un profond sur leur sens d'individu.

« L'idée les souffle juste partis et leurs yeux justes disparaissent grands ouverts, » a dit Gawlowski. « Il leur donne la liberté. Ils se sentent autorisés et validés. « 

« Il signifie beaucoup à une culture de minorité pour voir Jésus qui regarde plutôt eux que Jésus européen, » Gawlowski expliqué, qui a indiqué qu'il croit si Jésus devaient le retourner aujourd'hui serait une minorité. « Il a sélectionné les personnes hébreues, qui ont eu une histoire d'oppression et d'esclavage, ainsi il est entièrement probable que si le Christ revenait aujourd'hui, au moins en Amérique, il soit Américain africain, peut-être quelqu'un de l'héritage latin.  »

Loewe de l'université catholique dit ayant une interprétation littérale de l'image de Jésus aura un effet sur la façon dont les gens se perçoivent et d'autres, avec des effets secondaires potentiellement négatifs : « S'il est l'un de nous, ce les moyens qu'il n'a pas un ans vous, » ont indiqué Loewe.

La La Marre a indiqué qu'il a rencontré les chefs sceptiques de studio quand il a à l'origine essayé de lancer le film, avec certains disant le projet n'a eu aucune chance à moins qu'elle ait comporté un acteur comme Denzel Washington ou Don Cheadle dans le rôle de fil. Certains ont suggéré transformer le film en opéra de hanche-houblon de moderne-jour tenant le premier rôle un frappeur comme le cent 50.

« Ce qui était difficile trouvait n'importe qui qui était disposé à mettre l'argent dans le film. Dire des personnes que vous voulez faire le film (de ceci) est comme l'essai de dire des personnes vous voulez faire un film au sujet des nains vivant sur la lune, « a dit la La Marre.

La La Marre a finalement financé le coût de production $2.5 millions en hypothèquant deux maisons qu'il a possédées, un dans Beverly Hills et l'autre du film en plage du sud de Miami. « Parfois vous devez mettre votre argent où votre bouche est, et j'ai vraiment cru en cette image, » il a dit.

La La Marre a alors vendu le film au renard, qui a libéré « la passion du Christ » sur la vidéo. Le film de Gibson était un fracas de boîte-bureau, gagnant $370 millions dans la caisse domestique en 2004. En septembre, le renard a filmé le divertissement a annoncé des plans pour produire jusqu'des douzaine aux films Chrétiens-themed par année.

« Je pense le renard a réalisé ceci semblerait bon raisonnable, » a dit la La Marre, qui pense que les gens ont faim pour ces genres d'histoires. « Je pense que le monde devient plus d'un endroit spirituel, pour bon et mauvais, et les gens recherchent n'importe quel peu de salut qu'ils peuvent obtenir leurs mains dessus.  »

Jason B. Johnson, E-mail Jason B.
d'auteur de personnel de chronique. Johnson à jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

cet article est apparu à la page E - 1 de la chronique de San Francisco

¿Qué raza era Jesús? El “color de la cruz” pone una diversa cara en el discusión.
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
El La Marre de Jean-Claude escribió, dirigido y las estrellas como Jesús i… El ganador del arte co del nuevo-milenio de un compartimiento católico… Cazador de Jeffrey en el “rey de reyes.” Photo, 1961, cortesía…

Para muchos, la imagen de Jesús es la de un hombre blanco con el pelo rubio ondulado y los ojos azules -- clase de cazador semejante de Jeffrey en 1961's “rey de reyes.” Pero una película nueva, “color de la cruz,” demuestra a salvador cristiano como hombre negro.

Echándose en el papel del plomo, el escritor y el La Marre de director Jean-Claude es desafiadores una opinión Jesús que se domine desde las edades medias y la adición a un cuerpo cada vez mayor de las películas de Hollywood con temas cristianos, incluyendo la pasión de Gibson de los Mel “del Cristo” y “del código de Da Vinci.” También destaca un discusión largo-simmering en iglesias y universidades a través del país.

La película, que se abrió en último octubre en 19 mercados por toda la nación, abre viernes en el teatro de los robles en Berkeley. El La Marre ha tenido papeles de soporte en películas incluyendo 1992 de las heces del punto “Malcolm X” y los “hermanos el año pasado dirigidos en los brazos” David starring Carradine. El “color de la cruz” también ofrece a actriz Debbi Morgan como madre de Jesús, Maria.

Aunque la raza no se cita abiertamente como razón de Jesús slaying, en una escena Maria pide, “usted los piensa está haciendo esto porque él es negro?” El La Marre dijo que la aplicación el color de la piel es particularmente significativa en los Estados Unidos, dados su historia torturada con respecto a la raza.

“Cuando usted lo ve en la cruz, realmente le trae de nuevo a los días meridionales cuando colgaron a los hombres negros (de árboles),” dijo el La Marre, 38. “Cuando un hombre negro le dice él es el hijo del dios, él gente de los monstruos hacia fuera. ”

Por las edades medias tempranas, imágenes de Jesús había desarrollado temas comunes -- una barba bifurcada, un pelo de color claro de los ojos, pardo o rubio, y alisa características faciales -- y fueron utilizados en renderings artísticos incontables por los gustos del da Vinci y Michelangelo de Leonardo.

Guillermo Loewe, profesor de asociado de la teología y de los estudios religiosos en la universidad católica en Washington, C.C., dijo que es fácil encontrar los ejemplos diarios de cómo han echado a Jesús como europeo en la civilización occidental, citando un icono religioso en su propio campus.

“Es este extremadamente muscular, la figura azul-eyed, rubio-haired,” dijo Loewe. “Lo encuentro para ser ofensivo, por lo que me refiero, porque se parece ser tal negación de su Jewishness. ”

Han discutido la raza de Jesús desde por lo menos el diecinueveavo siglo, con las sociedades en diversas partes del mundo que lo representaba en su propia semejanza. Pero en América, lo ven tradicionalmente como hombre blanco en la mayoría de las iglesias y de los hogares, hasta hace poco tiempo.

Director Kevin Smith describió a Jesús como hombre negro en su 1999 película “dogma,” con la roca de Chris que jugaba a un apostle negro que historia fue borrada de canon bíblico por la iglesia.

“El tratar pensado I del crucifixion de Cristo sería una buena historia,” La Marre dicho. “Solamente el un problema que tenía, como la mayoría de los cristianos negros tienen, he sido las pinturas históricas de Hollywood de Cristo. Los”

eruditos convienen que no hay descripción definitiva de Cristo en la biblia. A pesar de pasos en el libro de la revelación que refiere a Jesús con el pelo lanoso y la piel bronce-coloreada, lo representan generalmente como teniendo la piel blanca, el pelo que fluye y características faciales europeas.

El inversor de corriente. Acreditan Cecil Murray, ministro negro en Los Ángeles y profesor de la religión en la universidad de California meridional, como un productor para su trabajo como consultor en el “color de la cruz.” Él dijo que la historia de las figuras bíblicas de las demostraciones de la región tales como Jesús y Moses tenía características negras o medio-orientales.

“Cuando consiguen listos ocultar a Jesús como bebé, su madre y su padre lo llevan a Egipto. Usted puede ocultar el chocolate en el medio del chocolate. Usted no puede ocultar la vainilla en el medio del chocolate, “Murray dicho.

Él despide la discusión que cuál es importante es el mensaje del salvador del nuevo testamento y no su color de la piel.

“Si desean hacerlo aceituna-pelado, fino. Si desean hacerlo pacana-pelado, fino. ¿Pero para hacerle blanco? “dijo a Murray. “Si nuestro icono de la religión -- el fundador de la fe cristiana -- parecido nosotros, entonces no podemos ser tan malos como nos han representado. ”

En el St. Paul de la iglesia del naufragio en la vecindad americana predominante africana de Bayview de San Francisco, su sacerdote anterior comisionó la fabricación de un Jesús negro para el crucifix de la iglesia hace 20 años, los funcionarios de la iglesia dichos.

St. Sacerdote actual de Paul, el inversor de corriente. Paul Gawlowski, dicho que cuando los niños en la iglesia oyen que Jesús pudo haber sido negro hace que un profundo afecte en su sentido del uno mismo.

“La idea apenas los sopla ausentes y sus ojos justos van abiertos de par en par,” dijo Gawlowski. “Les da libertad. Se sienten autorizados y validados. “

“Significa mucho a una cultura de la minoría ver a un Jesús que mire más bién ellos que un Jesús europeo,” Gawlowski explicado, que dijo que él cree si Jesús lo volviera hoy sería una minoría. “Él escogió a gente hebrea, que tenía una historia de la opresión y de la esclavitud, así que es enteramente probable que si Cristo se volviera hoy, por lo menos en América, él sea americano africano, quizás alguien de la herencia de Latino. ”

Loewe de la universidad católica dicho teniendo una interpretación literal de la imagen de Jesús tendrá un efecto en cómo la gente se percibe y otros, con efectos secundarios potencialmente negativos: “Si él es uno de nosotros, ese los medios que él no es uno usted,” dijeron Loewe.

El La Marre dijo que él encontró a jefes escépticos del estudio cuando él intentó originalmente echar la película, con alguno diciendo el proyecto no tenía ninguna ocasión a menos que ofreciera a agente como Denzel Washington o ponga Cheadle en el papel del plomo. Algunos sugirieron dar vuelta a la película en una ópera del cadera-salto del moderno-día starring un rapper como el centavo 50.

“Cuál era difícil encontraba a cualquier persona que estaba dispuesto a poner el dinero en la película. Decir a gente que usted desea hacer película (esto) es como intentar decir a gente usted desea hacer una película sobre los enanos que viven en la luna, “dijo el La Marre.

El La Marre financió en última instancia el coste de producción $2.5 millones hipotecando dos casas que él poseyó, uno en las colinas de Beverly y el otro de la película en la playa del sur de Miami. “Usted tiene que poner a veces su dinero donde está su boca, y realmente creí en este cuadro,” él dijo.

El La Marre entonces vendió la película al zorro, que lanzó “la pasión del Cristo” en el vídeo. La película de Gibson era una rotura violenta de la caja-oficina, ganando $370 millones en taquilla doméstica en 2004. En septiembre, el zorro filmó la hospitalidad anunció planes para producir hasta las películas de los docena Cristianos-themed al año.

“Pienso el zorro realizó éste tendría buen sentido,” dijo el La Marre, que piensa que la gente tiene hambre para estas clases de historias. “Pienso que el mundo se está convirtiendo en más de un lugar espiritual, para bueno y malo, y la gente está buscando cualquier pedacito de la salvación que ella puede conseguir sus manos encendido. ”

Jason B. Johnson, E-mail Jason B.
del escritor del personal del Chronicle. Johnson en jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

este artículo apareció en la página E - 1 del Chronicle de San Francisco

Che corsa era Jesus? “Il colore della traversa„ mette una faccia differente sul dibattito.
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
La La Marre del Jean-Claude ha scritto, diretto e stelle come Jesus i… Il vincitore di arte co di nuovo-millennio dello scomparto cattolico… Cacciatore del Jeffrey “in re dei re.„ Photo, 1961, cortesia…

Per molti, l'immagine di Jesus è quella di un uomo bianco con capelli biondi ondulati e gli occhi blu -- genere di cacciatore simile del Jeffrey in 1961's “re dei re.„ Ma una nuova pellicola, “colore della traversa,„ mostra il savior cristiano come uomo nero.

Lanciandosi nel ruolo del cavo, il produttore e la La Marre del direttore Jean-Claude è challenging un punto di vista di Jesus che è dominato Medio Evo e dalla aggiunta ad un corpo crescente delle pellicole di Hollywood con i temi cristiani, compreso la passione del Gibson di mel “del Christ„ e “del codice di Da Vinci.„ Inoltre evidenzia un dibattito lungo-simmering in chiese ed in università attraverso il paese.

La pellicola, che si è aperta verso la fine di ottobre in 19 mercati in tutta la nazione, apre venerdì al teatro delle quercie in Berkeley. La La Marre ha avuta ruoli di sostegno in film compreso 1992 dei rifugi del punto “Malcolm X„ e “i fratelli l'anno scorso diretti in armi„ David starring Carradine. “Il colore della traversa„ inoltre caratterizza il actress Debbi Morgan come madre del Jesus, Mary.

Anche se la corsa non si cita evidente come motivo per Jesus che slaying, in una scena Mary chiede a, “voi li pensa sta facendo questo perché è nero?„ La La Marre ha detto che l'emissione di colore della pelle è particolarmente espressiva negli Stati Uniti, dati la relativa storia torturata per quanto riguarda la corsa.

“Quando lo vedete sulla traversa, realmente li porta di nuovo ai giorni del sud quando gli uomini neri sono stati appesi (dagli alberi),„ ha detto la La Marre, 38. “Quando un uomo nero gli dice è il figlio del dio, esso la gente dei freaks fuori. „

Da Medio Evo giovani, immagini di Jesus aveva sviluppato i temi comuni -- una barba biforcata, i capelli nocciola o biondi di colore chiaro degli occhi, e liscia le caratteristiche facciali -- e sono stati usati in renderings artistici countless dai simili del da Vinci e Michelangelo del Leonardo.

William Loewe, professore di socio della teologia e degli studi religiosi all'università cattolica in Washington, DC, ad esempio che è facile da trovare gli esempi giornalieri di come Jesus è stato lanciato come europeo nella civilizzazione occidentale, citanti un'icona religiosa sulla sua propria città universitaria.

“È questo estremamente muscolare, la figura blu-eyed e biondo-haired,„ ha detto Loewe. “Lo trovo per essere offensivo, per quanto sono interessato, perché sembra essere una tal smentita del suo Jewishness. „

La corsa di Jesus è stata dibattuta almeno dal diciannovesimo secolo, con le società nelle parti differenti del mondo che lo descrive nella loro propria somiglianza. Ma in America, è visto tradizionalmente come uomo bianco nella maggior parte diin chiesa e delle sedi, fino a poco tempo fa.

Il direttore Kevin Smith ha descritto Jesus come uomo nero in sua 1999 pellicola “dogma,„ con la roccia del Chris che gioca un apostle nero di cui la storia è stata cancellata dal canon biblico dalla chiesa.

“Il crucifixion del Christ dealing with pensato I sarebbe una buona storia,„ La Marre detto. “Ma l'un problema che ho avuto, come la maggior parte dei cristiani neri hanno, sono stato i depictions storici di Hollywood di Christ. „

Gli eruditi accosentono là è descrizione definitiva di Christ nella bibbia. Malgrado i passaggi nel libro della rivelazione che si riferisce a Jesus con capelli lanosi e pelle bronzo-colorata, è descritto solitamente come avendo la pelle bianca, i capelli fluenti e caratteristiche facciali europee.

L'invertitore. Cecil Murray, un ministro nero a Los Angeles e un professore della religione all'università di California del sud, è accreditato come un produttore per il suo lavoro come consulente “su colore della traversa.„ Ha detto che la storia delle figure bibliche di esposizioni di regione quali Jesus e Moses ha avuta il nero o metà - caratteristiche orientali.

“Quando ottengono aspetti per nascondere Jesus come bambino, la sua madre ed il suo padre lo prende nell'Egitto. Potete nascondere il cioccolato del cioccolato in mezzo a. Non potete nascondere il cioccolato della vaniglia in mezzo a, “Murray detto.

Allontana la discussione che che cosa è importante è il messaggio del nuovo savior del testamento ed il non suo colore della pelle.

“Se desiderano farli oliva-pelato, fine. Se desiderano farli pecan-pelato, fine. Ma per rendergli bianco? “ha detto Murray. “Se la nostra icona della religione -- il fondatore della fede cristiana -- assomigliato noi, allora non possiamo essere difettosi come siamo stati descritti. „

Alla st Paul della chiesa di naufragio nella vicinanza americana principalmente africana di Bayview de San Francisco, il relativo ex priest ha incaricato fare di un Jesus nero per il crucifix della chiesa 20 anni fa, funzionari della chiesa detti.

St Priest corrente del Paul, l'invertitore. Paul Gawlowski, ad esempio che quando i bambini nella chiesa si sentono che Jesus può essere nero fa interessare un profondo sul loro senso dell'auto.

“L'idea appena li salta assenti ed i loro occhi giusti vanno spalancati,„ ha detto Gawlowski. “Dà loro la libertà. Ritengono autorizzati e convalidati. “

“Significa mólto ad una coltura di minoranza vedere un Jesus che osserva loro più che un Jesus europeo,„ Gawlowski spiegato, che ha detto che crede se Jesus dovesse restituirlo oggi fosse una minoranza. “Ha selezionato la gente ebraica, che ha avuta una storia del oppression e dello slavery, in modo da è interamente probabile che se Christ ritornasse oggi, almeno in America, sarebbe americano africano, forse qualcuno dell'eredità di Latino. „

Loewe dell'università cattolica detto avendo un'interpretazione letterale dell'immagine del Jesus avrà un effetto su come la gente si percepisce ed altri, con gli effetti secondari potenzialmente negativi: “Se è uno di noi, quel i mezzi che non è uno voi,„ hanno detto Loewe.

La La Marre ha detto che ha incontrato i capi scettici dell'studio quando originalmente ha provato a lanciare il film, con alcuno dicente il progetto non ha avuto probabilità a meno che caratterizzasse un attore come Denzel Washington o indossa Cheadle nel ruolo del cavo. Alcuni hanno suggerito trasformare nella pellicola un'opera del anca-luppolo di moderno-giorno che starring un rapper come il centesimo 50.

“Che cosa era difficile stava trovando chiunque che sia disposto a mettere i soldi nella pellicola. Dire alla gente che desiderate fare il film (questo) è come provare a dire alla gente desiderate fare un film circa i nani che vivono sulla luna, “ha detto la La Marre.

La La Marre infine ha finanziato il costo di produzione $2.5 milioni ipotecando due case che ha posseduto, uno in colline di Beverly e l'altro del film in spiaggia del sud de Miami. “A volte dovete mettere i vostri soldi in cui la vostra bocca è e realmente ho creduto in questa immagine,„ ha detto.

La La Marre allora ha venduto la pellicola alla volpe, che ha liberato “la passione del Christ„ sul video. Il film del Gibson era uno scontro dell'scatola-ufficio, guadagnante $370 milioni nell'ufficio di scatola domestico in 2004. In settembre, la volpe ha filmato l'intrattenimento ha annunciato i programmi per produrre fino alle pellicole dei dozzina Cristiani-themed un l'anno.

“Penso la volpe abbia realizzato questa avrebbe il buon significato,„ ha detto la La Marre, che pensa che la gente fosse affamata per questi generi di storia. “Penso che il mondo stia trasformandosi in più di un posto spiritoso, per buon e difettoso e la gente sta cercando tutta la punta di salvezza possono ottenere le loro mani sopra. „

Jason B. Johnson, E-mail Jason B.
del produttore del personale del Chronicle. Johnson a jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

questo articolo è comparso alla pagina E - 1 del Chronicle de San Francisco

Welches Rennen war Jesus? „Farbe des Kreuzes“ setzt ein anderes Gesicht auf die Debatte.
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Jean-Claude La Marre schrieb, verwiesen und Sterne als Jesus I… Der Sieger der kunst Co Neujahrtausend einer katholischen Zeitschrift… Jeffrey Jäger „im König der Könige.“ Photo, 1961, Höflichkeit…

Für viele ist das Bild von Jesus das eines weißen Mannes mit dem wellenförmigen blonden Haar und den blauen Augen -- Art des wieJeffrey Jägers in 1961's „König der Könige.“ Aber ein neuer Film, „Farbe des Kreuzes,“ zeigt den christlichen Retter als schwarzer Mann.

Indem sie in der Leitung Rolle sich werfen, ist Verfasser und Direktor Jean-Claude La Marre eine Ansicht von Jesus schwierig, der wird beherrscht seit dem mittleren Alter und dem Hinzufügen einem wachsenden Körper der Hollywood Filme mit christlichen Themen, einschließlich Mel Gibsons „die Neigung des Christ“ und „des Da Vinci Codes.“ Es hebt auch eine lange-simmering Debatte in den Kirchen und in den Universitäten über dem Land hervor.

Der Film, der in später Oktober in 19 Märkten sich im ganzen Land öffnete, öffnet Freitag am Eichen Theater in Berkeley. La Marre hat stützende Rollen in den Filmen einschließlich 1992 der Spitze Schutze „Malcolm X“ und letztes Jahr verwiesene „Brüder in den Armen“ starring David Carradine gehabt. „Farbe des Kreuzes“ kennzeichnet auch Schauspielerin Debbi Morgan als Mutter Jesus, Mary.

Obgleich Rennen nicht offenkundig als Grund für slaying Jesus zitiert wird, in einer Szene fragt Mary, „Sie denken sie tun dies, weil er ist schwarz?“ La Marre sagte, daß die Ausgabe der Hautfarbe in den Vereinigten Staaten besonders sinnvoll ist, seine gequälte Geschichte betreffend ist Rennen gegeben.

„Wenn Sie ihn auf dem Kreuz sehen, holt es Sie wirklich zurück zu den südlichen Tagen, als schwarze Männer (von den Bäumen) gehangen wurden,“ sagte La Marre, 38. „Wenn ein schwarzer Mann Ihnen erklärt, ist er der Sohn des Gottes, es Launeleute heraus. “

Durch das frühe mittlere Alter, Bilder von Jesus hatte allgemeine Themen entwickelt -- ein gegabelter Bart, hellfarbiges Augen, Haselnuß- oder blondes ein Haar und machen Gesichtseigenschaften glatt -- und wurden in den unzähligen künstlerischen renderings durch die Gleichen von Leonardo da Vinci und Michelangelo verwendet.

William Loewe, Teilnehmerprofessor der Theologie und der frommen Studien an der katholischen Universität in Washington, DC, sagte, daß es einfach ist, zu finden die täglichen Beispiele von, wie Jesus als Europäer in der westlichen Zivilisation geworfen worden ist und eine fromme Ikone auf seinem eigenen Campus zitiert.

„Es ist dieses extrem muskulöse, sagte blau-gemusterte, blond-behaarte Abbildung,“ Loewe. „Ich finde es, um beleidigend zu sein, insoweit ich betroffen werde, weil es scheint, solch eine Ablehnung seines Judentums zu sein. “

Das Rennen von Jesus ist seit mindestens dem 19. Jahrhundert, mit Gesellschaften in den unterschiedlichen Teilen der Welt debattiert worden, die ihn in ihrer eigenen Gleichheit bildlich darstellt. Aber in Amerika, wird er traditionsgemäß als weißer Mann in den meisten Kirchen und in den Häusern, bis vor kurzem gesehen.

Direktor Kevin Smith beschrieb Jesus als schwarzer Mann in seinem 1999 Film „Dogma,“ mit dem Chris Felsen, der einen schwarzen Apostel spielt dessen Geschichte vom biblischen Kanon durch die Kirche gelöscht wurde.

„Das I gedachte Beschäftigen crucifixion Christs würde eine gute Geschichte sein,“ La gesagtes Marre. „Aber das ein Problem, das, ich, wie die meisten schwarzen Christen haben, bin gewesen die historischen Hollywood Beschreibungen von Christ hatte. “

Gelehrte stimmen zu, daß es keine endgültige Beschreibung von Christ in der Bibel gibt. Trotz der Durchgänge im Buch von Enthüllung auf Jesus mit dem wolligen Haar und Bronze-farbiger Haut beziehend, wird er normalerweise als bildlich dargestellt, weiße Haut, flüssiges Haar und europäische Gesichtseigenschaften habend.

Der Polwender. Cecil Murray, ein schwarzer Minister in Los Angeles und ein Professor von der Religion an der Universität von Südkalifornien, wird gutgeschrieben, wie ein Produzent für seine Arbeit als Berater auf „Farbe des Kreuzes.“ Er sagte, daß die Geschichte der biblischen Regionerscheinenabbildungen wie Jesus und Moses Schwarzes oder Mitte - östliche Eigenschaften hatte.

„Wenn sie fertig werden, Jesus als Baby zu verstecken, nehmen seine Mutter und sein Vater ihn nach Ägypten. Sie können Schokolade in der Mitte der Schokolade verstecken. Sie können nicht Vanille in der Mitte der Schokolade verstecken, „gesagter Murray.

Er entläßt das Argument, daß, was wichtig ist, des die Anzeige Retters des neuen Testaments und nicht seine Hautfarbe ist.

„Wenn sie ihn bilden möchten Olive-enthäutet, fein. Wenn sie ihn bilden möchten Pekannuß-enthäutet, fein. Aber ihn Weiß bilden? „sagte Murray. „Wenn unsere Ikone der Religion -- der Gründer des christlichen Glaubens -- ausgesehen wie wir, dann können wir nicht so schlecht sein, wie wir bildlich dargestellt worden sind. “

An Str. Paul der Schiffswrack-Kirche afrikanischen amerikanischen Nachbarschaft Bayview San Franciscos in der überwiegend, sein ehemaliger Priester beauftragte das Bilden von einem schwarzen Jesus für das Kruzifix der Kirche 20 Jahren, vor, die gesagten Kirchebeamten.

Str. Pauls gegenwärtiger Priester, der Polwender. Paul Gawlowski, gesagt, daß, wenn Kinder in der Kirche hören, daß Jesus Schwarzes gewesen sein kann, es ein profundes auf ihrer Richtung von Selbst beeinflussen läßt.

„Die Idee brennt sie gerade weg durch und ihre Augen, die gerecht sind, gehen weit geöffnet,“ sagte Gawlowski. „Es gibt ihnen Freiheit. Sie glauben bevollmächtigt und validiert. „

„Bedeutet er viel zu einer Minoritätkultur, einen Jesus zu sehen, der eher wie sie als ein europäischer Jesus schaut,“ erklärtes Gawlowski, das sagte, daß er glaubt, wenn Jesus ihn heute zurückbringen sollten würde sein eine Minorität. „Er wählte die hebräischen Leute aus, die eine Geschichte der Unterdrückung und der Sklaverei hatten, also ist es völlig wahrscheinlich, daß, wenn Christ heute, mindestens in Amerika zurückkam, er afrikanischer Amerikaner sein würde, möglicherweise jemand des Latino Erbes. “

Loewe der katholische Universität, das gesagt wird, eine wörtliche Deutung von Bild Jesus habend, hat einen Effekt auf, wie Leute und andere sich wahrnehmen, mit möglicherweise negativen Nebenwirkungen: „Wenn er eins von uns ist, dieses sagten Mittel, die er nicht eins Sie,“ ist, Loewe.

La Marre sagte, daß er skeptische Studioleiter, als er ursprünglich versuchte, den Film zu werfen, mit einigem das Projekt sagend hatte keine Wahrscheinlichkeit antraf, es sei denn sie einen Schauspieler wie Denzel Washington kennzeichnete oder Cheadle in der Leitung Rolle anzieht. Einige schlugen das Machen des Filmes zu eine Moderntagc$hüftehopfenoper vor, die ein rapper wie Cent 50 starring ist.

„Was schwierig war, jedermann fand, das bereit war, Geld in den Film zu setzen. Leuten zu erklären, die Sie (dieses) Film bilden möchten, ist wie das Versuchen, Leuten zu erklären Sie einen Film über die Zwerge bilden möchten, die auf dem Mond leben, „sagte La Marre.

La Marre finanzierte schließlich die Kosten Produktion $2.5 Million, indem es zwei Häuser, die hypothekarisch belastete er, besaß, eins in den Beverly Hills und das andere des Films Miamis im Südstrand. „Manchmal müssen Sie Ihr Geld setzen, in dem Ihre öffnung ist, und ich glaubte wirklich an diese Abbildung,“ sagte er.

La Marre verkaufte dann den Film an Fuchs, der „die Neigung des Christ“ auf Bildschirm freigab. Film Gibsons war ein Kastenbüro Smash und erwarb $370 Million in der inländischen Kasse 2004. Im September filmte Fuchs Unterhaltung verkündete Pläne, um bis zu ein Dutzend Christ-themed den Filmen ein Jahr zu produzieren.

„Ich denke, Fuchs verwirklichte, dieser gutes sinnvoll,“ sein würde, sagte La Marre, das denkt, daß Leute für diese Arten von Geschichten hungrig sind. „Ich denke, daß die Welt mehr eines geistigen Platzes, für gutes und schlechtes wird und Leute nach jeder möglicher Spitze der Rettung suchen, die sie ihre Hände an erhalten können. “

Jason B. Johnson, Chronik-Stab-Verfasser-
E-mail Jason B. Johnson an jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
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dieser Artikel erschien auf Seite E - 1 der San Francisco Chronik

Que raça era Jesus? A “cor da cruz” põe uma cara diferente sobre o debate.
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
O La Marre de Jean-Claude escreveu, dirigido e estrelas como Jesus i… O vencedor da arte co do novo-millennium de um compartimento Catholic… Caçador de Jeffrey no “rei dos reis.” Foto, 1961, cortesia…

Para muitos, a imagem de Jesus é aquela de um homem branco com cabelo blond ondulado e os olhos azuis -- tipo do caçador semelhante de Jeffrey em 1961's “rei dos reis.” Mas uma película nova, “cor da cruz,” mostra o savior Christian como um homem preto.

Moldando-se himself no papel da ligação, o escritor e o La Marre do diretor Jean-Claude são challenging uma opinião Jesus que é dominado desde as idades médias e a adição a um corpo crescente de películas de Hollywood com temas Christian, including a paixão de Gibson dos Mel “do Christ” e “do código de Da Vinci.” Destaca também um debate longo-simmering nas igrejas e nas universidades através do país.

A película, que abriu em outubro atrasado em 19 mercados por todo o país, abre sexta-feira no Theatre dos carvalhos em Berkeley. O La Marre teve papéis suportando nos filmes including 1992 dos Lee do ponto “Malcolm X” e “irmãos o ano passado dirigidos nos braços” David starring Carradine. A “cor da cruz” caracteriza também a actriz Debbi Morgan como a mãe de Jesus, Mary.

Embora a raça não cited overtly como uma razão para Jesus que slaying, em uma cena Mary pergunta, “você pensa d está fazendo isto porque é preto?” O La Marre disse que a introdução da cor da pele é particularmente significativa nos Estados Unidos, dados sua história torturada a respeito da raça.

“Quando você o vê na cruz, trá-lo realmente para trás aos dias do sul quando os homens pretos foram pendurados (das árvores),” disse o La Marre, 38. “Quando um homem preto o diz é o filho do deus, ele povos dos freaks para fora. ”

Pelas idades médias adiantadas, imagens de Jesus tinha desenvolvido temas comuns -- um beard bifurcado, um cabelo light-colored dos olhos, o côr de avelã ou o blond, e alisam características facial -- e foram usados em renderings artísticos incontáveis pelos gostos do da Vinci e Michelangelo de Leonardo.

William Loewe, professor de associado do theology e dos estudos religiosos na universidade Catholic em Washington, C.C., disse que é fácil encontrar os exemplos diários de como Jesus foi moldado como o europeu na civilização ocidental, citing um ícone religioso em seu próprio campus.

“É este extremamente muscular, a figura azul-eyed, blond-haired,” disse Loewe. “Eu encontro-o para ser ofensivo, tanto quanto eu sou concernido, porque parece ser tal negação de seu Jewishness. ”

A raça de Jesus foi debatida desde pelo menos o 19o século, com sociedades em partes diferentes do mundo que descreve o em seu próprio likeness. Mas em América, é visto tradicional como um homem branco em a maioria igrejas e de repousos, até recentemente.

O diretor Kevin Smith descreveu Jesus como um homem preto em sua 1999 película “Dogma,” com a rocha de Chris que joga um apostle preto cuja a história fosse apagada do canon biblical pela igreja.

“Tratar pensado I do crucifixion de Christ seria uma história boa,” La Marre dito. “Mas o um problema que eu tive, como a maioria de cristãos pretos têm, fui os depictions históricos de Hollywood de Christ. Os”

Scholars concordam que não há nenhuma descrição definitive de Christ no Bible. Apesar das passagens no livro do Revelation que consulta a Jesus com cabelo woolly e pele bronze-colorida, é descrito geralmente como tendo a pele branca, o cabelo fluindo e características facial européias.

O Rev. Cecil Murray, um ministro preto em Los Angeles e um professor da religião na universidade de Califórnia do sul, é creditado como um produtor para seu trabalho como um consultante na “cor da cruz.” Disse que a história das figuras biblical das mostras da região tais como Jesus e Moses teve o preto ou o meio - características orientais.

“Quando começam prontos para esconder Jesus como um bebê, sua mãe e seu pai fazem exame dele a Egipto. Você pode esconder o chocolate no meio do chocolate. Você não pode esconder o vanilla no meio do chocolate, “Murray dito.

Demite o argumento que o que é importante são a mensagem do savior do Testament novo e não sua cor da pele.

“Se querem o fazer azeitona-descascado, fino. Se quiserem o fazer pecan-descascado, fino. Mas para fazer-lhe o branco? “disse Murray. “Se nosso ícone da religião -- o founder da fé Christian -- olhado como nós, então nós não podemos ser tão maus como nós fomos descritos. ”

No St. Paul da igreja do Shipwreck na vizinhança americana predominantly africana de Bayview do San Francisco, seu priest anterior comissão fazer de um Jesus preto para o crucifix da igreja 20 anos há, os oficiais da igreja ditos.

St. Priest atual de Paul, o Rev. Paul Gawlowski, dito que quando as crianças na igreja se ouvirem que Jesus pode ter sido preto manda um profundo afetar em seu sentido do self.

“A idéia funde-os apenas ausentes e seus olhos justos vão largamente abertos,” disse Gawlowski. “Dá-lhes a liberdade. Sentem empowered e validados. “

“Significa muito a uma cultura do minority ver um Jesus que olhe mais como eles do que um Jesus europeu,” Gawlowski explicado, que disse que acredita se Jesus devesse o retornar hoje fosse um minority. “Escolheu os povos Hebrew, que tiveram uma história do oppression e do slavery, assim que é inteiramente provável que se Christ voltar hoje, pelo menos em América, seria americano africano, talvez alguém do heritage de Latino. ”

Loewe da universidade Catholic dito tendo uma interpretação literal da imagem de Jesus terá um efeito em como os povos se percebem e outros, com efeitos laterais potencial negativos: “Se é um de nós, esse os meios que não é um você,” disseram Loewe.

O La Marre disse que encontrou chefes skeptical do estúdio quando tentou originalmente lançar o filme, com algum dizendo o projeto não teve nenhuma possibilidade a menos que caracterizasse um ator como Denzel Washington ou Don Cheadle no papel da ligação. Alguns sugeriram o giro da película em uma ópera do hip-hop de moderno-dia que starring um rapper como o centavo 50.

“O que era difícil encontrava qualquer um que era disposto pôr o dinheiro na película. Dizer povos que você quer fazer o filme (isto) é como tentar dizer povos você quer fazer um filme sobre os anões que vivem na lua, “disse o La Marre.

O La Marre financiou finalmente os custos de gastos de fabricação $2.5 milhões mortgaging duas casas que possuiu, um em montes de Beverly e o outro do filme na praia sul de Miami. “Às vezes você tem que pôr seu dinheiro onde sua boca está, e eu acreditei realmente neste retrato,” disse.

O La Marre vendeu então a película à raposa, que liberou “a paixão do Christ” no vídeo. O filme de Gibson era uma quebra do caixa-escritório, ganhando $370 milhões no escritório de caixa doméstico em 2004. Em setembro, a raposa filmou o Entertainment anunciou plantas para produzir até películas de uns dúzia Cristãos-themed um o ano.

“Eu penso a raposa realizou esta faria o sentido bom,” disse o La Marre, que pensa que os povos estão com fome para estes tipos das histórias. “Eu penso que o mundo se está transformando mais de um lugar espiritual, para bom e mau, e os povos estão procurando todo o bocado do salvation que podem começar suas mãos sobre. ”

Jason B. Johnson, E-mail Jason B.
do escritor da equipe de funcionários do Chronicle. Johnson em jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
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este artigo apareceu na página E - 1 do Chronicle do San Francisco

Var vilken race Jesus? ”Färga av det argt” sätter ett olikt vänder mot på debatten.
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Jean-Claude La Marre skrev, riktat och stjärnor som Jesus i…, Vinnaren av katolsk en tidskrifts ny-millenium konst co…, Jeffrey jägare i ”konung av konungar.”, Foto 1961, artighet…,

För många är avbilda av Jesus det av en vit man med wavy blont hår, och blått synar -- sort av den lika Jeffrey jägaren i 1961's ”konung av konungar.”, Men ett nytt filmar, ”färgar av det argt,” shows den kristna frälsaren som en svart man.

Vid själv i täten roll för rollbesättning utmanar författare- och direktörJean-Claude La Marre en beskåda av Jesus som domineras, sedan medeltiden och att tillfoga till växa förkroppsligar av Hollywood filmar med kristna teman som är inklusive MelGibsons ”passion av Kristus”, och ”Daen Vinci kodifierar.”, Den markerar också enputtra debatt i kyrkor och universitetar över landet.

Filma, som öppnade i sena Oktober i 19, marknadsför riksomfattande, öppnar fredag på Oakstheatren i Berkeley. La Marre har haft understödjes roller i grov spiklees för filmer däribland 1992 ”Malcolm X”, och i fjol beväpnar riktade ”bröder in” starring David Carradine. ”Färga av det argt” presenterar också aktrisen Debbi Morgan, som Jesus fostrar, Mary.

”Gör dig funderare som även om racen inte citeras offentligt, som en resonera för Jesuss slakt, i en plats Mary frågar, de gör detta, därför att han är svart?”, La Marre sade att utfärda av flår färgar är bestämt meningsfull i Förenta staterna som ges dess torterade historia angående racen.

”När du ser honom på det argt, kommer med som det egentligen dig, sade baksida till de sydliga dagarna, då svart man hängdes (från trees),” La Marre, 38. ”När en svart man berättar dig, är han sonen av guden, det flipper ur folk ut. ”

Vid tidig sortmedeltiden, avbildar av Jesus hade framkallat vanligt teman -- ett delat skägg som är light-colored synar, hazel eller blont hår, och slätar ansikts- särdrag -- och användes i otaliga konstnärliga tolkningar av något liknande av den Leonardo daen Vinci och Michelangelo.

William Loewe, förbunden professor av teologin och klosterbroderstudier på den katolska universitetar i Washington, D.C., sade att det är lätt att finna dagliga exempel av, hur Jesus har cast som europé i västra civilisation som citerar en religiös symbol på hans egna universitetsområde.

”Är det detta extremt muskulöst, blåögt, blond-haired figurera,” sade Loewe. ”Finner jag det för att vara offensiv, så avlägset som den angick I-förmiddagen, därför att den verkar för att vara en sådan förnekande av hans Jewishness. ”

Har racen av Jesus debatterats efter åtminstone det 19th århundradet, med samhällen i olika världsdelar som visar honom i deras egna likhet. Men i Amerika, ses han traditionellt som en vit man i mest kyrkor och hem, till för en tid sedan.

Direktören Kevin smeden beskrev Jesus som en svart man i hans 1999 filmar ”dogm,” med Chris vaggar att leka en svart apostel vars berättelse raderades från biblisk canon av kyrkan.

”I tänkt skulle handla med Kristus crucifixion är en bra berättelse,” La sagda Marre. ”Bara det ett problemet som jag hade, som mest svart kristen har, har varit de historiska Hollywood återgivningarna av Kristus. ”

Instämm forskare där är ingen definitiv beskrivning av Kristus i bibeln. Illviljapassager i boka av uppenbarelsen som ser till brons-färgade Jesus med ulligt hår och, flår, honom visas vanligt, som ha vit flå, särdrag för den flödande hår och européansiktsbehandlingen.

Rev.en Cecil Murray, en svart minister   i Los Angeles och en professor av religion på universitetar av sydliga Kalifornien, krediteras, som en producent för hans arbete som en konsulent på ”färgar av det argt.”, Han sade att historien av de bibliska regionshowsna figurerar liksom Jesus och Moses hade svarten eller en mitt - östliga särdrag.

”När de får ordnar till för att dölja Jesus som en behandla som ett barn, fostrar his och, hans fader tar honom till Egypten. Du kan dölja choklad i mitt av choklad. Du kan inte dölja vanilj i mitt av choklad, ”sagda Murray.

Han avfärdar argumentet att vad är viktig är den nya testamentfrälsare meddelande och inte his flår färgar.

”Om de önskar att göra oliv-flåd honom, fint. Om de önskar att göra pecannöt-flåd honom, fint. Men att göra honom vit? ”sade Murray. ”Om vår symbol av religionen -- grundaren av den kristna tron -- sett likt oss, därefter kan vi inte vara som dåligan, som vi har visats. ”

På St. Paul av skeppsbrottkyrkan i den afrikansk amerikanBayview för San Franciscos huvudsakligen grannskapen, dess tidigare präst bemyndigade danandet av en svart Jesus för kyrka kor 20 år sedan, sagda kyrkliga representanter.

St. Pauls strömpräst, Rev.en Paul Gawlowski som sägs att, när barn i kyrkan hör att Jesus kan ha varit svarten den har en djupsinnig affekt på deras avkänning av själven.

”Synar de rättvisa slagen för idén dem bort och deras går precis vitt öppna,” sade Gawlowski. ”Ger det dem frihet. Dem känselförnimmelse som bemyndigas och valideras. ”

”Förklarade den hjälpmedel ett lott till en minoritetkultur som ser en Jesus, som ser mer något liknande dem än en europé Jesus,” Gawlowski, som sade att han tror, om Jesus skulle gå i dag honom tillbaka skulle är en minoritet. ”Valde han det hebréiska folket, som hade en historia av förtryck och slaveri, så det är helt rimligt att, om Kristus kom tillbaka i dag, åtminstone i Amerika, han skulle är afrikansk amerikan, kanske någon av det Latino arvet. ”

Katolska avbildar sagda universitetar Loewe ha en ordagrann tolkning av Jesus ska har en verkställa på, hur folket märker sig och andra, med potentiellt negationbiverkningar: ”Om han är en av oss, det sade hjälpmedlet som han inte är ett dig,”, Loewe.

La Marre sade att han mötte skeptical studiochefer, då han försökte ursprungligen att kasta filmen, med något ordstäv som projektera hade inget att riskera, om inte den presenterade en skådespelarenågot liknande Denzel Washington eller den universitetslärareCheadle i täten rollen. Något möjligt roterande filma in i endag höft-hoppar operan som starring en Cent för rapparenågot liknande 50.

”Vad var svår fann någon som var villig att sätta pengar in i filma. Träffande folk som du önskar att göra (detta) film är likt pröva som berättar folk, du önskar att göra en film om dvärgar som bor på moonen, ”sade La Marre.

La Marre finansierade ultimately film $2.5 miljoner produktion kostar, genom att inteckna två hus som han ägde, en i Beverly kullar och annan i Miami södra strand. ”Ibland måste du att sätta dina pengar var din mun är, och jag trodde egentligen i denna föreställer,” sade han.

La Marre sålde därefter filma för att lura, som utsläppt ”passionen av Kristus” på videoen. Gibsons film var enkontor dundersuccé som tjänar $370 miljoner i inhemsk biljettkontor i 2004. I September filmade räven meddelad underhållning planerar till jordbruksprodukter, upp till som en dussin Kristen-themed filmar ett år.

”Realiserade I-funderareräven att skulle detta gör bra avkänning,”, sade La Marre, som funderarefolket är hungrigt för dessa sorter av berättelser. ”Är I-funderare världen passande mer av en negro spiritual förlägger, för goda och dåliga, och folket söker efter några bet av räddning som de kan få deras räcker på. ”

Jason B. Johnson krönikaredaktionsskribent
e-post Jason B. Johnson på jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

denna artikel visades på sida E - 1 av krönikan för San Francisco

Что гонкой было Иесус? «Цвет креста» одевает в по-разному сторону debate.
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
La Marre Jean-Клод написал, после того как он сразу и звезды как Иесус iий… Winner искусствоа co нов-тысячелетия католической кассеты… Охотник Джеффри в «короле королей.» Фотоий, 1961, учтивость…

Для много, изображение Иесус то из белого человека с волнистыми белокурыми волосами и голубыми глазами -- вроде как охотник Джеффри в 1961's «король королей.» Но новая пленка, «цвет креста,» показывает Кристиан savior как черный человек.

Путем бросать в роли руководства, сочинитель и La Marre директора Jean-Клод challenging взгляд Иесус который преобладан с средние века и добавлять к телу пленок Hollywood с темами Кристиан, включая страсть Гибсон Mel «Christ» и «Кодего Da Vinci.» Он также выделяет длинний-simmering debate в церков и университетах по всей стране.

Пленка, которая раскрыла в в конце октября в 19 рынках общенародно, раскрывает пятницу на театре дубов в Berkeley. La Marre имел поддерживая роли в киноих включая 1992 Ли спайка «Malcolm x» и в прошлом году сразу «братья в рукоятках» starring Дэвид Carradine. «Цвет креста» также отличает actress Debbi Morgan как мать Jesus, Mary.

Хотя не цитируют гонку overtly как причина для Jesus slaying, в одном месте Mary спрашивает, «вы думает они делает это потому что он черн?» La Marre сказал вопрос цвета кожи определенно содержатен в Соединенных Штатах, котор дали свою попытанную историю относительно гонки.

«Когда вы видите его на кресте, они реально приносят вас back to южные дни когда были повиснуты черные люди (от валов),» сказали La Marre, 38. «Когда черный человек говорит вас он будет сынком бога, его люди уродов вне. »

предыдущими средние века, изображениями Иесус начал общие темы -- развлетвлянная борода, light-colored волосы глаз, карих или белокурых, и приглаживают лицевые характеристики -- и использовал в бесчисленных художнических renderings подобиями da Vinci и Michelangelo Leonardo.

William Loewe, профессор сподвижницы теологии и вероисповедных изучений на католическом университете в вашингтоне, D.C., сказал легко найти ежедневные примеры как Иесус было брошено как евроец в западной цивилизации, цитируя вероисповедную икону на его собственном campus.

«Оно эти весьма мышечными, голубой-eyed, белокурый-haired рисунок,» сказал Loewe. «Я нахожу его для того чтобы быть одиозн, насколько я отношусь, потому что он кажется, что будет таким запирательством его Jewishness. »

Debated гонка Иесус с по крайней мере 19th столетия, с обществами в по-разному частях мира показывая его в их собственном likeness. Но в америке, он традиционно увиден как белый человек в большинств церков и домах, until recently.

Директор Кевин Smith описал Иесус как черный человек в его 1999 пленке «вероучение,» при утес Крис играя черного апостола рассказ которого был стерт от библейского канона церковью.

«Christ думаемого crucifixion I dealing with было бы хорошим рассказом,» La сказанное Marre. «Только одна проблема, котор я имел, по мере того как большинств черные христианки имеют, был историческими живописаниями Hollywood Christ. »

Эрудиты соглашаются не будет окончательного описания Christ в библии. Несмотря на проходы в книге откровения refer to Иесус с шерстистыми волосами и бронз-покрашенной кожей, он обычно показан как имеющ белую кожу, пропуская волос и европейские лицевые характеристики.

Реверсор. Чредитовано Сесиль Murray, черный министр в Лос-Анджелес и профессор вероисповедания на университете южного California, по мере того как производитель для его работы как консультант на «цвете креста.» Он сказал история библейских рисунков выставок зоны such as Иесус и Moses имела черноту или середину - восточные характеристики.

«Когда они получают готовыми спрятать Иесус как младенец, его мать и его отец принимают его к Египту. Вы можете спрятать шоколад в midst шоколада. Вы не можете спрятать ваниль в midst шоколада, «сказанное Murray.

Он увольняет аргумент что важно сообщение savior Нового завета и не его цвет кожи.

«Если они хотят сделать оливк-снятое кожу с его, то точно. Если они хотят сделать пекан-снятое кожу с его, то точно. Но сделать им белизну? «сказал Murray. «Если наша икона вероисповедания -- основатель христианская вера -- я посмотрены как мы, после этого мы не можем быть как плох по мере того как мы были показаны. »

На St. Пол церков кораблекрушением в районе Bayview San Francisco большей частью африканском американском, свой бывший священник поручило делать черного Иесус на распятие церков 20 лет тому назад, сказанные должностные лица церков.

St. Священник Пол в настоящее время, реверсор. Пол Gawlowski, сказанное что когда дети в церков слышат что Иесус может быть чернотой она имеет глубокомысленное повлиять на на их чувстве собственной личности.

«Идея как раз дует они отсутствующе и их глаза справедливые идут wide open,» сказал Gawlowski. «Оно дает им вольность. Они чувствуют empowered и утверженными. «

«Он намеревается много к культуре несовершеннолетия увидеть Иесус смотрит more like они чем европейское Иесус,» объясненное Gawlowski, которое сказало он верит если Иесус должны было возвратить сегодня его было бы несовершеннолетием. «Он выбрал древнееврейские людей, которые имели историю утеснения и невольничества, поэтому вс правоподобно что если Christ come back сегодня, по крайней мере в америке, то он был африканским американцом, возможно кто-то из наследия Latino. »

Сказанное Loewe католического университета имеющ буквальное толкование изображения Jesus будет иметь влияние на как люди воспринимают и другие, с потенциальн отрицательными побочными эффектами: «Если он одним из нас, то т середины, котор он не одним вы,» сказали Loewe.

La Marre сказал он столкнулось скептичные вожди студии когда он первоначально попытался соорудить киноего, с некоторым говоря проект не имело никакой шанс если он не отличить актером как вашингтон Denzel или Дон Cheadle в роли руководства. Некоторые предложили поворачивать пленку в оперу вальм-хмеля самомоднейш-дня starring rapper как цент 50.

«Было трудно нашл любое было охотно готово положить деньг в пленку. Говорить людей, котор вы хотите сделать киноего (этого) как пытаться сказать людей вы хотите сделать киноего о карликах живя на луне, «сказал La Marre.

La Marre предельно профинансировал $2.5 миллиона цену производства киноего путем закладывать 2 дома, котор он имел, одна в холмах Беверли и другая в пляже Miami южном. «Иногда вы должны класть вашу деньг где ваш рот, и я реально верил в этом изображении,» он сказал.

La Marre после этого продал пленку к лисице, которая выпустила «страсть Christ» на видеоем. Киноим Гибсон был smash коробк-офиса, зарабатывая $370 миллионов в отечественных кассах в 2004. В сентябре, лисица сняла зрелищность объявила планы для того чтобы произвести до пленок дюжины Христианок-themed год.

«Я думаю лисица осуществило это сделало хорошее чувство,» сказал La Marre, который думает люди голодны для этих видов рассказов. «Я думаю мир будет больше из духовного места, для хорошего и плохого, и люди ищут любой бит спасения, котор они могут получить их руки дальше. »

B. Джейсон. Johnson, B. Джейсон и-мэйла
сочинителя штата хроники. Johnson на jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

эта статья появилось на страницу e - 1 из хроники San Francisco

Welk ras was Jesus? De „kleur van het Kruis“ zet een verschillend gezicht op het debat.
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
Jean-Claude La Marre schreef, geleid en sterren als Jesus i… De winnaar van mede het nieuw-millennium de kunst van een Katholiek tijdschrift… De Jager van Jeffrey in „Koning van Koningen.“ Foto, 1961, hoffelijkheid…

Voor velen, is het beeld van Jesus dat van een witte mens met golvend blond haar en blauwe ogen -- soort gelijkaardige Jager Jeffrey in 1961's „Koning van Koningen.“ Maar een nieuwe film, „Kleur van het Kruis,“ toont Christelijke savior als zwarte mens.

Door in de loodrol te gieten, schrijver en directeurs Jean-Claude daagt La Marre een mening van Jesus uit die sinds de MiddenLeeftijden en het toevoegen aan een groeiend lichaam van films Hollywood met Christelijke thema's, met inbegrip van Mel Hartstocht van Gibson de „van Christus“ en de „Code van DA Vinci.“ wordt overheerst Het benadrukt ook een lang-suddert debat op kerken en universiteiten over het land.

De film, die in recent Oktober in 19 nationale markten opende, opent Vrijdag bij het Theater van Eiken in Berkeley. La Marre heeft ondersteunende rollen in movies met inbegrip van 1992 „Malcolm X“ en vorig jaar geleide „Wapenbroeders“ Starring David Carradine van de Aar van de Luwtes gehad. De „kleur van het Kruis“ kenmerkt ook actress Debbi Morgan als moeder van Jesus, Mary.

Hoewel de race niet openlijk wordt aangehaald aangezien een reden voor het doden van Jesus, in één scène Mary vraagt, „denkt u zij dit doen omdat hij?“ zwart is La Marre zei de kwestie van huidkleur in de Verenigde Staten, gezien zijn gemartelde geschiedenis betreffende ras bijzonder zinvol is.

„Wanneer u hem op het kruis ziet, brengt het u werkelijk terug naar de Zuidelijke dagen toen de zwarte mensen (van bomen),“ bovengenoemd La Marre, 38 werden gehangen. „Wanneer een zwarte mens u vertelt is hij uit de zoon van God, het freaks mensen. “

Door de vroege MiddenLeeftijden, hadden de beelden van Jesus gemeenschappelijke thema's ontwikkeld -- een vertakte baard, lichte ogen, een hazelaar of een blond haar, en vlotte gezichtseigenschappen -- en werden gebruikt in het talloze artistieke teruggeven door houdt van van Leonardo da Vinci en Michelangelo.

William Loewe, verwante professor van theologie en godsdienstige studies bij Katholieke Universiteit in Washington, D.C., zei het gemakkelijk is om dagelijkse voorbeelden van te vinden hoe Jesus Europees in Westelijke beschaving is gegoten, aanhalend een godsdienstig pictogram op zijn eigen campus.

„Het is dit uiterst spier, blauw-eyed, blond-haired cijfer,“ bovengenoemde Loewe. „Ik vind het aanvallend om te zijn, wat ik betreft, omdat het zulk een ontkenning van zijn Jewishness schijnt te zijn. De“

race van Jesus is gedebatteerd sinds minstens de 19de eeuw, met maatschappijen die in verschillende delen van de wereld hem de afschilderen in hun eigen gelijkenis. Maar in Amerika, wordt hij traditioneel gezien als witte mens in meeste kerken en de huizen, tot onlangs.

Directeur Kevin Smith beschreef Jesus als zwarte mens in zijn film „Dogma van 1999,“ met Chris Rock die zwarte apostle speelt het van wie verhaal van bijbelse canon door de kerk werd gewist.

„I gedacht zou behandelend de kruisiging van Christus een goed verhaal zijn,“ La bovengenoemde Marre. „Maar het één probleem dat ik heb gehad, aangezien de meeste zwarte Christenen hebben, ben geweest historische depictions Hollywood van Christus. De“

geleerden gaan akkoord er geen definitieve beschrijving van Christus in de Bijbel is. Ondanks passages in het Boek dat van Revelatie naar Jesus met wollig haar en brons-gekleurde huid verwijst, wordt hij gewoonlijk afgeschilderd zoals hebbend witte huid, stromend haar en Europese gezichtseigenschappen.

Toer. Cecil Murray, een zwarte minister in Los Angeles en een professor van godsdienst bij de Universiteit van Zuidelijk Californië, worden gecrediteerd als producent voor zijn werk als adviseur op „Kleur van het Kruis.“ Hij zei de geschiedenis van het bijbelse gebied cijfers zoals Jesus toont en Mozes zwarte of Van het Middenoosten eigenschappen had.

„Wanneer zij klaar worden om Jesus als baby te verbergen, nemen zijn moeder en zijn vader hem aan Egypte. U kunt chocolade in het midden van chocolade verbergen. U kunt geen vanille in het midden van chocolade verbergen, „bovengenoemde Murray.

Hij verwerpt het argument dat wat belangrijk is het bericht van Nieuwe savior van het Testament en niet zijn huidkleur is.

„Als zij hem willen olijf-gevild maken, boete. Als zij hem willen pecannoot-gevild maken, boete. Maar om hem wit te maken? „bovengenoemde Murray. „Als ons pictogram van godsdienst -- de stichter van het Christelijke geloof -- gekeken als ons, dan kunnen wij niet zo slecht zijn aangezien wij zijn afgeschilderd. “

Bij St. Paul van de Kerk van de Schipbreuk in Afrikaanse Amerikaanse buurt Bayview van San Francisco de hoofdzakelijk, zijn vroegere priester droeg het maken van een zwarte Jesus voor het kruisbeeld van de kerk 20 jaar op geleden, bovengenoemde kerkambtenaren.

St. De huidige priester van Paul, Toer. Paul Gawlowski, zei dat wanneer de kinderen in de kerk horen dat Jesus zwart kan geweest zijn het diepgaande affect op hun betekenis van zelf heeft.

Het „idee blaast hen weg enkel en hun ogen enkel gaan wijd open,“ bovengenoemde Gawlowski. „Het geeft hen vrijheid. Zij voelen gemachtigd en bevestigd. „

„Het betekent een partij aan een minderheidscultuur om een Jesus te zien die meer als hen dan een Europese Jesus kijkt,“ verklaarde Gawlowski, die zei hij gelooft als Jesus vandaag moest terugkeren hij zou zijn een minderheid. „Hij plukte de Hebreeuwse mensen, die een geschiedenis van onderdrukking en de slavernij hadden, zodat is het volledig waarschijnlijk dat als Christus, op zijn minst in Amerika vandaag terugkwam, hij Afrikaanse Amerikaan, misschien iemand van Latino erfenis zou zijn. Bovengenoemde

Loewe van de“ katholieke Universiteit zal het hebben van een letterlijke interpretatie van het beeld van Jesus een effect hebben op hoe de mensen zich en anderen, met potentieel negatieve bijwerkingen waarnemen: „Als hij één van ons is, betekent dat hij geen één u,“ bovengenoemde Loewe is.

La Marre zei hij sceptische studioleiders toen hij oorspronkelijk probeerde om movie te werpen, met sommigen die het project zeggen had geen kans ontmoette tenzij het een acteur zoals Denzel Washington kenmerkte of trekt Cheadle in de loodrol aan. Sommige voorgesteld veranderend de film in modern-dag heup-hop een opera die rapper zoals Cent 50 starring.

„Wat moeilijk was vond iedereen wie bereid was om geld in de film te zetten. Het vertellen van mensen u (dit) movie wilt maken is als het proberen mensen te vertellen u wilt movie over dwergen maken die op de maan leven, „bovengenoemd La Marre.

La Marre financierde uiteindelijk de movie $2.5 miljoen productiekosten door twee huizen te verpanden die hij, in Beverly Hills en andere in het Strand van het Zuiden van Miami heeft bezeten. „Soms moet u uw geld zetten waar uw mond is, en ik geloofde werkelijk in dit beeld,“ hij zei.

La Marre verkocht toen de film aan Vos, die de „Hartstocht van Christus“ op video vrijgaf. Movie van Gibson was doos-bureau ineenstorting, die $370 miljoen in binnenlands bespreekbureau in 2004 een verdient. In September, kondigde aan het Vermaak van Filmed van de Vos plannen tot een dozijn de te veroorzaken films een jaar christelijk-Themed.

„ik denk de Vos realiseerde dit goede,“ bovengenoemd La Marre steek zou houden, dat denkt de mensen voor deze soorten verhalen hongerig zijn. „Ik denk de wereld meer van een geestelijke plaats wordt, voor goed en slecht, en de mensen om het even welk beetje van redding zoeken zij hun handen op kunnen krijgen. “

Jason B. Johnson, stelt de Schrijver E-mail
Jason B. van het Personeel te boek. Johnson bij jbjohnson@sfchronicle.com.
http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

Dit artikel op pagina E verscheen - 1 van San Francisco stelt te boek

ما جنس كان يسوع? "يضع لون من الصليب" وجه مختلفة على المناقشة.
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
[جن-كلود] كتب لا [مرّ], يوجّه ونجوم كيسوع [إي]… الرابحة من مجلة كاثوليكيّة [نو-ميلّنّيوم] فن مجموعة… جيفري صياد في "ملك الأملاك." [فوتو], 1961, ملاطفة…

ل كثير, الصورة يسوع أنّ من رجل بيضاء مع شعر متموّجة شقراء وأعين زرقاء -- نوع من مثل جيفري صياد في 1961 "ملك من أملاك." غير أنّ يبدي فيلم جديدة, "لون من الصليب," المنقذة مسيحية كرجل سوداء.

ب يصبّبنفسي في الرصاص دور, كاتبة ومديرة [جن-كلود] لا [مرّ] صعبة منظرة يسوع أنّ يكون سيطرت منذ الأعمار متوسّطة ويضيف إلى ينمو جسم من هوليوود أفلام مع مواضيع مسيحية, بما في ذلك [مل] [جبسن] "العاطفة من مسيح" و" [دا] [فينس] رمز." هو أيضا يركّز مناقشة [لونغ-سمّرينغ] في كنائس وجامعات عبر البلد.

يفتح الفيلم, أيّ فتح في أكتوبر - تشرين الأوّل متأخّرة في 19 أسواق [نأيشنويد], يوم الجمعة في البلوط ساحة في [بركلي]. قد تلقّى لا [مرّ] يساند أدوار في أفلام بما في ذلك مسمار مآوي 1992"مالكولم [إكس]" و [لست ر] يوجّه "إخوان في [أرمس]" يتألّق دايفيد [كرّدين]. "يظهر لون من الصليب" أيضا ممثلة [دبّي] [مورغن] كيسوع أم, ميري.

رغم أنّ جنس يكون لا [أفرتلي] ذكرت كسبب ليسوع يذبح, في واحدة مشهد يسأل ميري, "أنت يفكّر هم يتمّ هذا لأنّ هو يكون سوداء?" قال لا [مرّ] الإصدار من جلد لون بشكل خاصّ ذو معنى في الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة, يعطى ه يعذّب تاريخ بخصوص جنس.

"عندما يرىه أنت على الصليب, هو حقّا يحضر أنت [بك تو] الأيام جنوبيّة عندما رجال سوداء كان علقت (من أشجار)," قال لا [مرّ], 38. "عندما يقول رجل سوداء أنت هو الإبنة الإلهة, هو شاذات الناس خارجا. كان"

بالأعمار مبكّرة متوسّطة, صور يسوع قد طوّر مواضيع عاديّة -- يملّس يتشعّب لحية, [ليغت-كلورد] أعين, بندقيّة أو شعر شقراء, وسمات وجهيّة -- استعملت وكان في أداء لا يحصى فنّيّة بالرغبات من ليوناردو [دا] [فينس] و [ميشلنجلو].

قال وليام [لوو], [أسّوست بروفسّور] من لاهوت ودراسات دينيّة في جامعة كاثوليكيّة في واشنطن, [د.ك.], هو يتيح أن يجد مثل يوميّة من كيف يسوع يتلقّى يكون صببت بما أنّ أوروبية في حضارة غربيّة, يذكر أيقون دينيّة على ه خاصّة حرم جامعيّ.

"هو هذا جدّا عضليّة, [بلو-د], قال رقم [بلوند-هيرد]," [لوو]. "يجد أنا هو أن يكون هجوميّة, [أس فر س] أنا تعلّقت, لأنّ هو يبدو أن يكون هذا إنكار من [جويشنسّ] ه. "

ناقشت الجنس يسوع يتلقّى يكون منذ على الأقلّ ال [19ث] قرن, مع مجتمعات في أجزاء مختلفة من العالم يصفه في هم خاصّة شبه. غير أنّ في أمريكا, رأيت هو تقليديّا يكون كرجل بيضاء في كثير كنائس ومنازل, [أونتيل رسنتلي].

وصف مديرة [كفين] [سميث] يسوع كرجل سوداء في ه 1999 فيلم "عقيدة," مع [كريس] صخرة يلعب رسول سوداء الذي قصة كان محيت من قائمة توراتيّة بالكنيسة.

"أنا كان يفكّر يعالج مع مسيح عمليّة صلب قصة جيّدة," لا [مرّ] يقال. "غير أنّ الواحدة مشكلة أنا تلقّيت, بما أنّ كثير مسيحيات سوداء يتلقّون, يكون التاريخيّة هوليوود أوصاف مسيح. "

يوافق طالبات هناك ما من وصف محدّدة مسيح في الكتاب مقدّس. على الرغم من ممرات في الكتاب الوحي يحيل يسوع مع شعر صوفيّة و [برونز-كلورد] جلد, وصفت هو عادة بما أنّ يتلقّى جلد بيضاء, يتدفّق شعر وسمات أوروبيّة وجهيّة.

ال [رف.]. منحت [سسل] [مورّي], وزيرة سوداء في [لوس نجلس] وأستاذة من دين في الجامعة من كاليفورنيا جنوبيّة, بما أنّ منتج لعمله كمستشارة على "لون من الصليب." هو قال تلقّى التاريخ من التوراتيّة منطقة أعراض أرقام مثل يسوع و [موسس] أسود أو وسط - سمات شرقيّة.

"عندما يحصل هم يتأهّب أن يخفي يسوع كطفلة, أمه وأبه يأخذه إلى مصر. أنت يستطيع أخفيت شوكولاطة في الغمرة الشوكولاطة. أنت يستطيع لا يخفي ونلّة في الغمرة الشوكولاطة, "[مورّي] يقال.

هو يصرف الحجة أنّ ماذا يكون مهمّة يكون ال [نو تستمنت] منقذة رسالة ولا ه جلد لون.

"إن هم يريدون أن يجعله [أليف-سكينّد], دقيقة. إن هم يريدون أن يجعله [بكن-سكينّد], دقيقة. غير أنّ أن يجعله أبيض? "قال [مورّي]. "إن أيقوننا الدين -- المؤسسة من الإيمان مسيحية -- ينظر مثل نا, بعد ذلك نحن يستطيع لا يكون مثل سيّئة بما أنّ وصفت نحن يتلقّى يكون. "

في [ست.] انتدب بول من الحطام سفينة كنيسة في [سن فرنسسك] [أفريكن] أمريكيّة [بفيو] جوار غالبا, كاهنه سابقة ال يجعل من يسوع سوداء للكنيسة صليب 20 سنون [أغو], كنيسة مسؤولات يقال.

[ست.] بول كاهن حاليّة, ال [رف.]. بول [غولووسكي], يقال أنّ عندما يسمع أطفال في الكنيسة أنّ يسوع يمكن يتلقّى كنت أسود هو يتلقّى عميقة أثرت على إحساسهم النفس.

"يفجّرهم الفكرة فقط بعيد وأعينهم صحيحة يذهبون [ويد وبن]," قال [غولووسكي]. "يعطيهم هو حرية. هم يشعرون يفوّض ويصدق. "

"يعني هو كثيرا إلى أقلية ثقافة أن يرى يسوع أنّ ينظر أشبه هم من يسوع أوروبيّة," يفسّر [غولووسكي], الذي قال هو يصدق إن يسوع كان أن يرجع اليوم هو كان أقلية. "التقط هو الالناس عبريّة, الذي تلقّى تاريخ من إضطهاد وعبودية, لذلك هو كلّيّا مرجّحة أنّ إن مسيح عاود اليوم, على الأقلّ في أمريكا, هو كان أمريكية [أفريكن], ربّما أحد ما من [لتينو] ميراث. "

جامعة كاثوليكيّة سيتلقّى [لوو] يقال يتلقّى تفسير حرفيّة من يسوع صورة تأثير على كيف الناس يلاحظون بنفسي وأخرى, مع [سد فّكت] سلبيّة احتماليّا: "إن هو يكون واحدة من نا, أنّ قال [منس] هو ليس واحدة أنت," [لوو].

قال لا [مرّ] هو واجه [سكبتيك] إستوديو رؤساء عندما هو أصلا حاول أن يزفّت الفيلم, مع بعض يقول المشروع تلقّى ما من فرصة ما لم هو أظهر ممثلة مثل [دنزل] واشنطن أو اتّخذ شكل [شدل] في الرصاص دور. بعض اقترح يلتفت الفيلم داخل [مودرن-دي] [هيب-هوب] أوبرا يتألّق [ربّر] مثل 50 سنة.

"ماذا كان يصعب كان وجد أيّ شخص الذي كان مستعدّة أن يضع مال داخل الفيلم. قال يقول الناس أنت تريد أن يجعل (هذا) فيلم مثل يحاول أن يقول الناس أنت تريد أن يجعل فيلم حول قزمات يعيش على القمر, "لا [مرّ].

موّل لا [مرّ] أخيرا الفيلم $2.5 مليون [برودوكأيشن كست] ب يرهن اثنان منازل هو امتلك, واحدة في [بفرلي هيلّ] والأخرى في ميامي شاطئ جنوبيّة. "أحيانا أنت يضطرّ وضعت مالك حيث فمك يكون, وصدق أنا حقّا في هذا صورة," هو قال.

باع لا [مرّ] بعد ذلك الفيلم إلى ثعلب, أيّ أطلق "العاطفة من مسيح" على فيديو. [جبسن] كان فيلم [بوإكس-وفّيس] تحطم, يكسب $370 مليون في [بوإكس وفّيس] محلّية في 2004. في سبتمبر - أيلول, صوّر ثعلب ترفيه أعلن خطط أن ينتج حتّى اثنا عشر [كريستين-ثمد] أفلام [ا] سنة.

"يفكّر أنا ثعلب حقّق هذا جعل إحساس جيّدة," قال لا [مرّ], الذي يفكّر الناس جائعة ل هذا أنواع القصص. "يفكّر أنا العالم يصبح أكثر من مكان روحانيّة, لجيّدة وسيّئة, والناس يفتّشون أيّ لقمة الإنقاذ هم يستطيع حصلت أياديهم فوق. "

[جسن] [ب.]. جونسون, تاريخ سير ملاكة كاتبة
بريد إلكترونيّ [جسن] [ب.]. جونسون في [جبجوهنسنسفكرونيكل.كم].
ظهر http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/07/DDG0VM628B1.DTL

هذا مادة على صفحة [إ] - 1 من [سن فرنسسك] تاريخ سير

Black snow. Coal dust. Sulfuric air. Welcome to life in the world's most polluted places.

Chockablock with heavy metals, chemical waste, air pollutants and, in the case of infamous Chernobyl, Ukraine, deadly radiation, these are the worst industrial cesspools on earth--and they rarely make headlines. Nothing in the West compares.

"In some towns, life expectancy approaches medieval rates, and birth defects are the norm, not the exception," according to the nonprofit Blacksmith Institute, which compiled the list earlier this fall. "In others, children's asthma rates are measured above 90%, and mental retardation is endemic."

China, India and Russia landed six cities on this list of 10. Fast-track economic growth and years of unregulated mining and chemical production have laid waste to the homes of millions.

Take Norilsk, Russia. A Siberian industrial city founded in 1935 as a slave labor camp, Norilsk contains the world's largest heavy-metals smelting complex, owned by Norilsk Nickel. It releases nearly 500 tons each of copper and nickel oxides and 2 million tons of sulfur dioxide into the air. Reports say the snow is black, the air tastes of sulfur and the life expectancy for factory workers is 10 years below the Russian average. The company has pledged to work with Blacksmith to improve conditions.

Others on the list include:

--Sumgayit, Azerbaijan, a former Soviet industrial center where cancer rates are more than 22% higher than in the rest of the country.

--Linfen, China, home to 3 million people and the center of the country's booming coal industry. Residents claim they often choke on the dust in the air in the evenings.

--Tianying, China, known for being the center of the country's lead processing industry is also known for having the worst air pollution in China.

--Sukinda, India, is home to 97% of India's chromite ore deposits (used in the production of chromium, an industrial metal with many uses), and it has one of the largest open-cast chromite ore mines in the world. Here, some 70% of the surface water and 60% of the drinking water contains hexavalent chromium, a powerful, cancer-causing carcinogen, at more than double national and international standards.

--Dzerzhinsk, Russia, once the center of Soviet chemical weapon production and home to a leaded gasoline plant, had nearly 300,000 tons of chemical waste improperly disposed between 1930 and 1998. Seeping into the groundwater: around 190 identified chemicals.

In 2006, Blacksmith started cataloging hyper-polluted hot spots around the world to draw attention to their poisonous effects. Blacksmith asks for nominations from around the world, assembling a database of 400 candidates. They're scored using criteria emphasizing human health (especially the young), developed by researchers from Johns Hopkins University; Hunter College; Harvard University; the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi; the University of Idaho; Mount Sinai Hospital; and Green Cross Switzerland.

What to do about these hellholes? Blacksmith's founder and director, Richard Fuller, says for less than $1 billion you could significantly mitigate the unhealthy effects of all the worst places across the globe. Simple fixes like digging up the toxic materials and moving them to safer areas away from people can have huge benefits. Other solutions are more complex, but still cheap, such as injecting a sugary mixture into a water supply contaminated by hexavalent chromium to make it less toxic and less mobile underground.

"If you spend 10% of the money, you deal with 90% of the problem," he says. "The fact of the matter is that children are sick and dying in these polluted places. And it's not rocket science to fix them."

The announcement that the Republic of the Congo, or Congo-Brazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley Process, which aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, marks a breakthrough.
Congo-Brazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and falsifying certificates of origin.
"Congo-Brazzaville comes back now after a very serious domestic effort to put their house in order and to get their domestic systems to the level required," Karel Kovanda, chairperson of the Kimberly Process secretariat, told IPS. "It was quite an emotional moment. We're always happy to have new people (come on board the Kimberley Process)."
Congo-Brazzaville's fate is just the latest example of the enforcement procedure which gets its name from the South African city where one of the first meetings was held on stemming the flow of diamonds used by rebel armies or other groups to fund conflict.
Congo-Brazzaville, which gained its independence from France in 1960, saw a series of coups and assassinations from that time on, erupting into a full-scale civil war in 1997 when forces loyal to current President Denis Sassou Nguesso (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted President Pascal Lissouba with the support of the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to have claimed at least 10,000 lives. A peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factions in March 2003 is still viewed as fragile.
Extending beyond the upheaval in Congo-Brazzaville, an even larger war in the immense DRC also raged, killing at least 3 million people and seeing a host of rebel armies attempting to profit from the country's natural resources, along with armed forces from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Congo-Brazzaville's exportation of diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly Process say.
Diamonds also served as a driving force in the funding of Sierra Leone's 1991-2002 civil war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the long-running conflict in Liberia which, under President Charles Taylor, effectively served as the RUF's patron state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Now, the three part Kimberly Process aims to ensure that diamonds do not finance any entity seeking to overthrow a government recognized by the United Nations, that all diamond exports be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate proving origin, and that member states don't act as third-party brokers for non-member states.
"Countries must have a legal framework in place that uses necessary import and export controls and controls on issuance of certificates," says Stephane Chardon, chairperson of the Kimberly Process working group responsible for re-admitting Congo. "You must be able to trace the diamonds from the mine to the export points."
For its part the United States' Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits "the importation into, or exportation from, the United States of any rough diamond, from whatever source, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme".
The European Union's position on conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in a 2001 position paper which affirmed that the Union and its member states "shall support and contribute to the efforts of the international community to break the link between conflict diamonds and the financing of armed conflict".
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns have fallen silent in Côte d'Ivoire's civil war, for example, the country remains split in half between a southern region controlled by forces loyal to the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and a northern and western one under the sway of the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) rebel movement.
In October of this year, the United Nations Security Council renewed diamond sanctions against Cote d'Ivoire due to their concerns about the production and illicit export of the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley Process continued to communicate information to the body regarding the issue.
"The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds but it hasn't totally eradicated it," said Ayesha Kajee, programme director with the International Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. "But, in itself, this case is an indication that the Kimberley process has succeeded to some extent."

CongoBrazzaville: Blood Diamonds No Longer Country' s Best Friend
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
The announcement that the Republic of the Congo, or CongoBrazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley Process, which aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, marks a breakthrough.
CongoBrazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and falsifying certificates of origin.
“CongoBrazzaville comes back now after a very serious domestic effort to put their house in order and to get their domestic systems to the level required,” Karel Kovanda, chairperson apagado the Kimberly Proceso Secretariado, told IPS. “IT was quite año emotional momento. We' re always happy to have new people (como él board the Kimberley Proceso). “
El Congo-Brazzaville' s fate is just the latest example apagado the enforcement procedimiento which gets its name from the South African city where one apagado the first reuniones was held él stemming the flow apagado diamonds Used by rebel armies ahora bien other groups to fund conflict.
CongoBrazzaville, which gained its independence from France in 1960, saw a series of coups and assassinations from that time on, erupting into a full-scale civil war in 1997 when forces loyal to current President Denis Sassou Nguesso (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted President Pascal Lissouba with the support of the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to have claimed at least 10,000 lives. A peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factions in March 2003 is still viewed as fragile.
Extending beyond the upheaval in CongoBrazzaville, an even larger war in the immense DRC also raged, killing at least 3 million people and seeing a host of rebel armies attempting to profit from the country' s natural resources, along with armed forces from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Congo-Brazzaville' s exportation of diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly Process say.
Diamonds also served as a driving force in the funding of Sierra Leone' s 1991-2002 civil war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the long-running conflict in Liberia which, under President Charles Taylor, effectively served as the RUF' s patron state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Now, the three part Kimberly Process aims to ensure that diamonds do not finance any entity seeking to overthrow a government recognized by the United Nations, that all diamond exports be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate proving origin, and that member states don' t act as third-party brokers for no member states.
“Countries must corta tiene legal framework en lugar that utilizado necessary importaciones and exportación controles and controles él issuance apagado certificates,” says Stephane Chardon, chairperson of the Kimberly Process working group responsible for readmitting Congo. “You must Be morralla to traza the diamonds from the mina to the exportación puntos. ”
For its part the United States' Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits “the importación into, ahora bien exportación from, the United States apagado any rough diamond, from whatever fuente, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Proceso Certificación Diseño”.
The European Union' s position on conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in a 2001 position paper which affirmed that the Union and its member states “shall support and contribute to the efforts of the international community to break the link between conflict diamonds and the financing of armed conflict”.
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns have fallen silent in Côte d' ivoire' s civil war, for example, the country remains split in half between a southern region controlled by forces loyal to the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and a northern and western one under the sway of the Forces Nouvelles (New Fuerzas) rebel movement.
In October of this year, the United Nations Security Council renewed diamond sanctions against Côte d' ivoire due to their concerns about the production and illicit export of the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley Process continued to communicate information to the body regarding the issue.
“The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds but it hasn' t totally eradicated it,” said Ayesha Kajee, programme director with the International Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. “But, in itself, this case is an indication that the Kimberley process has succeeded to some extent.”

Congo-Brazzaville: Blood Diamonds no longer Country's Best Friend
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
The announcement that the Republic of the congo, or Congo-Brazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley process, which aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, marks a breakthrough.
Congo-Brazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic of congo (DRC), and falsifying certificates of origin.
“Congo-Brazzaville comes back now after a very serious domestic effort to put their house in order and to get their domestic systems to the level required,„ Karel Kovanda, chairperson lontano the Kimberly Process segretariato, told IPS. “IT was quite anno emotional momento. We're always happy to have new people (come si board the Kimberley Process). “
Congo-Brazzaville's fate is Just the latest example lontano the enforcement procedura which gets its name from the South African city where one lontano the first riunioni was held si stemming the flow lontano diamonds used by rebel armies ma other groups to fund conflict.
Congo-Brazzaville, which gained its independence from france in 1960, saw a series of coups and assassinations from that time on, erupting into a full-scale civil war in 1997 when forces loyal to current president denis Sassou Nguesso (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted president pascal Lissouba with the support of the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to have claimed at least 10,000 lives. A peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factions in March 2003 is still viewed as fragile.
Extending beyond the upheaval in Congo-Brazzaville, an even larger war in the immense DRC also raged, killing at least 3 million people and seeing a host of rebel armies attempting to profit from the country's natural resources, along with armed forces from angola, Namibia, rwanda, Uganda and zimbabwe.
Congo-Brazzaville's exportation of diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly process say.
Diamonds also served as a driving force in the funding of Sierra Leone's 1991-2002 civil war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United front (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the long-running conflict in liberia which, under president charles taylor, effectively served as the RUF's patron state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Now, the three part Kimberly process aims to ensure that diamonds do not finance any entity seeking to overthrow a government recognized by the United nations, that all diamond exports be accompanied by a Kimberley process certificate proving origin, and that member states don't act as third-party brokers for non member states.
“Countries must have a legal framework in place that uses necessary import and export controls and controls on issuance of certificates,„ says stephane Chardon, chairperson of the Kimberly process working group responsible for re-admitting congo. “You must Be bianchetti to traccia the diamonds from the estrae to the export punti. „
For its part the United States'Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits “the importazione into, ma esportazione from, the United States lontano any rough diamond, from whatever fonte, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Process rilascio di attestati progettazione„.
The European Union's position on conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in a 2001 position paper which affirmed that the Union and its member states “shall support and contribute to the efforts of the international community to break the link between conflict diamonds and the financing of armed conflict„.
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns have fallen silent in Côte d'ivoire's civil war, for example, the country remains split in half between a southern region controlled by forces loyal to the government of president laurent Gbagbo and a northern and western one under the sway of the forces nouvelles (New Forces) rebel movement.
In October of this year, the United nations Security Council renewed diamond sanctions against côte d'ivoire due to their concerns about the production and illicit export of the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley process continued to communicate information to the body regarding the issue.
“The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds but it hasn't totally eradicated it,„ said Ayesha Kajee, programme director with the international Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. “But, in itself, this case is an indication that the Kimberley process has succeeded to some extent.„

Congo-Brazzaville: Blood Diamonds No Longer Country' s Best Friend
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
The announcement that the Republic of the Congo, or Congo-Brazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley Process, which aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, marks a breakthrough.
Congo-Brazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and falsifying certificates of origin.
„Congo-Brazzaville comes back now after a very serious domestic effort to put their house in order and to get their domestic systems to the level required,“ Karel Kovanda chairperson of the Kimberly Process Sekretariat told IPS. „IT was quite emotional Jahr Zeitpunkt. We' re always happy to have new people (als man board the Kimberley Process). „
Der Kongo-Brazzaville' s fate is just the latest example of the Verfahrensenforcement which gets its name from the South African city onewhere of the first Versammlungen was held man stemming the flow of diamonds used by rebel armies, aber other groups to fund conflict.
Congo-Brazzaville, which gained its independence from France in 1960, saw a series of coups and assassinations from that time on, erupting into a full-scale civil war in 1997 when forces loyal to current President Denis Sassou Nguesso (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted President Pascal Lissouba with the support of the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to have claimed at least 10,000 lives. A peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factions in March 2003 is still viewed as fragile.
Extending beyond the upheaval in Congo-Brazzaville, an even larger war in the immense DRC also raged, killing at least 3 million people and seeing a host of rebel armies attempting to profit from the country' s natural resources, along with armed forces from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Congo-Brazzaville'-Brazzaville' s exportation of diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly Process say.
Diamonds also served as a driving force in the funding of Sierra Leone' s 1991-2002 civil war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the long-running conflict in Liberia which, under President Charles Taylor, effectively served as the RUF' s patron state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Now, the three part Kimberly Process aims to ensure that diamonds do not finance any entity seeking to overthrow a government recognized by the United Nations, that all diamond exports be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate proving origin, and that member states don' t act as third-party brokers for Nicht-member states.
„Countries must schrämt hat legales gebrauchtes framework in Stelle that necessary import and Export controls and controls man issuance of certificates“ says Stephane Chardon, chairperson of the Kimberly Process working group responsible for Re-admitting Congo. „You must Be Weißbarsch to zieht the diamonds from the vermint to the PunktExport. “
For its part the United States' Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits „the Einfuhr into, aber Ausfuhr from, the United States of any rough diamond, from whatever Quelle that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Process Bescheinigung Scheme“.
The European Union' s position on conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in a 2001 position paper which affirmed that the Union and its member states „shall support and contribute to the efforts of the international community to break the link between conflict diamonds and the financing of armed conflict“.
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns have fallen silent in Côte d' ivoire' s civil war, for example, the country remains split in half between a southern region controlled by forces loyal to the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and a northern and western one under the sway of the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) rebel movement.
In October of this year, the United Nations Security Council renewed diamond sanctions against Côte d' ivoire due to their concerns about the production and illicit export of the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley Process continued to communicate information to the body regarding the issue.
„The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds but it hasn' t totally eradicated it,“ said Ayesha Kajee, programme director with the International Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. „But, in itself, this case is an indication that the Kimberley process has succeeded to some extent.“

CongoBrazzaville: Blood Diamonds No Longer Country' s Best Friend
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
The announcement that the Republic of the Congo, or CongoBrazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley Process, which aims to stem the flow of conflict diamonds, marks a breakthrough.
CongoBrazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and falsifying certificates of origin.
“CongoBrazzaville comes back now after a very serious domestic effort to put their house in order and to get their domestic systems to the level required,” Karel Kovanda, chairperson fora the Kimberly Processamento secretariado, told IPS. “Was quite ano emotional momento. We' re always happy to have new people (como ele board the Kimberley Processamento). “
Congo-Brazzaville' s fate is just the latest example fora the enforcement procedimento which gets its name from the South African city where one fora the first meetings was held ele stemming the flow fora diamonds used by rebel armies ora other groups to fund conflict.
CongoBrazzaville, which gained its independence from France in 1960, saw a series of coups and assassinations from that time on, erupting into a full-scale civil war in 1997 when forces loyal to current President Denis Sassou Nguesso (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted President Pascal Lissouba with the support of the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to have claimed at least 10,000 lives. A peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factions in March 2003 is still viewed as fragile.
Extending beyond the upheaval in CongoBrazzaville, an even larger war in the immense DRC also raged, killing at least 3 million people and seeing a host of rebel armies attempting to profit from the country' s natural resources, along with armed forces from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Congo-Brazzaville' s exportation of diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly Process say.
Diamonds also served as a driving force in the funding of Sierra Leone' s 1991-2002 civil war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the long-running conflict in Liberia which, under President Charles Taylor, effectively served as the RUF' s patron state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Now, the three part Kimberly Process aims to ensure that diamonds do not finance any entity seeking to overthrow a government recognized by the United Nations, that all diamond exports be accompanied by a Kimberley Process certificate proving origin, and that member states don' t act as third-party brokers for No.member states.
“Countries must have a legal framework in place that uses necessary import and export controls and controls on issuance of certificates,” says Stephane Chardon, chairperson of the Kimberly Process working group responsible for readmitting Congo. “You must Be able to traça the diamonds from the mina to the export pontos. ”
For its part the United States' Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits “the importação into, ora exportação from, the United States fora any rough diamond, from whatever fonte, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Processamento Certificação Modelo”.
The European Union' s position on conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in a 2001 position paper which affirmed that the Union and its member states “shall support and contribute to the efforts of the international community to break the link between conflict diamonds and the financing of armed conflict”.
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns have fallen silent in Côte d' Ivoire' s civil war, for example, the country remains split in half between a southern region controlled by forces loyal to the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and a northern and western one under the sway of the Forces Nouvelles (New Forças) rebel movement.
In October of this year, the United Nations Security Council renewed diamond sanctions against Cote d' Ivoire due to their concerns about the production and illicit export of the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley Process continued to communicate information to the body regarding the issue.
“The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds but it hasn' t totally eradicated it,” said Ayesha Kajee, programme director with the International Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. “But, in itself, this case is an indication that the Kimberley process has succeeded to some extent.”

Congo-Brazzaville: Blood Diamonds No To skirt Country' S Best Friend
Automatically translated into English thanks to WorldLingo
The announcement that the Republic off the Congo, gold Congo-Brazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley Process, which aims to stem the flow off conflict diamonds, marks has breakthrough.
Congo-Brazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic off Congo (DRC), and falsifying certificates off origin.
“Congo-Brazzaville comes back now after has very serious domestic effort to could their house in order and to get to their domestic systems to the level required,” Karel Kovanda, chairperson off the Kimberly Process secretariat, told IPS. “It was quite year emotional moment. We' Re always happy to cuts new people (like one board the Kimberley Process). “
Congo-Brazzaville' S fate is just the latest example off the enforcement procedure which gets its name from the South African city where one off the first meeting was held one stemming the flow off diamonds used by rebel armies gold other groups to fund conflict.
Congo-Brazzaville, which gained its independence from France in 1960, saw has series off blows and assassinations from that time one, erupting into has full-scale civil war in 1997 honest when forces to current President Denis Sassou Nguesso off (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted President Pascal Lissouba with the support the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to cuts claimed At least 10,000 lives. With peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factions in March 2003 is still viewed have fragile.
Extending beyond the upheaval in Congo-Brazzaville, year even larger war in the immense DRC also raged, killing At least 3 million people and seeing has host off rebel armies attempting to profit from the country' S natural resources, along with armed forces from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Congo-Brazzaville' S export off diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly Process say.
Diamonds also served have has off driving force in the funding Sierra Leone' S 1991-2002 civil war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the length-running conflict in Liberia which, under President Charles Taylor, effectively served have the RUF' S owner state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The La Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Now, the three share Kimberly Process aims to ensure that diamonds C not finance any entity seeking to overthrow has government recognized by the United Nations, that Al diamond exports Be accompanied by has Kimberley Process certificate proving origin, and that member states don' T act have third-party brokers for non-member states.
“Countries must cuts has legal framework in place that use off necessary importation and export controls and controls one issuance certificates,” says Stephan Chardon, chairperson off the responsible Kimberly Process working group for Re-admitting Congo. “You must Be whitebait to trace the diamonds from the mine to the export points. ”
For its share the United States' Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits “the importation into, but export from, the United States off any rough diamond, from whatever source, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Process Certification Design”.
The European Union' S position one conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in A 2001 position paper which affirmed that the Union and its member states “shall international support and contribute to the efforts off the community to station-wagon the link between conflict diamonds and the financing off armed conflict”.
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns cuts fallen silent in Coast of Ivoire' S civil war, for example, the country remains Split in half between has government southern area controlled by forces honest to the off President Laurent Gbagbo and has off northern and western one under the sway the Forces New (New Forces) rebel movement.
In October off this year, the United Nations Security Council renewed diamond sanctions against Ivory Coast due to to their concerns butt the production and illicit export off the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley Process continued to communicate information to the body regarding the resulting.
“The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds goal it hasn' T totally eradicated it,” said Ayesha Kajee, program director with the International Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) At the University off the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. “Goal, in itself, this box is year indication that the Kimberley process has succeeded to nap extent.”

Congo-Brazzaville: Ge  första erfarenh  diamanter inte för att kringgå den Country S bästa vän
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Meddelandet, som republiken av Kongofloden, guld- Congo-Brazzaville, har readmitted till den processaa Kimberleyen, som syften att stem flödet av konfliktdiamanter, markerar har genombrott.
Congo-Brazzaville drevs ut från the-then årigt bearbetar i 2004 för att exportera diamanter från dess kriger-wracked grannet, den demokratiska republiken av Kongofloden (DRC) och falsifying av certifikat av beskärning.
”Kommer Congo-Brazzaville tillbaka nu, efter har haft mycket allvarligt inhemskt försök kunde deras hus in beställa, och att få till deras inhemska system till jämnt krävt,” Karel Kovanda, ordförande av Kimberly den processaa secretariaten, berättade IPS. ”Var det ganska det emotionella ögonblicket för året. Vi är alltid lyckliga till nytt folk för snitt (något liknande en stiger ombord den processaa Kimberleyen). ”
Är det Congo-Brazzaville' S ödet rättvist det senaste exemplet av framtvingandetillvägagångssättet som får dess känt från den sydafrikanska staden, var en av första möte rymdes en som stemming flödet av diamanter som användes av guld- rebelliska arméer andra grupper för att betala konflikt.
Congo-Brazzaville, som nådde dess självständighet från Frankrike i 1960, sågar har serie av slag, och lönnmord från den tid en som får utbrott in i, har den full-scale inbördeskriget i 1997 som är ärlig när styrkor till strömpresidenten Denis Sassou Nguesso av (vem härskade också landet från 1979 till 1992), avhyst presidentPascal Lissouba med servicen den angolanska armén.
Den two-year konflikten beräknades till snitt fordrade åtminstone 10.000 liv. Med fredöverenskommelse som undertecknas av den Nguesso regeringen med olika rebelliska fraktioner i mars 2003, beskådas fortfarande har bräckligt.
Den fördjupande det okända omstörtningen i Congo-Brazzaville, det även större året kriger i den enorma DRCEN som rasas också och att döda åtminstone 3 miljon folk, och att se har att vara värd av rebelliska arméer som försöker att gagna från naturresurserna för country S, tillsammans med krigsmakt från Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda och Zimbabwe.
Den Congo-Brazzaville' S exporten av diamanter numrerar in den avlägsna det okända som dess kapacitet till jordbruksprodukter var den första varningen undertecknar, att något var amiss, representanter med Kimberlyen bearbetar något att säga.
Diamanter som tjänas som också, har har av drivkraft i finansieringSierra Leone inbördeskrig 1991-2002 som sågar utbredda grymheter som begås av den förenade revolutionären, beklär (RUF).
Smugglade diamanter från det land vårdade också denspring konflikten i Liberia som, under den presidentCharles tayloren, tjänade som effektivt har den statliga ägaren för RUF S. Tayloren väntar på för närvarande försök i laen Hague för krigsbrott och brott mot mänsklighet.
Nu kände igen de tre aktieKimberly processaa syftena att se till, att finans för diamanter C inte någon enhet som söker att omstörta har regeringen, vid Förenta nationen, att Aldiamantexporter medföljs by, har Kimberley det processaa certifikat att bevisa beskärning, och att medlemmen påstår, agerar inte har third-party mäklare för non-member påstår.
”Har landsmustsnitt den lagliga ramen in att förlägga det bruk av nödvändig importation, och exporten kontrollerar och kontrollerar certifikat för en issuance,” något att säga Stephan Chardon, ordförande av ansvarigKimberly den processaa funktionsdugliga gruppen för Re-admitting av Kongofloden. ”Måste du vara whitebait som spårar diamanterna från det min till exporten, pekar. ”
För dess aktie som de eniga tillståndens den rena diamanthandeln agerar, som genomfördes i 2003, förbjuder ”importationen in i, bara export från, Förenta staterna av någon grov diamant, från, allt vad källa, som inte har kontrollerats till och med Kimberley den processaa attesteringsdesignen”.
Europeiska unionerna placerar diamanter för en konflikt, artikulerades under tiden i A 2001 placerar pappers- som intygade att unionen och dess medlem påstår ”landskampservice och att bidra till försöken av gemenskapen till postera-vagnen anknyta mellan konfliktdiamanter och finansieringen av beväpnad konflikt”.
Ansträngningen mot konfliktdiamanter är långtifrån över, fast, sagda observatörer.
Segla utmed kusten av den Ivoire S inbördeskriget, även om vapnen klipper stupat tyst in, till exempel har har landsremainsen som delas i halva between, regerings- sydligt område som kontrolleras av styrkor som är ärliga till av presidenten Laurent Gbagbo och, av nordlig och västra under gungningen den nya (nya styrkor) rebelliska rörelsen för styrkor.
I Oktober av detta år förnyade diamantsanktionerna för Förenta nation seglar utmed kusten frågade säkerhetsrådet mot elfenben tack vare till deras bekymmerända produktionen och den olagliga exporten av ädelstenarna och att det Kimberley processaa som fortsättas till meddelar information till förkroppsliga angående resultera.
”Begränsar det processaa bestämt handeln i bloddiamantmål som den inte har totalt utrotat det,”, sade Ayesha Kajee, programdirektör med landskampmänsklig rättighetutbytet (IHRE) på universitetar av Witwatersranden i Johannesburg, Sydafrika. ”Boxas målet, i honom, detta är årsindikeringen som den processaa Kimberleyen har lyckas för att ta sig en tupplur grad.”,

Конго-Brazzaville: Диаманты крови не для обхода друга Country s самого лучшего
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Объявление республике с Конго, золота Конго-Brazzaville, readmitted к процессу Kimberley, который направляет запрудить подачу с диамантов конфликта, метки имеет прорыв.
Конго-Brazzaville был вытеснен от the-then процесс year-old в 2004 для ехпортировать диаманты от своего соседа войны-wracked, демократической республики с Конго (DRC), и фальсифицировать сертификаты с начала.
«Конго-Brazzaville come back теперь после того как имеет очень серьезное отечественное усилие смогл их дом в заказе и получить к их отечественным системам к необходимо уровню,» Karel Kovanda, председатель с секретариата Кимберли отростчатого, сказало IPS. «Было довольно моментом года эмоциональным. Мы всегда счастливы к людям отрезоков новым (как одна доска процесс Kimberley). «
Судьба Конго-Brazzaville' s справедлива самый последний пример с процедуры по принуждения получает свое имя от южного африканского города где одно с первой встречи держалось одно запруживая подачу с диамантов используемых rebel золотом армий другие группы для того чтобы фондировать конфликт.
Конго-Brazzaville, который приобрел свою независимость от Франции в 1960, пила имеет серию с дуновений и assassinations от того времени одного, извергая в имеют полномасштабное гражданскую войну в 1997 честном когда усилия к в настоящее время президенту Denis Sassou Nguesso с (также управляло страной от 1979 до 1992) ousted президента Паскаля Lissouba с поддержкой ангольская армия.
Двухклассный конфликт был оценен к отрезокам востребовал по крайней мере 10.000 жизней. При мирное соглашение подписанное правительством Nguesso с различными rebel факциями в марте 2003 все еще осматривает имейте утлое.
Удлиняющ за upheaval в Конго-Brazzaville, война года даже более большое в большом DRC также свирепствовало, убивающ по крайней мере 3 миллиона людей и видеть имеет хозяина с rebel армий пытая принести пользу от природные ресурсы country s, вместе с вооруженными силы страны от Анголы, Намибии, Руанды, Уганды и Зимбабве.
Экспортом Конго-Brazzaville' s с диамантов в номерах далеко за своей способностью произвести было первое предупредительный знак что-то было amiss, должностные лица с Кимберли, котор процесс говорит.
Также, котор служят диаманты имеют имеют с управляющей силы в фондируя гражданской войне 1991-2002 Sierra Leone s увидело widespread зверства порученные революционным объединенным фронтом (RUF).
Smuggled диаманты от той страны также воспитали длин-конфликт в Либерии, под президентом Charles Портноем, эффективно служила имеет положение предпринимателя RUF s. Портной в настоящее время ждет пробы в La Hague для военных преступления и преступление против человечества.
Теперь, процесс Кимберли 3 долей направляет обеспечить что финансы c диамантов не любая реальность изыскивая overthrow имеют правительство узнанное Организацией Объединенных Наций, чтобы экспорты диаманта Al были сопровожены мимо имеет сертификат Kimberley отростчатый доказать начало, и что статусы члена не действуют имеет third-party маклеров для положений non-member.
«Отрезоки сусла стран имеют правовую структуру in place используют с сертификаты обязательно экспортный контроль ввозки и и issuance управления одного,» говорят Stephan Chardon, председателя с ответственной рабочей группы Кимберли отростчатой для Re-admitting Конго. «Вы должны быть whitebait для того чтобы трассировать диаманты от шахты к пунктам экспорта. »
Для своего доля Соединенные Штаты очищает диамант Trade, котор поступок, который был снабжен в 2003, запрещает «ввозку в, только экспорт от, Соединенные Штаты с любого грубого диаманта, от любой источник, который не был проконтролирован через конструкцию аттестации Kimberley отростчатую».
Европейские диаманты конфликта положения одного Union s, между тем, были артикулированы в справка с изложением фактической стороны вопроса a 2001 которое подтвердило что соединение и свои статусы члена «члена международная поддержка и способствовать к усилиям с общины к станци-фуре соединение между диамантами конфликта и финансированием с вооруженного конфликта».
Схваткой против диамантов конфликта будет far from сверх, хотя, сказанные наблюдатели.
Даже если пушки режут упаденное молчком в свободном полете гражданской войны Ivoire s, например, остаток страны разделенный в половине имеет зону правительства южную контролируемую усилиями честными к президенту Laurent Gbagbo и имеет с северное и западное одного под sway движение усилий новое (новые усилия) rebel.
В октябре с этого года, санкции диаманта Совета безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций возобновленные против Берега Слоновои Кости из-за к их забот бодают продукцию и illicit экспорт с драгоценных камней и спросили что процесс Kimberley продолжался связывать информация к телу относительно приводить к.
«Процесс некоторо ограничивает торговлю в цели диамантов крови, котор он полно не искоренял ее,» сказал Ayesha Kajee, директор программы с международным обменом прав человека (IHRE) на университете с Witwatersrand в Johannesburg, Южной Африке. «Целью, в действительности, эта коробка будет индикация года которая процесс Kimberley преуспевал в объем ворсины.»

Kongo-Brazzaville: Blood Diamonds No Varen Country' s Best Friend
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
The announcement that the Republic off the Kongo, echter Kongo-Brazzaville, has been readmitted to the Kimberley Process, which aims to stem the flow off conflict diamonds, mark aan breakthrough.
Kongo-Brazzaville was expelled from the-then year-old process in 2004 for exporting diamonds from its war-wracked neighbour, the Democratic Republic off Kongo (DRC), and falsifying certificates off origin.
„Kongo-Brazzaville comes back now after aan very serious domestic inspanning to kunnen their hoes in order and to get their domestic systems to the niveau required,“ Karel Kovanda, chairperson off the Kimberly Process secretariaat, told IPS. „IT was quite emotional jaar moment. We' re always happy to have new people (als men board the Kimberley Process). „
Kongo-Brazzaville' s fate is Just the latest example off the enforcement procedure which gets its name from the South African city where one off the first bijeenkomsten was held men stemming the flow off diamonds used by rebel armies echter other groups to fund conflict.
Kongo-Brazzaville, which gained its independence from Frankrijk in 1960, saw hebben reeks off slag and assassinations from that time men, erupting into hebben full-scale burger war in 1997 when kracht trouw to current President Dennis Sassou Nguesso (who also ruled the country from 1979 to 1992) ousted President PASCAL Lissouba with the steun off the Angolan army.
The two-year conflict was estimated to have claimed at least 10,000 lives. AAN peace agreement signed by the Nguesso government with various rebel factie in March 2003 is still viewed aas breekbaar.
Extending beyond the upheaval in Kongo-Brazzaville, jaar even larger war in the enorm DRC also raged, killing at least 3 miljoen people and seeing aan host off rebel armies attempting to winst from the country' s natural hulpbronnen, along with armed kracht from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Kongo-Brazzaville' s uitvoer off diamonds in numbers far beyond its ability to produce was the first warning sign that something was amiss, officials with the Kimberly Process say.
Diamonds also served aas aan driving forceren in the funding off Sierra Leone' s 1991-2002 burgerlijk war which saw widespread atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Voorhoofd (RUF).
Smuggled diamonds from that country also fostered the long-running conflict in Liberia which, under President Charles Taylor, effectively served aas the RUF' s werkgever state. Taylor is currently awaiting trial in The Hague for war misdaad and misdaad against humanity.
Now, the three ver*trekken Kimberly Process aims to ensure that diamonds do not financieren any entity seeking to overthrow hebben government recognized by the United Volk, that DE diamond exports be accompanied by aan Kimberley Process certificate proving origin, and that member states don' t act aas third-party wisselagent for nee-member states.
„Countries must have hebben wettelijk framework in plaats that gebruiken necessary import and export controls and controls men issuance off certificates,“ says Stephane Distel, chairperson off the Kimberly Process working group responsible for re-admitting Kongo. „You must be witvis to schetst the diamonds from the ondermijnt to the export punten. “
For its ver*trekken the United States' Clean Diamond Trade Act, which was implemented in 2003, prohibits „the invoer into, echter uitvoer from, the United States off any rough diamond, from whatever bron, that has not been controlled through the Kimberley Process Certificatie Schema“.
The European Union' s positie men conflict diamonds, meanwhile, was articulated in hebben 2001 positie paper which affirmed that the Unie and its member states „shall steun and contribute to the inspanning off the internationaal community to stationcar the link between conflict diamonds and the financing off armed conflict“.
The struggle against conflict diamonds is far from over, though, observers said.
Even though the guns have fallen silent in Côte d' ivoire' s burgerlijk war, for example, the country remains split in half between aan southern gebied controlled by kracht trouw to the government off President Laurent Gbagbo and aan northern and western one under the sway off the Kracht Nieuw (New Krachten) rebel movement.
In October off this year, the United Volk Security Council renewed diamond sanctie against Ivoorkust te wijten to their concerns about the productie and illicit export off the precious stones and asked that the Kimberley Process continued to communicate informatie to the body regarding the afloop.
„The process certainly restricts the trade in blood diamonds drinken IT hasn' t totally eradicated IT,“ said Ayesha Kajee, programma director with the Internationaal Human Rights Exchange (IHRE) at the University off the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, South Africa. „Doel, in itself, this plaatsen is jaar aanwijzing that the Kimberley process has succeeded to sommeren extent.“

[كنغ-برزّفيلّ]: دم ماس لا أن يطوّق [كونتر'] [س] [ولّ فريند]
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
يتلقّى الإعلان أنّ الجمهورية من كونغو, نوع ذهب [كنغ-برزّفيلّ], يتلقّى يكون اعترفت إلى [كيمبرلي] عملية, أيّ يهدف أن يصدّ الدفق من نزاع ماس, علامات إختراق.
طردت [كنغ-برزّفيلّ] كان من [ث-ثن] [ير-ولد] عملية في 2004 ل يصدر ماس من ه [ور-وركد] جار, الجمهورية ديموقراطيّة من كونغو ([درك]), ويزوّر شهادات من أصل.
"يعاود [كنغ-برزّفيلّ] الآن عقب يتلقّى جهد جدّيّة محلّية جدّا أن استطاع منزلهم في أمر وأن يحصل إلى نظاماتهم محلّية إلى المستوى يتطلّب," [كرل] [كوفندا], رئيس من [كيمبرلي] أمانة سرّ معامل, قال [إيبس]. "كان هو الى حدّ بعيد سنة عزم عاطفيّة. نحن دائما سعيدة إلى قطعات الناس جديدة (مثل واحدة لون [كيمبرلي] عملية). "
[كنغ-برزّفيلّ'] [س] قدر صحيحة المثال متأخّرة من الإنفاذ إجراء أيّ يحصل اسمه من المدينة افريقي جنوبي حيث واحدة من الاجتماع أوّل كان أمسكت واحدة يصدّ الدفق من ماس يستعمل بمتمرّدة جيوش نوع ذهب أخرى مجموعة أن يموّل نزاع.
يتلقّى [كنغ-برزّفيلّ], أيّ كسب استقلاله من فرنسا في 1960, منشار [سري] من ضرب وإغتيالات من أنّ وقت واحدة, يثور داخل يتلقّون حرب أهليّة [فولّ-سكل] في 1997 صادقة عندما قوات إلى رئيس حاليّة [دنيس] [سسّوو] [نغسّو] من (الذي أيضا حكم البلد من 1979 إلى 1992) يطاح رئيس باسكال [ليسّووبا] مع الدعم الجيش أنغوليّة.
قدّمت النزاع لمدّة سنتين كان إلى قطعات ادّعى على الأقلّ 10,000 حيوات. شاهدت مع سلام إتفاق يوقع ب [نغسّو] حكومة مع زمر مختلفة متمرّدة في مارس - آذار 2003 بعد يتلقّى هشّة.
يمدّد إلى ما بعد الإنقلاب في [كنغ-برزّفيلّ], سنة حتّى احتدّ حرب كبيرة في ال [درك] ضخمة أيضا, يقتل على الأقلّ 3 [ميلّيون بيوبل] ويرى يتلقّى مضيفة من جيوش متمرّدة يحاول أن يربح من ال [كونتر'] [س] [نتثرل رسورس], مع قوات مسلّحة من أنغولا, نميبيا, روندا, أوغندا وزمبابوي.
[كنغ-برزّفيلّ'] [س] كان تصدير من ماس في أرقام بعيدا إلى ما بعد قدرته أن ينتج الإشارة إنذار أولى أنّ شيء كان بشكل, مسؤولات مع [كيمبرلي] عملية يقول.
ماس أيضا يخدم يتلقّى من [دريف فورس] في ال يموّل [سرّا ليون'] [س] 1991-2002 حرب أهليّة أيّ رأى شناعة واسع انتشار يرتكب بالثوريّة يوحّد جبهة ([روف]).
عزّز يهرّب ماس من أنّ بلد أيضا ال [لنغث-رونّينغ] نزاع في ليبيريا أيّ, تحت رئيس شارلز تايلور, بشكل فعّال خدم يتلقّى ال [روف'] [س] مالكة دولة. يترقّب تايلور حاليّا محاكمة في اللا [هغ] لجريمة حرب وجرائم ضدّ إنسانية.
الآن, الثلاثة سهم [كيمبرلي] يهدف عملية أن يضمن أنّ ماس [ك] لا مالية أيّ ذاتية يبحث أن يسقط يتلقّى حكومة يميّز بالالأمم المتّحدة, أنّ [أل] ماس تصديرات يرافقوا جانبا يتلقّى [كيمبرلي] شهادة معامل يبرهن أصل, وأنّ دولة عضو لا يتصرّفون يتلقّى وسيطات طرف ثالث لبلد غير عضو دول.
"بلد عفن يتلقّى قطعات [لغل فرموورك] [إين بلس] أنّ يستعمل من إستيراد ضروريّة ويصدق تحكمات وتحكمات واحدة إصدار شهادات," يقول [ستفن] [شردون], رئيس من المسؤولة [كيمبرلي] [ووركينغ غرووب] معامل ل [ر-دميتّينغ] كونغو. "أنت ينبغي كنت بلد أن يتتبّع الماس من المنجم لغم إلى التصدير نقطات. "
ل ه ينظّف سهم الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة ماس عمل تجاريّة, أيّ كان طبّقت في 2003, يحظّر "الإستيراد داخل, غير أنّ تصدير من, الولايات المتّحدة الأمريكيّة من أيّ ماس خشنة, من أيّما مصدر, أنّ يتلقّى لم يكن ضبطت من خلال [كيمبرلي] معامل تصديق تصميم".
الأوروبيّة [أونيون'] [س] موقعة واحدة نزاع مفصلت ماس, في الوقت نفسه, كان في [ا] 2001 موقعة ورقيّة أيّ أكّد أنّ الإتحاد ودولت عضوه "سوفت سيساند وسيسهم إلى الجهود دوليّة من الجماعة إلى [ستأيشن-وغن] الخطوة بين نزاع ماس والتمويل من نزاع مسلّحة".
الكفاح ضدّ نزاع ماس [فر فروم] على [, ثوو], ملاحظات يقال.
[إفن ثوو] المسدّس مدفع يقطعون يسقط يسكت في ساحل من [إيفوير'] [س] حرب أهليّة, مثلا, البلد يتلقّى أثر ينقسم في نصف فيما بين حكومة منطقة جنوبيّة يضبط بقوات صادقة إلى ال باتّجاه آخر رئيس [لورنت] غباغبو ويتلقّى من شماليّة وغربيّة واحدة تحت التمايل القوات جديدة (جديدة قوات) حركة متمرّدة.
في أكتوبر - تشرين الأوّل من هذا سنة, الالأمم المتّحدة أمن مجلس يجدّد ماس ينطح عقوبات ضدّ ساحل العاج واجبة إلى إلى اهتماماتهم الإنتاج وتصدير محظورة من ال [برسووس ستون] وسأل أنّ [كيمبرلي] عملية استمرّ أن يتّصل معلومة إلى الجسم بخصوص ال ينتج.
"يقيّد العملية بالتّأكيد التجارة في دم ماس هدف هو يتلقّى لم تماما يستأصل هو," قال [أشا] [كج], برنامج مديرة مع الدوليّة حقوق الإنسان تبادل ([إيهر]) في الجامعة من [ويتوترسرند] في جوهانسبورغ, جنوب افريقيا. "هدف, في بنفسي, هذا صندوق سنة دلالة أنّ [كيمبرلي] عملية قد نجح أن يقول مدى."

Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC and Neil Holloway, President of Microsoft Europe Middle East and Africa.

Nigeria says a unique memorandum of understanding with Microsoft will help it to identify and prosecute cyber criminals, create a safe legal environment, and restore hundreds of millions of dollars in lost investmentThe last person you want to see caught in a financial scam is a widow. Nigerian Amaka Anajemba, who had been widowed at the young age of 37, was caught in the largest financial scam of its type in her country's history, one in which the perpetrators stole a total of $242 million. But before you work up too much sympathy for Anajemba, you should know that she wasn't a victim of the scam — she was one of its perpetrators.

In 2002, the Nigerian government established the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to battle the growing problem of cybercrime in that country. The recent successful prosecution of Anajemba is one of 50 EFCC cases, recently completed or currently underway, involving close to 100 defendants. Hundreds more are being investigated. And the effort is having an impact. The rate of spam from Nigeria seeking to swindle people has been halved, according to the government.

Despite its success, the Nigerian government wanted to do more and it knew it needed help. Starting today, Nigeria is getting that help in a formalised way with the signing of an agreement with Microsoft, under which the two will collaborate on information sharing, training, and capacity building to fight internet crime originating in the country. Their memorandum of understanding is the first of its type for both parties and is believed to be the first of its type in Africa, if not the world.
Costing Hundreds of Millions of Dollars

"The $100 million we've confiscated from spammers and other defendants is the least that cybercrime has cost our country," says Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, executive chairman of the EFCC. "Our economy has lost hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign investment because our credibility and the trust of the international community have been affected. Nigerians can't even use financial instruments as basic as mail orders; if it comes from Nigeria, it's suspect."

So when Microsoft, which has an office in Nigeria, approached the EFCC about collaborating to fight cybercrime, the government was interested. But according to Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, a Paris-based attorney and internet safety expert in Microsoft's EMEA organisation, Nigeria had more to offer than a problem with cybercrime.

"We're interested in fighting cybercrime globally, of course, but working with Nigeria held particular attractions for us," says Le Toquin. "The EFCC is a skilled organisation, with a significant law enforcement infrastructure backing it, and Nigeria has the political willingness to take action against cyber criminals. As much as they were doing on their own, they were comfortable with the idea of getting help from us to do even more."

And Nigeria, in turn, saw distinct advantages in partnering with Microsoft. "Microsoft is not only a technology leader, it's also a leader in the fight against cybercrime," says Ribadu. "No other company is doing what Microsoft is doing to fight cybercrime and no other company could provide the help we will get under this agreement."

"This agreement will be of great benefit to us," he adds. "It will put us in the proper direction in fighting cybercrime. It will help us to improve our understanding of the technologies involved as well as give us new investigative skills to go after the criminals. They are constantly changing their tactics and we have to constantly keep up. This agreement will help us to do that. And anything that reduces cybercrime in Nigeria will also benefit computer users everywhere, since the crime that starts here doesn't stop at our borders."

Providing Expertise, Information And More
The agreement defines a framework for co-operation between Microsoft and Nigeria that will give the EFCC access to Microsoft's technical expertise, information for successful enforcement, Microsoft-sponsored seminars, and training sessions specifically designed for law enforcement officers and representatives.

For example, Microsoft expects to provide knowledge on so-called "botnet" technology that enables hackers to control tens of thousands of PCs and to use those PCs to spread spam or to inundate websites with so much traffic that the sites crash in denial-of-service attacks. Microsoft expects to instruct Nigerian investigators in how to extract useful information from PCs compromised by botnet attacks, how to monitor computer networks to detect such attacks, and how to identify the people behind them.

Microsoft also expects to provide leads on spam originating from Nigeria, enabling the authorities there to pursue investigations more quickly and successfully. Microsoft conducts a worldwide analysis of spam sent to e-mail accounts that it establishes and monitors for this purpose.
"Our analysis of spam produces hundreds of leads each year," says Le Toquin. "Because we already generate this information, it's easy for us to provide it to the law enforcement authorities who can do something about it. Most countries are in no position to identify the spammers within their borders. We can help do that and share the information with them so they can take action. That's an example of the information sharing we will do with Nigeria."

Building on Informal Relationships
The memorandum of understanding is the first formal agreement of its type between Microsoft and a national government, but it builds on informal relationships that Microsoft has built with international agencies and national governments worldwide. The company co-operates with Interpol as well as with countries in Europe, the Middle East, Asia and North America.

And Microsoft's efforts to fight cybercrime go beyond the financial crimes that Nigeria is addressing. For example, the company has initiated a child exploitation tracking system to help law enforcement agencies fight internet child pornography.

In all, Microsoft has a team of 65 working to promote internet security worldwide. In addition to its informal relationships with governments and agencies, the company provides structured support to the public sector through both its Government Security Program, begun in 2003, and its Security Cooperation Program, begun in February of this year. These programs help governments address their unique security concerns around the use of technology. The Government Security Program provides national governments with the resources necessary to conduct a comprehensive security review of Microsoft products, while the Security Cooperation programme helps governments to respond to computer attacks, mitigate the effects of those attacks, and provide outreach and education to citizens.

Microsoft's work with governments and agencies, in turn, is part of its broader Trustworthy Computing initiative, which seeks to bring secure, private and reliable computing experiences to everyone. Other Trustworthy Computing efforts include technology innovation, co-operation with industry, academia and governments, and litigation against known spammers and others.

A Truly Important Development
The agreement between Microsoft and Nigeria is the culmination of several months of informal co-operation between the two. Over the summer, for example, Microsoft provided information that Nigerian officials used to identify two Internet Service Providers associated with large amounts of spam there. The EFCC launched investigations against the companies and made arrests. Prosecutions are now pending.

"We're confident that this agreement with Microsoft is a truly important development for us," says Ribadu. "It's coming at a critical time. We expect it will help us to create a safe legal environment, to enforce the laws that will help attract foreign investment, and to spur economic development."

"But beyond the impact on our national economy is the impact that this agreement will have on the lives of our citizens," he adds. "It will improve the quality of people's lives by reducing the crime around them, enabling them to find better jobs, and raising the integrity of Nigeria in the world community. That's what Microsoft is doing for us."

Les inondateurs prennent garde : Microsoft et équipe du Nigéria jusqu'au combat Cybercrime
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC et Neil Holloway, président de Microsoft l'Europe Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique.

Le Nigéria indique un protocole d'accord unique avec Microsoft l'aidera pour identifier et poursuivre des criminels de cyber, créer un environnement légal sûr, et reconstituer des centaines de millions de dollars chez la personne perdue de bout d'investmentThe que vous voulez voir qu'attrapée dans un scam financier est une veuve. Amaka nigérien Anajemba, qui avait été veuf au jeune âge de 37, a été attrapé dans le plus grand scam financier du son saisissent l'histoire de son pays, une dans laquelle les malfaiteurs ont volé un total de $242 millions. Mais avant que vous travailliez vers le haut de trop de sympathie pour Anajemba, vous devriez savoir qu'elle n'était pas une victime du scam - elle était l'un de ses malfaiteurs.

En 2002, le gouvernement de nigérien a établi la Commission économique et financière de crimes (EFCC) pour lutter le problème croissant du cybercrime dans ce pays. La poursuite réussie récente d'Anajemba est l'un de 50 cas d'EFCC, récemment accompli ou actuellement en cours, impliquant de près de 100 défendeurs. Des centaines de plus sont étudiées. Et l'effort a un impact. Le taux de Spam du Nigéria cherchant à escroquer des personnes a été divisé en deux, selon le gouvernement.

En dépit de son succès, le gouvernement nigérien a voulu faire plus et il l'a su aide nécessaire. Commençant aujourd'hui, le Nigéria obtient cette aide d'une manière formalisée avec la signature d'un accord avec Microsoft, sous lequel les deux collaboreront sur le partage d'informations, la formation, et le bâtiment de capacité pour combattre le crime d'Internet provenant du pays. Leur protocole d'accord est le premier de son type pour les deux parties et est censé pour être le premier du son saisissent l'Afrique, sinon le monde.
Coûtant à des centaines de millions de dollars

« les $100 millions nous avons confisqué des inondateurs et d'autres défendeurs est les mineurs que le cybercrime a coûté notre pays, » dit Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Président exécutif de l'EFCC. « Notre économie a perdu des centaines de millions de dollars dans l'investissement étranger parce que notre crédibilité et la confiance de la communauté internationale ont été affectées. Les nigériens ne peuvent pas même utiliser les instruments aussi fondamentaux que les ventes par correspondance ; s'il vient du Nigéria, il est suspect. « 

Ainsi quand Microsoft, qui a un bureau au Nigéria, a approché l'EFCC au sujet de la collaboration pour combattre le cybercrime, le gouvernement a été intéressé. Mais selon Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, un mandataire Paris-basé et expert en matière de sûreté d'Internet dans l'organisation de l'EMEA de Microsoft, Nigéria a eu plus à offrir qu'un problème avec le cybercrime.

« Nous sommes intéressés par le cybercrime de combat globalement, naturellement, mais travailler avec le Nigéria a tenu les attractions particulières pour nous, » dit Le Toquin. « L'EFCC est une organisation habile, avec un support significatif d'infrastructure d'application de loi il, et le Nigéria a la volonté politique d'agir contre des criminels de cyber. Autant qu'ils faisaient tout seuls, ils étaient confortables avec l'idée d'obtenir l'aide de nous pour faire encore plus. « 

Et le Nigéria, alternativement, avantages distincts de scie dans le partenariat avec Microsoft. « Microsoft est non seulement un chef de technologie, c'est également un chef dans le combat contre le cybercrime, » dit Ribadu. « Aucune autre compagnie ne fait ce que Microsoft fait pour combattre le cybercrime et aucune autre compagnie ne pourrait fournir l'aide que nous obtiendrons aux termes de cet accord.  »

« Cet accord sera de grand avantage à nous, » il s'ajoute. « Il nous mettra dans la direction appropriée dans le cybercrime de combat. Il nous aidera à améliorer notre arrangement des technologies impliquées aussi bien que l'élasticité nous de nouvelles qualifications investigatrices pour aller après les criminels. Ils changent constamment leur tactique et nous devons constamment continuer. Cet accord nous aidera à faire cela. Et quelque chose qui réduit le cybercrime au Nigéria bénéficiera également des utilisateurs d'ordinateur partout, puisque le crime qui commence ici ne s'arrête pas à nos frontières. « 

Fournissant l'expertise, l'information et plus
l'accord définit un cadre pour la coopération entre Microsoft et le Nigéria qui donneront l'accès d'EFCC à l'expertise technique de Microsoft, l'information pour l'application réussie, des conférences Microsoft-commanditées, et des sessions de formation spécifiquement conçues pour des dirigeants et des représentants d'application de loi.

Par exemple, Microsoft compte fournir la connaissance sur la prétendue technologie de « botnet » qui permet à des intrus de commander des dizaines de milliers de PCs et utiliser ces PCs pour écarter le Spam ou pour inonder des sites Web avec tellement le trafic que les emplacements se brisent dans le démenti-de-service attaque. Microsoft compte instruire les investigateurs nigériens dans la façon extraire l'information utile à partir des PCs compromis par des attaques de botnet, la façon surveiller des réseaux informatiques pour détecter de telles attaques, et comment identifier les personnes derrière elles.

Microsoft compte également fournir des fils sur le Spam provenant du Nigéria, permettant aux autorités là de poursuivre des investigations plus rapidement et avec succès. Microsoft conduit une analyse mondiale de Spam envoyée aux comptes d'E-mail qu'elle établit et surveille à cette fin.
« Notre analyse de Spam produit des centaines de fils tous les ans, » dit Le Toquin. « Puisque nous produisons déjà de cette information, il est facile pour nous de la fournir aux autorités d'application de loi qui peuvent faire quelque chose à son sujet. La plupart des pays sont en aucune position pour identifier les inondateurs dans leurs frontières. Nous pouvons aider faisons cela et partageons l'information avec eux ainsi ils peuvent agir. C'est un exemple du partage d'informations que nous ferons avec le Nigéria. Le « 

bâtiment sur des rapports sans cérémonie
le protocole d'accord est le premier accord formel de son type entre Microsoft et un gouvernement national, mais il construit sur les rapports sans cérémonie que Microsoft a établis dans le monde entier avec les agences internationales et les gouvernements nationaux. La compagnie coopère avec Interpol aussi bien qu'avec des pays Europe, le Moyen-Orient, l'Asie et Amérique du Nord.

Et les efforts de Microsoft de combattre le cybercrime dépassent les crimes financiers que le Nigéria adresse. Par exemple, la compagnie a lancé un système de piste d'exploitation d'enfant pour aider des agences d'application de loi à combattre la pornographie d'enfant d'Internet.

En tout, Microsoft a une équipe de 65 travaillant pour favoriser la sécurité d'Internet dans le monde entier. En plus de ses rapports sans cérémonie avec des gouvernements et d'agences, la compagnie fournit l'appui structuré au secteur public par des les deux son programme de sécurité de gouvernement, commencé en 2003, et son programme de coopération de sécurité, commencé en février de cette année. Ces gouvernements d'aide de programmes adressent leurs soucis uniques de sécurité autour de l'utilisation de la technologie. Le programme de sécurité de gouvernement fournit à des gouvernements nationaux les ressources nécessaires pour conduire un examen complet de sécurité des produits de Microsoft, alors que le programme de coopération de sécurité aide des gouvernements pour répondre aux attaques d'ordinateur, atténuer les effets de ces attaques, et fournir dépassez et éducation aux citoyens.

Le travail de Microsoft avec des gouvernements et des agences, alternativement, fait partie de sa plus large initiative de calcul digne de confiance, qui cherche à apporter bloqué, privé et le calcul fiable éprouve à chacun. D'autres efforts de calcul dignes de confiance incluent l'innovation de technologie, la coopération avec l'industrie, le milieu universitaire et les gouvernements, et le litige contre des inondateurs connus et d'autres.

Un développement véritablement important
l'accord entre Microsoft et le Nigéria est le point culminant de plusieurs mois de coopération sans cérémonie entre les deux. Au cours de l'été, par exemple, Microsoft a fourni les informations que les fonctionnaires nigériens avaient l'habitude d'identifier deux Internet Service Provider liés à de grandes quantités de Spam là. L'EFCC a lancé des investigations contre les compagnies et a fait des arrestations. Les poursuites sont maintenant en suspens.

« Nous sommes confiants que cet accord avec Microsoft soit un développement véritablement important pour nous, » dit Ribadu. « Il vient à un temps critique. Nous prévoyons qu'il nous aidera à créer un environnement légal sûr, à imposer les lois qui aideront à attirer l'investissement étranger, et à stimuler le développement économique. « 

« Mais au delà de l'impact sur notre économie nationale est l'impact que cet accord aura les vies de nos citoyens, » il s'ajoute. « Il améliorera la qualité des vies des personnes en réduisant le crime autour de elles, en leur permettant de trouver les meilleurs travaux, et en soulevant l'intégrité du Nigéria dans la communauté du monde. Est ce ce que Microsoft fait pour nous. « 

Los Spammers se guardan: Microsoft y equipo de Nigeria hasta la lucha Cybercrime
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC y Neil Holloway, presidente de Microsoft Europa Medio Oriente y de África.

Nigeria dice un memorándum de la comprensión único con Microsoft le ayudará para identificar y procesar a criminales del cyber, crear un ambiente legal seguro, y restaurar centenares de millones de dólares en persona perdida del último del investmentThe que usted desea ver que cogida en un scam financiero sea una viuda. Amaka nigeriano Anajemba, que había sido widowed en la edad joven de 37, fue cogido en el scam financiero más grande de su mecanografía adentro la historia de su país, una en el cual los autores robaron un total de $242 millones. Pero antes de que usted trabaje encima de demasiada condolencia para Anajemba, usted debe saber que ella no era una víctima del scam - ella era uno de sus autores.

En 2002, el gobierno del Nigerian estableció la Comisión económica y financiera de los crímenes (EFCC) para luchar el problema cada vez mayor del cybercrime en ese país. El procesamiento acertado reciente de Anajemba es uno de 50 casos de EFCC, terminado recientemente o actualmente en curso, implicando cerca de 100 demandados. Los centenares se están investigando más. Y el esfuerzo está teniendo un impacto. El índice del Spam de Nigeria que intentaba estafar a gente se ha partido en dos, según el gobierno.

A pesar de su éxito, el gobierno nigeriano deseó hacer más y lo sabía ayuda necesitada. Comenzando hoy, Nigeria está consiguiendo esa ayuda de una manera formalizada con la firma de un acuerdo con Microsoft, debajo de las cuales los dos colaborarán en la información que comparte, entrenando, y el edificio de la capacidad de luchar el crimen del Internet que origina en el país. Su memorándum de la comprensión es el primer de su tipo para ambas partes y se cree para ser el primer de su mecanografía adentro África, si no el mundo.
Costando a centenares de millones de dólares

“los $100 millones hemos confiscado de spammers y otros demandados son los lo menos que el cybercrime ha costado nuestro país,” dicen Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, presidente ejecutivo del EFCC. “Nuestra economía ha perdido centenares de millones de dólares en la inversión extranjera porque nuestra credibilidad y la confianza de la comunidad internacional se han afectado. Los Nigerians no pueden incluso utilizar los instrumentos financieros tan básicos como los pedidos por correo; si viene de Nigeria, es sospechado. “

Tan cuando Microsoft, que tiene una oficina en Nigeria, acercó al EFCC sobre la colaboración para luchar el cybercrime, el gobierno estuvo interesado. Pero según Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, abogado París-basado y experto en la organización de EMEA de Microsoft, Nigeria de la seguridad del Internet tenía más a ofrecer que un problema con el cybercrime.

“Estamos interesados en cybercrime que lucha global, por supuesto, pero el trabajo con Nigeria celebró las atracciones particulares para nosotros,” dice a Le Toquin. “El EFCC es una organización experta, con un forro significativo de la infraestructura de la aplicación de ley él, y Nigeria tiene la buena voluntad política de tomar la acción contra criminales del cyber. Tanto como hacían en sus los propios, eran cómodos con la idea de conseguir ayuda de nosotros para hacer aún más. “

Y Nigeria, alternadamente, ventajas distintas de la sierra en partnering con Microsoft. “Microsoft es no sólo un líder de la tecnología, es también un líder en la lucha contra cybercrime,” dice Ribadu. “Ninguna otra compañía está haciendo lo que está haciendo Microsoft para luchar el cybercrime y ninguna otra compañía podría proporcionar la ayuda que conseguiremos según los términos de este acuerdo. ”

“Este acuerdo estará de gran ventaja a nosotros,” él agrega. “Nos pondrá en la dirección apropiada en cybercrime que lucha. Nos ayudará a mejorar nuestra comprensión de las tecnologías implicadas así como elasticidad nosotros las nuevas habilidades investigadoras para ir después de los criminales. Están cambiando constantemente sus táctica y tenemos que continuar constantemente. Este acuerdo nos ayudará a hacer eso. Y cualquier cosa que reduce el cybercrime en Nigeria también beneficiará a usuarios de la computadora por todas partes, puesto que el crimen que comienza aquí no para en nuestras fronteras. “

Proporcionando la maestría, información y más
el acuerdo define un marco para la cooperación entre Microsoft y Nigeria que den el acceso de EFCC a la maestría técnica de Microsoft, la información para la aplicación acertada, seminarios Microsoft-patrocinados, y las sesiones del entrenamiento diseñadas específicamente para los oficiales y los representantes de la aplicación de ley.

Por ejemplo, Microsoft espera proporcionar conocimiento en la tecnología supuesta del “botnet” que permite a hackers controlar diez de millares de PC y utilizar esas PC para separar el Spam o para inundate Web site con tanto tráfico que los sitios se estrellan en negación-de-servicio ataca. Microsoft espera mandar a investigadores nigerianos en cómo extraer la información útil de las PC comprometidas por ataques del botnet, cómo supervisar las redes de ordenadores para detectar tales ataques, y cómo identificar a la gente detrás de ella.

Microsoft también espera proporcionar los plomos en el Spam que origina de Nigeria, permitiendo a las autoridades allí perseguir investigaciones más rápidamente y con éxito. Microsoft conduce un análisis mundial del Spam enviado a las cuentas del E-mail que establece y supervisa para este propósito.
“Nuestro análisis del Spam produce centenares de plomos cada año,” dice a Le Toquin. “Porque generamos ya esta información, es fácil que la proporcionemos a las autoridades de la aplicación de ley que pueden hacer algo sobre ella. La mayoría de los países están en ninguna posición para identificar los spammers dentro de sus fronteras. Podemos ayudar hacemos eso y compartimos la información con ellos así que pueden tomar la acción. Ése es un ejemplo de la información compartiendo que haremos con Nigeria. El “

edificio en relaciones informales
el memorándum de la comprensión es el primer acuerdo formal de su tipo entre Microsoft y un gobierno nacional, pero construye en las relaciones informales que Microsoft ha construido con las agencias internacionales y los gobiernos nacionales por todo el mundo. La compañía coopera con Interpol así como con países en Europa, el Oriente Medio, Asia y Norteamérica.

Y los esfuerzos de Microsoft de luchar el cybercrime van más allá de los crímenes financieros que Nigeria está tratando. Por ejemplo, la compañía ha iniciado un sistema que seguía de la explotación del niño para ayudar a las agencias de la aplicación de ley a luchar pornografía del niño del Internet.

En todos, Microsoft tiene un equipo de 65 que trabajan para promover seguridad del Internet por todo el mundo. Además de sus relaciones informales con gobiernos y de las agencias, la compañía proporciona la ayuda estructurada al sector público con ambos su programa de la seguridad de gobierno, comenzado en 2003, y su programa de la cooperación de la seguridad, comenzado en febrero de este año. Estos gobiernos de la ayuda de los programas tratan sus preocupaciones únicas de la seguridad alrededor del uso de la tecnología. El programa de la seguridad de gobierno provee de gobiernos nacionales los recursos necesarios para conducir una revisión comprensiva de la seguridad de los productos de Microsoft, mientras que el programa de la cooperación de la seguridad ayuda a gobiernos para responder a los ataques de la computadora, atenuar los efectos de esos ataques, y proporcionar exceda y educación a los ciudadanos.

El trabajo de Microsoft con gobiernos y agencias, alternadamente, es parte de su iniciativa que computa digna de confianza más amplia, que intenta traer seguro, privado y el computar confiable experimenta a cada uno. Otros esfuerzos que computan dignos de confianza incluyen la innovación de la tecnología, cooperación con industria, academia y los gobiernos, y pleito contra spammers sabidos y otros.

Un desarrollo verdaderamente importante
el acuerdo entre Microsoft y Nigeria es la culminación de varios meses de la cooperación informal entre los dos. Sobre el verano, por ejemplo, Microsoft proporcionó la información que los funcionarios nigerianos identificaban dos Internet Service Provider asociados a cantidades grandes de Spam allí. El EFCC lanzó investigaciones contra las compañías e hizo detenciones. Los procesamientos son pendientes ahora.

“Somos confidentes que este acuerdo con Microsoft es un desarrollo verdaderamente importante para nosotros,” decimos Ribadu. “Está viniendo en un rato crítico. Esperamos que nos ayude a crear un ambiente legal seguro, a hacer cumplir los leyes que ayudarán a atraer la inversión extranjera, y a estimular el desarrollo económico. “

“Pero más allá del impacto en nuestra economía nacional está el impacto que este acuerdo tendrá en las vidas de nuestros ciudadanos,” él agrega. “Mejorará la calidad de las vidas de la gente reduciendo el crimen alrededor de ellas, permitiéndoles encontrar trabajos mejores, y levantando la integridad de Nigeria en la comunidad del mundo. Eso es lo que está haciendo Microsoft para nosotros. “

Gli Spammers si guardano da: Microsoft e squadra della Nigeria fino alla lotta Cybercrime
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC e Neil Holloway, presidente di Microsoft Europa Medio Oriente e dell'Africa.

La Nigeria dice un memorandum d'intesa unico con Microsoft lo aiuterà per identificare e proseguire i criminali del cyber, generare un ambiente legale sicuro e ristabilire le centinaia di milioni di dollari nella persona persa dell'ultimo del investmentThe desiderate vedere che interferita in uno scam finanziario è una vedova. Amaka nigeriano Anajemba, che era stato widowed all'età giovane di 37, è stato interferito nel più grande scam finanziario del relativo scrive dentro la storia a macchina del suo paese, una in cui i perpetrators hanno rubato un totale di $242 milioni. Ma prima che lavoriate troppa compassione per Anajemba, dovreste sapere che non era una vittima dello scam - era uno dei relativi perpetrators.

In 2002, il governo nigeriano ha stabilito la Commissione economica e finanziaria di crimini (EFCC) per combattere il problema crescente di cybercrime in quel paese. Il processo riuscito recente di Anajemba è uno di 50 casi di EFCC, recentemente completato o attualmente in corso, coinvolgendo vicino a 100 difensori. Le centinaia di più stanno studiande. E lo sforzo sta avendo un effetto. Il tasso dello Spam dalla Nigeria che cerca di swindle la gente è stato diviso in due, secondo il governo.

Malgrado il relativo successo, il governo nigeriano ha desiderato fare più e lo ha conosciuto aiuto stato necessario. Cominciando oggi, la Nigeria sta ottenendo quell'aiuto in un senso formalizzato con la sign di un accordo con Microsoft, sotto cui i due collaboreranno sulle informazioni che si ripartiscono, addestrando e la costruzione di capienza combattere il crimine del Internet che proviene dal paese. Il loro memorandum d'intesa è il primo del relativo tipo per entrambi i partiti e si crede per essere il primo del relativo scrive dentro l'Africa, se non il mondo a macchina.
Costando a centinaia di milioni di dollari

“i $100 milioni abbiamo confiscato dagli spammers ed altri difensori è i minimi che il cybercrime ha costato il nostro paese,„ dice Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, presidente esecutivo del EFCC. “La nostra economia ha perso le centinaia di milioni di dollari nell'investimento straniero perché la nostra credibilità e la fiducia della Comunità internazionale sono state influenzate. I Nigerians non possono neppure utilizzare gli strumenti finanziari fondamentali quanto gli ordini di posta; se viene dalla Nigeria, è sospetto. “

Così quando Microsoft, che ha un ufficio in Nigeria, si è avvicinato al EFCC circa la collaborazione per combattere il cybercrime, il governo è stato interessato. Ma secondo Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, a Parigi-ha basato l'avvocato e l'esperto nell'organizzazione di EMEA del Microsoft, Nigeria di sicurezza del Internet ha avuto più da offrire che un problema con cybercrime.

“Siamo interessati nel cybercrime di combattimento globalmente, naturalmente, ma funzionare con la Nigeria ci ha tenuto le attrazioni particolari per,„ dice Le Toquin. “Il EFCC è in un'organizzazione esperta, con una protezione significativa dell'infrastruttura di applicazione di legge esso e la Nigeria ha la compiacenza politica agire contro i criminali del cyber. Tanto come stavano facendo da sè, stavano bene con l'idea di convincere l'aiuto da noi per fare ancor più. “

E la Nigeria, alternativamente, vantaggi distinti della sega nel partnering con Microsoft. “Microsoft è non solo un capo di tecnologia, è inoltre un capo nella lotta contro cybercrime,„ dice Ribadu. “Nessun'altra azienda sta facendo che cosa Microsoft sta facendo per combattere il cybercrime e nessun'altra azienda potrebbe fornire l'aiuto che otterremo sotto questo accordo. „

“Questo accordo sarà di notevole beneficio a noi,„ lui aggiunge. “Li metterà nel senso adeguato nel cybercrime di combattimento. Li aiuterà a migliorare la nostra comprensione delle tecnologie addette così come give noi nuove abilità investigative per andare dopo i criminali. Stanno cambiando costantemente le loro tattiche e dobbiamo continuare costantemente. Questo accordo li aiuterà a fare quello. E qualche cosa che riduca il cybercrime in Nigeria inoltre avvantaggerà gli utenti del calcolatore dappertutto, poiché il crimine che comincia qui non si arresta ai nostri bordi. “

Fornendo la perizia, le informazioni e più
l'accordo definisce una struttura per la cooperazione fra Microsoft e la Nigeria che daranno l'accesso di EFCC a perizia tecnica del Microsoft, le informazioni per applicazione riuscita, i seminari Microsoft-patrocinati e le sessioni di addestramento specificamente progettate per gli ufficiali ed i rappresentanti di applicazione di legge.

Per esempio, Microsoft pensa fornire la conoscenza su cosiddetta tecnologia “del botnet„ che permette ai hackers di controllare i dieci delle migliaia dei pc ed utilizzare quei pc per spargere lo Spam o per inundate i Web site con così tanto traffico che i luoghi si arrestano nel smentita-de-servizio attaca. Microsoft pensa insegnare ai ricercatori nigeriani in come estrarre le informazioni utili dai pc compromessi tramite gli attacchi del botnet, in come controllare le reti di calcolatore per rilevare tali attacchi e come identificare loro la gente.

Microsoft inoltre pensa fornire i cavi sullo Spam che proviene dalla Nigeria, permettendo alle autorità là di perseguire più rapidamente e con successo le indagini. Microsoft conduce un'analisi in tutto il mondo dello Spam trasmessa ai clienti di E-mail che stabilisce e controlla a questo fine.
“La nostra analisi dello Spam produce ogni anno le centinaia dei cavi,„ dice Le Toquin. “Poiché già generiamo queste informazioni, è facile affinchè noi le fornisca alle autorità di applicazione di legge che possono fargli qualcosa. La maggior parte dei paesi sono in nessuna posizione per identificare gli spammers all'interno dei loro bordi. Possiamo aiutare facciamo quello e ripartiamo le informazioni con loro in modo da possono agire. Quello è un esempio delle informazioni ripartendoci che faremo con la Nigeria. “

La costruzione sui rapporti informali
il memorandum d'intesa è il primo accordo ufficiale del relativo tipo fra Microsoft e un governo nazionale, ma costruisce sui rapporti informali che Microsoft ha sviluppato con le agenzie internazionali ed i governi nazionali universalmente. L'azienda coopera con Interpol così come con i paesi Europa, il Medio Oriente, in Asia ed in America del Nord.

E gli sforzi del Microsoft combattere il cybercrime vanno oltre i crimini finanziari che la Nigeria sta richiamando. Per esempio, l'azienda ha iniziato un sistema di inseguimento di sfruttamento del bambino per aiutare le agenzie di applicazione di legge a combattere la pornografia del bambino del Internet.

In tutto, Microsoft ha una squadra di 65 che lavorano per promuovere la sicurezza del Internet universalmente. Oltre che i relativi rapporti informali con i governi e le agenzie, l'azienda fornisce il supporto strutturato al settore pubblico con gli entrambi il relativo programma di titolo di stato, cominciato in 2003 ed il relativo programma di cooperazione di sicurezza, cominciato in febbraio di questo anno. Questi governi di aiuto di programmi richiamano le loro preoccupazioni uniche di sicurezza intorno all'uso di tecnologia. Il programma di titolo di stato fornisce i governi nazionali le risorse necessarie per condurre una revisione completa di sicurezza dei prodotti di Microsoft, mentre il programma di cooperazione di sicurezza aiuta i governi per rispondere agli attacchi del calcolatore, attenuare gli effetti di quegli attacchi e fornire superi e formazione ai cittadini.

Il lavoro del Microsoft con i governi e le agenzie, a sua volta, fa parte della relativa più vasta iniziativa di calcolo in maniera fidata, che cerca di portare sicuro, riservato e la computazione certa sperimenta a tutto. Altri sforzi di calcolo in maniera fidata includono l'innovazione di tecnologia, la cooperazione con industria, l'accademia e governi e controversia contro gli spammers conosciuti ed altri.

Uno sviluppo vero importante
l'accordo fra Microsoft e la Nigeria è il punto di parecchi mesi della cooperazione informale fra i due. Sopra l'estate, per esempio, Microsoft ha fornito le informazioni che i funzionari nigeriani hanno usato identificare due Internet Service Provider connessi con i grandi importi dello Spam là. Il EFCC ha lanciato le indagini contro le aziende ed ha fatto gli arresti. I processi ora sono in corso.

“Siamo sicuri che questo accordo con Microsoft è uno sviluppo vero importante per noi,„ diciamo Ribadu. “Sta venendo ad un tempo critico. Prevediamo che li aiuti a generare un ambiente legale sicuro, a fare rispettare le leggi che contribuiranno ad attrarre l'investimento straniero ed a stimolare lo sviluppo economico. “

“Ma oltre l'effetto sulla nostra economia nazionale è l'effetto che questo accordo avrà sulle vite dei nostri cittadini,„ lui aggiunge. “Migliorerà la qualità delle vite della gente riducendo il crimine intorno loro, permettendo loro di trovare i lavori migliori e sollevando l'integrità della Nigeria nella Comunità del mondo. Quello è che cosa Microsoft sta facendo per noi. “

Spammers passen auf: Microsoft und Nigeria Mannschaft bis zum Kampf Cybercrime
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC und Neil Holloway, Präsident Microsoft Europa des Mittlere Ostens und Afrika.

Nigeria sagt, eine einzigartige Vereinbarung mit Microsoft ihm hilft, um zu kennzeichnen und cyber Verbrecher verfolgen, ein sicheres zugelassenes Klima verursachen, und Hunderte Millionen Dollar in verlorener investmentThe Letztperson wieder herstellen, die Sie sehen möchten, in einem finanziellen scam eine Witwe daß verfangen ist. Nigerisches Amaka Anajemba, das gewesen war, widowed am jungen Alter von 37, wurde verfangen im größten finanziellen scam von seinem eintippen Geschichte ihres Landes, eine, in der die Täter eine Gesamtmenge von $242 Million stahlen. Aber, bevor Sie herauf zu viel Sympathie für Anajemba arbeiten, sollten Sie wissen, daß sie nicht ein Opfer des scam war - sie war einer seiner Täter.

2002 stellte die Nigerianerregierung die ökonomische und finanzielle Verbrechen-Kommission (EFCC) her um das wachsende Problem cybercrime in diesem Land zu kämpfen. Die neue erfolgreiche Verfolgung von Anajemba ist einer von 50 EFCC Fällen, vor kurzem durchgeführt oder z.Z. unterwegs und bezieht nah an 100 Beklagten mit ein. Hunderte mehr werden nachgeforscht. Und die Bemühung hat eine Auswirkung. Die Rate von Spam von Nigeria, das swindle Leute sucht, ist, entsprechend der Regierung halbiert worden.

Trotz seines Erfolges wollte die nigerische Regierung mehr tun und sie kannte sie benötigte Hilfe. Heute beginnend, erhält Nigeria diese Hilfe in einer formalisierten Weise mit dem Unterzeichnen einer Vereinbarung mit Microsoft, unter denen die zwei auf den Informationen zusammenarbeiten, die teilen und ausbilden, und Kapazität Gebäude, das Internet-Verbrechen zu kämpfen, das im Land entsteht. Ihre Vereinbarung ist die erste seiner Art für beide Parteien und wird geglaubt, um die erste von seinem zu sein eintippen Afrika, wenn nicht die Welt.
Hunderten Millionen Dollar „

die $100 Million kostend, haben wir von den Spammers konfisziert und andere Beklagte ist die wenigen, daß cybercrime unser Land gekostet hat,“ sagt Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, Executivvorsitzender des EFCC. „Unsere Wirtschaft hat Hunderte Millionen Dollar in der Auslandsanlage verloren, weil unsere Glaubwürdigkeit und das Vertrauen der internationalen Gemeinschaft beeinflußt worden sind. Nigerianer können nicht die Finanzierungsinstrumentarien sogar benutzen, die wie Bestellungen per Post so grundlegend sind; wenn es aus Nigeria kommt, ist es vermutlich defekt. „

So, als Microsoft, das ein Büro in Nigeria hat, dem EFCC über das Zusammenarbeiten sich näherte, zum von cybercrime zu kämpfen, war die Regierung interessiert. Aber entsprechend Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, ein Paris-gegründeter Rechtsanwalt und Internet-Sicherheit Experte in der Organisation EMEA Microsofts, Nigeria hatte mehr, zum als ein Problem mit cybercrime anzubieten.

„Wir sind an kämpfendem cybercrime global interessiert, selbstverständlich aber das Arbeiten mit Nigeria hielt bestimmte Anziehungen für uns,“ sagt Le Toquin. „Das EFCC ist eine erfahrene Organisation, mit einem bedeutenden Gesetzdurchführung-Infrastrukturschutzträger es, und Nigeria hat die politische Bereitwilligkeit, Maßnahmen gegen cyber Verbrecher zu ergreifen. Soviel wie taten sie auf ihren Selbst, sie fûhlten wohl mit der Idee des Erhaltens von Hilfe von uns, um sogar zu tun. „

Und Nigeria der Reihe nach eindeutige Vorteile der Säge beim Partnering mit Microsoft. „Microsoft ist nicht nur ein Technologieführer, ist es auch ein Führer im Kampf gegen cybercrime,“ sagt Ribadu. „Keine andere Firma tut, was Microsoft tut, um cybercrime zu kämpfen und keine andere Firma die Hilfe zur Verfügung stellen könnte, die wir unter dieser Vereinbarung erhalten. “

„Ist diese Vereinbarung vom großen Nutzen zu uns,“ er hinzufügt. „Es setzt uns in die korrekte Richtung in kämpfendes cybercrime ein. Es hilft uns, unser Verständnis der Technologien zu verbessern, die sowie Geben wir neue Untersuchungsfähigkeiten, um nach den Verbrechern zu gehen mit einbezogen werden. Sie ändern ständig ihre Taktiken und wir müssen ständig aufrechterhalten. Diese Vereinbarung hilft uns, das zu tun. Und alles, das cybercrime in Nigeria verringert, fördert auch Computerbenutzer überall, da das Verbrechen, das hier beginnt, nicht an unseren Rändern stoppt. „,

Sachkenntnis, Informationen zur Verfügung stellend und mehr,
definiert die Vereinbarung einen Rahmen für Mitarbeit zwischen Microsoft und Nigeria, die den EFCC Zugang Microsofts zur technischen Sachkenntnis, die Informationen für erfolgreiche Durchführung, die Microsoft-geförderten Seminare und die Training Lernabschnitte, die spezifisch für Gesetzdurchführungoffiziere und -repräsentanten konzipiert sind geben.

Z.B. erwartet Microsoft, Wissen auf sogenannter „botnet“ Technologie zur Verfügung zu stellen, die Häckern ermöglicht, 10 Tausenden PC zu steuern und jene PC zu benutzen, um Spam zu verbreiten oder Web site mit soviel Verkehr überzufluten, daß die Aufstellungsorte im Ablehnung-vonservice zusammenstoßen in Angriff nimmt. Microsoft erwartet, nigerische Forscher, in wie man nützliche Informationen von PC, die extrahiert durch botnet Angriffe verglichen werden, in wie man Computernetze, um überwacht solche Angriffe zu ermitteln und wie man anzuweisen die Leute hinter ihnen kennzeichnet.

Microsoft erwartet auch, Leitungen auf Spam zur Verfügung zu stellen, das von Nigeria entsteht und dort ermöglicht den Behörden, Untersuchungen schneller und erfolgreich auszuüben. Microsoft leitet eine weltweite Analyse von Spam geschickt zu den E-mail Konten, die sie zu diesem Zweck herstellt und überwacht.
„Unsere Analyse von Spam produziert Hunderte Leitungen jedes Jahr,“ sagt Le Toquin. „Weil wir bereits diese Informationen erzeugen, ist es einfach für uns, sie zu den Gesetzdurchführungbehörden zur Verfügung zu stellen, die etwas über sie tun können. Die meisten Länder sind in keiner Position, zum der Spammers innerhalb ihrer Ränder zu kennzeichnen. Wir können helfen tun das und teilen die Informationen mit ihnen, also können sie Maßnahmen ergreifen. Das ist ein Beispiel der Informationen, teilend, das wir mit Nigeria tun. „

Gebäude auf formlosen Verhältnissen
die Vereinbarung ist die erste formale Vereinbarung seiner Art zwischen Microsoft und einer Nationalregierung, aber es errichtet auf formlosen Verhältnissen, die Microsoft mit internationalen Agenturen und Nationalregierungen weltweit errichtet hat. Die Firma kooperiert mit Interpol sowie mit Ländern bei Europa, der Mittlere Osten, bei Asien und bei Nordamerika.

Und Bemühungen Microsofts, cybercrime zu kämpfen gehen über den finanziellen Verbrechen hinaus, die Nigeria adressiert. Z.B. hat die Firma ein Kindausnutzung-Spurhaltung System eingeleitet, um Gesetzdurchführungagenturen zu helfen, Internet-Kindpornographie zu kämpfen.

In allen hat Microsoft eine Mannschaft von 65 arbeitend, um Internet-Sicherheit weltweit zu fördern. Zusätzlich zusätzlich seinen formlosen Verhältnissen zu den Regierungen und zu den Agenturen stellt die Firma strukturierte Unterstützung zum allgemeinen Sektor durch beide sein Staatsanleihe-Programm zur Verfügung, angefangen 2003 und sein Sicherheit Mitarbeit-Programm, angefangen im Februar dieses Jahres. Diese Programmhilfe Regierungen adressieren ihre einzigartigen Sicherheit Interessen um den Gebrauch von Technologie. Das Staatsanleihe-Programm versieht Nationalregierungen mit den Betriebsmitteln, die notwendig sind, einen kompletten Sicherheit Bericht der Microsoft Produkte zu leiten, während das Sicherheit Mitarbeitprogramm Regierungen hilft, um auf Computerangriffe zu reagieren, die Effekte jener Angriffe abzuschwächen und zur Verfügung zu stellen und Ausbildung zu den Bürgern übertreffen Sie.

Arbeit Microsofts mit Regierungen und Agenturen ist der Reihe nach ein Teil seiner ausgedehnteren vertrauenswürdigen rechnenden Initiative, die sucht, sicheres zu holen, privat und das zuverlässige Rechnen erfährt zu jeder. Andere vertrauenswürdige rechnende Bemühungen schließen Technologieinnovation, Mitarbeit mit Industrie, Akademie und Regierungen und Rechtsstreit gegen bekannte Spammers und andere ein.

Eine wirklich wichtige Entwicklung
die Vereinbarung zwischen Microsoft und Nigeria ist der Höhepunkt einiger Monate der formlosen Mitarbeit zwischen den zwei. Über dem Sommer z.B. stellte Microsoft Informationen zur Verfügung, denen nigerische Beamte pflegten, zwei Internet Service Provider zu kennzeichnen, die mit großen Mengen Spam dort verbunden sind. Das EFCC stieß Untersuchungen gegen die Firmen aus und bildete Anhalten. Verfolgungen sind jetzt schwebend.

„Wir sind, daß diese Vereinbarung mit Microsoft eine wirklich wichtige Entwicklung für uns ist,“ sagen Ribadu überzeugt. „Es kommt zu einer kritischen Zeit. Wir erwarten, daß es uns, ein sicheres zugelassenes Klima zu verursachen, die Gesetze zu erzwingen hilft, die helfen, Auslandsanlage anzuziehen, und ökonomische Entwicklung anzutreiben. „

„Aber über der Auswirkung auf unsere Volkswirtschaft hinaus ist die Auswirkung, die diese Vereinbarung auf den Leben unserer Bürger hat,“ er hinzufügt. „Es verbessert die Qualität der Leben der Leute, indem es das Verbrechen um sie verringert ermöglicht, ihnen, bessere Jobs zu finden, und die Vollständigkeit von Nigeria in der Weltgemeinschaft aufwirft. Das ist, was Microsoft für uns tut. „

Os Spammers Beware: Microsoft e equipe de Nigéria até a luta Cybercrime
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC e Neil Holloway, presidente do leste médio de Microsoft Europa e África.

Nigéria diz um memorando de compreensão original com Microsoft lhe ajudará identificar e para prosecute criminosos do cyber, para criar um ambiente legal seguro, e para restaurar centenas dos milhões dos dólares em pessoa que perdida do último do investmentThe você quer ver que travada em um scam financeiro é uma viúva. Amaka Nigerian Anajemba, que tinha sido widowed na idade nova de 37, foi travado no scam financeiro o maior do seu datilografa dentro a história do seu país, uma em que os perpetrators roubaram um total de $242 milhões. Mas antes que você trabalhe acima de demasiado sympathy para Anajemba, você deve saber que não era uma vítima do scam - era um de seus perpetrators.

Em 2002, o governo do Nigerian estabeleceu o Commission econômico e financeiro dos crimes (EFCC) para battle o problema crescente do cybercrime nesse país. O prosecution bem sucedido recente de Anajemba é uma de 50 casos de EFCC, terminado recentemente ou atualmente underway, envolvendo perto de 100 réus. As centenas estão sendo investigadas mais. E o esforço está tendo um impacto. A taxa do Spam de Nigéria que procura swindle povos halved, de acordo com o governo.

Apesar de seu sucesso, o governo Nigerian quis fazer mais e soube-o ajuda necessitada. Começando hoje, Nigéria está começando essa ajuda em uma maneira formalised com assinar de um acordo com Microsoft, sob que os dois collaborate na informação que compartilha, treinando, e edifício da capacidade lutar o crime do Internet que origina no país. Seu memorando de compreensão é o primeiro de seu tipo para ambos os partidos e é acreditado para ser o primeiro do seu datilografa dentro África, se não o mundo.
Custando a centenas dos milhões dos dólares

“os $100 milhões nós confiscated dos spammers e outros réus são os menos que o cybercrime custou nosso país,” dizem Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, presidente executivo do EFCC. “Nossa economia perdeu centenas dos milhões dos dólares no investimento extrangeiro porque nosso credibility e a confiança da comunidade internacional foram afetados. Os Nigerians não podem mesmo usar os instrumentos financeiros tão básicos quanto ordens de correio; se vier de Nigéria, é suspeito. “

Assim quando Microsoft, que tem um escritório em Nigéria, aproximou o EFCC sobre collaborating para lutar o cybercrime, o governo foi interessado. Mas de acordo com Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, um advogado Paris-baseado e perito na organização de EMEA de Microsoft, Nigéria da segurança do Internet teve mais a oferecer do que um problema com cybercrime.

“Nós estamos interessados no cybercrime de combate global, naturalmente, mas trabalhar com Nigéria prendeu atrações particulares para nós,” diz Le Toquin. “O EFCC é uma organização hábil, com um revestimento protetor significativo do infrastructure do enforcement de lei ele, e Nigéria tem o voluntariedade político fazer exame da ação de encontro aos criminosos do cyber. Tanto quanto estavam fazendo no seus próprios, eram confortáveis com a idéia de começar a ajuda de nós fazer ainda mais. “

E Nigéria, por sua vez, vantagens distintas da serra em partnering com Microsoft. “Microsoft é não somente um líder da tecnologia, é também um líder na luta de encontro ao cybercrime,” diz Ribadu. “Nenhuma outra companhia está fazendo o que Microsoft está fazendo para lutar o cybercrime e nenhuma outra companhia poderia fornecer a ajuda que nós começaremos sob este acordo. ”

“Este acordo será do benefício grande a nós,” ele adiciona. “Por-nos-á no sentido apropriado no cybercrime de combate. Ajudar-nos-á melhorar nossa compreensão das tecnologias envolvidas as well as a elasticidade nós habilidades investigative novas para ir após os criminosos. Estão mudando constantemente suas táticas e nós temos que constantemente proseguir. Este acordo ajudar-nos-á fazer aquele. E qualquer coisa que reduz o cybercrime em Nigéria beneficiará também usuários do computador em toda parte, desde que o crime que começa aqui não para em nossas beiras. “

Fornecendo a perícia, informação e mais
o acordo define uma estrutura para a cooperação entre Microsoft e Nigéria que dão o acesso de EFCC à perícia técnica de Microsoft, a informação para o enforcement bem sucedido, seminários Microsoft-patrocinados, e sessões do treinamento projetadas especificamente para oficiais e representantes do enforcement de lei.

Por exemplo, Microsoft espera fornecer o conhecimento na tecnologia so-called do “botnet” que permite hackers de controlar dez dos milhares dos PCes e usar aqueles PCes espalhar o Spam ou inundate Web site com tanto tráfego que os locais deixam de funcionar no negação--serviço ataca. Microsoft espera instruir investigators Nigerian em como extrair a informação útil dos PCes comprometidos por ataques do botnet, em como monitorar redes de computador para detectar tais ataques, e como identificar os povos atrás deles.

Microsoft espera também fornecer ligações no Spam que origina de Nigéria, permitindo as autoridades lá de perseguir mais rapidamente e com sucesso investigações. Microsoft conduz uma análise worldwide do Spam emitida aos clientes do E-mail que estabelece e monitora para esta finalidade.
“Nossa análise do Spam produz centenas das ligações todos os anos,” diz Le Toquin. “Porque nós geramos já esta informação, é fácil para nós fornecê-la às autoridades do enforcement de lei que podem fazer algo sobre ela. A maioria de países estão em nenhuma posição para identificar os spammers dentro de suas beiras. Nós podemos ajudar fazemos isso e compartilhamos da informação com eles assim que podem fazer exame da ação. Aquele é um exemplo da informação compartilhando que nós faremos com Nigéria. O “

edifício em relacionamentos informais
o memorando de compreensão é o primeiro acordo formal de seu tipo entre Microsoft e um governo nacional, mas constrói nos relacionamentos informais que Microsoft construiu com agências internacionais e governos nacionais worldwide. A companhia coopera com o Interpol as well as com países em Europa, em o Oriente Médio, em Ásia e em America do Norte.

E os esforços de Microsoft lutar o cybercrime vão além dos crimes financeiros a que Nigéria se está dirigindo. Por exemplo, a companhia iniciou um sistema seguindo da exploração da criança para ajudar a agências do enforcement de lei lutar o pornography da criança do Internet.

Em tudo, Microsoft tem uma equipe de 65 que trabalham para promover worldwide a segurança do Internet. Além a seus relacionamentos informais com governos e a agências, a companhia fornece a sustentação estruturada ao setor público com os ambos seu programa da segurança de governo, começado em 2003, e o seu programa da cooperação da segurança, começado em fevereiro deste ano. Estes governos da ajuda dos programas dirigem-se a seus interesses originais da segurança em torno do uso da tecnologia. O programa da segurança de governo fornece governos nacionais com os recursos necessários conduzir uma revisão detalhada da segurança de produtos de Microsoft, quando o programa da cooperação da segurança ajudar a governos responder aos ataques do computador, para mitigate os efeitos daqueles ataques, e para fornecer exceda e instrução aos cidadãos.

O trabalho de Microsoft com governos e agências, por sua vez, é parte de sua iniciativa computando Trustworthy mais larga, que procura trazer seguro, confidencial e computar de confiança experimenta a todos. Outros esforços computando Trustworthy incluem a inovação da tecnologia, a cooperação com a indústria, o academia e os governos, e o litigation de encontro aos spammers sabidos e a outros.

Um desenvolvimento verdadeiramente importante
o acordo entre Microsoft e Nigéria é a culminação de diversos meses da cooperação informal entre os dois. Sobre o verão, por exemplo, Microsoft forneceu a informação que os oficiais Nigerian se usaram identificar dois Internet Service Provider associados com as quantidades grandes de Spam lá. O EFCC lançou investigações de encontro às companhias e fêz apreensões. Os Prosecutions são agora pendentes.

“Nós somos confiáveis que este acordo com Microsoft é um desenvolvimento verdadeiramente importante para nós,” dizemos Ribadu. “Está vindo em uma estadia crítica. Nós esperamos que nos ajudará criar um ambiente legal seguro, reforçar as leis que ajudarão atrair o investimento extrangeiro, e spur o desenvolvimento econômico. “

“Mas além do impacto em nossa economia nacional é o impacto que este acordo terá nas vidas de nossos cidadãos,” ele adiciona. “Melhorará a qualidade de vidas do pessoa reduzindo o crime em torno delas, permitindo as de encontrar trabalhos melhores, e levantando a integridade de Nigéria na comunidade do mundo. Aquele é o que Microsoft está fazendo para nós. “

Spammers akta sig: Microsoft och slagsmål Cybercrime för Nigeria lag upp till
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC och Neil Holloway, president av Microsoft Europa Mellanösten och Afrika.

Nigeria något att säga en unik anteckning av överenskommelse med Microsoft ska hjälp skapar det som identifierar och som åtalar cyberbrottslingar, en laglig miljö för kassaskåp, och hundramiljontals dollar för återställandet i borttappad investmentThejumboperson du önskar att se att fångad i en finansiell scam är en änka. Nigerianska Amaka Anajemba, som hade varit som är änka på den unga åldern av 37, fångades i den största finansiella scamen av dess typ i hennes lands historia, en som förövarna stal i en slutsumma av $242 miljoner. Men, för du fungerar upp för mycket sympati för Anajemba, bör du veta att hon inte var ett offer av scamen - hon var en av dess förövare.

I 2002, det nigerianska regerings- etablerat den ekonomiska och finansiella brottkommissionen (EFCC) som däri slåss det växande problemet av landet för cybercrime. Det nya lyckade åtalet av Anajemba är ett av 50 EFCC-fall, för en tid sedan avslutat eller för närvarande kommande och att gälla nästan 100 svaranden. Hundreds utforskas mer. Och försöket har en få effekt. Klassa av spam från Nigeria som söker att bedra folk, har halverats, enligt regeringen.

Illviljan dess framgång, det nigerianska regerings- önskade att göra mer, och den visste det behövd hjälp. Start i dag, Nigeria får den hjälp i som långt formaliseras med underteckna av en överenskommelse med Microsoft, som de ska tvåna samarbetar under på information som delar och att utbilda, och kapacitetsbyggnad att slåss internetbrott som påbörjar i landet. Deras anteckning av överenskommelse är första av dess typ för båda partier och tros för att vara första av dess typ i Afrika, om inte världen.
Kosta hundramiljontals dollar

”de $100 miljonerna har vi beslagtagit från spammers, och andra svaranden är least, som cybercrime har att kosta vårt land,” något att säga Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, den utöva ordföranden av EFCCEN. ”Har vår ekonomi borttappada hundramiljontals dollar i utländsk investering, därför att vår trovärdighet och förtroendet av internationellt samfund har påverkats. Nigerians kan inte ens använda finansiellt instrumenterar så grundläggande som postorder; om det kommer från Nigeria, är det misstänkt. ”

Så, då Microsoft, som har ett kontor i Nigeria, att närma sig EFCCEN om att samarbeta som slåss cybercrime, intresserades regeringen. Men enligt Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, enbaserad advokat och internetsäkerhet som var sakkunniga i Microsoft EMEA-organisationen, Nigeria hade mer som ska erbjudas än ett problem med cybercrime.

”Intresseras vi i stridighetcybercrime globalt, naturligtvis bara arbetet med Nigeria rymde särskilda dragningar för oss,” något att säga Le Toquin. ”Är EFCCEN en kompetent organisation, med en viktig rättsskipninginfrastrukturtäckning det, och Nigeria har den politiska villigheten som tar handling mot cyberbrottslingar. Så mycket, som de gjorde på deras eget, var de bekväma med idén av att få hjälp från oss för att göra även mer. ”

Och Nigeria, sågar i sin tur distinkt fördelar, i att bli partner med med Microsoft. ”Är Microsoft inte endast en teknologiledare, det är också en ledare i slagsmål mot cybercrime,” något att säga Ribadu. ”Gör inget annat företag vad Microsoft gör för att slåss cybercrime och inget annat företag kunde ge hjälpen som vi ska får under denna överenskommelse. ”

”Är denna ska överenskommelse av store gynnar till oss,” honom tillfogar. ”Ska det satte oss i den riktiga riktningen i stridighetcybercrime. Det ska hjälper oss att förbättra vår överenskommelse av teknologierna som var involverade as well as give oss ny undersöka expertis för att gå efter brottslingarna. De ändrar constantly deras taktik, och vi måste constantly uppehället upp. Denna ska överenskommelse hjälper oss att göra det. Och något, som förminskar cybercrime i Nigeria som också ska, gynnar datoranvändare överallt, sedan brott, som startar här, inte stoppar på vårt, gränsar. ”

Ge sakkunskap, information och mer
definierar överenskommelsen en ram för samarbete mellan Microsoft, och Nigeria, som ska give EFCCEN, tar fram till Microsoft tekniska sakkunskap, information för lyckad framtvingande, Microsoft-sponsrade seminarier och utbildningsperioder som planläggs specifikt för polisar och tekniker.

Till exempel förväntar Microsoft att ge kunskap på so-called ”botnet” teknologi som möjliggör hackers för att kontrollera tiotusentals PC, och att använda de PC till spridningspam eller att översvämma websites med trafikerar så mycket att platserna kraschar i förnekande-av-servar attacker. Microsoft förväntar att instruera nigerianska utredare, i hur till användbar information om extraktet från PC som kompromissas av botnetattacker, hur man övervakar datornät för att avkänna sådan attacker och hur man identifierar folket bak dem.

Microsoft förväntar också att ge blytak på spam som påbörjar från Nigeria och att möjliggöra myndigheterna där för att förfölja utredningar snabbare och lyckat. Microsoft förar en världsomspännande analys av spam som överförs till e-postkonton som den upprättar och övervakar för detta ämnar.
”Producerar vår analys av spam hundratals blytak varje år,” något att säga Le Toquin. ”Därför att vi frambringar redan denna information, är det lätt att vi ger den till rättsskipningmyndigheterna som kan göra något om den. Mest länder är i inget placerar för att identifiera spammersna inom deras gränsar. Vi kan hjälpa gör det och delar informationen med dem, så de kan ta handling. Det är ett exempel av informationen, dela som vi ska gör med Nigeria. ”

Är byggnad på informella
förhållanden anteckningen av överenskommelse den första formella överenskommelsen av dess typ mellan Microsoft och en medborgareregering, men den bygger på informella förhållanden som Microsoft har byggt med landskampbyråer och medborgareregeringar över hela världen. Företaget co-operates med Interpol as well as med länder i Europa, Mellanösten, Asien och Nordamerika.

Och Microsoft försök att slåss cybercrime går det okända de finansiella brotten som Nigeria tilltalar. Till exempel har företaget initierat ett system för barnexploateringspårning som hjälper rättsskipande myndighet att slåss internetbarnpornografi.

Sammanlagt har Microsoft ett lag av arbete 65 som över hela världen främjar internetsäkerhet. Förutom dess informella förhållanden med regeringar och byråer ger företaget strukturerad service till den offentliga sektoren till och med båda dess regerings- säkerhetsprogram som börjas i 2003 och dess säkerhetssamarbetsprogram som börjas i Februari av detta år. Dessa programhjälpregeringar tilltalar deras unika säkerhetsbekymmer runt om bruket av teknologi. Det regerings- säkerhetsprogramet ger medborgareregeringar med resurserna som är nödvändiga att föra en omfattande säkerhet, granskar av Microsoft produkter, programmerar stunder säkerhetssamarbetet hjälpregeringar för att reagera till datorattacker, verkställer ger att mildra av de attacker och överstiger och utbildning till medborgare.

Microsoft arbete med regeringar och byråer, är i sin tur delen av dess mer breda trovärdiga beräknande insats, som sökanden att komma med säker, privat och pålitlig beräkning erfar till alla. Andra trovärdiga beräknande försök inkluderar teknologiinnovation, samarbete med bransch, den akademiska världen och regeringar och prosessen mot bekant spammers och andra.

En riktigt viktig utveckling
överenskommelsen mellan Microsoft och Nigeria är höjdpunkten av flera månader av informellt samarbete mellan tvåna. Över sommaren till exempel, g Microsoft information att van vid nigerianska representanter identifierar två tjänste- familjeförsörjare för internet som är tillhörande med stora belopp av spam där. EFCCEN lanserade utredningar mot företagen och gjorde gripanden. Åtal är nu oavgjorda.

”Är vi säkra, att denna överenskommelse med Microsoft är en riktigt viktig utveckling för oss,” något att säga Ribadu. ”Är det kommande på en kritisk tid. Vi förväntar att det ska hjälper oss att skapa en laglig miljö för kassaskåp, för att upprätthålla lagarna som ska hjälp tilldrar utländsk investering, och att sporra ekonomisk utveckling. ”

”Men det okända som få effekt på vår medborgareekonomi är få effekt, som denna ska överenskommelse har på liven av våra medborgare,” honom, tillfogar. ”Ska det förbättrar det kvalitets- av folkets liv vid förminskande brott runt om dem och att möjliggöra dem för att finna bättre jobb och lyfta fullständigheten av Nigeria i världsgemenskapen. Det är vad Microsoft gör för oss. ”,

Spammers Beware: Команда Microsoft и Нигерии до драки Cybercrime
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, EC, EFCC и Нейл Holloway, президент Востока Microsoft Europe Ближнего и Африка.

Нигерия говорит уникально договор о взаимопонимании с Microsoft поможет ему для того чтобы определить и prosecute преступники cyber, создать безопасная правовая среда, и восстановить сотниы миллионов долларов в lost персоне последнего investmentThe, котор вы хотите увидеть уловлен в финансовохозяйственном scam widow. Нигерийское Amaka Anajemba, которое было widowed на молодом времени 37, было уловлено в самом большом финансовохозяйственном scam своего печатает внутри историю на машинке ее страны, одно в котором perpetrators украли итог $242 миллиона. Но прежде чем вы работаете вверх по too much сочувствия для Anajemba, вы должны знать что она не была жертвой scam - она была одним из своих perpetrators.

В 2002, нигерийское правительство установило хозяйственную и финансовохозяйственную комиссию злодеяний (EFCC) для того чтобы сразить проблему cybercrime в той стране. Недавний успешно prosecution Anajemba одним из 50 случаев EFCC, недавн после того как я завершит или в настоящее время underway, включающ close to 100 подсудимых. Сотниы больше расследуются. И усилие имеет удар. Тариф spam от Нигерии изыскивая смошенничать людей был halved, согласно правительству.

Несмотря на свой успех, нигерийское правительство хотело сделать больше и оно знало его необходимо помощь. Начинающ сегодня, Нигерия получает ту помощь в оформленной дороге с подписанием согласования с Microsoft, под которым 2 сотрудничают на информации, тренирующ, и зданием емкости воевать злодеяние интернета возникая в стране. Их договор о взаимопонимании первый из своего типа для обеих партий и поверены, что будет первым из своего печатает внутри Африку, if not мир на машинке.
Стоящ сотниам миллионов долларов

«$100 миллионов мы конфисковали от spammers и другие подсудимые самым меньшим что cybercrime стоило нашу страну,» говорят Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, executive руководителя EFCC. «Наша экономия теряла сотниы миллионов долларов в зарубежных инвестициях потому что были повлияны на наше правдоподобие и доверие сообществ. Nigerians не может даже использовать финансовые дочументы как основные как почтовые заказы; если оно приходит от Нигерии, то оно подозреваемо. «

Так когда Microsoft, который имеет офис в Нигерии, причалил EFCC о сотрудничать для того чтобы воевать cybercrime, правительство было заинтересовано. Но согласно Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, Paris-основанному юристу и специалисту в организации EMEA Microsoft, Нигерии безопасности интернета имел больше, котор нужно предложить чем проблема с cybercrime.

«Мы заинтересованн в воюя cybercrime гловально, of course, но работа с Нигерией держала определенные привлекательности для нас,» говорит Le Toquin. «EFCC будет skilled организацией, с значительно затыловкой инфраструктуры обеспечения соблюдения законов оно, и Нигерия имеет политическую готовность принять действие против преступников cyber. Как много по мере того как они делали на их, они были удобны с идеей получать, что помощь от нас сделали even more. «

И Нигерия, в свою очередь, преимущества пилы определенные в partnering с Microsoft. «Microsoft будет not only руководителем технологии, это будет также руководителем в драке против cybercrime,» говорит Ribadu. «Никакая другая компания не делает Microsoft делает для того чтобы воевать cybercrime и никакая другая компания не смогла предусмотреть помощь, котор мы получим под этим согласованием. »

«Это согласование будет большого преимущества к нам,» он добавляет. «Оно положит нас в правильное направление в воюя cybercrime. Оно поможет нам улучшить наше вникание технологий, котор включили также, как податливость мы новые трассологические искусства для того чтобы пойти после преступников. Они постоянн изменяют их тактик и мы должны постоянн keep up. Это согласование поможет нам сделать то. И что-нибыдь уменьшает cybercrime в Нигерии также поможет потребителям компьютера везде, в виду того что злодеяние которое начинает здесь не останавливает на наших границах. «

Обеспечивающ экспертизу, информацию и больше
согласование определяет рамки для сотрудничества между Microsoft и Нигерией который передадут доступ EFCC к экспертизе Microsoft технически, информация для успешно принуждения, Microsoft-спонсированные семинары, и встречи специфически конструированные для офицеров и представителей обеспечения соблюдения законов.

Например, Microsoft рассчитывает обеспечить знание на so-called технологии «botnet» которая позволяет hackers контролировать 10 тысяч PCs и использовать те PCs для того чтобы распространить spam или к websites inundate с so much движением что места разбивают в запирательств--обслуживании атакует. Microsoft рассчитывает проинструктировать нигерийские исследователей в как извлечь полезную информацию от PCs скомпрометированных нападениями botnet, как контролировать компьютерные сети для того чтобы обнаружить такие нападения, и как определить людей за ими.

Microsoft также рассчитывает предусмотреть руководства на spam возникая от Нигерии, позволяющ авторитеты там последовать исследования более быстро и успешно. Microsoft дирижирует всемирный анализ spam посланный к учету и-мэйла он устанавливает и контролирует для этой цели.
«Наш анализ spam производит сотниы руководств each year,» говорит Le Toquin. «Потому что мы уже производим эту информацию, легко для нас снабдить ее авторитеты обеспечения соблюдения законов которые могут сделать что-то о ей. Большинств страны находятся в никаком положении для того чтобы определить spammers внутри их граници. Мы можем помочь делаем то и делим информацию с ими поэтому они могут принять действие. То будет пример информации, котор мы сделаем с Нигерией. «

Здание на неофициальных отношениях
договор о взаимопонимании будет первым формальный договор своего типа между Microsoft и национальным правительством, но оно строит на неофициальных отношениях которые Microsoft строил с международными организациями и национальными правительствами всемирно. Компания co-operates с Interpol также, как с страны в Europe, The Middle East, Азии и Северной Америке.

И усилия Microsoft воевать cybercrime идут за финансовохозяйственными злодеяниями Нигерия адресует. Например, компания включала систему слежения эксплуатирования ребенка для того чтобы помочь агенствам обеспечения соблюдения законов воевать порнографию ребенка интернета.

В всех, Microsoft имеет команду 65 работая для того чтобы повысить обеспеченность интернета всемирно. В дополнение к своим неофициальным отношениям с правительствами и агенствам, компания снабубежит составленную поддержку общественный сечтор через оба своя программа правительственной бумаги, начатая в 2003, и свою программу сотрудничества обеспеченностью, начатую в феврале этого года. Эти правительства помощи программ адресуют их уникально заботы обеспеченностью вокруг пользы технологии. Программа правительственной бумаги обеспечивает национальные правительства с ресурсами обязательно для того чтобы дирижировать просмотрение всеобъемлющей безопасности продуктов Microsoft, пока программа сотрудничества обеспеченностью помогает правительствам для того чтобы ответить к нападениям компьютера, mitigate влияния тех нападений, и обеспечить outreach и образование к гражданам.

Работой Microsoft с правительствами и агенствами, в свою очередь, будет часть своей более обширной благонадежной вычисляя инициативы, которая изыскивает принести безопасное, приватно и надежный вычислять испытывает к каждому. Другие благонадежные вычисляя усилия вклюают рационализаторство технологии, сотрудничество с индустрией, academia и правительства, и судебный процечч против известных spammers и других.

Поистине важным развитием
согласование между Microsoft и Нигерией будет кульминация нескольких месяцев неофициального сотрудничества между 2. Над летом, например, Microsoft обеспечил информацию которой нигерийские должностные лица использовали определить 2 Providers обслуживания интернета связанного с большим количеством spam там. EFCC запустило исследования против компаний и сделало арестования. Prosecutions теперь ожидающи решения.

«Мы уверенно что этим согласованием с Microsoft будет поистине важное развитие для нас,» говорим Ribadu. «Оно приходит на предельное временя. Мы предпологаем оно поможет нам создать безопасную правовую среду, принудить законы которые помогут привлечь зарубежные инвестиции, и пришпорить экономическое развития. «

«Но за ударом на нашем национальной экономике удар это согласование будет иметь на жизнях наших граждан,» он добавляет. «Оно улучшит качество жизней людей путем уменьшение злодеяния вокруг их, позволять они найти более лучшие работы, и поднимать герметичность Нигерии в мирового сообщество. То Microsoft делает для нас. «

Spammers Beware: Microsoft en Nigeria werken samen om Cybercrime te bestrijden
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
Nuhu Ribadu, de EG, EFCC en Neil Holloway, Voorzitter van Microsoft Europa het Midden-Oosten en Afrika.

Nigeria zegt een uniek memorandum van overeenstemming met Microsoft het zal helpen om cyber misdadigers te identificeren en te vervolgen, een veilige juridische voorwaarde tot stand te brengen, en honderden miljoenen dollars in verloren investmentThe laatste persoon te herstellen u wilt zien gevangen in een financiële scam een weduwe is. Nigeriaanse Amaka Anajemba, die op de jonge leeftijd van 37 widowed was geweest, werd gevangen in grootste financiële scam van zijn type in de geschiedenis van haar land, waarin de daders een totaal van $242 miljoen stalen. Maar alvorens u teveel sympathie voor Anajemba uitwerkt, zou u moeten weten dat zij geen slachtoffer van scam was - zij was één van zijn daders.

In 2002, richtte de Nigeriaanse overheid de Economische en Financiële Commissie van Misdaden op (EFCC) om het groeiende probleem van cybercrime in dat land te vechten. De recente succesvolle vervolging van Anajemba is één van 50 voltooide gevallen EFCC, onlangs of momenteel aan de gang, implicerend bijna 100 gedaagden. Honderden worden meer onderzocht. En de inspanning heeft een invloed. Het tarief van spam van Nigeria dat aan swindle mensen zoekt is gehalveerd, volgens de overheid.

Ondanks zijn succes, wilde de Nigeriaanse overheid meer doen en het wist het hulp vergde. Vandaag beginnend, krijgt Nigeria dat hulp op een geformaliseerde manier met het ondertekenen van een overeenkomst met Microsoft, waaronder twee op informatie samenwerken zullen die, en het capaciteitsbouw Internet misdaad uit het land deelt opleidt te bestrijden. Hun memorandum van overeenstemming is eerste van zijn type voor beide partijen en om verondersteld te zijn eerste van zijn type in Afrika, als niet de wereld.
Honderden van de kostprijsberekening Miljoenen

$100 miljoen van Dollars „hebben wij van spammers in beslag genomen en andere gedaagden is het minst wie cybercrime ons land heeft gekost,“ zegt Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, uitvoerende voorzitter van EFCC. „Onze economie heeft honderden miljoenen dollars in buitenlandse investering verloren omdat onze geloofwaardigheid en vertrouwen van de internationale gemeenschap zijn beïnvloed. Nigerianen kunnen geen financiële instrumenten zo zelfs gebruiken basis zoals postorders; als het uit Nigeria komt, is het verdacht. „

Zo toen Microsoft, wat een bureau in Nigeria heeft, EFCC over het samenwerken te vechten cybercrime naderde, was de overheid geinteresseerd. Maar volgens Jean-Christophe Le Toquin, een procureur en Internet een veiligheidsdeskundige In Parijs gevestigd in EMEA van Microsoft organisatie, Nigeria aan te bieden meer hadden dan een probleem met cybercrime.

„Wij zijn geinteresseerd in globaal het vechten cybercrime, natuurlijk, maar het werken met Nigeria hield bijzondere aantrekkelijkheden voor ons,“ zegt Le Toquin. „EFCC is een bekwame organisatie, met een significante infrastructuur die van de wetshandhaving het steunt, en Nigeria heeft de politieke bereidheid om actie tegen cybermisdadigers te voeren. Zo veel aangezien zij op hun deden, waren zij comfortabel met het idee van het ertoe brengen van hulp van ons om zelfs nog meer te doen. „

En Nigeria, beurtelings, zag verschillende voordelen in partnering met Microsoft. „Microsoft is niet alleen een technologieleider, is het ook een leider in de bestrijding van cybercrime,“ zegt Ribadu. „Geen ander bedrijf doet wat Microsoft doet vechten cybercrime en geen ander bedrijf de hulp kon verstrekken die wij in het kader van deze overeenkomst zal krijgen. “

„Deze overeenkomst zal van groot voordeel aan ons zijn,“ hij voegt toe. „Het zal ons in de juiste richting in het vechten cybercrime zetten. Het zal ons helpen om ons begrip van de technologieën te verbeteren in kwestie evenals ons nieuwe onderzoeksvaardigheden te geven om na de misdadigers te gaan. Zij veranderen constant hun tactiek en wij moeten constant omhoog houden. Deze overeenkomst zal ons helpen om dat te doen. En om het even wat die cybercrime in Nigeria vermindert zal ook computer aan gebruikers overal ten goede komen, aangezien de misdaad die hier begint niet bij onze grenzen ophoudt. „

Verstrekkend Deskundigheid, bepaalt de Informatie en
meer de overeenkomst een kader voor samenwerking tussen Microsoft en Nigeria dat de toegang EFCC tot de technische deskundigheid van Microsoft, informatie voor succesvolle handhaving, microsoft-Gesponsorde seminaries, en opleidingssessies geven zullen die specifiek voor de ambtenaren en de vertegenwoordigers van de wetshandhaving worden ontworpen.

Bijvoorbeeld, denkt Microsoft om kennis op zogenaamde „botnet“ technologie te verstrekken die hakkers toelaat om tientallen duizenden PCs te controleren en die PCs te gebruiken uit te spreiden of spam websites met zo veel verkeer te overstromen dat de plaatsen in de ontkenning-van-dienst aanvallen verpletteren. Microsoft denkt om Nigeriaanse onderzoekers in te instrueren hoe te om nuttige informatie uit PCs te halen die door botnetaanvallen wordt gecompromitteerd, hoe te computernetwerken te controleren om dergelijke aanvallen te ontdekken, en hoe te om de mensen achter hen te identificeren.

Microsoft denkt ook om lood op spam uit Nigeria te verstrekken, daar toelatend de autoriteiten om onderzoeken sneller en met succes na te streven. Microsoft leidt een analyse wereldwijd van spam die naar e-mailrekeningen wordt verzonden die het met deze bedoeling vestigt en controleert.
„Onze analyse van spam veroorzaakt honderden lood elk jaar,“ zegt Le Toquin. „Omdat wij reeds deze informatie produceren, is het gemakkelijk voor ons om het aan de autoriteiten van de wetshandhaving te verstrekken die iets over het kunnen doen. De meeste landen zijn in geen positie om spammers binnen hun grenzen te identificeren. Wij kunnen helpen dat doen en de informatie met hen delen zodat kunnen zij actie voeren. Dat is een voorbeeld van de informatie delend wij zal doen met Nigeria. „

Voortbouwend op Informele Verhoudingen
is het memorandum van overeenstemming de eerste formele overeenkomst van zijn type tussen Microsoft en een nationale overheid, maar het bouwt op informele verhoudingen voort die Microsoft met internationale agentschappen en nationale overheden wereldwijd heeft gebouwd. Het bedrijf werkt met Interpol evenals met landen in Europa, het Midden-Oosten, Azië en Noord-Amerika samen.

En de inspanningen van Microsoft te vechten cybercrime gaan verder dan de financiële misdaden die Nigeria richt. Bijvoorbeeld, heeft het bedrijf een volgend systeem van de kindbenutting in werking gesteld om Internet van de de agentschappenstrijd van de wetshandhaving te helpen kindpornografie.

Over het geheel genomen, Microsoft een team van 65 werkend heeft om Internet veiligheid wereldwijd te bevorderen. Naast zijn informele verhoudingen met overheden en agentschappen, verleent het bedrijf gestructureerde steun aan de openbare sector door zowel zijn Programma van de Veiligheid van de Overheid, dat in 2003 is met, als zijn Programma van de Samenwerking van de Veiligheid, dat in Februari van dit jaar is begonnen begonnen met. Deze programma's helpen overheden richten hun unieke veiligheidszorgen rond het gebruik van technologie. Het programma van de Veiligheid van de Overheid voorziet nationale overheden van de middelen noodzakelijk om een uitvoerig veiligheidsoverzicht van de producten van Microsoft te leiden, terwijl het programma van de Samenwerking van de Veiligheid overheden om aan computeraanvallen helpt te antwoorden, de gevolgen van die aanvallen te verlichten, en te verstrekken overtreft en onderwijs aan burgers.

Het werk van Microsoft met overheden en agentschappen, beurtelings, maakt deel uit van zijn breder Betrouwbaar initiatief van de Gegevensverwerking, dat tot doel heeft om veilige, privé en betrouwbare gegevensverwerkingservaringen aan iedereen te brengen. Andere Betrouwbare inspanningen van de Gegevensverwerking omvatten technologieinnovatie, samenwerking met de industrie, academia en overheden, en proces tegen bekende spammers en anderen.

Een echt Belangrijke Ontwikkeling
de overeenkomst tussen Microsoft en Nigeria is het hoogtepunt van verscheidene maanden van informele samenwerking tussen twee. Tijdens de zomer, bijvoorbeeld, verstrekte Microsoft informatie die de Nigeriaanse ambtenaren gebruikten om twee Dienstverleners te identificeren Van Internet die met grote hoeveelheden spam daar worden geassoci�ërd. EFCC lanceerde onderzoeken tegen de bedrijven en maakte arrestaties. De vervolgingen zijn nu hangend.

„Wij zijn zeker dat deze overeenkomst met Microsoft een echt belangrijke ontwikkeling voor ons is,“ zeggen Ribadu. „Het komt in een kritieke tijd. Wij denken het ons zal helpen om een veilige juridische voorwaarde tot stand te brengen, de wetten af te dwingen die zullen helpen buitenlandse investering aantrekken, en economische ontwikkeling aan te sporen. „

„Maar voorbij het effect op onze nationale economie is de invloed die deze overeenkomst op het leven van onze burgers zal hebben,“ hij toevoegt. „Het zal de kwaliteit van het leven van mensen door het verminderen van de misdaad rond hen, hen toe te laten om betere banen te vinden, en de integriteit van Nigeria in de wereldgemeenschap op te heffen verbeteren. Dat is wat Microsoft voor ons doet. „

[سبمّر] يحذرون: مكروسوفت ونيجيريا فريق حتّى معركة [سبركريم]
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
[نوهو] [ريبدو], [إك], [إفكّ] و [نيل] [هولّووي], رئيس من مكروسوفت أوروبا [ميدّل ست] وإفريقيا.

نيجيريا يقول سيساعد [ممورندوم وف وندرستندينغ] فريدة مع مكروسوفت هو أن يعيّن وحاكمت [سبر] مجرمات, خلقت آمنة جائز بيئة, وأحيات مئات الملايين الدولارات في ضائعة [إينفستمنتّه] أخرى شخص أنت تريد أن يرى يمسك في [سكم] ماليّة أرملة. [ويدوود] [أمكا] نيجيريّة [أنجمبا], الذي كان قد كان في العمر شابّة من 37, كان مسكت في ال [سكم] كبيرة ماليّة من ه يطبع داخل بلده تاريخ, واحدة في أيّ المقترف سرقوا مجموعة من $242 مليون. غير أنّ قبل أن يعمل أنت فوق [توو موش] تعاطف ل [أنجمبا], أنت سوفت عرفت أنّ هو [ب] لم ضحية من ال [سكم] - هو كان واحدة من مقترفه.

في 2002, النيجيريّ أسّس حكومة الاقتصاديّة وماليّة جرائم عمولة ([إفكّ]) أن يعارك ال ينمو مشكلة ال [سبركريم] في أنّ بلد. المقاضاة أخيرة ناجحة [أنجمبا] واحدة من 50 [إفكّ] حالات, مؤخّرا يتمّ أو حاليّا جار, يتضمّن [كلوس تو] 100 مدّعى عليه. تحرّيت مئات أكثر يكون. ويتلقّى الجهد تأثير صدمة. شطرت المعدل ال [سبم] من نيجيريا يبحث أن يخدع الناس يتلقّى يكون, وفقا ل الحكومة.

على الرغم من نجاحه, أراد الحكومة نيجيريّة أن يتمّ أكثر وهو عرف هو يحتاج مساعدة. يبدأ اليوم, يحصل نيجيريا أنّ مساعدة في يشكّل طريق مع ال يقع من إتفاق مع مكروسوفت, تحت أيّ الاثنان سيتعاون على [إينفورمأيشن شرينغ], تدريب, وقدرة بناية أن يتنازع إنترنت جريمة يتكوّن في البلاد. [ممورندوم وف وندرستندينغ] هم الأولى من نوعه ل كلا أحزاب وصدقت أن يكون الأولى من ه يطبع داخل إفريقيا, [إيف نوت] العالم.
يكلّل مئات الملايين الدولارات

"ال $100 مليون قد صادر نحن من [سبمّر] وأخرى مدّعى عليه ال بعض أنّ [سبركريم] قد كلّل بلادنا," يقول [ملّم] [نوهو] [ريبدو], رئيس مجلس إدارة تنفيذيّة من ال [إفكّ]. "قد خسر اقتصادنا مئات الملايين الدولارات في [فورين ينفستمنت] لأنّ مصداقيتنا والثقة من الالمجتمع الدولي يتلقّى يكون أثرت. نيجيريّ يستطيع لا حتّى استعملت [فيننسل ينسترومنت] مثل أساسيّة بما أنّ [ميل وردر]; إن هو يأتي من نيجيريا, هو متّهمة. "

هكذا عندما قارب مكروسوفت, أيّ يتلقّى مكتب في نيجيريا, ال [إفكّ] حول يتعاون أن يتنازع [سبركريم], الحكومة كان هممت. تلقّى غير أنّ وفقا ل [جن-كريستوف] [ل] [توقوين], [بريس-بسد] وكيلة وإنترنت أمان خبيرة في مكروسوفت [إما] منظمة, نيجيريا أكثر أن يقدّم من مشكلة مع [سبركريم].

"نحن راغبة في يتنازع [سبركريم] على نحو شامل, [أف كورس], غير أنّ أمسك يعمل مع نيجيريا حالة جذب خاصّة ل نا," يقول [ل] [توقوين]. "ال [إفكّ] يمهر منظمة, مع هامّة [لو نفورسمنت] بنية أساسيّة ظهارة هو, ويتلقّى نيجيريا الاستعداد سياسيّة أن يأخذ عمل ضدّ [سبر] مجرمات. مثل كثير بما أنّ أتمّ هم كان على هم خاصّة, هم كانوا مريحة مع الفكرة من يحصل مساعدة من نا أن يتمّ [إفن مور]. "

ونيجيريا, بالتّالي, منشار ميزات بارزة في يتشارك مع مكروسوفت. يقول "مكروسوفت ليس فحسب تكنولوجيا زعيمة, هو أيضا زعيمة في المعركة ضدّ [سبركريم]," [ريبدو]. "ما من أخرى يتمّ شركة ماذا مكروسوفت يكون يتمّ أن يتنازع [سبركريم] وما من أخرى شركة استطاع زوّدت المساعدة نحن سنحصل تحت هذا إتفاق. "

"سيكون هذا إتفاق من فائدة عظيمة إلى نا," هو يضيف. "سيضعنا هو في الاتّجاه مناسبة في يتنازع [سبركريم]. هو سيساعدنا أن يحسن تفهمنا من التكنولوجيا يتضمّن [أس ولّ س] مرونة نا مهارات جديدة تحقيقيّة أن يذهب بعد المجرمات. هم باستمرار يغيّرون تكتيكاتهم ونحن يضطرّ باستمرار تماديت. سيساعدنا هذا إتفاق أن يتمّ أنّ. وسيستفيد أيّ شيء أنّ يقلّل [سبركريم] في نيجيريا أيضا حاسوب مستعملات في كلّ مكان, بما أنّ الجريمة أنّ يبدأ هنا لا يتوقّف في حافاتنا. "

يزوّد خبرة, معلومة وكثير
يعيّن الإتفاق هيكل لتعاون بين مكروسوفت ونيجيريا أنّ سيعطي ال [إفكّ] منفذة إلى مكروسوفت خبرة فنّيّة, معلومة لإنفاذ ناجحة, [ميكروسفت-سبونسرد] حلقة دراسيّة, وتدريب جلسات خصوصا يصمد ل [لو نفورسمنت] ضابطات وممثلات.

مثلا, يتوقّع مكروسوفت أن يزوّد معرفة على ما يسمّى "[بوتنت]" تكنولوجيا أنّ يمكّن مستقطعات أن يضبط [تن] الآلاف ال [بكس] وأن يستعمل أنّ [بكس] أن ينشر [سبم] أو أن يغمر موقعات مع كثيرا حركة مرور أنّ الموقعات يتحطّمون في [دنيل-وف-سرفيس] يهاجم. مكروسوفت يتوقّع أن يأمر محققات نيجيريّة في كيف أن يستخرج معلومة مفيدة من [بكس] يتورّط ب [بوتنت] هجوم, كيف أن يراقب [كمبوتر نتوورك] أن يكشف هذا هجوم, وكيف أن يعيّن الالناس خلف هم.

يتوقّع مكروسوفت أيضا أن يزوّد [لدس] على [سبم] يتكوّن من نيجيريا, يمكّن السلطات هناك أن يتتبّع تحقيقات أكثر سريعا وبنجاح. مكروسوفت يوصل تحليل عالميّ نطاق [سبم] يرسل إلى بريد إلكترونيّ حسابات أنّ هو يؤسّس ويراقب [ثيس بوربوس].
"ينتج تحليلنا ال [سبم] مئات ال [لدس] [إش ر]," يقول [ل] [توقوين]. "لأنّ نحن سابقا نلد هذا معلومة, هو يتيح ل نا أن يزوّد هو إلى ال [لو نفورسمنت] سلطات الذي يستطيع أتمّت شيء حول هو. كثير بلاد في ما من موقعة أن يعيّن ال [سبمّر] ضمن حافاتهم. نحن يستطيع ساعدت يتمّ أنّ ويشارك المعلومة مع هم لذلك هم يستطيع أخذت عمل. أنّ مثال من ال [إينفورمأيشن شرينغ] نحن سنتمّ مع نيجيريا. "

بناية على علاقات
رسميّة ال [ممورندوم وف وندرستندينغ] الإتفاق أولى رسميّة من نوعه بين مكروسوفت و[نأيشنل غفرنمنت], غير أنّ يبني هو على علاقات رسميّة أنّ مكروسوفت قد بنى مع وكالات دوليّة و [نأيشنل غفرنمنت] عالميّا. [ك-وبرتس] الشركة مع [إينتربول] [أس ولّ س] مع بلاد في أوروبا, [ث ميدّل ست], آسيا و [نورث مريك].

ومكروسوفت يذهب جهود أن يتنازع [سبركريم] إلى ما بعد الجرائم ماليّة أنّ نيجيريا يكون يخاطب. مثلا, قد بدأ الشركة طفلة إستثمار [ترك سستم] أن يساعد [لو نفورسمنت] وكالات تنازعت إنترنت طفلة إباحيّة.

في كلّ, يتلقّى مكروسوفت فريق من 65 يعمل أن يروّج إنترنت أمن عالميّا. [إين دّيأيشن تو] علاقاته رسميّة مع حكومات ووكالات, يزوّد الشركة يشيّد دعم إلى الالقطاع العامّ من خلال كلا ه [غفرنمنت سكريتي] برنامج, يبدأ في 2003, وه أمن تعاون برنامج, يبدأ في فبراير - شباط من هذا سنة. هذا برنامج مساعدة يخاطب حكوماتهم فريد أمن اهتمامات حول الإستعمال التكنولوجيا. ال [غفرنمنت سكريتي] يزوّد برنامج [نأيشنل غفرنمنت] مع الموردات ضروريّة أن يوصل شاملة أمن مراجعات من مكروسوفت منتوجات, بينما الأمن تعاون برنامج يساعد حكومات أن يستجيب إلى حاسوب هجوم, خفّفت التأثيرات من أنّ هجوم, وزوّدت جاوزت وتربية إلى مواطنات.

مكروسوفت عمل مع حكومات ووكالات, بالتّالي, جزء من ه واسعة جدير بالثّقة يحسب مبادرة, أيّ يبحث أن يحضر يؤمّن, خاصّة وموثوقة يختبر يحسب إلى كلّ شخص. أخرى يتضمّن جدير بالثّقة يحسب جهود تكنولوجيا إبتداع, تعاون مع صناعة, الحياة الأكاديميّة وحكومات, ونزاع ضدّ يعرف [سبمّر] وأخرى.

تطوير
مهمّة حقّا الإتفاق بين مكروسوفت ونيجيريا الاكتمال من عدّة شهور من تعاون رسميّة بين الاثنان. على الفصل صيف, مثلا, زوّد مكروسوفت معلومة أنّ مسؤولات نيجيريّة استعملوا أن يعيّن اثنان [إينترنت سرفيس بروفيدر] يصحب مع مبلغات كبيرة [سبم] هناك. أطلق ال [إفكّ] تحقيقات ضدّ الشركات وجعل إعتقالات. مقاضيات الآن معلّقة.

"نحن واثقة أنّ هذا إتفاق مع مكروسوفت تطوير مهمّة حقّا ل نا," يقول [ريبدو]. "يأتي هو في وقت حرجة. نحن نتوقّع سيساعدنا هو أن يخلق آمنة جائز بيئة, أن ينفذ القانون أنّ سيساعد جذبت [فورين ينفستمنت], وأن يهمز تطور اقتصادي. "

"غير أنّ إلى ما بعد التأثير صدمة على [نأيشنل كنومي] نا التأثير صدمة أنّ هذا إتفاق سيتلقّى على الحيوات من مواطناتنا," هو يضيف. "سيحسن هو النوعية من الناس حيوات ب يقلّل الجريمة حول هم, يمكّنهم أن يجد أشغال جيّدة, ويرفع النزاهة نيجيريا في العالم جماعة. أنّ ماذا مكروسوفت يكون يتمّ ل نا. "

ABUJA, Nigeria: Vice President Atiku Abubakar filed a law suit Friday seeking to overturn an electoral commission decision that bars him from running for president next month.

Abubakar was protesting his omission from a list of two dozen approved candidates for April 21 elections illegal released Thursday. He named the electoral commission and its chairman, Maurice Iwu, as co-defendants, court papers released by his lawyers showed.

Court officials confirmed receiving a filing. Hearings were expected to begin Monday at the federal court in the capital, Abuja.

The electoral commission gave no reason for excluding Abubakar, who is involved in a public feud with the president, but listed constitutional prohibitions on candidates indicted for crimes before a court or executive panel.

In a statement Friday, the president's office lauded the commission for working "to rid governance of bad eggs and corrupt elements for the good of our beloved country."

Last year Abubakar was accused of corruption by an administrative panel set up by President Olusegun Obasanjo.

Abubakar's camp has called the panel unconstitutional and denied the allegations, saying they stemmed from a public spat after Abubakar helped stop his boss from extending his tenure beyond the constitutional limit.

Abubakar's failure to support the president soured relations between the two men and eventually prompted Abubakar to quit the ruling party and go into opposition.

Lawyers say only the nation's highest court can overturn the electoral commission's decision, which cleared 24 other candidates on Thursday, including the other two clear leaders: governing party candidate Umaru Yar'Adua, a governor of northern Katsina state; and Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a former military leader.

If held successfully, the April polls would set up the first civilian-to-civilian transfer of power in Nigeria's history since independence from Britain in 1960. Previous electoral transitions have been interrupted by annulments or military coups.

The back-and-forth between the ruling party and Atiku's campaign has raised fears in Nigeria that a violent crisis could erupt, leading to an extension or cancellation of the polls. More than 10,000 people have died in strife since the end of military rule uncorked long-simmering resentments in a country with 250 ethnic groups.

With 140 million people, Nigeria is Africa's most-populous nation and its largest oil producer. Many in West Africa fear massive chaos in Nigeria could send refugees streaming across the region, undermining years of hard-won peace and increased stability in the region.

Obasanjo's 1999 election alongside Abubakar ended years of brutal military rule. Obasanjo, a one-time military leader who handed over to a civilian government himself in the 1970s, won re-election in 2003 polls that the opposition called rigged.

The Nigerian electoral commission has not said when it would have to start printing ballots to ensure they are distributed in time for 61 million registered voters in a country twice the size of California to have them for the ballot. Nigeria has many far-flung regions and villages unconnected by roads.

Le vice-président du Nigéria intente le procès au-dessus de l'exclusion à partir de l'élection d'avril
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Nigéria : Vice-président Atiku Abubakar a intenté un procès vendredi de loi cherchant à retourner une décision électorale de commission qui l'empêche de courir pour le président le mois prochain.

Abubakar protestait son omission d'une liste de deux candidats approuvés par douzaine pour des élections jeudi libéré illégal du 21 avril. Il a appelé la commission électorale et son Président, Maurice Iwu, comme Co-défendeurs, papiers de cour a libéré par ses avocats montrés.

Fonctionnaires de cour confirmés recevant un classement. On s'est attendu à ce que des auditions commencent lundi à la cour fédérale dans la capitale, Abuja.

La commission électorale n'a donné aucune raison d'exclure Abubakar, qui est impliqué dans une inimitié publique du président, mais les prohibitions constitutionnelles énumérées sur des candidats ont accusé pour des crimes avant un panneau de cour ou de directeur.

Dans un rapport vendredi, le bureau du président a glorifié la commission pour travailler « pour débarrasser le gouvernement des oeufs gâtés et pour corrompre des éléments pour le bien de notre pays aimé.  »

Abubakar a été accusé l'année dernière de la corruption par un panneau administratif établi par le Président Olusegun Obasanjo.

Le camp d'Abubakar a appelé le panneau inconstitutionnel et a nié les allégations, dire elles ont provenu d'une guêtre publique après qu'arrêt aidé par Abubakar son patron de prolonger sa tenure au delà de la limite constitutionnelle.

Le manque d'Abubakar de soutenir le président a acidifié des relations entre les deux hommes et l'Abubakar par la suite incité pour stopper la partie régnante et pour entrer dans l'opposition.

Les avocats disent que seulement la cour la plus élevée de la nation peut retourner la décision de la commission électorale, qui a dégagé 24 autres candidats jeudi, y compris les deux autres chefs clairs : candidat régissant Umaru Yar'Adua, un gouverneur de partie d'état nordique de Katsina ; et générateur. Muhammadu Buhari, un ancien chef militaire.

Si tenus avec succès, les scrutins d'avril établiraient le premier transfert de civil-à-civil de la puissance dans l'histoire du Nigéria depuis l'indépendance à partir de la Grande-Bretagne en 1960. Des transitions électorales précédentes ont été interrompues par des annulations ou des coups militaires.

Le de va-et-vient entre la partie régnante et la campagne d'Atiku a soulevé des craintes au Nigéria qu'une crise violente pourrait éclater, menant à une prolongation ou à une annulation des scrutins. Plus de 10.000 personnes sont mortes dans les différends depuis que la fin de la règle militaire uncorked long-fermentant des ressentiments dans un pays avec 250 groupes ethniques.

Avec 140 millions de personnes, le Nigéria est la nation plus-populeuse de l'Afrique et son plus grand producteur de pétrole. Beaucoup dans le chaos massif de crainte occidentale de l'Afrique au Nigéria ont pu envoyer des réfugiés coulant à travers la région, minant des années de paix dur-gagnée et de stabilité accrue dans la région.

L'élection 1999 d'Obasanjo à côté d'Abubakar a fini des années de règle militaire brutale. Obasanjo, un chef militaire jetable qui a remis à un gouvernement civil lui-même dans les années 70, réélection gagnée dans 2003 scrutins que l'opposition a appelés a calé.

La commission électorale nigérienne n'a pas déclaré quand elle devrait commencer à imprimer des votes pour les assurer sont distribuées pour 61 millions d'électeurs enregistrés dans un pays deux fois la taille de la Californie pour les avoir pour le vote. Le Nigéria a beaucoup de régions et villages vastes déconnectés par des routes.

El vice presidente de Nigeria archiva el juego sobre la exclusión de la elección de abril
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Nigeria: Vice presidente Atiku Abubakar archivó un juego viernes de la ley que intentaba volcar una decisión electoral de la comisión que lo barra del funcionamiento para el presidente el mes próximo.

Abubakar protestaba su omisión de una lista de dos candidatos aprobados docena a las elecciones jueves lanzado ilegal del 21 de abril. Él nombró a comisión electoral y su presidente, Maurice Iwu, como co-demandados, papeles de la corte lanzó por sus abogados demostrados.

Funcionarios de corte confirmados recibiendo una limadura. Se esperaba que las audiencias comenzaran lunes en la corte federal en el capital, Abuja.

La comisión electoral no dio ninguna razón de excluir Abubakar, que está implicado en una pelea pública con el presidente, pero las prohibiciones constitucionales enumeradas en candidatos procesaron para los crímenes antes de un panel de la corte o del ejecutivo.

En una declaración viernes, la oficina del presidente alabó a comisión para trabajar “para librar el gobierno de malos huevos y para corromper los elementos para el bueno de nuestro país querido. ”

Abubakar fue acusado el año pasado de la corrupción por un panel administrativo instalado por presidente Olusegun Obasanjo.

El campo de Abubakar ha llamado el panel inconstitucional y ha negado las alegaciones, decir provinieron una polaina pública después de que parada ayudada Abubakar su jefe de ampliar su arrendamiento más allá del límite constitucional.

La falta de Abubakar de apoyar al presidente agrió relaciones entre los dos hombres y el Abubakar eventual incitado para parar el partido predominante y para entrar la oposición.

Los abogados dicen que solamente la tribunal más superior de la nación puede volcar la decisión de la comisión electoral, que dio salida a a 24 otros candidatos el jueves, incluyendo los otros dos líderes claros: candidato Umaru Yar'Adua, un gobernador del partido que gobierna del estado norteño de Katsina; y generador. Muhammadu Buhari, líder militar anterior.

Si estuvieron llevadas a cabo con éxito, las encuestas de abril instalarían la primera transferencia del civil-a-civil de la energía en la historia de Nigeria desde independencia de Gran Bretaña en 1960. Las transiciones electorales anteriores han sido interrumpidas por anulaciones o golpes militares.

El hacia adelante y hacia atrás entre el partido predominante y la campaña de Atiku ha levantado miedos en Nigeria que una crisis violenta podría entrar en erupción, conduciendo a una extensión o a una cancelación de las encuestas. Más de 10.000 personas han muerto en la distensión desde que el final de la regla militar uncorked resentimientos largos-simmering en un país con 250 grupos étnicos.

Con 140 millones de personas de, Nigeria es nación más-populosa de África y su productor de aceite más grande. Muchos en caos masivo del miedo del oeste de África en Nigeria podían enviar a refugiados que fluían a través de la región, minando años de la paz duro-ganada y de la estabilidad creciente en la región.

La elección 1999 de Obasanjo junto a Abubakar terminó los años de la regla militar brutal. Obasanjo, líder militar de una sola vez que entregó a un gobierno civil mismo en los años 70, reelección ganada en 2003 encuestas que la oposición llamó aparejó.

La comisión electoral nigeriana no ha dicho cuándo tendría que comenzar a imprimir balotas para asegurarlos se distribuye para 61 millones de votantes registrados en un país dos veces el tamaño de California para tenerlos para la balota. Nigeria tiene muchas regiones y aldeas far-flung no relacionadas por los caminos.

Il vice presidente della Nigeria archivia il vestito sopra l'esclusione dall'elezione di aprile
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Nigeria: Il vice presidente Atiku Abubakar ha archiviato un vestito venerdì di legge che cerca di capovolgere una decisione elettorale della commissione che lo esclude dal funzionare per il presidente il mese prossimo.

Abubakar stava protestando la sua omissione da una lista di due candidati approvati dozzina per le elezioni giovedì liberato illegale del 21 aprile. Ha chiamato la commissione elettorale ed il relativo presidente, Maurice Iwu, come co-difensori, carte dalla corte si è liberato dai suoi avvocati indicati.

Funzionari di corte confermati ricevendo una limatura. Le udienze si sono pensate che comincino lunedì alla corte federale nel capitale, Abuja.

La commissione elettorale non ha dato motivo per escludere Abubakar, che è coinvolto in un feud pubblico con il presidente, ma le proibizioni costituzionali elencate sui candidati hanno incriminato per i crimini prima di un pannello dell'esecutivo o della corte.

In una dichiarazione venerdì, l'ufficio del presidente lauded la commissione per il funzionamento “per sbarazzare il controllo delle uova difettose e per corrompere gli elementi per il buon del nostro paese caro. „

L'anno scorso Abubakar è stato accusato della corruzione da un pannello amministrativo installato dal presidente Olusegun Obasanjo.

L'accampamento del Abubakar ha denominato il pannello inconstituzionale ed ha negato le allegazioni, ad esempio hanno provenuto da una ghetta pubblica dopo che arresto aiutato Abubakar la sua sporgenza dall'estensione del suo possesso oltre il limite costituzionale.

L'omissione del Abubakar di sostenere il presidente ha inacidito i rapporti fra i due uomini e il Abubakar finalmente richiamato per rinunciare il partito di regolamento e per entrare in opposizione.

Gli avvocati dicono che soltanto l'più alta corte della nazione può capovolgere la decisione della commissione elettorale, che ha annullato altri 24 candidati il giovedì, compreso gli altri due capi liberi: il candidato governante Umaru Yar'Adua del partito, un regolatore di Katsina nordico dichiara; e generatore. Muhammadu Buhari, un ex capo militare.

Se tenuto con successo, lo scrutinio di aprile installerebbe il primo trasferimento del civile--civile di alimentazione nella storia della Nigeria da indipendenza dalla Gran-Bretagna in 1960. Le transizioni elettorali precedenti sono state interrotte dai annulments o dai colpi militari.

L'avanti e indietro fra il partito di regolamento e la campagna del Atiku ha sollevato i timori in Nigeria che una crisi violenta potrebbe scoppiare, conducendo ad un'estensione o ad un annullamento dello scrutinio. Più di 10.000 genti sono morto nella disputa da quando la conclusione della regola militare uncorked i rancori lunghi-simmering in un paese con 250 gruppi etnici.

Con 140 milione di persone, la Nigeria è nazione più-popolata dell'Africa ed il relativo più grande produttore di petrolio. Molti nel caos voluminoso di timore ad ovest dell'Africa in Nigeria hanno potuto trasmettere i rifugiati che effluiscono attraverso la regione, insidiando gli anni di pace duro-vinta e di stabilità aumentata nella regione.

L'elezione 1999 del Obasanjo accanto a Abubakar si è conclusa anni della regola militare brutale. Obasanjo, un capo militare di una volta che ha cosegnato ad un governo civile egli stesso negli anni 70, rielezione vinta in 2003 scrutinii che l'opposizione denominata ha attrezzato.

La commissione elettorale nigeriana non ha detto quando dovrebbe cominciare stampare le schede elettorali per accertarli è distribuita in tempo per 61 milione elettori registrati in un paese due volte il formato della California per averla per la scheda elettorale. La Nigeria ha molti regioni e villaggi far-flung disgiunti dalle strade.

Nigeria Vizepräsident ordnet Klage über Ausschluß von der Wahl Aprils ein
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Nigeria: Vizepräsident Atiku Abubakar ordnete eine Gesetzklage Freitag suchend, eine Wahlkommission Entscheidung umzuwerfen ein, die ihn von für Präsidenten laufen folgender Monat abhält.

Abubakar protestierte seine Auslassung von einer Liste von zwei Dutzend genehmigten Anwärtern für 21. April Wahlen ungültiger freigegebener Donnerstag. Er nannte die Wahlkommission und sein Vorsitzender, Maurice Iwu, wie Cobeklagte, Gerichtpapiere freigab durch seine gezeigten Rechtsanwälte.

Gerichtsbeamte bestätigt, eine Archivierung empfangend. Hörfähigkeiten wurden erwartet, um Montag am Bundesgerichtshof im Kapital anzufangen, Abuja.

Die Wahlkommission gab keinen Grund für das Ausschließen von Abubakar, das in eine allgemeine Fehde in den Präsidenten miteinbezogen wird, aber registrierte konstitutionelle Verbote auf Anwärtern klagten für Verbrechen vor einer Gericht- oder Hauptleiterverkleidung an.

In einer Aussage Freitag, lauded das Büro des Präsidenten die Kommission zu einem Arbeiten, „, zum von Regierungsgewalt von den schlechten Eiern zu reinigen und der Elemente für das gute unseres geliebten Landes zu verderben. “

Letztes Jahr Abubakar wurde von der Korruption durch eine administrative Verkleidung beschuldigt, die vom Präsidenten Olusegun Obasanjo aufgestellt wurde.

Lager Abubakars hat die Verkleidung verfassungswidrig genannt und die Behauptungen verweigert, sagen stammten sie eine allgemeine Gamasche nachdem Abubakar geholfener Anschlag sein Chef vom Verlängern seines Besitzes über der konstitutionellen Begrenzung hinaus ab.

Störung Abubakars, den Präsidenten zu stützen säuerte Relationen zwischen den zwei Männern und schließlich aufgeforderten Abubakar, um die regierende Partei zu beendigen und in Opposition einzusteigen.

Rechtsanwälte sagen, daß nur das höchste Gericht der Nation die Wahlentscheidung der kommission, die 24 andere Anwärter am Donnerstag löschte, einschließlich die anderen zwei freien Führer umwerfen kann: regelnParteianwärter Umaru Yar'Adua, ein Regler des NordKatsina Zustandes; und Generator. Muhammadu Buhari, ein ehemaliger militärischer Führer.

Wenn sie erfolgreich gehalten werden, würden die April Abstimmungen die erste Zivilist-zuzivilist übertragung der Energie in der Geschichte Nigerias seit Unabhängigkeit von Großbritannien 1960 aufstellen. Vorhergehende Wahlübergänge sind durch Annulments oder militärische Coupe unterbrochen worden.

Das hin- und her zwischen der regierenden Partei und Kampagne Atikus hat Furcht in Nigeria aufgeworfen, daß eine heftige Krise ausbrechen könnte und zu eine Verlängerung oder eine Annullierung der Abstimmungen führen. Mehr als 10.000 Leute sind im Streit gestorben, seit das Ende der militärischen Richtlinie langen-simmering Groll in einem Land mit 250 ethnischen Gruppen uncorked.

Mit 140 Million Leuten ist Nigeria Afrikas am meisten-einwohnerstarke Nation und sein größter ölproduzent. Viele im massiven Chaos der Westafrika Furcht in Nigeria konnten die Flüchtlinge senden, die über der Region strömen und Jahre des hart-gewonnenen Friedens und der erhöhten Stabilität in der Region untergraben.

Obasanjos Wahl 1999 neben Abubakar beendete Jahre der brutalen militärischen Richtlinie. Obasanjo, ein einmaliger militärischer Führer, der zu einer Zivilregierung selbst in den siebziger Jahren überreichte, gewonnene Wiederwahl in 2003 Abstimmungen, die die benannte Opposition in Ordnung brachte.

Die nigerische Wahlkommission hat nicht gesagt, als sie Stimmzettel zu drucken würde, beginnen müssen, um sie sicherzustellen wird verteilt rechtzeig zu 61 Million eingetragenen Wählern in einem Land zweimal die Größe von Kalifornien zum Haben sie für den Stimmzettel. Nigeria hat viele far-flung Regionen und Dörfer, die durch Straßen unverbunden sind.

O vice-presidente de Nigéria arquiva o terno sobre a exclusão da eleição de abril
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Nigéria: O vice-presidente Atiku Abubakar arquivou um terno sexta-feira da lei que procura virar uma decisão electoral do commission que o barrasse de funcionar para o presidente mês seguinte.

Abubakar protestava sua omissão de uma lista de dois candidatos aprovados dúzia para eleições quinta-feira liberada ilegal abril de 21. Nomeou o commission electoral e seu presidente, Maurice Iwu, como co-réus, papéis da corte liberou-se por seus advogados mostrados.

Oficiais de corte confirmados recebendo um arquivamento. Os Hearings esperaram-se começar segunda-feira na corte federal no capital, Abuja.

O commission electoral não deu nenhuma razão para excluir Abubakar, que é envolvido em um feud público com o presidente, mas as proibições constitutional alistadas em candidatos processaram para crimes antes de um painel da corte ou do executivo.

Em uma indicação sexta-feira, o escritório do presidente lauded o commission para trabalhar “para livrar o governance de ovos maus e para corrupt elementos para o bom de nosso país beloved. ”

Abubakar foi acusado o ano passado do corruption por um painel administrativo ajustado acima pelo presidente Olusegun Obasanjo.

O acampamento de Abubakar chamou o painel unconstitutional e negou os allegations, dig stemmed de um spat público depois que batente ajudado Abubakar sua saliência de estender seu tenure além do limite constitutional.

A falha de Abubakar suportar o presidente soured relações entre os dois homens e o Abubakar eventualmente alertado para parar o partido governando e para entrar na oposição.

Os advogados dizem que somente a corte a mais elevada da nação pode virar a decisão do commission electoral, que cancelou outros 24 candidatos em quinta-feira, including outros dois líderes desobstruídos: candidato governando Umaru Yar'Adua do partido, um regulador do estado do norte de Katsina; e gerador. Muhammadu Buhari, um líder militar anterior.

Se prendidas com sucesso, as votações de abril ajustariam acima primeira transferência do civil-à-civil do poder na história de Nigéria desde a independência de Grâ Bretanha em 1960. As transições electoral precedentes foram interrompidas por annulments ou por coups militares.

O para a frente e para trás entre o partido governando e a campanha de Atiku levantou medos em Nigéria que uma crise violenta poderia erupt, conduzindo a uma extensão ou a um cancelamento das votações. Mais de 10.000 povos morreram no strife desde que o fim da régua militar uncorked resentments longos-simmering em um país com 250 grupos étnicos.

Com os 140 milhão povos, Nigéria é nação mais-populous de África e seu produtor de óleo mais maior. Muitos no caos maciço do medo ocidental de África em Nigéria podiam emitir os refugees que fluem através da região, undermining anos da paz duro-ganhada e da estabilidade aumentada na região.

A eleição 1999 de Obasanjo ao lado de Abubakar terminou anos da régua militar brutal. Obasanjo, um líder militar one-time que entregasse o excesso a um governo civil ele mesmo nos 1970s, re-election ganhado em 2003 votações que a oposição chamada equipou.

O commission electoral Nigerian não disse quando teria que começar imprimir cédulas para os assegurar é distribuído a tempo para 61 milhão eleitores registados em um país duas vezes o tamanho de Califórnia para os ter para a cédula. Nigéria tem muitas regiões e vilas far-flung unconnected por estradas.

Den Nigeria vicepresidentet sparar passar över uteslutande från Aprils val
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA Nigeria: Vicepresidentet Atiku Abubakar sparade en lag passar fredagen som söker att välta ett val- kommissionbeslut som bommar för honom från skötsel för president den nästa månaden.

Abubakar protesterade hans utelämnande från en lista av två dussina godkända kandidater för olaglig utsläppt torsdag för April 21 val. Han namngav den val- kommissionen, och dess ordförande, Maurice Iwu, som co-svaranden, domstollegitimationshandlingar som var utsläppt vid hans advokater, visade.

Domstolrepresentanter bekräftade häleri spara. Utfrågningar förväntades för att börja Måndag på federal domstol i huvudstaden, Abuja.

Den val- kommissionen gav inget resonerar för uteslutande av Abubakar, som är involverad i en offentlig fejd med presidenten, bara av listade konstitutionella förbud på kandidater indicted för brott för en domstol eller en utöva panel.

I en meddelandefredag president lauded kontor kommissionen för arbete ”för att rid makt av rötägg och korrumperade beståndsdelar för godan av vårt älskade land. ”

I fjol anklagades Abubakar av korruption av en administrativ paneluppsättning upp av President Olusegun Obasanjo.

Abubakars läger har kallat panelen okonstitutionell, och förnekat beskyllningarna, ordstävet som de stemmed från en offentlig smågräl efter Abubakar hjälpt stopp, his basar från fördjupning av hans ambetstiddet okända, det konstitutionellt begränsar.

Abubakars fel att stötta presidenten soured förbindelse mellan de två manarna och den slutligen meddelade Abubakaren för att avsluta styrande parti och för att gå in i opposition.

Advokatnågot att säga endast nation högsta domstol kan välta val- kommission beslut, som görade klar 24 andra kandidater på torsdag, däribland de andra två klara ledarna: reglerande partikandidat Umaru Yar'Adua, en statlig regulator av nordliga Katsina; och generator. Muhammadu Buhari, en tidigare militär ledare.

Om rymt lyckat, samlar April den skulle uppsättningen upp den första civilist-till-civilisten som överföringen av driver i Nigeria historia efter självständighet från Britannien i 1960. Föregående val- övergångar har avbrutits av annulments eller militärdirektstötar.

Det fram- och tillbaka mellan styrande parti och Atikus aktion har lyftt skräck i Nigeria att en våldsam kris kunde få utbrott och att leda till en f8orlängning eller en annullering av röstningarna. Mer än 10.000 folk har dött i tvist, sedan avsluta av militären härskar uncorked lång-puttra harm i ett land med 250 folkgrupper.

Med 140 miljon folk är Nigeria Afrika mest-tätbefolkada nation och dess största olje- producent. Många i massiva kaosar för västra Afrika skräck i Nigeria kunde överföra flyktingar som strömmer över regionen och att underminera år av hård-segrad fred och ökande stabilitet i regionen.

Obasanjos avslutade år 1999 för val tillsammans med härskar Abubakar av den brutala militären. Obasanjo en one-time militär ledare, som räckte över till ett civilt regerings- självt i 70-tal, segrad omval i 2003 röstningar som den kallade oppositionen rigged.

Den nigerianska val- kommissionen har inte sagt när hon skulle måste att starta att skriva ut sluten omröstning för att se till dem är utdelad i tid för 61 miljon registreringsväljare i ett land två gånger storleksanpassa av Kalifornien att ha dem för sluten omröstning. Nigeria har många far-flung regioner och byar som är osammanhängande vid vägar.

Недостаток Нигерии - президент подаст иск над исключением от избрания Эйприл
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Нигерия: Вице - президент Atiku Abubakar подал иск пятница закона изыскивая опрокинуть электоральное решение комиссии то адвокатские сословия он от бежать для президента следующий месяц.

Abubakar протестовало его упущение от перечня 2 дюжина одобренных выбранного для избраний противозаконного выпущенного четверга 21-ое апреля. Он назвал электоральную комиссию и свой руководитель, Морис Iwu, как co-подсудимые, судебные документы выпустил его показанными законоведами.

Подтверженные должностные лица суда получающ опиловку. Были ы, что начали слухи понедельник на федеральном суде в столице, Abuja.

Электоральная комиссия не дала никакую причину для исключать Abubakar, которое включается в общественный феод с президентом, только перечисленные конституционные запрещения на выбранных предъявленных обвинение для злодеяний перед панелью суда или экзекьютива.

В заявлении пятнице, офис президента похвалил комиссию для работы «для того чтобы rid управление плохих яичек и коррумпированных элементов для хорошего нашей beloved страны. »

В прошлом году Abubakar было обвинено развращения управленческой панелью установленной вверх президентом Olusegun Obasanjo.

Лагерь Abubakar вызывал панель неконституционно и отказывал заявления, говорить они stem from общественный spat после того как стоп помогли Abubakar, котор его босс от расширять его tenure за конституционным пределом.

Отказ Abubakar поддержать президента прокиснул отношения между двумя человек и окончательн пробуженным Abubakar для того чтобы прекратить правящую партию и пойти в противовключение.

Законоведы говорят только высшая инстанция нации может опрокинуть решение электоральной комиссии, которое освободило 24 других выбранного на четверге, включая другие 2 ясных руководителя: управляя выбранный Umaru Yar'Adua партии, воевод северного положения Katsina; и генератор. Muhammadu Buhari, бывший воинский руководитель.

Если придержали успешно, списки избирателей в Эйприл установили бы вверх первое передачу энергии civilian-к-civilian в истории Нигерии с независимости от Британии в 1960. Ранее электоральные переходы были прерваны аннулированиями или военными переворотами.

Back and forth между правящей партией и кампанией Atiku поднимало страхи в Нигерии что яростный кризис смог извергнуть, водящ к выдвижению или отмене списков избирателей. Больше чем 10.000 людей умирали в strife в виду того что конец воинского правила uncorked длинние-simmering resentments в стране с 250 этнические группы.

С 140 миллионов людей, Нигерия будет нацией Африки больше всего-многолюдной и своим самым большим производителем масла. Много в беспорядке западного страха Африки массивнейшем в Нигерии были в состоянии послать беженцам через зону, минирующ леты трудн-выигранного мира и увеличенной стабилности в зоне.

Избрание 1999 Obasanjo наряду с Abubakar закончилось леты зверского воинского правила. Obasanjo, одноразовый воинский руководитель который hand over к гражданскому правительству себя в 1970s, выигранный перевыбор в 2003 списках избирателей которые противовключение вызвало оснастило.

Нигерийская электоральная комиссия не сказала когда его начать напечатать ballots для того чтобы обеспечить их распределяют in time for 61 миллион зарегистрированных избирателей в стране дважды размер California, котор нужно иметь их для ballot. Нигерия имеет много far-flung зоны и сел несоединенных дорогами.

Het kostuum van de ondervoorzittersdossiers van Nigeria over uitsluiting van de verkiezing van April
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
ABUJA, Nigeria: Ondervoorzitter Atiku Abubakar diende een Vrijdag van het wetskostuum willend in een kiescommissiebeschikking ten val brengen die hem van volgende maand het lopen voor voorzitter verspert.

Abubakar protesteerde zijn weglating van een lijst van twee dozijnen erkende kandidaten voor 21 April verkiezingen onwettige vrijgegeven Donderdag. Hij noemde de kiescommissie en zijn voorzitter, Maurice Iwu, als mede-gedaagden, hofdocumenten die door zijn getoonde advocaten worden vrijgegeven.

Bevestigde de ambtenaren van het Hof het ontvangen van het indienen. De hoorzittingen zouden beginnen met Maandag bij het federale hof in het kapitaal, Abuja.

De kiescommissie gaf geen reden om Abubakar uit te sluiten, die bij een openbare ruzie met de voorzitter betrokken is, maar vermelde constitutionele verboden op kandidaten die voor misdaden voor een hof of een uitvoerend Comité worden aangeklaagd.

In een verklaringsVrijdag, loofde het bureau van de voorzitter de commissie voor het werken „om bestuur van slechte eieren te bevrijden en elementen voor het goed van ons geliefd land te bederven. “

Vorig jaar werd Abubakar van corruptie door een administratief paneel beschuldigd dat door President Olusegun Obasanjo wordt opgericht.

Kamp van Abubakar heeft het paneel ongrondwettig geroepen en de beweringen ontkend, zeggend stamden zij uit een openbare slobkous na Abubakar geholpen einde zijn werkgever van het uitbreiden van zijn ambtstermijn voorbij de constitutionele grens.

Nalaten van Abubakar om de voorzitter te steunen verzuurde relaties tussen de twee mensen en zette uiteindelijk Abubakar ertoe aan om met de beslissende partij op te houden en in oppositie te gaan.

De advocaten zeggen slechts het hoogste hof van de natie de beschikking van de kiescommissie, die 24 andere kandidaten op Donderdag ontruimde, met inbegrip van de andere twee duidelijke leiders kan ten val brengen: het regeren van partijkandidaat Umaru Yar'Adua, een gouverneur van noordelijke staat Katsina; en Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, een vroegere militaire leider.

Indien met succes gehouden, zouden de opiniepeilingen van April de eerste burgerlijk-aan-burgerlijke overdracht van macht in de geschiedenis van Nigeria sinds onafhankelijkheid van Groot-Brittannië in 1960 opzetten. De vorige kiesovergangen zijn onderbroken door annulments of militaire staatsgrepen.

Heen-en-weer tussen de de beslissende partij en campagne van Atiku heeft vrees in Nigeria opgeheven dat een hevige crisis kon losbarsten, leidend tot een uitbreiding of een annulering van de opiniepeilingen. Meer dan 10.000 mensen zijn in geschil gestorven aangezien het eind van militaire regel lang-suddert wrok in een land met 250 etnische groepen uncorked.

Met 140 miljoen mensen, is Nigeria de het meest-dichtbevolkte natie van Afrika en zijn grootste olieproducent. Velen in West-Afrika vrezen de massieve chaos in Nigeria kon vluchtelingen sturen die over het gebied stromen, dat jaren van hard-won vrede en verhoogde stabiliteit in het gebied ondermijnt.

De verkiezing van 1999 van Obasanjo naast Abubakar gebeëindigde jaren van brutale militaire regel. Obasanjo, een éénmalige militaire leider die aan een burgerlijke overheid zelf in de jaren '70 overhandigde, won herverkiezing in 2003 opiniepeilingen die de geroepen oppositie monteerde.

De Nigeriaanse kiescommissie heeft niet gezegd wanneer het zou moeten beginnen stemmingen te drukken om te verzekeren zij op tijd voor 61 miljoen geregistreerde kiezers in een land tweemaal de grootte van Californië om hen te hebben voor de stemming worden verdeeld. Nigeria heeft vele ver-gegooide gebieden en dorpen die door wegen worden afgekoppeld.

نيجيريا يصنّف نائب رئيس دعوى على استثناء من أبريل - نيسان إنتخاب
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
[أبوجا], نيجيريا: صنّف [فيس-برسدنت] [أتيكو] [أبوبكر] قانون دعوى يوم الجمعة يبحث أن يقلب انتخابيّة عمولة قرار أنّ يسدّه من يركض لرئيس شهر تالية.

احتجّ [أبوبكر] كان عمليّت حذفه من قائمة ميلان إلى جانب من اثنان اثنا عشر يوافق مرشحات لأبريل - نيسان 21 إنتخابات غير شرعيّ يطلق يوم الخميس. هو عيّن العمولة انتخابيّة وأطلق رئيس مجلس إدارته, [موريس] [إيوو], ك [ك-دفندنتس], محكمة أوراق بمحامياته يبدى.

[كورت وفّيسل] يؤكّد يستلم تصنيف. توقّعت جلسة استماع كان أن يبدأ يوم الإثنين في ال [فدرل كورت] في الرأس مال, [أبوجا].

أعطى العمولة انتخابيّة ما من سبب ل يستثني [أبوبكر], الذي يكون تضمّنت في حزازة عامّة مع الرئيس, غير أنّ يعدّد حظور دستوريّة على مرشحات اتّهموا لجرائم قبل محكمة أو مديرة لوح.

في بيان يوم الجمعة, الرئيس مجّد مكتب العمولة ل يعمل "أن يخلّص حكم من بيضات سيّئة وأفسدت عناصر للجيّدة من بلدنا محبوبة. "

[لست ر] اتّهمت [أبوبكر] كان من فساد بلون إداريّة يثبت فوق برئيس [ألوسغن] [أبسنجو].

[أبوبكر] قد دعا مخيم اللون غير دستوريّ وينكر الادّعاءات, [سينغ] هم ترتّبوا بيض الصدف عامّة عقب [أبوبكر] يساعد موقف رئيسه من يمدّد توله إلى ما بعد الحد دستوريّة.

[أبوبكر] حمّض إخفاق أن يساند الرئيس علاقات بين الاثنان رجال وأخيرا يحضّ [أبوبكر] أن يترك ال يحكم حزب وذهبت داخل معارضة.

محاميات يقولون فقط الأمة محكمة [هيغست] يستطيع قلبت الانتخابيّة عمولة قرار, أيّ أخلى 24 أخرى مرشحات في يوم الخميس, بما في ذلك الأخرى اثنان زعيمات واضحة: يحكم حزب مرشح [أومرو] [ير'دوا], حاكمة من شماليّة [كتسنا] دولة; و [جن.]. [موهمّدو] [بوهري], زعيمة سابقة عسكريّة.

إن يمسك بنجاح, أبريل - نيسان ثبت عمليّة تصويت فوق الأولى [سفيلين-تو-سفيلين] إنتقال القوة في نيجيريا تاريخ منذ استقلال من بريطانيا في 1960. أوقفت إنتقال سابقة انتخابيّة يتلقّى يكون بعمليات أو إنقلابات عسكريّة.

قد رفع ال [بك-ند-فورث] بين ال يحكم حزب و [أتيكو] حملة خوف في نيجيريا أنّ أزمة عنيفة استطاع ثرت, يقود إلى إمتداد أو إلغاء من العمليّة تصويت. أكثر من 10,000 قد مات الناس في نزاع بما أنّ النهاية من قاعدة عسكريّة نزع إمتعاضات [لونغ-سمّرينغ] في بلد مع 250 مجموعة عرقيّة.

مع 140 [ميلّيون بيوبل], نيجيريا إفريقيا أمة [موست-بوبولووس] ومنتج نفطه كبيرة. كثير في غربيّة إفريقيا خوف حالة فوضى ضخمة في نيجيريا استطاع أرسلت لاجئ يجري عبر المنطقة, يضعف سنون من [هرد-وون] سلام ويزاد استقرار في المنطقة.

[أبسنجو] 1999 أنهى إنتخاب إلى جانب [أبوبكر] سنون من قاعدة قاسية عسكريّة. جهّز [أبسنجو], زعيمة [أن-تيم] عسكريّة الذي [هند وفر] إلى حكومة مدنيّة بنفسي في السبعينات, يربح إعادة انتخاب في 2003 عمليّة تصويت أنّ المعارضة دعا.

لم يقل العمولة نيجيريّة انتخابيّة يتلقّى عندما هو اضطرّ بدأت يطبع اقتراع سرّيّ أن يضمن هم يكون وزّعت حتّى 61 مليون يسجّل مقترعات في بلد مرّتين الحجم كاليفورنيا أن يتلقّىهم لالاقتراع سرّيّ. نيجيريا يتلقّى كثير واسع الإنتشار مناطق وقرى [أونكنّكتد] بطرق.

Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra'iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia Meles Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu la baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Dagaal caawa ka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra' iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia Meles Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu la baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Dagaal caawa ka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra'iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia meles Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu la baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Dagaal caawa ka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra' iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia Meles Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu la baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Dagaal caawa ka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra' iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia Meles Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu la baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Dagaal caawa ka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into English thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra' iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia Mix Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu the baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Dagaal caawaka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho, ciidamadda Etiopien för ee för sodonka för wadada för dagaal för uu för Magaalada Muqdisho caawawaxa för ka dhacay ku för goobo dherersan för leeyihiin för ku för halkaasioofariisimo ay.

Kuen för wadadaas för hubaysan ayaaweeraro ku för gaadmo för Kooxo ah lahaayeen den qaaday fariimahan ay för den Cali Kamiin för xaafadahaen för yaalaen för kuen för ciidamadaEtiopien ee dhagax för labaen ilaaen, daqiiqo för sodon för muddo för ilaa för iyadooweerarku socday ah.

Den Dhinaca kaleciidamaddaen Etiopien, för Muqdisho för magaaladaen för kaen för gooboen för kaen för ayaamaantabaaritaanoen Etiopien för ciidamadaen för den samayanayay tirsan kadib för weeraroen för isdabajoog för ahaaen för ooen xalay för fiidkiien fariisimoen för laguen qaaday den ay kuen lahaayeen magaalada för oo för meelokala duwan ah, magaaladaen för den weerar för kale för iyadoosaqdiidhexenaen den dhacay kaen för uuen.

För den Etiopien för ciidankaen för den Weerarradii kalaen för ka för xalay laguen qaaday waxa ayaaen dhaceen den ay för den Etiopien för ciidamaddaen för ooen för ilaalixsaldhig Somalia för caasimadaen för leeyihiin ay kuen ee Muqdisho, fudud för kuwa för iyo för culus för qoryaha för ee för adeegsaday för bambooyinka för iyadooloo för gacanta för iyo kala för noocyada duwan.

Etiopien för dalkaen för wasaarahaen för iisul för ra för uuen för xillien för sooen för den Weerarrada ayaakuen riiqdeen den beegmay blandningen Zenawi som är sheegay i ay ku för ciidankiisu, dagaaladaen Muqdisho, awoodin för ciidankiisa för islamarkaanaaanu i uu baxohaddaen.

För den Muqdisho för magaaladaen för kaen för ooen för kulul för den Horaantii Etiopien för den bishan ayaadagaalloen dhacay ayaaen för kooxahaen för kaen för sooen för horjeedaen ciidamaddaen för joogitaankaen jiideen den ay kuen ciidamaddaen Etiopien för den qaar kaen för den waddooyinkaMuqdisho meydadkaen den mitt- ah.

Ka dhacay Muqdisho caawa Dagaal
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Ku goobo ka uu waxa caawa Magaalada Muqdisho magaalada Muqdisho ee sodonka wadada dagaal dhacay dherersan, ciidamadda эфиопия leeyihiin ku fariisimo oo halkaasi ay.

Ku gaadmo weeraro ayaa Kooxo ku wadadaas hubaysan ah qaaday fariimahan ay lahaayeen dhagax laba ilaa Cali Kamiin xaafadaha yaala ku ee эфиопии ciidamada, daqiiqo sodon muddo ilaa weerarku iyadoo socday ah.

Ciidamadda ku эфиопии kale Dhinaca, fariisimo lagu fiidkii oo ahaa isdabajoog weeraro kadib Muqdisho magaalada ka goobo ka baaritaano maanta ayaa эфиопии ciidamada samayanayay tirsan xalay qaaday ay lahaayeen magaalada oo kala meelo duwan ah, ka uu kale dhexena saqdii iyadoo magaalada weerar dhacay.

Waxa ayaa эфиопии ciidanka lagu Weerarradii kala ka xalay qaaday ay dhaceen ee Muqdisho Сомали caasimada leeyihiin ku эфиопии ciidamadda oo saldhig lix ilaa ay, kala noocyada iyo gacanta bambooyinka loo iyadoo fudud kuwa iyo culus qoryaha ee adeegsaday duwan.

Смешивание Zenawi эфиопии dalka wasaaraha iisul ra uu xilli soo ku ayaa Weerarrada beegmay sheegay в ku ciidankiisu ay riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, awoodin ciidankiisa aanu markaana isla в uu hadda baxo.

Ciidamadda joogitaanka horjeeda soo ka kooxaha ayaa Muqdisho magaalada ka oo kulul dagaallo ayaa Horaantii ku эфиопии bishan dhacay ay jiideen ciidamadda эфиопия qaar ka meydadka Muqdisho waddooyinka mid ah.

Dagaal caawa ka dhacay Muqdisho
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
Magaalada Muqdisho caawa waxa dagaal uu ka dhacay goobo ku dherersan wadada sodonka ee magaalada Muqdisho, halkaasi oo fariisimo ay ku leeyihiin ciidamadda Ethiopia.

Kooxo hubaysan ayaa weeraro gaadmo ah ku qaaday fariimahan ay wadadaas ku lahaayeen ciidamada Ethiopia ee ku yaala xaafadaha Cali Kamiin ilaa laba dhagax, iyadoo weerarku socday ilaa muddo sodon daqiiqo ah.

Dhinaca kale ciidamadda Ethiopia, ayaa maanta baaritaano ka samayanayay goobo ka tirsan magaalada Muqdisho kadib weeraro isdabajoog ahaa oo xalay fiidkii lagu qaaday fariisimo ay ciidamada Ethiopia ku lahaayeen meelo kala duwan oo magaalada ah, iyadoo saqdii dhexena weerar kale uu ka dhacay magaalada.

Weerarradii xalay lagu qaaday ciidanka Ethiopia ayaa waxa ay ka kala dhaceen ilaa lix saldhig oo ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku leeyihiin caasimada Somalia ee Muqdisho, iyadoo loo adeegsaday bambooyinka gacanta iyo noocyada kala duwan ee qoryaha culus iyo kuwa fudud.

Weerarrada ayaa ku soo beegmay xilli uu ra' iisul wasaaraha dalka Ethiopia Mengen Zenawi sheegay in ciidankiisu ay ku riiqdeen dagaalada Muqdisho, isla markaana aanu ciidankiisa awoodin in uu baxo hadda.

Horaantii bishan ayaa dagaallo kulul oo ka dhacay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa kooxaha ka soo horjeeda joogitaanka ciidamadda Ethiopia ay ku jiideen waddooyinka Muqdisho meydadka qaar ka mid ah ciidamadda Ethiopia.

[دغل] [كوا] [كا] [دهكي] [موقديشو]
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
[مغلدا] [موقديشو] [كوا] [وإكسا] [دغل] [أوو] [كا] [دهكي] [غوبو] [كو] [دهررسن] [وددا] [سدونكا] [إ] [مغلدا] [موقديشو], [هلكس] [أو] [فرييسمو] [أي] [كو] [لييهيين] [سيدمدّا] أثيوبيا.

[كووإكسو] [هوبسن] [أا] [ويررو] [غدمو] آه [كو] [قدي] [فرييمهن] [أي] [وددس] [لهين] [كو] [سيدمدا] أثيوبيا [إ] [كو] [يلا] [إكسفدها] [كلي] [كميين] [إيلا] [لبا] [دهغإكس], [إيدوو] [ويرركو] [سكدي] [إيلا] [مودّو] [سدون] [دقييقو] آه.

[دهينك] كرنب لارؤيسيّ [لهين] [سيدمدّا] أثيوبيا, [أا] [منتا] [بريتنو] [كا] [سمني] [غوبو] [كا] [تيرسن] [مغلدا] [موقديشو] [كديب] [ويررو] [إيسدبجووغ] [أها] [أو] [إكسلي] [فييدكيي] [لغ] [فرييسمو] [قدي] [أي] [سيدمدا] أثيوبيا [كو] [ميلو] [كلا] [دوون] [أو] [مغلدا] آه, [إيدوو] [سقديي] [دهإكسنا] [ويرر] كرنب لارؤيسيّ [أوو] [كا] [مغلدا] [دهكي].

[ويررّديي] [إكسلي] [لغ] [قدي] [سيدنكا] أثيوبيا [أا] [وإكسا] [أي] [كا] [دهسن] [كلا] [إيلا] [ليإكس] [سلدهيغ] [أو] [سيدمدّا] أثيوبيا [أي] [كو] [لييهيين] [كسمدا] صومال [إ] [موقديشو], [إيدوو] [لوو] [أديغسدي] [بمبووينكا] [غكنتا] [إيو] [نووسدا] [كلا] [دوون] [إ] [قورها] [كلوس] [إيو] [كووا] [فودود].

[ويررّدا] [أا] [كو] [سو] [بيغمي] [إكسيلّي] [أوو] [ر'] [إييسول] [وسرها] [دلكا] أثيوبيا [رييقدين] مزيج [زنوي] [شيغي] في [سيدنكييسو] [كو] [أي] [دغلدا] [موقديشو], [إيسلا] [مركنا] [أنو] [سيدنكييسا] [أووودين] في [أوو] ال [بإكسو] [هدّا].

[هورنتيي] [بيشن] [أا] [دغلّو] [كولول] [أو] [كا] [دهكي] [مغلدا] [موقديشو] [أا] [كووإكسها] [كا] [سو] [هورجيدا] [جووجتنكا] [سيدمدّا] أثيوبيا [جييدين] [كو] [أي] [ودّووينكا] [موقديشو] [مددكا] [كا] [قر] منتصفة آه [سيدمدّا] أثيوبيا.