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| December 28, 2007 | 1:03 PM |
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Brothers in arms against apartheid, now Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma face each other in a bitter struggle for power
Related to country: South Africa
available in: (original) | | | | | | | | |
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Jonathan Clayton in Johannesburg
Their families shared in the struggle against apartheid and both played a prominent role in ending white minority rule in South Africa. But Thabo Mbeki, the country’s President, and Jacob Zuma, his main challenger, come from very different worlds.
The two men, both 65 and once comrades in arms, are engaged in a bitter power struggle that threatens to destroy the movement that enfranchised black South Africans and drag the country deeper into turmoil.
Mr Mbeki — bookish, with a taste for pipes, Yeats and Wordsworth — has spent the past few days ensconced in the presidential study, drafting the speech that he hopes will persuade the African National Congress (ANC) to give him a third term as party leader.
In contrast Mr Zuma, a firebrand populist given to wearing tribal dress, was doing what he does best: greeting euphoric supporters at “victory” rallies up and down the country, confident that he will unseat his great rival.
If Mr Zuma is elected as ANC president during the party’s congress, which begins tomorrow, he is almost certain to be the party’s candidate in the 2009 presidential election; a poll that the ANC is assured of winning, given its total grip on power in the country 13 years after the end of apartheid.
Mr Mbeki, whose parents were teachers and activists, is constitutionally barred from standing for a third term as President of South Africa. But he is desperate to retain control of the ANC so that he can influence the choice of his successor as the leader of the country. It is unthinkable that he would anoint Mr Zuma, whom he dismissed as ANC deputy president in 2005 after he was linked to a multibillion-pound arms scandal.
Corruption charges against Mr Zuma, the son of a domestic maid, collapsed last year on a technicality. He also beat a separate rape charge last May, which many of his supporters believe was orchestrated by pro-Mbeki supporters in an attempt to consign him to political obscurity.
At first, it seemed to have worked.Public opinion was outraged by Mr Zuma’s admission that he had unprotected sex with the 32-year-old daughter of a family friend who was HIV positive and called him “uncle”.
He later said that he took a shower to reduce the chances of infection; a statement that appalled activists in a country where 900 people a day die of Aids.
Mr Zuma fought back, capitalising on Mr Mbeki’s unpopularity, particularly among the township poor, who have seen little benefit from business-friendly, pro-market economic policies that have led to an unparalleled period of economic growth.
The President’s “denialist” stand on Aids, his refusal to criticise events in neighbouring Zimbabwe, and failure to rein in — or even admit to — one of the world’s worst crime rates, and his frequent trips abroad to further his vision of an “African renaissance” all played into his rival’s hands.
In regional conferences to decide on nominations for the five-yearly National Conference, Mr Mbeki received only 1,400 votes and the backing of four out of nine provinces.
Mr Zuma took 2,232 votes and five provinces. He has also won the endorsement of the left-wing Youth League and, in an amazing setback for Mr Mbeki, who has consistently trumpeted gender rights, the ANC Women’s League. Mr Zuma’s astonishing comeback has come at a huge price. The mighty ANC, which defeated minority white rule through unity and tight organisation, now faces the worst split in its 95-year history, presenting the country with the biggest political crisis since the end of apartheid in 1994.
In a rare comment on the situation yesterday Mr Mbeki, who took office when Nelson Mandela stepped down, said that the bitter contest could destroy the party. “If division leads to retribution, that’s what will destroy the ANC . . . Part of our responsibility is to avoid such an outcome,” Mr Mbeki said in an interview with the weekly Mail and Guardian. “We must take this thing away from personalities. The masses of our people are not interested in who dances best,” he added.
Once again, however, Mr Mbeki, who has clearly been taken aback by the strength of the opposition to him, appears to have got it wrong. Responding to criticism that he has stifled debate, he said: “Do I look as if I’ve got horns? It’s said that I block debate and inhibit open discussion — that’s puzzling to me. It’s completely untrue.”
The tussle between the two men, which will be settled by a vote of 5,000 delegates on Monday, has been devoid of virtually any policy discussion, though Mr Zuma has promised to make Aids and crime national priorities.
He has also, recently, assiduously courted big business in an effort to lose his “champion of the poor” image and allay fears that he would drop free-market policies.
Political analysts suggest that white property and businesses would not be at risk, but say that a Zuma presidency would represent a major break with the past and the country could look much more like other African nations, with a “big man” ruler.
Buchizya Mseteka, an expert on southern Africa, said: “The country is at a turning point. A Zuma presidency would be very different in style and substance. He owes many people favours and so patronage, already important, would be even more critical.”
Others concur, saying that the days of “a little bit of Europe in Africa” would be numbered. “Culturally the country could be more confident and assertive,” one Zuma backer said. “It could look like a successful version of Nigeria.”
Ill at ease in a crowd and uncomfortable at traditional African ceremonies, Mr Mbeki’s rise to power came as a result of astute backroom politicking and his closeness to senior ANC figures. He joined the party at the age of 14, but spent most of his life in exile on ANC instructions. Even his marriage, in 1974, had to be approved by the party leadership. In contrast, Mr Zuma, a Zulu, moves easily from left-wing township militancy to traditional village ceremonies, where he dons leopardskin loincloths. He has fathered 17 children from four official wives, but turns such issues to his advantage. “Other political leaders hide the fact they have mistresses . . . I am an African man and proud of my culture,” he told The Times in a recent interview. “I admit my faults and don’t deny that I am human. Others lie.”
ANC officials are so concerned about a public humiliation of Mr Mbeki that they have banned all T-shirts emblazoned with slogans supporting one candidate or the other from the conference centre in the sleepy northern town of Polokwane, Limpopo Province. They know that few people will be wearing pro-Mbeki ones, whereas those bearing the legends “100 per cent Zuma” and “Zulu Boy” have been selling in their thousands for weeks.
Despite frantic last-minute horse trading and accusations of money changing hands and offers of jobs and promotions, ANC insiders rule out any chance of Mr Mbeki swinging votes back in his favour at the conference. “The best he could hope for now is a postponement, but he has played his cards badly and even that is an outside chance,” one official commented.
Prosecutors have indicated that they could still charge Mr Zuma again, but have so far failed to bring a case they are confident would result in a conviction. If he takes the ANC presidency it is doubtful whether any prosecutor would dare to bring charges.
“Jacob Zuma will have an unofficial presidential immunity — it would take a very brave man to charge the ANC president. I can’t see it happening,” said Allister Sparks, the veteran journalist and author. Most ANC members believe that Mr Zuma was a victim of a plot by Mbeki supporters. They argue that Mr Zuma, who spent ten years on Robben Island and then became the head of the ANC’s military wing, was badly treated. He is also credited with ending a vicious civil war in the 1990s between ANC and the Zulu-dominated Inkatha Freedom Party in KwaZulu-Natal.
Other figures involved in the arms scandal received much more than the £35,000 that Mr Zuma was accused of pocketing. They have not been pursued, leading to allegations that the President was misusing state funds to settle a political vendetta.
“Zuma is an African traditionalist. He can’t possibly deliver to all the constituencies who have supported him if he becomes President, but at the moment people don’t care, they just have had it with Mbeki and his perceived aloofness,” Mr Sparks said.
In Soweto yesterday there was little sympathy for the President. “We JWs are left to foot it while the bigwigs drive around in fast cars,” said Philemon, an unemployed builder, as he pointed at the BMWs and Mercedes of the new black elite — dubbed Black Diamonds — who have made fortunes in the booming economy. About 40 per cent of the country’s population remains jobless and have seen little improvement in living standards since the arrival of majority rule.
THE CANDIDATES
Thabo Mbeki age 65
Style Western-friendly proponent of an intellectual "African Renaissance"
Childhood His parents were teachers and ANC intellectuals, as close to a middle class upbringing as was possible at the time
Family One son by a teenage relationship, who was killed while trying to escape South Africa. Married his wife Zanele in 1974
The apartheid years Joined the ANC aged 14, but fled after arrests of Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela. He earned a masters degree in Britain at the University of Sussex, went to train in guerrilla tactics in Moscow, then moved to the ANC headquarters in exile in Zambia
Jacob Zuma age 65
Style African "Big Man", comfortable in tribal dress
Childhood Born into poverty, his father died in his infancy. Received no formal education
Family Four official wives and 17 children. “Other political leaders hide the fact they have mistresses . . . I am an African man and proud of my culture,” he said
The apartheid years Arrested on charges of conspiring to overthrow the government, Zuma was incarcerated in Robben Island prison for ten years. On his release he helped to set up the ANC underground resistance, before moving into exile between 1975 and 1990
Source: ANC
Les frères dans des bras contre la ségrégation, maintenant Thabo Mbeki et Jacob Zuma se font face dans une lutte amère pour la puissance
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
Jonathan Clayton à Johannesburg
leurs familles partagées dans la lutte contre la ségrégation et toutes les deux a joué un rôle en avant dans la règle blanche de minorité de fin en Afrique du Sud. Mais Thabo Mbeki, président du pays, et Jacob Zuma, son challengeur principal, viennent des mondes très différents.
Les deux hommes, 65 et une fois que des camarades dans des bras, sont engagés dans une lutte amère de puissance qui menace de détruire le mouvement qui enfranchised les Africains du sud noirs et traînent le pays plus profond dans l'agitation.
M. Mbeki - livresque, avec un goût pour des pipes, Yeats et Wordsworth - a passé les derniers jours cachés dans l'étude présidentielle, rédigeant le discours qu'il espère persuadera le congrès national africain (ANC) de lui donner une troisième limite comme chef de partie.
En revanche M. Zuma, un populiste de tison donné à porter la robe tribale, faisait ce qu'il fait mieux : saluant les défenseurs euphoriques à la « victoire » se rassemble à travers le pays, confiant qu'il déplacera son grand rival.
Si M. Zuma est élu comme président d'ANC pendant le congrès de la partie, qui commence demain, il est presque sûr d'être le candidat de la partie dans l'élection 2009 présidentielle ; un scrutin que l'ANC est assuré du gain, donné sa poignée totale sur la puissance dans le pays 13 ans après la fin de la ségrégation.
M. Mbeki, dont les parents étaient des professeurs et des activistes, est constitutionnellement empêché de se tenir pour une troisième limite comme président de l'Afrique du Sud. Mais il est désespéré pour garder la main de l'ANC de sorte qu'il puisse influencer le choix de son successeur en tant que chef du pays. Il est impensable qu'il oigne M. Zuma, qu'il a écarté pendant que président de député d'ANC en 2005 après qu'il ait été lié à un scandale de bras de milliardaire-livre.
La corruption charge contre M. Zuma, le fils d'une bonne domestique, effondré l'année dernière sur une technicité. Il également a battu une charge séparée de viol mai passé, que plusieurs de ses défenseurs croient ont été orchestrés par des défenseurs de pro-Mbeki afin d'essayer de le consigner à l'obscurité politique.
Au début, il a semblé avoir fonctionné. L'opinion publique a été outragé par admission de M. Zuma's qu'il a eu le sexe non protégé avec la fille de 32 ans d'un ami de famille qui était HIV positif et appelé le le « oncle ».
Il plus tard a dit qu'il a pris une douche pour réduire les chances de l'infection ; un rapport qui appalled des activistes dans un pays où 900 personnes une matrice de jour des aides.
M. Zuma a battu en retraite, profitant de l'impopularité de M. Mbeki, en particulier parmi les pauvres de banlieue noire, qui ont vu peu d'avantage d'affaire-amical, les politiques économiques de pro-marché qui ont mené à une période inégalée de croissance économique.
Le stand du « denialist » du président sur des aides, son refus pour critiquer des événements au Zimbabwe voisin, et manque de retenir dedans - ou même admettre à - un des plus mauvais taux de crime du monde, et de ses voyages fréquents à l'étranger à autre sa vision « d'une Renaissance africaine » ont tout joué dans les mains de son rival.
Dans des conférences régionales à décider des nominations pour la conférence cinq par an nationale, M. Mbeki a reçu seulement 1.400 voix et le support de quatre sur neuf provinces.
M. Zuma a pris 2.232 voix et cinq provinces. Il a également gagné l'approbation de la ligue de la jeunesse et, dans un recul étonnant pour du M. de gauche Mbeki, qui a des droits uniformément sonnés de la trompette de genre, la ligue des femmes d'ANC. Le retour étonnant de M. Zuma's est venu à un prix énorme. L'ANC puissant, qui a défait la règle blanche de minorité par l'unité et l'organisation serrée, fait face maintenant à la plus mauvaise fente dans sa histoire de 95 ans, présentant le pays avec la plus grande crise politique depuis la fin de la ségrégation en 1994.
Dans un commentaire rare sur M. Mbeki de situation hier, qui a pris le bureau quand Nelson Mandela a fait un pas vers le bas, a dit que le concours amer pourrait détruire la partie. « Si la division mène au hâtiment, c'est ce qui détruira l'ANC. . . Une partie de notre responsabilité est d'éviter des tels résultats, » M. Mbeki dit dans une entrevue avec le courrier et le gardien hebdomadaires. « Nous devons prendre cette chose loin des personnalités. Les masses de nos personnes ne sont pas intéressées par qui danse mieux, » lui se sont ajoutées.
De nouveau, cependant, M. Mbeki, qui a été clairement pris l'aback par la force de l'opposition lui, semble l'avoir fausse. Répondant à la critique qu'il a suffoqué la discussion, il a dit : Est-ce que « je regarde comme si j'ai des klaxons ? Il a indiqué que je bloque la discussion et empêche la discussion ouverte - qui embarasse à moi. Il est complètement faux. »
Le tussle entre les deux hommes, qui seront arrangés par une voix de 5.000 délégués lundi, a été exempt de pratiquement n'importe quelle discussion de politique, bien que M. Zuma ait promis de faire des aides et des priorités de national de crime.
Il également, récemment, est assidûment allé au devant de grandes affaires dans un effort de perdre son « champion » de l'image pauvre et d'apaiser des craintes qu'il laisserait tomber des politiques de marché libre.
Les analystes politiques proposent que la propriété et les entreprises blanches ne soient pas en danger, mais disent qu'une présidence de Zuma représenterait une coupure importante avec le passé et le pays pourrait regarder beaucoup plutôt d'autres nations africaines, avec une règle de « grand homme ».
Buchizya Mseteka, un expert en l'Afrique australe, dite : « Le pays est à un tournant. Une présidence de Zuma serait très différente dans le modèle et la substance. Il doit beaucoup de faveurs de personnes et ainsi le patronage, déjà important, serait bien plus critique. »
D'autres concourent, dire que les jours de « un peu de l'Europe en Afrique » seraient numérotés. « Culturelement le pays pourrait être plus confiant et autoritaire, » un appui de Zuma a indiqué. « Il pourrait ressembler à une version réussie du Nigéria. »
Mal à l'aise dans une foule et inconfortable aux cérémonies africaines traditionnelles, élévation de M. Mbeki à la puissance est venu en raison de politicking discret astucieux et de sa proximité aux chiffres aînés d'ANC. Il a joint la partie à l'âge de 14, mais a passé la majeure partie de sa vie dans l'exil sur des instructions d'ANC. Même son mariage, en 1974, a dû être approuvé par la conduite de partie. En revanche, M. Zuma, un zoulou, se déplace facilement du militantisme de gauche de banlieue noire aux cérémonies traditionnelles de village, où il met des loincloths de leopardskin. Il a engendré 17 enfants de quatre épouses officielles, mais tours de telles questions à son avantage. La « autre peau politique de chefs le fait ils ont des maîtresses. . . Je suis un homme africain et fier de ma culture, » il a dit les temps dans une entrevue récente. « J'admets mes défauts et ne nie pas que je suis humain. D'autres se trouvent. Les »
fonctionnaires d'ANC sont ainsi préoccupé par une humiliation publique de M. Mbeki qu'ils ont interdit tout le T-shirts décoré avec des slogans soutenant un candidat ou l'autre du centre de conférence dans la ville nordique somnolente de Polokwane, province de Limpopo. Ils savent que peu de gens porteront pro-Mbeki ceux, tandis que ceux soutenant les légendes « 100 pour cent Zuma » et « garçon de zoulou » s'étaient vendus dans leurs milliers pendant des semaines.
En dépit du commerce de cheval et des accusations des mains de change et des offres de dernière minute effrénés des travaux et des promotions, les initiés d'ANC éliminent n'importe quelle chance des voix de oscillation de M. Mbeki en arrière en sa faveur à la conférence. « Le meilleur qu'il pourrait espérer maintenant est un ajournement, mais il a joué à ses cartes mal et même c'est une chance extérieure, » un fonctionnaire a commenté.
Les procureurs ont indiqué qu'ils pourraient M. immobile Zuma de charge encore, mais jusqu'ici n'ont pas apporté un cas qu'ils sont confiants auraient comme conséquence une conviction. S'il prend la présidence d'ANC elle est douteuse que n'importe quel procureur oserait apporter des frais.
« Jacob Zuma aura une immunité présidentielle officieuse - elle prendrait très un homme de braver pour charger le président d'ANC. Je ne peux pas le voir se produire, » a dit des étincelles d'Allister, le journaliste de vétéran et auteur. La plupart des membres d'ANC croient que M. Zuma était une victime d'une parcelle de terrain par des défenseurs de Mbeki. Ils arguent du fait que M. Zuma, qui a passé dix ans sur l'île de Robben et est puis devenu le chef de l'aile militaire de l'ANC, a été mal traité. Il est également crédité de finir une guerre civile méchante dans les années 90 entre ANC et la partie Zoulou-dominée de liberté d'Inkatha dans KwaZulu-Natal.
Autre figure qu'impliqué dans le scandale de bras a reçu beaucoup plus que le £35,000 que M. Zuma a été accusé d'empocher. Ils n'ont pas été poursuivis, menant aux allégations que le président abusait des fonds d'état pour arranger un vendetta politique.
« Zuma est un traditionaliste africain. Il ne peut pas probablement livrer à tous collèges électoraux qui l'ont soutenu s'il devient président, mais au moment où les gens ne s'inquiètent pas, ils juste l'ont eu avec Mbeki et le sien distance perçue, » M. Sparks dit.
Dans Soweto hier il y avait peu de sympathie pour le président. « Nous JWs sommes laissés au pied qu'il tandis que les bigwigs conduisent autour dans des voitures rapides, » a indiqué Philemon, un constructeur sans emploi, en tant que lui nous sommes dirigés chez le BMWs et Mercedes de la nouvelle élite noire - les diamants noirs doublés - qui ont fait des fortunes dans l'économie éclatante. Environ 40 pour cent de la population du pays demeurent sans emploi et ont vu peu d'amélioration des normes vivantes depuis l'arrivée de la règle de majorité.
Le partisan
Occidental-amical de modèle de l'âge 65
de Thabo Mbeki de CANDIDATS d'un enfance intellectuel « de la Renaissance africaine
» ses parents étaient des professeurs et des intellectuels d'ANC, comme près d'une éducation de la bourgeoisie de même que possible lorsque
le fils de la famille une par un rapport d'adolescent, qui a été tué tout en essayant d'échapper à l'Afrique du Sud. A épousé son épouse Zanele dans 1974
la ségrégation que les années ont joint l'ANC âgé 14, mais sauvé après des arrestations de Walter Sisulu et de Nelson Mandela. Il a gagné une maîtrise en Grande-Bretagne à l'université du Sussex, est allé s'exercer dans la tactique de guérillero à Moscou, alors déplacée aux sièges sociaux d'ANC dans l'exil chez homme
de modèle de l'âge 65 de Jacob
Zuma de la Zambie le « grand » africain, confortable dans l'enfance tribal
de robe soutenu dans la pauvreté, son père mort dans sa enfance. N'a reçu aucune épouse officielle
de la famille quatre d'enseignement conventionnel et 17 enfants. La « autre peau politique de chefs le fait ils ont des maîtresses. . . Je suis un homme africain et fier de ma culture, » il a dit
les années de ségrégation arrêtées sur des frais de la conspiration pour renverser le gouvernement, Zuma a été incarcéré dans la prison d'île de Robben pendant dix années. Sur son dégagement il a aidé à établir la résistance souterraine d'ANC, avant l'entrée dans l'exil entre la source 1975 et
1990 : ANC
Los hermanos en brazos contra el apartheid, ahora Thabo Mbeki y Jacob Zuma se hacen frente en una lucha amarga para la energía
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
Jonatán Clayton en Johannesburg
sus familias compartidas en la lucha contra apartheid y ambos desempeñó un papel prominente en la regla blanca de la minoría del conclusión en Suráfrica. Pero Thabo Mbeki, el presidente del país, y Jacob Zuma, su desafiador principal, vienen de mundos muy diversos.
Los dos hombres, 65 y una vez que contraten a los camaradas en brazos, a una lucha amarga de la energía que amenace destruir el movimiento que enfranchised a africanos del sur negros y arrastra el país más profundo en la agitación.
Sr. Mbeki - bookish, con un gusto para las pipas, Yeats y Wordsworth - ha pasado el pasado que pocos días ensconced en el estudio presidencial, bosquejando el discurso que él espera persuadirá a congreso nacional africano (ANC) darle un tercer término como líder del partido.
En cambio Sr. Zuma, populist del firebrand dado a usar el vestido tribal, hacía lo que él hace lo más mejor posible: saludando los partidarios eufóricos en la “victoria” se reúne arriba y abajo del país, confidente que él quitará el puesto a su gran rival.
Si eligen a Sr. Zuma como presidente de ANC durante el congreso del partido, que comienza mañana, él está casi seguro de ser el candidato del partido en la elección presidencial 2009; una encuesta que el ANC está asegurado de ganar, dado su apretón total en energía en el país 13 años después del final del apartheid.
Barran a Sr. Mbeki, que padres eran profesores y activistas, constitucional de estar parado para un tercer término como presidente de Suráfrica. Pero él es desesperado conservar el control del ANC de modo que él pueda influenciar la opción de su sucesor como el líder del país. Es increíble que él untaría a Sr. Zuma, a que él despidió mientras que presidente del diputado de ANC en 2005 después de que lo ligaran a un escándalo de los brazos de la multibillonario-libra.
La corrupción carga contra Sr. Zuma, el hijo de una criada doméstica, derrumbado el año pasado en una tecnicidad. Él también batió una carga separada de la violación el pasado mes de mayo, que muchos de sus partidarios creen fueron orquestrados por los favorables-Mbeki partidarios en un intento por consignarlo a la oscuridad política.
Al principio, se parecía haber trabajado. La opinión pública fue ultrajada por la admisión de Sr. Zuma que él tenía sexo desprotegido con la hija de 32 años de un amigo de la familia que era VIH positivo y llamado lo “tío”.
Él dijo más adelante que él tomó una ducha para reducir las ocasiones de la infección; una declaración que aterró a activistas en un país en donde 900 personas un dado del día de ayudas.
Sr. Zuma luchó detrás, capitalizando en impopularidad de Sr. Mbeki, particularmente entre los pobres del municipio, que han visto poca ventaja de negocio-amistoso, las políticas económicas del favorable-mercado que han conducido a un período sin par del desarrollo económico.
El soporte del “denialist” del presidente en ayudas, su denegación para criticar acontecimientos en Zimbabwe vecino, y la falta de contener adentro - o aún admitir a - uno de las tarifas de crimen peores del mundo, y de sus viajes frecuentes al exterior a más futuro su visión de un “renacimiento africano” jugaron todo en las manos de su rival.
En las conferencias regionales a decidir sobre los nombramientos para la conferencia de cinco años nacional, Sr. Mbeki recibió solamente 1.400 votos y el forro de cuatro fuera de nueve provincias.
Sr. Zuma tomó 2.232 votos y cinco provincias. Él también ha ganado el endoso de la liga y, en un revés asombroso para de Sr. izquierdistas Mbeki, que de la juventud tiene derechas constantemente tocadas la trompeta del género, la liga de las mujeres de ANC. La reaparición asombrosa de Sr. Zuma ha venido en un precio enorme. El ANC poderoso, que derrotó la regla blanca de la minoría con la unidad y la organización apretada, ahora hace frente a la fractura peor de su historia de 95 años, presentando el país con la crisis política más grande desde el final del apartheid en 1994.
En un comentario raro sobre Sr. Mbeki de la situación, que tomó la oficina cuando caminó Nelson Mandela abajo, dijo ayer que la competencia amarga podría destruir el partido. “Si la división conduce a la recompensa, eso es qué destruirá el ANC. . . La parte de nuestra responsabilidad es evitar tal resultado,” Sr. Mbeki dicho en una entrevista con el correo y el guarda semanales. “Debemos tomar esta cosa lejos de personalidades. Las masas de nuestra gente no están interesadas en quién baila lo más mejor posible,” él agregaron.
De nuevo, sin embargo, Sr. Mbeki, que ha sido tomado claramente el aback por la fuerza de la oposición él, aparece tenerla incorrecta. Respondiendo a la crítica que él ha sofocado el discusión, él dijo: ¿“Miro como si tenga cuernos? Ha dicho que bloqueo el discusión e inhibo la discusión abierta - que está desconcertando a mí. Es totalmente falso. ”
El tussle entre los dos hombres, que serán colocados por un voto de 5.000 delegados el lunes, ha sido desprovisto de virtualmente cualquier discusión de la política, aunque Sr. Zuma ha prometido hacer ayudas y prioridades del nacional del crimen.
Él también, ha cortejado recientemente asiduo negocio grande en un esfuerzo de perder a su “campeón” de la imagen pobre y de aliviar miedos que él caería políticas del libre-mercado.
Los analistas políticos sugieren que la característica y los negocios blancos no estuvieran a riesgo, pero dicen que una presidencia de Zuma representaría una rotura importante con el pasado y el país podría mirar mucho más bién otras naciones africanas, con una regla del “hombre grande”.
Buchizya Mseteka, experto en África meridional, dicha: “El país está en un momento crucial. Una presidencia de Zuma sería muy diferente en estilo y sustancia. Él debe muchos favores de la gente y así que el patrocinio, ya importante, sería aún más crítico. ”
Otros concurren, decir que los días de “un poco de Europa en África” serían numerados. “Cultural el país podría ser más confidente y asertivo,” un soporte de Zuma dijo. “Podría parecer una versión acertada de Nigeria. ”
Molesto en una muchedumbre e incómodo en las ceremonias africanas tradicionales, subida de Sr. Mbeki a la energía vino como resultado de politicking astuto del backroom y de su proximidad a las figuras mayores de ANC. Él ensambló el partido en la edad de 14, pero pasado la mayor parte de su vida en exilio en instrucciones de ANC. Incluso su unión, en 1974, tuvo que ser aprobada por la dirección del partido. En cambio, Sr. Zuma, un Zulú, se mueve fácilmente desde militancia izquierdista del municipio a las ceremonias tradicionales de la aldea, donde él pone loincloths del leopardskin. Él ha engendrado 17 niños a partir de cuatro esposas oficiales, pero vueltas tales ediciones a su ventaja. La “otra piel política de los líderes el hecho tienen amantes. . . Soy un hombre africano y orgulloso de mi cultura,” él dijo los tiempos en una entrevista reciente. “Admito mis averías y no niego que soy humano. Otros mienten. Los”
funcionarios de ANC son así que tratado sobre una humillación pública de Sr. Mbeki que han prohibido todas las camisetas blasonadas con los lemas que apoyaban a un candidato o al otro del centro de conferencia en la ciudad norteña soñolienta de Polokwane, provincia de Limpopo. Saben que pocos personas usarán los favorables-Mbeki, mientras que ésos que llevaban las leyendas “100 por ciento Zuma” y “muchacho del Zulú” han estado vendiendo en sus millares por semanas.
A pesar de negociar del caballo y acusaciones de las manos del cambio de divisas y ofertas de última hora frenéticos de trabajos y de promociones, los iniciados de ANC eliminan cualquier ocasión de los votos que hacen pivotar de Sr. Mbeki detrás en su favor en la conferencia. “El mejor que él podría esperar ahora es un aplazamiento, pero él ha jugado sus tarjetas gravemente e incluso eso es una ocasión exterior,” un funcionario comentó.
Los querellantes han indicado que podrían Sr. inmóvil Zuma de la carga otra vez, sino no haber podido hasta ahora traer un caso que son confidentes darían lugar a una convicción. Si él toma la presidencia de ANC es dudosa si cualquier querellante se atrevería a traer cargas.
“Jacob Zuma tendrá una inmunidad presidencial oficiosa - tomaría a hombre muy valiente para cargar al presidente de ANC. No puedo verlo el suceder,” dijo las chispas de Allister, el periodista del veterano y autor. La mayoría de los miembros de ANC creen que Sr. Zuma era una víctima de un diagrama al lado de los partidarios de Mbeki. Discuten que trataran a Sr. Zuma, que pasó diez años en la isla de Robben y después hizo el jefe del ala militar del ANC, gravemente. También le acreditan con terminar una guerra civil viciosa en los años 90 entre ANC y el partido Zulú-dominado de la libertad de Inkatha en KwaZulu-Natal.
Otro calcula que implicado en el escándalo de los brazos recibió mucho más que el £35,000 que acusaron a Sr. Zuma de embolsar. No se han perseguido, conduciendo a las alegaciones que el presidente empleaba mal fondos del estado para colocar un vendetta político.
“Zuma es un tradicionalista africano. Él no puede entregar posiblemente a todos los distritos electorales que lo han apoyado si él hace presidente, pero en el momento que la gente no cuida, ella acaban de tenerlo con Mbeki y el suyo aloofness percibido,” Sr. Sparks dicho.
En Soweto había ayer poca condolencia para el presidente. “Nos JWs dejan al pie que mientras que los bigwigs conducen alrededor en coches rápidos,” dijo Philemon, un constructor parado, como él señalamos en el BMWs y Mercedes de la nueva élite negra - los diamantes negros doblados - que han hecho fortunas en la economía que crecía. Cerca de 40 por ciento de la población del país siguen siendo desempleados y han considerado poca mejora en estándares vivos desde la llegada de la regla de la mayoría.
El autor
Occidental-amistoso del estilo de la edad 65
de Thabo Mbeki de los CANDIDATOS de una niñez intelectual del “renacimiento africano
” sus padres era profesores e intelectuales de ANC, como cerca de una educación de la clase media al igual que posible cuando
el hijo de la familia una por una relación adolescente, que fue matada mientras que intentaba escapar Suráfrica. Casó a su esposa Zanele en 1974
el apartheid que los años ensamblaron el ANC envejecido 14, pero huido después de detenciones de Walter Sisulu y de Nelson Mandela. Él ganó un masters en Gran Bretaña en la universidad de Sussex, fue a entrenar en táctica del guerrilla en Moscú, entonces movida a las jefaturas de ANC en exilio en el hombre
“grande” africano
del estilo de la edad 65 de Jacob Zuma de Zambia, cómodo en la niñez tribal
del vestido nacida en la pobreza, su padre muerto en su infancia. No recibió a ninguna esposa oficial
de la familia cuatro de la enseñanza convencional y a 17 niños. La “otra piel política de los líderes el hecho tienen amantes. . . Soy un hombre africano y orgulloso de mi cultura,” él dijo
los años del apartheid arrestados en cargas de conspiración derrocar el gobierno, Zuma incarcerated en la prisión de la isla de Robben por diez años. En su lanzamiento él ayudó a instalar la resistencia subterránea de ANC, antes de mover en exilio entre la fuente 1975 y
1990: ANC
I fratelli in armi contro segregazione, ora Thabo Mbeki e Jacob Zuma si affrontano in una lotta amara per alimentazione
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
Jonathan Clayton a Johannesburg
le loro famiglie compartecipi nella lotta contro segregazione ed entrambe ha svolto un ruolo prominente nella regola bianca di minoranza di conclusione in Sudafrica. Ma Thabo Mbeki, il presidente del paese e Jacob Zuma, il suo sfidante principale, vengono dai mondi molto differenti.
I due uomini, sia 65 che una volta che i camerati in armi, sono agganciati in una lotta amara di alimentazione che minaccia di distruggere il movimento che enfranchised gli Africani del sud neri e trascina il paese più profondo in agitazione.
Il sig. Mbeki - bookish, con un gusto per i tubi, Yeats e Wordsworth - ha speso i giorni ultimi ensconced nello studio presidenziale, disegnante il discorso che spera persauderà il congresso nazionale africano (ANC) di dargli un terzo termine come capo del partito.
In opposizione il sig. Zuma, un populist del firebrand dato a portare il vestito tribale, stava facendo che cosa fa il più bene: greeting i sostenitori euforici “alla vittoria„ si raduna su e giù il paese, sicuro che unseat il suo rivale grande.
Se il sig. Zuma è scelto come presidente di ANC durante il congresso del partito, che comincerà domani, è quasi sicuro essere il candidato del partito nell'elezione presidenziale 2009; uno scrutinio che il ANC si assicura di vincita, dato alla relativa presa totale su alimentazione nel paese 13 anni dopo la conclusione di segregazione.
Il sig. Mbeki, di cui i genitori erano insegnanti e attivisti, costituzionalmente è escluso dal levarsi in piedi per un terzo termine come presidente della Sudafrica. Ma è disperato mantenere il controllo del ANC in moda da poterlo influenzare lui la scelta del suo successore come il capo del paese. È impensabile che anoint il sig. Zuma, quale ha allontanato mentre presidente del delegato di ANC in 2005 dopo che sia stato collegato ad uno scandalo di armi della miliardario-libbra.
La corruzione si carica contro il sig. Zuma, il figlio di una domestica domestica, crollato l'anno scorso su una tecnicità. Inoltre ha battuto una carica separata della violenza maggio scorso, che molti dei suoi sostenitori credono sono stati disposti dai pro-Mbeki sostenitori nel tentativo di consegnarli a obscurity politico.
Inizialmente, ha sembrato funzionare. L'opinione pubblica è stata oltraggiata dall'ammissione del sig. Zuma che ha avuto sesso non protetto con la figlia di 32 anni di un amico della famiglia che era HIV positivo e denominato lui “zio„.
Successivamente ha detto che ha preso un acquazzone per ridurre le probabilità dell'infezione; una dichiarazione che appalled gli attivisti in un paese in cui 900 genti un dado di giorno dei sussidi.
Il sig. Zuma ha combattuto indietro, capitalizzando sul unpopularity del sig. Mbeki, specialmente fra i poveri di borgata, che hanno visto poco beneficio da commercio-amichevoli, le politiche economiche del pro-mercato che hanno condotto ad un periodo senza pari di sviluppo economico.
Il basamento “di denialist„ del presidente sui sussidi, il suo rifiuto per criticare gli eventi nello Zimbabwe vicino e l'omissione di frenare dentro - o persino ammettere a - uno dei tassi di crimine più difettosi del mondo e dei suoi frequenti viaggi all'estero ad ulteriore la sua visione “di una rinascita africana„ interamente hanno giocato nelle mani del suo rivale.
Nei congressi regionali da decidere delle nomine per il congresso ogni cinque anni nazionale, il sig. Mbeki ha ricevuto soltanto 1.400 voti e la protezione di quattro su nove province.
Il sig. Zuma ha preso 2.232 voti e cinque province. Inoltre ha vinto l'approvazione della lega della gioventù e, in una battuta d'arresto stupefacente per del sig. left-wing Mbeki, che ha diritti costantemente strombazzati di genere, la lega delle donne di ANC. Il comeback astonishing del sig. Zuma è venuto ad un prezzo enorme. Il ANC mighty, che ha sconfitto la regola bianca di minoranza con unità e l'organizzazione stretta, ora affronta la spaccatura più difettosa nella relativa storia di 95 anni, presentante il paese con la crisi politica più grande dalla conclusione di segregazione in 1994.
In un commento raro sul sig. Mbeki di situazione ieri, che ha preso l'ufficio quando il Nelson Mandela ha fatto un passo giù, ad esempio che il concorso amaro potrebbe distruggere il partito. “Se la divisione conduce a retribution, quello è che cosa distruggerà il ANC. . . La parte della nostra responsabilità è di evitare un tal risultato,„ il sig. Mbeki detto in un'intervista con la posta ed il guardiano settimanali. “Dobbiamo prendere questa cosa via dalle personalità. Le masse di nostra gente non sono interessate chi balla il più bene,„ in lui hanno aggiunto.
Ancora una volta, tuttavia, il sig. Mbeki, che è stato preso chiaramente il aback dalla resistenza dell'opposizione lui, sembra ottenerlo errata. Rispondendo alla critica che ha soffocato il dibattito, ha detto: “Osservo come se abbia ottenuto i corni? Ha detto che ostruisco il dibattito ed inibisco la discussione aperta - che sta imbarazzando a me. È completamente falso. „
Il tussle fra i due uomini, che saranno depositati da un voto di 5.000 delegati il lunedì, è stato privo di virtualmente tutta la discussione di politica, benchè il sig. Zuma avesse promesso di fare i sussidi e le priorità del cittadino di crimine.
Inoltre, recentemente, ha sollecitato assiduamente il commercio grande in uno sforzo perdere il suo “campione di povera„ immagine ed acquietare i timori che cadrebbe le politiche del libero-mercato.
Gli analisti politici suggeriscono che la proprietà ed i commerci bianchi non sarebbero al rischio, ma dicono che una presidenza di Zuma rappresenterebbe una rottura importante con il passato ed il paese potrebbe osservare molto più come altre nazioni africane, con “un righello dell'uomo grande„.
Buchizya Mseteka, un esperto sull'Africa del sud, ad esempio: “Il paese è ad una svolta. Una presidenza di Zuma sarebbe molto differente nello stile ed in sostanza. Deve molti favori della gente ed in modo da il patronato, già importante, sarebbe ancor più critico. „
Altri concordano, ad esempio che i giorni “di una punta piccola di Europa in Africa„ sarebbero numerati. “Culturalmente il paese potrebbe essere più sicuro ed assertive,„ un appoggio di Zuma ha detto. “Potrebbe assomigliare ad una versione riuscita della Nigeria. „
A disagio in una folla e scomodo alle cerimonie africane tradizionali, aumento del sig. Mbeki ad alimentazione è venuto come conseguenza politicking astuto del backroom e della sua prossimità alle figure maggiori di ANC. Ha unito il partito all'età di 14, ma ha speso la maggior parte della sua vita nel exile sulle istruzioni di ANC. Anche la sua unione, in 1974, ha dovuto essere approvata dalla direzione del partito. In opposizione, il sig. Zuma, uno zulù, si muove facilmente dalla militanza left-wing di borgata verso le cerimonie tradizionali del villaggio, dove indossa i loincloths del leopardskin. Ha generato 17 bambini da quattro mogli ufficiali, ma le girate tali edizioni al suo vantaggio. “L'altro pellame politico dei capi il fatto hanno mistresses. . . Sono un uomo africano e fiero della mia coltura,„ ha detto ai tempi in un'intervista recente. “Ammetto i miei difetti e non nego che sono umano. Altri si trovano. „
I funzionari di ANC sono in modo da interessato circa un humiliation pubblico del sig. Mbeki che hanno vietato tutti i T-shirts blasonati con gli slogan che sostengono un candidato o l'altro dal centro di congresso nella città nordica sleepy di Polokwane, provincia di Limpopo. Sanno che poca gente porterà quei pro-Mbeki, mentre quelle che sopportano le leggende “100 per cento Zuma„ e “ragazzo zulù„ stanno vendendo nelle loro migliaia per le settimane.
Malgrado il commercio del cavallo e le accuse delle mani di cambio e le offerte dell'ultimo minuto frantic dei lavori e delle promozioni, i membri di ANC eliminano tutta la probabilità dei voti d'oscillazione del sig. Mbeki indietro nel suo favore al congresso. “Il la cosa migliore che potrebbe sperare per ora è un rinvio, ma ha giocato male le sue schede e perfino quella è una probabilità esterna,„ un funzionario ha commentato.
I procuratori hanno indicato che potrebbero ancora il sig. tranquillo Zuma della carica, ma finora non riuscire a portare un caso che sono sicuri provocherebbero una convinzione. Se prende la presidenza di ANC è dubbio che qualunque procuratore abbia osato portare le spese.
“Jacob Zuma avrà un'immunità presidenziale ufficiosa - prenderebbe un uomo molto brave per caricare il presidente di ANC. Non posso vederlo accadere,„ ha detto le scintille di Allister, il giornalista del veterano ed autore. La maggior parte dei membri di ANC credono che il sig. Zuma sia stato una vittima di un diagramma dai sostenitori del Mbeki. Sostengono che il sig. Zuma, che ha speso dieci anni sull'isola di Robben ed allora è diventato la testa dell'ala militare del ANC, è stato curato male. Inoltre è accreditato la conclusione della guerra civile viziosa negli anni 90 fra ANC ed il partito Zulu-dominato di libertà di Inkatha in KwaZulu-Natale.
Altro calcola che implicato nello scandalo di armi ha ricevuto molto più del £35,000 che il sig. Zuma è stato accusato di intascare. Non sono stati perseguiti, conducenti alle allegazioni di che il presidente stava abusando dichiara i fondi monetari per depositare un vendetta politico.
“Zuma è un tradizionalista africano. Non può possibilmente trasportare a tutti i collegi elettorali che lo hanno sostenuto se diventa presidente, ma dal momento che la gente non si preoccupa, lo hanno avuto appena con Mbeki e suo aloofness percepito,„ il sig. Sparks detta.
In Soweto ieri ci era poca compassione per il presidente. “JWs siamo lasciati al piede che mentre i bigwigs guidano intorno in automobili veloci,„ ha detto Philemon, un costruttore disoccupato, come lui abbiamo indicato al BMWs ed a Mercedes di nuova elite nera - diamanti neri dubbed - che hanno fatto le fortune nell'economia crescente. Circa 40 per cento della popolazione del paese rimangono senza lavoro ed hanno visto poco miglioramento nei campioni viventi dall'arrivo della regola di maggioranza.
Il fautore
Occidentale-amichevole di stile di età 65
di Thabo Mbeki dei CANDIDATI “di un'infanzia intellettuale di rinascita africana
„ i suoi genitori era insegnanti ed intellettuali di ANC, come vicino ad un upbringing del codice categoria centrale come era possibile quando
il figlio della famiglia una da un rapporto teenage, che è stato ucciso mentre provava a fuoriuscire la Sudafrica. Ha sposato la sua moglie Zanele in 1974
la segregazione che gli anni hanno unito il ANC anziano 14, ma fuggito dopo gli arresti di Walter Sisulu e del Nelson Mandela. Ha guadagnato una laurea in Gran-Bretagna all'università di Sussex, è andato addestrare nelle tattiche del guerrigliero a Mosca, allora spostata verso le sedi di ANC nel exile nell'uomo
“grande„ di stile
di età 65 del Jacob Zuma dello Zambia africano, comodo nell'infanzia tribale
del vestito sopportata in povertà, il suo padre morto nella sua infanzia. Non ha ricevuto mogli ufficiali
della famiglia quattro di educazione scolastica e 17 bambini. “L'altro pellame politico dei capi il fatto hanno mistresses. . . Sono un uomo africano e fiero della mia coltura,„ ha detto
gli anni di segregazione arrestati sulle spese della cospirazione overthrow il governo, Zuma incarcerated nella prigione dell'isola di Robben per dieci anni. Sul suo rilascio ha contribuito a presentare in su la resistenza sotterranea di ANC, entrare nel exile fra la fonte 1975 e
1990: ANC
Brüder in den Armen gegen Apartheid, jetzt Thabo Mbeki und Jacob Zuma stellen sich in einem bitteren Kampf für Energie gegenüber
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Jonathan Clayton in Johannesburg
ihre Familien, die im Kampf gegen Apartheid und beide geteilt wurden, spielte eine vorstehende Rolle in der weißen Minoritätrichtlinie des Endes in Südafrika. Aber Thabo Mbeki, Präsident des Landes und Jacob Zuma, sein Hauptherausforderer, kommen von den sehr unterschiedlichen Welten.
Die zwei Männer, 65 und sobald Kameraden in den Armen, an einem bitteren Energie Kampf teilnehmen, der bedroht, die Bewegung zu zerstören, die schwarze Südafrikaner enfranchised und das Land schleppt, das in Tumult tiefer ist.
Herr Mbeki - gelehrt, mit einem Geschmack für Rohre, Yeats und Wordsworth - hat die letzten Tage verbracht, die in der Präsidentenstudie verborgen werden und die Rede gezeichnet, die er hofft, überzeugt den afrikanischen Nationalkongreß (ANC) ihm eine dritte Bezeichnung als Parteiführer zu geben.
Demgegenüber tat Herr Zuma, ein Firebrandpopulist, der zum Tragen des Stammes- Kleides gegeben wurde, was er gut tut: euphorische Verfechter „am Sieg“ grüßend, sammelt auf und ab das Land, überzeugt, dem er seinen großen Rivalen vom Sitz wirft.
Wenn Herr Zuma gewählt wird, wie ANC Präsident während des Kongresses der Partei, der morgen anfängt, ist er fast sicher, der Anwärter der Partei in der Präsidentenwahl 2009 zu sein; eine Abstimmung, daß das ANC vom Gewinnen versichert wird, seinem Gesamtgriff auf Energie im Land 13 Jahre nach dem Ende von Apartheid gegeben.
Herr Mbeki, dessen Eltern Lehrer und Aktivisten waren, wird konstitutionell vom Stehen für eine dritte Bezeichnung als Präsident von Südafrika abgehalten. Aber er ist hoffnungslos, Steuerung des ANC zu behalten, damit er die Wahl seines Nachfolgers als der Führer des Landes beeinflussen kann. Es ist undenkbar, daß er Herrn Zuma anoint, den er während ANC Abgeordnetpräsident 2005 entließ, nachdem er mit einem Milliarden-zerstoßene Armskandal verbunden wurde.
Korruption lädt gegen Herrn Zuma, der Sohn eines inländischen Mädchens, eingestürztes letztes Jahr auf einer Technik auf. Er schlug auch eine unterschiedliche Raubaufladung letzter Mai, dem viele seiner Verfechter wurden instrumentiert durch Pro-Mbeki Verfechter, um ihn zum politischen Obscurity zu überliefern glauben.
Anfangs schien es gearbeitet zu haben. Öffentliche Meinung wurde durch Aufnahme Herrn Zumas verletzt, daß er ungeschütztes Geschlecht mit der 32 Einjahrestochter eines Familie Freunds hatte, der HIV war-, der positiv und ihn „Onkel“ angerufen ist.
Er sagte später, daß er eine Dusche nahm, um die Wahrscheinlichkeiten der Infektion zu verringern; eine Aussage, die Aktivisten in einem Land in dem 900 Leute ein Tageswürfel der Hilfsmittel entsetzte.
Herr Zuma kämpfte zurück und schrieb auf Unpopularität Herrn Mbekis, besonders unter den Gemeindearmen, die wenig Nutzen von Geschäft-freundlichem gesehen haben, Pro-markt Wirtschaftspolitik gross, die zu eine unvergleichliche Periode des Wirtschaftswachstums geführt haben.
Der „denialist“ des Präsidenten Standplatz auf Hilfsmitteln, seine Ablehnung, zum von Fällen in benachbartem Zimbabwe zu kritisieren und Störung rein innen - oder sogar zu zulassen - eine der schlechtesten Verbrechensraten der Welt und seiner häufigen Reisen auswärts zu weiterem sein Anblick einer „afrikanischen Renaissance“ spielten ganz in Hände seines Rivalen.
In den regionalen Konferenzen, zum auf Nennungen für die Fünfjahres- nationale Konferenz zu entscheiden, empfing Herr Mbeki nur 1.400 Stimmen und den Schutzträger von vier aus neun Provinzen heraus.
Herr Zuma nahm 2.232 Stimmen und fünf Provinzen. Er hat auch die Aufschrift der left-wing Jugend-Liga und, in einem erstaunlichen Hindernis für des Herrn Mbeki, der durchweg trompetete Geschlechtrechte hat, die Liga der ANC Frauen gewonnen. Erstaunliches Comeback Herrn Zumas ist zu einem sehr großen Preis gekommen. Das mächtige ANC, das weiße Richtlinie der Minorität durch Einheit und feste Organisation besiegte, stellt jetzt die schlechteste Spalte in seiner 95-Jahr-Geschichte gegenüber und stellt das Land mit der größten politischen Krise seit dem Ende von Apartheid 1994 dar.
In einer seltenen Anmerkung zu Situation gestern Herrn Mbeki, der Amt übernahm, als Nelson Mandela unten trat, sagte, daß der bittere Wettbewerb die Partei zerstören könnte. „Wenn Abteilung zu Vergeltung führt, ist das, was das ANC zerstört. . . Der Teil unserer Verantwortlichkeit ist, solch ein Resultat zu vermeiden,“ Herr Mbeki, das in einem Interview mit der wöchentlichen Post und dem Wächter gesagt wird. „Wir müssen diese Sache weg von den Beschaffenheiten nehmen. Die Massen unserer Leute sind nicht an wer gut tanzt,“ ihm hinzufügten interessiert.
Noch einmal jedoch scheint Herr Mbeki, dem offenbar ihm aback durch die Stärke der Opposition genommen worden ist, sie zu haben falsch. Reagierend auf Kritik, daß er Debatte erstickt hat, sagte er: „Schaue ich, als ob ich Horne habe? Es hat gesagt, daß ich Debatte blockiere und geöffnete Diskussion hemme - die zu mir verwirrt. Es ist vollständig untrue. “
Das tussle zwischen den zwei Männern, die durch eine Stimme von 5.000 Delegierten am Montag vereinbart werden, ist von praktisch jeder möglicher Politikdiskussion leer gewesen, obwohl Herr Zuma versprochen hat, Hilfsmittel und Verbrechenstaatsangehörigprioritäten zu bilden.
Er hat auch vor kurzem eifrig Grossbetrieb in einer Bemühung, seinen „Meister des schlechten“ Bildes zu verlieren und Furcht zu mildern umworben, daß er Freimarkt politische Richtlinien fallenlassen würde.
Politische Analytiker schlagen, daß weiße Eigenschaft und Geschäfte nicht an der Gefahr sein würden vor, aber sagen, daß ein Zuma Vorsitz einen Hauptbruch mit der Vergangenheit darstellen würde und das Land viel eher wie andere afrikanische Nationen schauen könnte, mit einer Lehre „des grossen Mannes“.
Buchizya Mseteka, ein Experte auf Südafrika, gesagt: „Das Land ist an einem Drehpunkt. Ein Zuma Vorsitz würde in der Art und in der Substanz sehr unterschiedlich sein. Er verdankt viele Leutebevorzugungen und also würde das Patronat, bereits wichtig, sogar kritisch sein. “
Andere stimmen, sagen überein, daß die Tage von „ein wenig von Europa in Afrika“ numeriert würden. „Kulturell könnte das Land überzeugter sein und assertive,“ sagte ein Zuma Beistand. „Es könnte wie eine erfolgreiche Version von Nigeria aussehen. “
Unbehaglich in einer Masse und unbequem an den traditionellen afrikanischen Zeremonien, Aufstieg Herrn Mbekis zur Energie kam resultierend aus dem schlauen backroom Politicking und seiner Nähe zu den älteren ANC Abbildungen. Er verband die Partei am Alter von 14, aber verbrachte die meisten seines Lebens im Exil auf ANC Anweisungen. Sogar mußte seine Verbindung, 1974, durch die Parteiführung genehmigt werden. Demgegenüber zieht Herr Zuma, ein Zulu, leicht vom left-wing Gemeinde Militancy auf traditionelle Dorfzeremonien um, in denen er leopardskin loincloths anzieht. Er hervorbringen 17 Kinder von vier amtlichen Frauen, aber Umdrehungen solche Ausgaben zu seinem Vorteil. „Anderes politisches Führerfell die Tatsache haben sie Geliebten. . . Ich bin ein afrikanischer Mann und stolz auf meine Kultur,“ er erklärte die Zeiten in einem neuen Interview. „Ich lasse meine Störungen zu und verweigere nicht, daß ich menschlich bin. Andere liegen. “
ANC Beamte sind also betroffen über eine allgemeine Erniedrigung von Herrn Mbeki, daß sie alle T-Shirts verboten haben, die mit den Slogans blasoniert werden, die einen Anwärter oder den anderen vom Konferenzzentrum in der schläfrigen Nordstadt von Polokwane, Limpopo Provinz stützen. Sie wissen, daß wenige Leute die Pro-Mbeki tragen werden, während die, welche die Legenden „100 Prozent Zuma“ und „Zulu-Junge“ tragen, in ihren Tausenden für Wochen verkauft haben.
Trotz des wild last-minute Pferd Handelns und der Anklagen des Geldes - ändernde Hände und Angebote der Jobs und der Förderungen, ANC Eingeweihte streichen jede mögliche Wahrscheinlichkeit der schwingstimmen Herrn Mbeki zurück zu seinen Gunsten bei der Konferenz durch. „Das beste, das er für jetzt hoffen könnte, ist ein Aufschub, aber er hat seine Karten schlecht gespielt und sogar die ist eine äußere Wahrscheinlichkeit,“ ein Beamter kommentierte.
Verfolger haben, daß sie ruhiger Aufladung Herr Zuma wieder konnten, aber, einen Fall holen bis jetzt nicht gekonnt zu haben angezeigt, den sie würden ergeben eine überzeugung überzeugt sind. Wenn er den ANC Vorsitz nimmt, ist er zweifelhaft, ob irgendein Verfolger trauen würde, Aufladungen zu holen.
„Jacob Zuma hat eine nicht offizielle Präsidentenimmunität - sie würde einen sehr tapferen Mann nehmen, um den ANC Präsidenten aufzuladen. Ich kann nicht es sehen, zu geschehen,“ sagte Allister Funken, der Veteranjournalist und Autor. Die meisten ANC Mitglieder glauben, daß Herr Zuma ein Opfer eines Plots durch Mbeki Verfechter war. Sie argumentieren, daß Herr Zuma, der 10 Jahre auf Robben Insel verbrachte und dann der Kopf des militärischen Flügels des ANCS wurde, schlecht behandelt wurde. Er wird auch das Ende eines schändlichen Bürgerkrieges in den neunziger Jahren zwischen ANC und der Zulu-vorherrsch Inkatha Freiheit Partei in KwaZulu-Geburts- gutgeschrieben.
Anderes stellt dar, daß beteiligt im Armskandal viel mehr als das £35,000 empfing, daß Herr Zuma vom Einstecken beschuldigt wurde. Sie sind nicht ausgeübt worden und geführt zu Behauptungen, daß der Präsident Zustandkapital fehlanwendete, um ein politisches vendetta zu vereinbaren.
„Zuma ist ein afrikanischer Traditionalist. Er kann nicht an alle Wahlkreise vielleicht liefern, die ihn gestützt haben, wenn er Präsident wird, aber, in dem Augenblick als Leute sich nicht interessieren, haben sie gerade es mit Mbeki und seinem wahrgenommene Zurückhaltung gehabt,“ Herr gesagtes Sparks.
In Soweto gestern gab es wenig Sympathie für den Präsidenten. „Wir JWs werden Fuß, den überlassen es, während die bigwigs herum in schnelle Autos fahren,“ Philemon sagte, einen arbeitslosen Erbauer, als er zeigten beim BMWs und bei Mercedes der neuen schwarzen Auslese - betitelte schwarze Diamanten - die Vermögen in der dröhnenden Wirtschaft gebildet haben. Ungefähr 40 Prozent der Bevölkerung des Landes bleibt arbeitslos und hat wenig Verbesserung in lebenden Standards seit der Ankunft der Majorität Richtlinie gesehen.
DER ANWÄRTER
Thabo Mbeki Alter 65
Westlich-freundliche Antragsteller der Art einer intellektuellen „afrikanische Renaissance-“
Kindheit seine Eltern waren Lehrer und ANC Intellektuelle, wie nah an einer mittlere Kategorie Erziehung, wie zu der Zeit als Familie eine
Sohn durch ein Jugend-Verhältnis möglich, das beim Versuchen, Südafrika zu entgehen getötet wurde. Heiratete seine Frau Zanele in 1974
die Apartheid, die Jahre das gealterte ANC 14 verbanden, aber geflohen nach Anhalten von Walter Sisulu und von Nelson Mandela. Er erwarb einen Hauptgrad in Großbritannien an der Universität von Sussex, ging, in den Bandenkämpfertaktiken in Moskau auszubilden, dann verschoben auf die ANC Hauptsitze im Exil Sambia
Jacob Zuma Alter 65
im Art-afrikanischen „grossen Mann“, bequem in der Stammes- Kleid
Kindheit, die in Armut, sein Vater getragen wurde, der in seiner Kindheit gestorben wurde. Empfing keine formale Ausbildung
Familie vier amtlichen Frauen und 17 Kinder. „Anderes politisches Führerfell die Tatsache haben sie Geliebten. . . Ich bin ein afrikanischer Mann und stolz auf meine Kultur,“ er sagte
die Apartheid Jahre, die auf Aufladungen des Verschwörens, die Regierung festgehalten wurden, Zuma zu besiegen wurde im Robben Inselgefängnis für 10 Jahre eingesperrt. Auf seiner Freigabe half er, den ANC unterirdischen Widerstand aufzustellen, bevor er in Exil zwischen Quelle 1975 und 1990
bewog: ANC
Os irmãos nos braços de encontro ao apartheid, agora Thabo Mbeki e Jacob Zuma enfrentam-se em um esforço amargo para o poder
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
Jonathan Clayton em Joanesburgo
suas famílias compartilhadas no esforço de encontro ao apartheid e a ambos jogou um papel proeminente na régua branca do minority do ending em África do Sul. Mas Thabo Mbeki, o presidente do país, e Jacob Zuma, seu desafiador principal, vêm dos mundos muito diferentes.
Os dois homens, 65 e uma vez que os camaradas nos braços, são acoplados em um esforço amargo do poder que ameace destruir o movimento que enfranchised africanos sul pretos e arrasta o país mais profundo no turmoil.
O Sr. Mbeki - bookish, com um gosto para as tubulações, o Yeats e o Wordsworth - gastou o passado onde poucos dias ensconced no estudo presidencial, esboçando o discurso que espera persuadirá o Congress nacional africano (ANC) lhe dar um terceiro termo como o líder do partido.
No Sr. Zuma do contraste, um populist do firebrand dado a desgastar o vestido tribal, fazia o que faz melhor: cumprimentando supporters euphoric na “vitória” rallies acima e tragam o país, confiável que destituirá seu rival grande.
Se o Sr. Zuma for elegido como presidente de ANC durante o congress do partido, que começa amanhã, é quase certo que será o candidato do partido na eleição 2009 presidencial; uma votação que o ANC está assegurado de ganhar, dado seu aperto total no poder no país 13 anos após o fim do apartheid.
O Sr. Mbeki, cujos os pais eram professores e activistas, é barrado constitutionally de estar para um terceiro termo como o presidente de África do Sul. Mas é desesperado reter o controle do ANC de modo que possa influenciar a escolha de seu sucessor como o líder do país. É unthinkable que anoint o Sr. Zuma, quem demitiu enquanto presidente do deputado de ANC em 2005 depois que foi ligado a um scandal dos braços de multibillion-libra.
O Corruption carrega de encontro ao Sr. Zuma, filho de uma empregada doméstica doméstica, desmoronado o ano passado em um technicality. Bateu também uma carga separada da violação último maio, que muitos de seus supporters acreditam orchestrated por supporters pro-Mbeki em uma tentativa de consign o ao obscurity político.
No início, pareceu ter trabalhado. A opinião pública foi ultrajada pela admissão do Sr. Zuma que teve sexo desprotegido com a filha de 32 year-old de um amigo da família que fosse HIV positivo e chamado o “tio”.
Disse mais tarde que fêz exame de um chuveiro para reduzir as possibilidades da infecção; uma indicação que appalled activistas em um país onde 900 povos um dado do dia dos dae (dispositivo automático de entrada).
O Sr. Zuma lutou para trás, capitalising no unpopularity do Sr. Mbeki, particularmente entre os pobres do township, que viram pouco benefício de negócio-amigável, as políticas econômicas do pro-mercado que conduziram a um período unparalleled do crescimento econômico.
O carrinho do “denialist” do presidente em dae (dispositivo automático de entrada), sua recusa para criticar eventos em Zimbabwe neighbouring, e a falha controlar dentro - ou para admitir mesmo a - um das taxas de crime as mais más do mundo, e de seus desengates freqüentes no exterior a mais adicional sua visão “de um renascimento africano” jogaram toda nas mãos do seu rival.
Nas conferências regionais a decidir-se em nominations para a conferência de cinco anos nacional, o Sr. Mbeki recebeu somente 1.400 votos e o revestimento protetor de quatro fora de nove províncias.
O Sr. Zuma fêz exame de 2.232 votos e de cinco províncias. Ganhou também o endosso da liga da juventude e, em um setback surpreendente para do Sr. left-wing Mbeki, que tem direitas consistentemente tocadas trombeta do gender, a liga das mulheres de ANC. O comeback astonishing do Sr. Zuma veio em um preço enorme. O ANC poderoso, que derrotou a régua branca do minority com a unidade e a organização apertada, enfrenta agora o split o mais mau em uma sua história de 95 anos, apresentando o país com a crise política a mais grande desde o fim do apartheid em 1994.
Em um comentário raro no Sr. Mbeki da situação ontem, que fêz exame do escritório quando Nelson Mandela pisou para baixo, disse que a competição amarga poderia destruir o partido. “Se a divisão conduz ao retribution, aquele é o que destruirá o ANC. . . A parte de nossa responsabilidade é evitar tal resultado,” Sr. Mbeki dito em uma entrevista com o correio e o Guardian semanais. “Nós devemos fazer exame desta coisa longe das personalidades. As massas de nosso pessoa não estão interessadas quem dança melhor, no” ele adicionaram.
Uma vez que outra vez, entretanto, o Sr. Mbeki, que estêve feito exame claramente do aback pela força da oposição a ele, parece a ter começado errada. Respondendo ao criticism que stifled o debate, disse: “Eu olho como se eu comecei chifres? Disse que eu obstruo o debate e inibo a discussão aberta - que me está confundindo. É completamente untrue. ”
O tussle entre os dois homens, que serão estabelecidos por um voto de 5.000 delegados em segunda-feira, foi devoid de virtualmente toda a discussão da política, embora o Sr. Zuma prometeu fazer dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) e prioridades do nacional do crime.
Também, recentemente, cortejou assiduously o negócio grande em um esforço perder seu “campeão” da imagem pobre e allay medos que deixaria cair políticas do livre-mercado.
Os analistas políticos sugerem que a propriedade e os negócios brancos não seriam em risco, mas dizem que um presidency de Zuma representaria uma ruptura principal com o passado e o país poderia olhar muito mais como outras nações africanas, com “uma régua do homem grande”.
Buchizya Mseteka, um perito em África do sul, dita: “O país está em um ponto de giro. Um presidency de Zuma seria muito diferente no estilo e na substância. Deve muitos favores dos povos e assim que o patronage, já importante, seria ainda mais crítico. ”
Outros concur, dig que os dias de “de Europa em África” estariam numerados um pouco. “Culturally o país poderia ser mais confiável e assertive,” um suporte de Zuma disse. “Poderia olhar como uma versão bem sucedida de Nigéria. O”
mal - em - facilidade em uma multidão e incômodo nos ceremonies africanos tradicionais, ascensão do Sr. Mbeki ao poder veio em conseqüência de politicking astute do backroom e de seu closeness às figuras sênior de ANC. Juntou o partido na idade de 14, mas gastou a maioria de sua vida no exile em instruções de ANC. Mesmo sua união, em 1974, teve que ser aprovada pela liderança do partido. No contraste, o Sr. Zuma, um tribo Zulu, move-se fàcilmente do militancy left-wing do township para os ceremonies tradicionais da vila, onde dons loincloths do leopardskin. Genou 17 crianças de quatro esposas oficiais, mas voltas tais edições a sua vantagem. O “outro hide político dos líderes o fato têm mistresses. . . Eu sou um homem africano e orgulhoso de minha cultura,” disse os tempos em uma entrevista recente. “Eu admito minhas falhas e não nego que eu sou humano. Outros encontram-se. De”
os oficiais ANC são assim que concernido sobre um humiliation público do Sr. Mbeki que proibiram todos os T-shirts brasonados com os slogans que suportam um candidato ou o outro do centro de conferência na cidade do norte sleepy de Polokwane, província de Limpopo. Sabem que poucos povos estarão desgastando o pro-Mbeki, visto que aqueles que carregam as legendas “100 por cento Zuma” e do “menino tribo Zulu” têm vendido em seus milhares por semanas.
Apesar de negociar do cavalo e de accusations das mãos do câmbio e de ofertas last-minute frantic dos trabalhos e dos promotions, os insiders de ANC governam para fora toda a possibilidade de votos balançando do Sr. Mbeki para trás em seu favor na conferência. “O mais melhor que poderia esperar para agora é um postponement, mas jogou seus cartões mal e mesmo aquela é uma possibilidade exterior,” um oficial comentou.
Os Prosecutors indicaram que poderiam Sr. imóvel Zuma da carga outra vez, mas assim distante não trazem um caso que são confiáveis resultariam em uma convicção. Se fizer exame do presidency de ANC é duvidoso se qualquer prosecutor ousaria trazer cargas.
“Jacob Zuma terá um immunity presidencial unofficial - faria exame de um homem muito bravo para carregar o presidente de ANC. Eu não posso vê-lo acontecer,” disse faíscas de Allister, o journalist do veteran e autor. A maioria de membros de ANC acreditam que o Sr. Zuma era uma vítima de um lote por supporters de Mbeki. Discutem que o Sr. Zuma, que gastou dez anos no console de Robben e se transformou então a cabeça da asa militar do ANC, estêve tratado mal. É creditado também com terminar uma guerra civil vicious nos 1990s entre ANC e o partido Tribo Zulu-dominado da liberdade de Inkatha em KwaZulu-Natal.
Outro figura que involvido no scandal dos braços recebeu muito mais do que o £35,000 que o Sr. Zuma estêve acusado de pocketing. Não foram perseguidos, conduzindo aos allegations que o presidente empregava mal fundos do estado para estabelecir um vendetta político.
“Zuma é uma tradicionalista africana. Não pode possivelmente entregar a todos os círculos eleitorais que o suportaram se se transformasse presidente, mas no momento em que os povos não se importam, apenas tiveram-no com Mbeki e his aloofness percebido,” Sr. Acender dito.
Em Soweto ontem havia pouco sympathy para o presidente. “Nós JWs somos deixados ao pé que quando os bigwigs dirigirem ao redor em carros rápidos,” disse Philemon, um construtor unemployed, como ele apontamos no BMWs e em Mercedes do elite preto novo - os diamantes pretos dubbed - que fizeram fortunas na economia crescendo. Aproximadamente 40 por cento da população do país remanescem jobless e viram pouca melhoria em padrões vivos desde a chegada da régua da maioria.
O proponent
Ocidental-amigável do estilo da idade 65
de Thabo Mbeki dos CANDIDATOS “de uma infância intelectual do renascimento africano
” seus pais era professores e intelectuais de ANC, como perto de um upbringing da classe média como era possível então
o filho da família uma por um relacionamento teenage, que fosse matado ao tentar escapar de África do Sul. Casou sua esposa Zanele em 1974
o apartheid que os anos juntaram o ANC envelhecido 14, mas fujido após apreensões de Walter Sisulu e de Nelson Mandela. Ganhou um grau de mestres em Grâ Bretanha na universidade de Sussex, foi treinar em táticas do guerrilla em Moscow, movido então para as matrizes de ANC no exile no homem
“grande” africano
do estilo da idade 65 de Jacob Zuma da Zâmbia, confortável na infância tribal
do vestido carregada na pobreza, seu pai morrido em seu infancy. Não recebeu nenhuma esposa oficial
da família quatro da instrução formal e 17 crianças. O “outro hide político dos líderes o fato têm mistresses. . . Eu sou um homem africano e orgulhoso de minha cultura,” disse
os anos do apartheid prendidos em cargas de conspiring overthrow o governo, Zuma incarcerated na prisão do console de Robben por dez anos. Em sua liberação ajudou ajustar acima a resistência subterrânea de ANC, antes de mover-se em um exile entre a fonte 1975 e
1990: ANC
Bröder beväpnar in mot apartheid, nu Thabo Mbeki, och Jacob Zuma vänder mot varje annan i en bitter ansträngning för driver
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Jonathan Clayton i Johannesburg
deras familjer som delades i ansträngningen mot apartheid och båda, lekte en framstående roll i sinande vitminoritet härskar i Sydafrika. Men Thabo Mbeki, landets president och Jacob Zuma, hans huvudsakliga utmanare, kommer från mycket olika världar.
De två manarna, både 65 och, när vapenbröder, är förlovad i en bitterhet, driver ansträngning, som hotar för att förstöra rörelsen, som enfranchised svart södra afrikaner, och släpar landet som är djupare in i turmoil.
Herr Mbeki - som är boklärd, med en smak för, leda i rör, Yeats och Wordsworth - har spenderat de förgångna få dagarna ensconced i den presidents- studien som formulerar anförandet, som han hoppas ska, övertalar den afrikanska medborgarekongressen (ANC) för att ge honom som en third benämner som partiledare.
I kontrast Herr Zuma, en populistisk fallen för ha på sig stam- klänning för firebrand, gjorde vad han gör bäst: greeting euphoric supportrar på ”segern” samlar uppåt- och neråt landet som är säkert, som han ska unseat hans storerival.
Om Herr Zuma väljs, som ANC-presidenten under parti kongress, som börjar i morgon, är han nästan bestämd att vara parti kandidat i presidentval 2009; en röstning, att ANCEN försäkras av att segra, givet dess sammanlagda fattande på, driver i landet 13 år efter avsluta av apartheid.
Herr Mbeki, vars föräldrar var lärare och aktivister, bommas för constitutionally från att stå för en third benämner som president av Sydafrika. Men han är desperat att behålla kontrollerar av ANCEN så att honom canpåverkan det primat av hans efterträdare som ledare av landet. Det är otänkbart att han skulle anoint Herr Zuma, som han avfärdade, som den ställföreträdande presidenten för ANC i 2005, efter han anknöts till endunka, beväpnar skandal.
Korruption laddar mot Herr Zuma, sonen av en inhemsk maid, kollapsad i fjol på en technicality. Han slår också ett separat våldtar den sist maj för laddningen, som många av hans tro supportrar iscensattes av pro-Mbeki supportrar i ett försök att consign honom till politisk grumlighet.
Först verkade det för att ha fungerat. Allmän opinion grovt förolämpa av Herr Zumas erkännande att han hade oskyddat att könsbestämma med den åriga dottern 32 av en familjvän, som var HIV-realiteten och kallat honom ”unclen”.
Han mer sistnämnd said, som han tog en dusch för att förminska, riskerar av infektion; ett meddelande, som appalled aktivister i ett land, var 900 bemannar en dagmatris av, bistår.
Herr Zuma slogs tillbaka och att kapitalisera på den Herr Mbekis unpopularityen, bestämt bland den fattiga församlingen, som har sett lite för att gynna från affär-vänskapsmatch, pro-marknadsför näringspolitikar som har ledde till en exempellös period av ekonomisk tillväxt.
President ”det denialist” stativ bistår på, hans vägran att kritisera händelser i neighbouring Zimbabwe och fel att tygla in - eller även att medge - en av världens värst brottsfrekvenser, och his frekventerar snubblar utomlands för att främja hans vision av ”en afrikansk renässans” som lekas all in i hans rival, räcker.
I regionala konferenser som ska avgöras på utnämningar för five-yearly riksstämman, mottog Herr Mbeki, endast 1.400 röstar och täckningen av fyra ut ur nio landskap.
Herr Zuma tog 2.232 röstar och fem landskap. Han har också segrat stöd av den left-wing ungdomligan och, i ett fantastiskt bakslag för Herr Mbeki, som har konsekvent trumpetade genusrätter, ANC-kvinna liga. Herr Zumas har den häpnadsväckande återkomsten kommit på ett enormt prissätter. De väldiga ANCNA, som besegrade minoritetvit, härskar till och med enhet och åtsittande organisation, vänder mot nu den värst splittringen i dess 95 år historia som framlägger landet med den största politiska krisen sedan avsluta av apartheid i 1994.
I en sällsynt kommentar på läget Herr Mbeki, som tog kontoret, när Nelson klev Mandela besegrar, sade igår att den bittra striden kunde förstöra partit. Förstör ANCEN, ”om uppdelningsblytaket till vedergällning, det är ska vad. . . Delen av vårt ansvar är att undvika ett sådan resultat,” postar Herr Mbeki som sägs i en intervju med weeklyen, och förmyndaren. ”Måste vi ta detta ting i väg från personligheter. Samlas av vårt folk intresseras inte i vem dansar bäst,” honom tillfogade.
Ytterligare en gång emellertid, verkar Herr Mbeki, som har klart varit förbluffad vid styrkan av oppositionen till honom, att ha fått den fel. Reagera till kritik, som han har stifled debatt, sade han: ”Ser jag som, om jag har fått horns? Det har sagt att I-kvarterdebatten och förhindrar den öppna diskussionen - som förbryllar till mig. Det är fullständigt osannt. ”
Sättas har dusten mellan de två manarna, som ska, av en rösta av 5.000 delegater på Måndag, varit devoid av faktiskt någon politikdiskussion, fast Herr Zuma har lovat för att göra bistår och brotts- medborgareprioriteter.
Han också, för en tid sedan, har flitigt uppvaktat stora affärer i ett försök att förlora his ”mästare av det fattigt” avbildar och lugnar skräck som han skulle tappar fri-marknadsför politik.
Politisk analytiker föreslår att vitegenskapen och affärer skulle för att inte vara på riskerar, men något att säga, som en skulle Zuma presidentsämbete föreställer ett ha som huvudämneavbrott med förflutnan, och landet kunde se mycket mer något liknande andra afrikanska nationer, med en linjal ”för stor man”.
Buchizya Mseteka, ett sakkunnigt på sydliga Afrika som sägs: ”Är landet på en vändpunkt. En Zuma presidentsämbete skulle är mycket olik utformar in och vikten. Han varar skyldig många folk favörer och, så beskydd, redan viktigt som skulle är även mer kritisk. ”
Sammanfaller andra, ordstävet som dagarna av ”a bet lite av Europa i skulle Afrika” numreras. ”Culturally kunde landet vara säkrare, och självsäkert,” sade en Zuma hjälpare. ”Kunde det se likt en lyckad version av Nigeria. ”
Dåligt - på - lindra i en folkmassa och obekvämt på traditionella afrikanska ceremonier, den Herr Mbekis löneförhöjningen för att driva kom som ett resultat av skarpsinnig på baksidaen politicking, och hans closeness till pensionären ANC figurerar. Han sammanfogade partit på åldern av 14, men spenderat mest av hans liv i exil på ANC-anvisningar. Även måste hans förbindelse, i 1974, att vara godkänd vid partiledarskap. I kontrast Herr Zuma, en Zulu, flyttningar lätt från left-wing församlingmilitancy till traditionella byceremonier, var honom universitetslärareleopardskinloincloths. Han har avlat 17 barn från fyra officiella fruar, men sådan vänd utfärdar till hans fördel. ”Annat politisk ledareskinn faktumet har de husmor. . . Förmiddag I en afrikansk man och stolt av min kultur,” berättade han tiderna i en ny intervju. ”Medger jag mitt kritiserar och förnekar inte att I-förmiddagmänniskan. Andra ligger. ”
Är ANC-representanter så angått om en offentlig förödmjukelse av Herr Mbeki att de har förbjudit alla T-tröja emblazoned med den understödja en kandidaten för slogan eller annat från konferensen centrerar i den sömniga nordliga townen av Polokwane, det Limpopo landskapet. De vet att få människor ska ha på sig pro-Mbeki, eftersom de som uthärdar legenderna ”100 procent Zuma” och ”Zulupojken” har sålt i deras tusentals för veckor.
Utom sig last-minute kohandel för illvilja och beskyllningar av pengar - ändra räcker och erbjuder av jobb, och befordringar, ANC-insider härskar några riskerar ut av Herr Mbeki att svänga röstar tillbaka i hans favör på konferensen. ”Det bäst kunde han hoppas för nu är en uppskjutande, men han har lekt hans kort dåligt, och även det är en yttersida riskerar,” en kommenterad representant.
Åklagare har indikerat, att de kunde stilla laddningen Herr Zuma igen, men har så långt missat för att komma med ett fall som de är det säkra skulle resultatet i en övertygelse. Om han tar ANC-presidentsämbetet, är det tvivelaktigtt huruvida någon åklagare skulle utmaning att komma med laddningar.
”Har Jacob ska Zuma en inofficiell presidents- immunitet - den skulle taken en mycket modig man för att ladda ANC-presidenten. Jag kan inte se det att hända,” sade Allister Sparks, veteranjournalisten och författare. Mest ANC-medlemmar tror att Herr Zuma var ett offer av en täppa av Mbeki supportrar. De argumenterar den Herr Zuma, som spenderade tio år på den Robben ön och blev därefter huvudet av ANC'SENS militär påskyndar, behandlades dåligt. Han krediteras också med att avsluta en ondskefull inbördeskrig i 90-tal mellan ANC och detdominerade Inkatha frihetspartit i KwaZulu-Natal.
Annat figurerar involverat i beväpnar skandal mottog mycket mer än £35,000en att Herr Zuma anklagades av att stoppa i fickan. De har inte förfölts som leder till beskyllningar som presidenten missbrukade statliga fonder för att sätta en politisk vendetta.
”Är Zuma en afrikansk traditionalist. Han kan inte eventuellt leverera till alla valkretsar som har stöttat honom, om han blir presidenten, men på ögonblicket att bry sig har folket inte, dem haft precis den med Mbeki och hans märkte aloofness,” sagda Herr Sparks.
I Soweto igår fanns det lite sympati för presidenten. ”Vi JWs lämnas till foten som den fördriver höjdarna drev i fastar omkring bilar,”, sade Philemon, en arbetslös byggmästare, som honom pekade på BMWsen och Mercedes av den nya svart eliten - dubbade svart diamanter - som har gjort förmögenheter i den dåna ekonomin. Omkring 40 procent av landets befolkning återstår arbetslös och har sett lite förbättring i bosatt normal, sedan ankomsten av majoriteten härskar.
Den KANDIDAT
Thabo Mbeki åldern 65
utformar Västra-vänskapsmatchen förespråkare av en intellektuell barndom ”för afrikansk renässans
” som hans föräldrar var lärare och ANC-intellektueller, som nästan en medelklassuppfostran, som var möjligheten på sonen
för tidfamilj en vid ett tonårs- förhållande, som var dödade stunder som var prövas till flykten Sydafrika. Att gifta sig hans fru Zanele i 1974
apartheiden som år sammanfogade ANCEN som åldras 14, men flytt efter gripanden av Walter Sisulu och Nelson Mandela. Han tjänade a styr grad i Britannien på universitetar av Sussex, gick att utbilda i gerillasoldattaktik i Moscow, därefter som var rörd till ANC-högkvarteren i exil i Zambia
Jacob, Zuma som ålder 65
utformar den afrikanska ”stora manen” som är bekväm i stam- klänning
barndom som var född in i armod, hans fader som dogs i hans spädbarnsålder. Mottog inga fruar för familj
fyra för formell utbildning officiella och 17 barn. ”Annat politisk ledareskinn faktumet har de husmor. . . Förmiddag I en afrikansk man och stolt av min kultur,” sade han
apartheidåren som arresterades på laddningar av att konspirera som omstörtar regeringen, Zuma spärrades in i det Robben öfängelset för tio år. På hans frigörare hjälpte han till uppsättningen upp det underjordiska motståndet för ANC, för flyttning in i exil mellan källan 1975 och
1990: ANC
Братья в рукоятках против арартеида, теперь Thabo Mbeki и Jacob Zuma смотрят на в упорная борьба для силы
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Джонатан Клейтон в Johannesburg
их семьи, котор делят в схватке против арартеида и обоих сыграло видно роль в господстве белого меньшинства законцовки в Южной Африке. Но Thabo Mbeki, президент страны, и Jacob Zuma, его GLAVNый претендент, приходят от очень по-разному миров.
Два человека, и 65 и как только камрады в рукоятках, включены в горькой схватке силы которая угрожает разрушить движение которое enfranchised черные южные африканцы и волочит страну более глубокую в суматоху.
Г-н Mbeki - книжное, с вкусом для труб, Yeats и Wordsworth - проводил past few дни ensconced в президентском изучении, чертя речь которая он надеется уговорит Африканский Национальный Конгресс (ANC) для того чтобы дать ему третью термину как партийный руководитель.
In contrast г-н Zuma, народническое firebrand, котор дали к носить соплеменное платье, делал он делает наиболее наилучшим образом: приветствующ эйфоричных сторонниц на «победе» вновь собирает up and down страна, уверенно которой он ссадит с места его большого соперника.
Если г-н Zuma избран, то по мере того как президент ANC во время партийныйа съезд, который начнет завтра, он почти обязательно быть выбранным партии в президентском выборе 2009; список избирателей что ANC убежено выигрывать, после того как оно дало своему полному сжатию на силе в стране через 13 лет после конца арартеида.
Г-н Mbeki, родителями которого были учителями и актуариями, конституционно заперт от стоять для третьей термины как президент Южной Африки. Но он отчаянн для того чтобы сохранить управление ANC TAK, CTO он сможет влиять на выбор его продолжателя как руководитель страны. Unthinkable что он anoint г-н Zuma, который он уволил по мере того как президент депутата ANC в 2005 после того как он был соединен к скандалу рукояток многомиллиардн-фунта.
Развращение поручает против га-н Zuma, сынка отечественной горничной, обрушенного в прошлом году на technicality. Он также побил отдельно обязанность рапса последний май, которому много из его сторонниц верят были оркестрованы pro-Mbeki сторонницами для того чтобы consign он к политической невыясненности.
Во-первых, оно показалось, что работало. Общественное мнение было злодействовано допущением га-н Zuma's что он имел unprotected секс с дочью 32 year-old друга семьи был HIV положительным и вызванным его «дядюшкой».
Он более поздно сказал что он принял ливень для уменьшения шансов инфекции; заявление то appalled актуарии в стране где 900 людей плашка дня помощи.
Г-н Zuma воевал назад, пишущ прописными буквами на unpopularity га-н Mbeki's, определенно среди бедных township, которые видели меньшее преимущество от дел-содружественного, экономические политики pro-рынка которые водили к unparalleled периоду экономический роста.
Стойка «denialist» президента на помощи, его неоказание для того чтобы рецензировать случаи в соседской Зимбабве, и отказ rein внутри - or even впустить к - одно из тарифов злодеяния мира самых плохих, и его частых зарубежная поездка к дальнейшему его зрение «африканского ренессанса» совсем сыграли в руки его соперника.
В региональных конференциях, котор нужно решать на выставлениях для пятилетн национальной конференции, г-н Mbeki получил только 1.400 вотумов и затыловку 4 из 9 провинций.
Г-н Zuma принял 2.232 вотума и 5 провинций. Он также выиграл жироприказ left-wing лиги молодости и, в amazing задержке для га-н Mbeki, который имеет последовательно раззвоненные права gender, лига женщин ANC. Comeback га-н Zuma's удивительнейший приходил на огромное цену. Mighty ANC, которое нанесло поражение правилу несовершеннолетия белому через всеединство и плотно организацию, теперь смотрит на самое плохое разделение в своей истории 95 год, представляя страну с самым большим политическим кризисом с конца арартеида в 1994.
В редком комментарии на ге-н Mbeki ситуации вчера, который принимал когда Нельсон Mandela шагнуло вниз, сказал что упорное соревнование смогло разрушить партию. «Если разделение водит к возмездности, то то разрушит ANC. . . Часть нашей ответственности должна избежать такого исхода,» г-н Mbeki сказанное в интервью с еженедельными почтой и радетелем. «Мы должны принять эту вещь далеко от личностей. Массы наших людей не заинтересованн в танцует наиболее наилучшим образом,» ем добавили.
Еще раз, однако, кажется, что получает г-н Mbeki, которому ясно принимал aback прочностью противовключения к ему, его неправильное. Отвечающ к критицизму что он stifled debate, он сказал: «Я смотрю если я получаю рожочки? Оно говорило что я преграждаю debate и блокирую открытое обсуждение - озадачивает к мне. Оно вполне untrue. »
Tussle между двумя человек, которые будет установлен вотумом 5.000 уполномоченных представителей на понедельнике, devoid фактически любого обсуждения политики, хотя г-н Zuma обещал сделать помощь и национальные приоритеты злодеяния.
Он также, недавн, усидчиво ухаживал большой бизнес в усилии потерять его «чемпиона плохого» изображения и allay страхи что он упал политики свободно-рынка.
Политические аналитики предлагают что белые свойство и дела не были в опасности, но говорят что президентство Zuma представит главный пролом с прошлым и страна смогла посмотреть много more like другие африканские нации, с «правителем большого человека».
Buchizya Mseteka, специалист на сказанной Южной Африке: «Страна находится на поворотном пункте. Президентство Zuma было бы очень по-разному в типе и веществе. Он задолжает много благосклонностей людей и поэтому протекция, уже важная, была бы even more критически. »
Другие соглашаются, говорить что дни «немного Europe в Африке» были пронумерованы. «Культурно страна смогла быть уверенноее и ассерторическо,» один backer Zuma сказал. «Оно смогло посмотреть как успешно вариант Нигерии. »
Больной - на - легкость в толпе и дискомфортное на традиционных африканских церемониях, подъеме га-н Mbeki's к силе пришел в результате astute politicking backroom и его сомкнутости к старшим рисункам ANC. Он соединил партию на времени 14, но проводил большая часть из его жизни в exile на инструкциях ANC. Даже его замужество, в 1974, должно быть одобрено руководством партии. In contrast, г-н Zuma, Zulu, двигает легко от left-wing militancy township к традиционным церемониям села, где он надевает loincloths leopardskin. Он был отцом 17 детей от 4 официальных супруг, но поворотов такие вопросы к его преимуществу. «Другое мостовье политических руководителей факт они имеют хоек. . . Я буду африканским человеком и самолюбиво моей культуры,» он сказал времена в недавнем интервью. «Я впускаю мои недостатки и не отказываю что я людск. Другие лежат. »
Должностные лица ANC поэтому после того как я отнесли о общественном humiliation га-н Mbeki что они запрещали все тенниски emblazoned при лозунги поддерживая один выбранный или другое от центра конференции в сонном северном городке Polokwane, провинции Limpopo. Они знают что немногие люди будут носить pro-Mbeki одни, тогда как те нося сказания «100 процентов Zuma» и «мальчик Zulu» продают в их тысячах на недели.
Несмотря на оголтелые last-minute торговать лошади и обличительства деньг - изменяя руки и предложения работ и промотирований, людей внутри ANC rule out любой шанс вотумов га-н Mbeki отбрасывая назад в его благосклонности на конференции. «Самое лучшее, котор он смог понадеяться для теперь будет задержкой, но он играл его карточки плох и даже то будет внешний шанс,» одно должностное лицо прокомментировало.
Обвинителя показывали что они смогли все еще поручать га-н Zuma снова, но до тех пор не сумели принести случай, котор они уверенно привели бы к в осуждении. Если он принимает президентство, то ANC он сомнитен посмел ли любой обвинитель принести обязанности.
«Jacob Zuma будет иметь неслужебную президентскую невосприимчивость - оно приняло бы очень храбрейшего человека для того чтобы поручить президента ANC. Я не могу увидеть, что оно случилось,» сказал искры Allister, журналист ветерана и автор. Большинств члены ANC верят что г-н Zuma был жертвой графика сторонницами Mbeki. Они спорят что г-н Zuma, который проводил 10 лет на острове Robben и после этого стал головкой крыла ANC воинского, плох был обработан. Он также чредитован с кончать порочное гражданскую войну в 1990s между ANC и Zulu-преобладанной партией свободы Inkatha в KwaZulu-Натальном.
Другое вычисляет involved в скандале рукояток получил очень больше чем £35,000 что г-н Zuma был обвинен pocketing. Они не были последованы, водя к заявлениям что президент злоупотреблял фондами положения для того чтобы установить политическое vendetta.
«Zuma будет африканским traditionalist. Он не может по возможности поставить к всем constituencies поддерживали его если он будет президентом, то но at the moment люди не заботят, они как раз имели его с Mbeki и его восприниманное aloofness,» г-н сказанный Искрить.
В Soweto вчера было меньшее сочувствие для президента. «Мы JWs переданы к ноге, котор она пока bigwigs управляют вокруг в быстрых автомобилях,» сказала Philemon, безработному строителю, как он указали на BMWs и Mercedes новой черной элиты - dubbed черные диаманты - которые делали удачи в гремя экономии. Около 40 процентов населенности страны остает jobless и увидел меньшее улучшение в living стандарт стандартах с прибытия принципа большинства.
Пропонент
типа времени 65 Thabo
Mbeki ВЫБРАННЫХ Западн-содружественный интеллектуального «детства африканского ренессанса
» его родители был учителями и интеллигентками ANC, как close to upbringing среднего класса как был по возможности at the time
сынок семьи одного подростковым отношением, которое было убито пока пытающся для того чтобы избеубежать Южную Африку. Поженил его супруга Zanele в 1974
арартеид, котор леты соединили ANC постаретое 14, но исчезано после арестований Вальтер Sisulu и Нельсон Mandela. Он заработал диплом магистра в Британии на университете Sussex, пошел натренировать в тактик guerrilla в Moscow, после этого двинутом к штабам ANC в exile в человеке
типа времени 65 Jacob
Zuma Замбии африканском «большом», удобном в соплеменном детстве
платья принесенном в скудость, его отца, котор умерли в его младенчестве. Не получил никаких супруг семьи
4 официального образования официальных и 17 детей. «Другое мостовье политических руководителей факт они имеют хоек. . . Я буду африканским человеком и самолюбиво моей культуры,» он сказал
леты арартеида арестованные на обязанностях конспирировать overthrow правительство, Zuma был incarcerated в тюрьме острова Robben на 10 лет. На его отпуск он помог установить вверх сопротивление ANC подземное, перед двигать в exile между источником 1975 и
1990: ANC
De wapenbroeders tegen apartheid, nu Thabo Mbeki en Jacob Zuma zien elkaar in een bittere strijd voor macht onder ogen
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
Jonathan Clayton in Johannesburg
Hun families deelde in de strijd tegen apartheid en allebei speelden een prominente rol in het einde van witte minderheidsregel in Zuid-Afrika. Maar Thabo Mbeki, de Voorzitter van het land, en Jacob Zuma, zijn hoofduitdager, komen uit zeer verschillende werelden.
De twee mensen, zowel 65 en zodra de kameraden in wapens, met een bittere machtsstrijd bezig zijn die dreigt om de beweging te vernietigen die zwarte Zuid-Afrikanen enfranchised en het land dieper in opschudding sleept.
M. leesgraag Mbeki -, met een smaak voor pijpen, Yeats en Wordsworth - heeft de afgelopen dagen ensconced in de presidentiële studie doorgebracht, opstellend de toespraak die hij hoopt het Afrikaanse Nationale Congres (ANC) zal overreden om hem een derde termijn als partijleider te geven.
In tegenstelling deed M. Zuma, populistisch firebrand gegeven aan het dragen van stammenkleding, wat hij beste doet: het begroeten van euforische verdedigers bij „overwinnings“ verzamelingen boven en beneden het zekere land, dat hij zijn grote rivaal ten val zal brengen.
Als M. Zuma als ANC voorzitter tijdens het partijcongres wordt verkozen, dat morgen begint, is hij bijna bepaald de kandidaat van de partij in de presidentiële verkiezing van 2009 te zijn; een opiniepeiling dat ANC van het winnen, gezien zijn totale greep op macht in het land 13 jaar na het eind van apartheid wordt verzekerd.
M. Mbeki, de van wie ouders leraren en activisten waren, wordt constitutioneel versperd van het betekenen een derde termijn als President van Zuid-Afrika. Maar hij is wanhopig om controle van ANC te behouden zodat hij de keus van zijn opvolger als leider van het land kan beïnvloeden. Het is ondenkbaar dat hij anoint M. Zuma, die hij als ANC afgevaardigdevoorzitter in 2005 verwierp nadat hij werd verbonden met een multibillion-pond bewapent schandaal.
Lasten van de corruptie tegen M. Zuma, de zoon van een binnenlands meisje, stortten vorig jaar op een technisch karakter in. Hij sloeg ook een afzonderlijke verkrachtingslast laatste Mei, die veel van zijn verdedigers geloven door verdedigers pro-Mbeki werd bewerkt in een poging om hem aan politieke obscurity te verzenden.
Eerst, scheen het gewerkt te hebben. De publieke opinie werd geweld aangedaan door de toelating van M. Zuma's dat hij onbeschermd geslacht met de 32 éénjarigendochter van een familievriend had die HIV positief was en hem „oom“ riep.
Hij zei later dat hij een douche nam om de kansen van besmetting te verminderen; een verklaring die activisten in een land appalled waar 900 mensen een dag aan Hulp sterven.
M. Zuma bood weerstand, voordeel trekkend van het gebrek aan populariteit van M. Mbeki's, in het bijzonder onder de gemeentearmen, die weinig voordeel aan business-friendly hebben gemerkt, pro-markt economisch beleid dat heeft geleid tot een onvergelijkelijke periode van de economische groei.
De denialist“ tribune van de Voorzitter „op Hulp, zijn weigering om gebeurtenissen in naburig Zimbabwe te kritiseren, en nalaten om - of zelfs toelaten - één van de slechtste de misdaadtarieven van de wereld, en zijn frequente reizen te beteugelen in het buitenland om zijn visie van een „Afrikaanse renaissance“ te bevorderen allen speelde in de handen van zijn rivaal.
In regionale conferenties om over benoemingen voor de vijfjaarlijkse Nationale Conferentie te beslissen, ontving M. Mbeki slechts 1.400 stemmen en de steun van vier van de negen provincies.
M. Zuma nam 2.232 stemmen en vijf provincies. Hij heeft ook de goedkeuring van de linkse Liga van de Jeugd en, in een verbazende tegenslag voor M. Mbeki gewonnen, wie constant geslachtsrechten, de ANC Liga van de Vrouwen heeft uitgebazuind. Is de verbazingwekkende terugkeer van M. Zuma's aan een reusachtige prijs gekomen. Machtige ANC, die minderheids witte regel door eenheid en strakke organisatie versloeg, ziet nu de slechtste spleet in zijn 95-jaar geschiedenis onder ogen, die het land met de grootste politieke crisis sinds het eind van apartheid in 1994 voorstelt.
In een zeldzame commentaar op de situatie M. Mbeki, die bureau nam toen Nelson Mandela neer stapte, zei gisteren dat de bittere wedstrijd de partij kon vernietigen. „Als de afdeling tot retribution leidt, is dat wat ANC zal vernietigen. . . Het deel van onze verantwoordelijkheid moet zulk een resultaat vermijden,“ M. Mbeki zei in een gesprek met de wekelijkse Post en de Beschermer. „Wij moeten dit ding vanaf persoonlijkheden nemen. De massa's van onze mensen zijn niet geinteresseerd in wie het best danst,“ hij toevoegden.
Nogmaals, echter, schijnt M. Mbeki, die duidelijk aback door de sterkte van de oppositie tegen hem is genomen, om verkeerd het te hebben. Antwoordend aan kritiek dat hij debat heeft verstikt, zei hij: „Zie ik eruit alsof ik hoornen heb? Het heeft gezegd dat ik debat blokkeer en open bespreking rem - dat is in verwarring brengend aan me. Het is volledig untrue. “
Worstel tussen de twee mensen, wat door een stem zal worden geregeld van 5.000 afgevaardigden op Maandag, verstoken is geweest van vrijwel om het even welk oriënterend debat, hoewel M. Zuma heeft beloofd om tot Hulp en misdaad nationale prioriteiten te maken.
Hij heeft ook, onlangs, nauwgezet streefde naar grote zaken in een inspanning om zijn „kampioen van het slechte“ beeld te verliezen en vrees dat te verminderen hij free-market beleid zou laten vallen.
De politieke analisten stellen voor dat het witte bezit en de ondernemingen niet in gevaar zouden zijn, maar zeggen dat een voorzitterschap Zuma een belangrijke onderbreking met het verleden zou vertegenwoordigen en het land kon kijken veel meer als andere Afrikaanse naties, met een „grote mensen“ heerser.
Buchizya Mseteka, een deskundige op Zuid-Afrika, zei: Het „land is op een draaiend punt. Een voorzitterschap Zuma zou in stijl en substantie zeer verschillend zijn. Hij is vele mensengunsten verschuldigd en zodat zou de belangrijke bescherming, reeds, kritieker zijn. “
Anderen stemmen overeen, zeggend dat de dagen van „een weinig Europa in Afrika“ worden genummerd. „Cultureel zou het land zekerder en assertief kunnen zijn,“ één bovengenoemde steun Zuma. „Het kon als een succesvolle versie van Nigeria kijken. “
Onbehaaglijk in een menigte en ongemakkelijk bij traditionele Afrikaanse ceremonies, de stijging van M. Mbeki's aan macht kwam als resultaat van het scherpzinnige discrete politicking en zijn nabijheid aan hogere ANC cijfers. Hij werd lid van de partij op de leeftijd van 14, maar bracht het grootste deel van zijn leven in ballingschap aan ANC instructies door. Zelfs moest zijn huwelijk, in 1974, door de partijleiding worden goedgekeurd. In tegenstelling, beweegt M. zich Zuma, Zulu, gemakkelijk van linkse gemeentemilitantisme aan traditionele dorpsceremonies, waar hij leopardskin loincloths aantrekt. Hij heeft fathered 17 kinderen van vier officiële vrouwen, maar draaien dergelijke kwesties aan zijn voordeel. „Andere politieke leiders verbergen het feit zij maitresses hebben. . . Ik ben een Afrikaanse mens en trots van mijn cultuur,“ hij vertelde The Times in een recent gesprek. „Ik laat mijn fouten toe en ontken niet dat ik menselijk ben. Anderen liggen. De“
ANC ambtenaren zijn zo bezorgd over een openbare vernedering van M. Mbeki dat zij alle T-shirts verboden hebben die met slogans ondersteunend één kandidaat of andere van het conferentiecentrum worden opgehemeld in de slaperige noordelijke stad van Polokwane, Provincie Limpopo. Zij weten dat weinig mensen degenen pro-Mbeki zullen dragen, terwijl die die de legenden „100 percenten Zuma“ en „Zulu Jongen“ dragen in hun duizenden voor weken hebben verkocht.
Ondanks overhandigen de gek paard van het laatste ogenblik handel en de beschuldigingen van geldwisselen en bieden van banen aan en de bevorderingen, ANC insiders sluiten uit om het even welke kans van het slingeren van M. Mbeki terug vóór zijn op de conferentie stemt. Het „beste kon hij hopen voor nu een uitstel is, maar hij heeft zijn kaarten slecht gespeeld en zelfs is dat een buitenkans,“ één ambtenaar becommentari�ërde.
De eisers hebben dat zij M. Zuma konden nog laden opnieuw erop gewezen, maar tot dusver er niet in geslaagd om een geval te brengen zij zouden resulteren in een overtuiging zeker zijn. Als hij het ANC voorzitterschap neemt is het twijfelachtig of om het even welke eiser zou durven om lasten te brengen.
„Jacob Zuma zal een officieuze presidentiële immuniteit hebben - het zou een zeer moedige mens nemen om de ANC voorzitter te laden. Ik kan niet het het gebeuren,“ bovengenoemde Vonken Allister, de veteraanjournalist en de auteur zien. De meeste ANC leden geloven dat M. Zuma een slachtoffer van een perceel door Mbeki verdedigers was. Zij debatteren dat M. Zuma, die tien jaar aan Eiland Robben doorbracht en toen het hoofd van de ANC militaire vleugel werd, slecht werd behandeld. Hij wordt ook gecrediteerd voor het einde van een wrede burgeroorlog in de jaren '90 tussen ANC en de zulu-Overheerste Partij van de Vrijheid Inkatha in kwaZulu-Geboorte.
Andere cijfers betrokken bij het wapensschandaal ontvingen veel meer dan £35,000 dat M. Zuma van het pocketing werd beschuldigd. Zij zijn niet achtervolgd, leidend tot beweringen dat de Voorzitter staatsfondsen verkeerd gebruikte om een politieke vendetta te regelen.
„Zuma is een traditionalistische Afrikaan. Hij kan onmogelijk aan alle bevolking leveren die hem heeft gesteund als hij Voorzitter wordt, maar op het ogenblik geven de mensen niet, hebben zij net het met Mbeki gehad en zijn waargenomen aloofness,“ M. Sparks zei.
In Soweto gisteren was er weinig sympathie voor de Voorzitter. „Wij worden JWs verlaten aan voet het terwijl bigwigs rond in snelle auto's drijven,“ bovengenoemde Philemon, een werkloze bouwer, aangezien hij in BMWs en Mercedes van de nieuwe zwarte elite richtte - gesynchroniseerde Zwarte Diamanten - die fortuinen in de een hoge vlucht nemende economie hebben gemaakt. Ongeveer 40 percent van de bevolking van het land blijft werkloos en weinig verbetering van levensstandaarden sinds de aankomst van meerderheidsregel gezien.
Leeftijd
65 van Thabo Mbeki van KANDIDATEN
de westelijk-Vriendschappelijke verdediger van de Stijl van Kinderjaren intellectuele van de „Afrikaanse Renaissance
“ Zijn ouders was leraren en ANC intellectuelen, zoals dicht bij een middenklasseopvoeding zoals bij tijdFamilie Één
de zoon door een tienerverhouding mogelijk was, die terwijl het proberen om aan Zuid-Afrika te ontsnappen werd gedood. Huwde zijn vrouw Zanele in 1974
de apartheidsjaren van ANC op de leeftijd van 14 lid werden, maar gevlucht na arrestaties van Walter Sisulu en Nelson Mandela. Hij verdiende een doctoraal examen in Groot-Brittannië bij de Universiteit van Sussex, ging in guerillatactiek in Moskou opleiden, dan verplaatste naar het ANC hoofdkwartier in ballingschap in leeftijd
65 van Zambia Jacob Zuma
de Afrikaanse „Grote Mens“ van de Stijl, comfortabel in stammenkledings
Kinderjaren Geboren in armoede, stierf zijn vader in zijn kleutertijd. Ontving geen officieel onderwijs
Familie Vier officiële vrouwen en 17 kinderen. „Andere politieke leiders verbergen het feit zij maitresses hebben. . . Ik ben een Afrikaanse mens en trots van mijn cultuur,“ hij zei
de apartheidsjaren die op lasten van het samenzweren worden gearresteerd om de overheid omver te werpen, was Zuma incarcerated in de gevangenis van het Eiland Robben tien jaar. Op zijn versie die hij heeft helpen om de ANC ondergrondse weerstand op te zetten, alvorens in ballingschap tussen de Bron van 1975 zich te bewegen en
van 1990: ANC
يواجه إخوان في [أرمس] ضدّ عزل عنصريّ, الآن [ثبو] [مبكي] ويعقوب [زوما] بعضهم بعضا في كفاح مرّة لقوة
Automatically translated into Arabic thanks to WorldLingo
لعب جوناثان [كلتون] في جوهانسبورغ
أسراتهم يشارك في الكفاح ضدّ عزل عنصريّ وكلا دور بارزة في نهاية بيضاء أقلية قاعدة في جنوب افريقيا. غير أنّ يأتي [ثبو] [مبكي], البلد رئيس, ويعقوب [زوما], منافسته رئيسيّة, من عوالم مختلفة جدّا.
الاثنان رجال, على حدّ سواء 65 وما إن رفيقات في [أرمس], يكون شبكت في مرّة قوة كفاح أنّ يهدّد أن يدمّر الحركة أنّ [إنفرنشسد] افريقي جنوبي سوداء ويجرّ البلد عميقة داخل إضطراب.
قد أنفق سيد [مبكي] - [بووكيش], مع ذوق لأنابيب, [يتس] و [ووردسوورث] - الأيام [بست فو] [إنسكنسد] في الدراسة رئاسيّة, يسحب الخطبة أنّ هو يأمل سيقنع ال [نأيشنل كنغرسّ] [أفريكن] ([أنك]) أن يعطيه عبارة ثالثة كحزب زعيمة.
بالمقابل أتمّ سيد [زوما], [فيربرند] شعبية يعطى إلى يرتدي ثوب قبليّة, كان ماذا هو يتمّ على أحسن وجه: يحشد [غريتينغ] مؤيدات منتش في "نصرة" عبر البلد, واثقة أنّ هو سيخلع منافسته عظيمة.
إن سيد [زوما] يكون انتخبت بما أنّ [أنك] رئيس أثناء الحزب إجتماع, أيّ يبدأ غدا, هو تقريبا مؤكّدة أن يكون الحزب مرشح في ال 2009 إنتخاب رئاسيّة; عمليّة تصويت أنّ أكّدت ال [أنك] من يربح, يعطي قبضته إجماليّة على قوة في البلد 13 سنون بعد النهاية العزل عنصريّ.
[برّ] سيد [مبكي], الذي والد كانوا معلمات ونشط, دستوريا من يقف لعبارة ثالثة كرئيس جنوب افريقيا. غير أنّ هو يائسة أن يحتبس تحكم من ال [أنك] [س ثت] هو يستطيع أثرت الإختبار من خلفه كالزعيمة من البلد. هو غير وارد أنّ مسح هو سيد [زوما], الّذي هو صرف بما أنّ [أنك] نائبة رئيس في 2005 عقب هو كان اقترنت إلى [مولتيبيلّيون-بووند] [أرمس] فضيحة.
فساد يحمّل ضدّ سيد [زوما], الإبنة من عذراء محلّية, ينهار [لست ر] على صفة تقنيّة. هو أيضا ضرب منفصلة عمليّة اغتصاب حشوة شهر ماي متأخّرة, أيّ كثير من مؤيداته يصدق كان نظّمت بمؤيدات [برو-مبكي] [إين ن تّمبت تو] أودعته إلى حالة غموض سياسيّة.
أوّلا, بدا هو أن يتلقّى عملت. انتهكت رأي عامّة كان بسيد [زوما] انضمام أنّ هو تلقّى جنس غير محميّ مع ال 32 [ير-ولد] ابنة من أسرة صديقة الذي كان [هيف] إيجابيّة ويدعى ه "عمة".
هو فيما بعد قال أنّ أخذ هو وابل أن يقلّد الفرص التلوث; بيان أنّ [أبّلّد] نشط في بلد حيث 900 الناس يوم قالب ال [أيدس].
تنازع سيد [زوما] إلى الخلف, يرسمل على سيد [مبكي] [أونبوبولريتي], بشكل خاصّ بين المنطقة فقراء, الذي قد رأى بعض فائدة من [بوسنسّ-فريندلي], [برو-مركت] سياسة اقتصاديّة أنّ قد قاد إلى فترة [أونبرلّلد] نموّ اقتصاديّ.
الرئيس "[دنيليست]" لعب حامل قفص على [أيدس], رفضه أن ينتقد حادثات في زمبابوي مجاورة, وإخفاق أن يكبح داخل - [أر فن] اعترفت إلى - واحدة من العالم [كريم رت] مريضة, ورحلاته متكرّرة في الخارج إلى بعيد رؤيته من "نهضة [أفريكن]" جميعا داخل منافسته أيادي.
في مؤتمرات إقليميّة أن يقرّر على تعيينات للمؤتمر وطنيّة [فيف-رلي], استلم سيد [مبكي] فقط 1,400 إقتراعات والظهارة من أربعة من تسعة محافظات.
أخذ سيد [زوما] 2,232 إقتراعات وخمسة محافظات. يربح هو يتلقّى أيضا التظهير من اليساريّة شباب جامعة و, في مدهشة نكسة لسيد [مبكي], الذي يتلقّى باستمرار يقبع جنس حقوق, ال [أنك] نساء جامعة. سيد [زوما] قد أتى عودة مذهلة في سعر ضخمة. يواجه ال [أنك] عظيمة, أيّ هزم أقلية قاعدة بيضاء من خلال وحدة ومنظمة مشدودة, الآن الشقّ مريضة في ه 95 سنة تاريخ, يقدّم البلد مع الأزمة كبيرة سياسيّة منذ النهاية العزل عنصريّ في 1994.
في تعليق نادرة على الحالة بالأمس سيد [مبكي], الذي أخذ مكتب عندما خطا [نلسن] [مندلا] إلى أسفل, قال أنّ المسابقة مرّة استطاع دممت الحزب. "إن تقسيم يقود إلى جزاء, أنّ ماذا سيدمّر ال [أنك]. . . جزء من مسؤوليتنا أن يتفادى هذا نتيجة," سيد [مبكي] يقال في مقابلة مع الأسبوعيّة بريد إلكترونيّ وحارسة. "نحن ينبغي أخذت هذا شيء بعيدا من شخصيات. ليس ال [مسّ] من الناسنا راغبة في الذي يرقص على أحسن وجه," هو أضاف.
[أنس غين], مهما, يظهر سيد [مبكي], الذي يتلقّى بوضوح يكون أخذت [أبك] بالقوة من المعارضة إلى ه, أن [هف جت] هو خاطئة. يستجيب إلى نقد أنّ قد خنق هو مناقشة, هو قال: "أنا أنظر [أس يف] [هف جت] أنا قرن بوري? هو قد قال أنّ يسدّ أنا مناقشة ويمنع نقاشة مفتوحة - أنّ يكون يربك إلى ي. هو تماما [أونترو]. "
قد كان ال [تثسّل] بين الاثنان رجال, أيّ كنت سيقرّر بإقتراع من 5,000 مندوبات في يوم الإثنين, خلو من في الواقع أيّ سياسة نقاشة [, ثوو] سيد [زوما] قد وعد أن يجعل [أيدس] وجريمة مواطنة أولويات.
يلاطف هو يتلقّى أيضا, مؤخّرا, بمواظبة [بيغ بوسنسّ] في جهد أن يخسر ه "بطلة من الفقيرة" صورة وليّنت خوف أنّ هو سقط [فري-مركت] سياسات.
يقترح محللات سياسيّة أنّ بيضاء خاصية وأعمال لم [ب] في خطر, غير أنّ يقول أنّ [زوما] رئاسة مثّل كسر كبريات مع الماض والبلد استطاع نظرت كثير أشبه أخرى أمم [أفريكن], مع "كبيرة رجل" مسطرة.
[بوشزا] [مستكا], خبيرة على [سوثرن فريك], يقال: "البلد في [تثرن بوينت]. [زوما] كان رئاسة جدّا مختلفة في أسلوب ومادة. هو يستدين كثير الناس معروفات ولذلك كان رعاية, سابقا مهمّة, [إفن مور] حرجة. "
يتزامن أخرى, [سينغ] أنّ الأيام من "[ا ليتّل بيت] من أوروبا في إفريقيا" كنت عدّلت. "ثقافيّا البلد استطاع كنت أكثر واثقة وجازمة," واحدة [زوما] قال نصير. "هو استطاع نظرت مثل صيغة ناجحة نيجيريا. أتى"
[إيلّ-ت-س] في حشد ومتضايق في مراسم تقليديّة [أفريكن], سيد [مبكي] إرتفاع إلى قوة نتيجة ماكرة [بكرووم] [بوليتيكينغ] ودرجت تقاربه إلى كبريات [أنك] أرقام. هو تلاقى الحزب في العمر من 14, غير أنّ أنفق أكثر من حياته في حالة نفي على [أنك] تعليمات. حتّى زواجه, في 1974, اضطرّ كنت وافقت بالحزب قيادة. بالمقابل, يتحرّك سيد [زوما], [زولو], بسهولة من يساريّة منطقة نضالية إلى تقليديّة قرية مراسم, حيث هو اتّخذ شكل [ليوبردسكين] [لوينكلوثس]. هو قد نجل 17 أطفال من أربعة زوجات رسميّة, غير أنّ دورات هذا إصدارات إلى ميزته. "أخرى سياسيّة زعيمات جلد الحقيقة يتلقّى هم سيدات. . . أنا رجل [أفريكن] وفخورة من ثقافتي," قال هو الأوقات في مقابلة أخيرة. "يعترف أنا أخطاءي ولا ينكر أنّ أنا إنسانيّة. أخرى يكذب. "
[أنك] مسؤولات لذلك يتعلّق حول إذلال عامّة سيد [مبكي] أنّ قد حظر هم كلّ [ت-شيرتس] يمجّد مع شعارات يساند واحدة مرشح أو الأخرى من ال [كنفرنس سنتر] في المدينة نعسانة شماليّة [بولوكون], [ليمبوبو] محافظة. هم يعرفون أنّ سيرتدي قليل من الناس كنت [برو-مبكي] أحد, حيث أنّ أنّ يحمل الأساطير "100 نسبة مئويّة [زوما]" و" [زولو] فتى" يتلقّى يكون يبيع في آلافهم لأسابيع.
على الرغم من مسعورة في الآونة الأخيرة حصان حجر السّامة يتاجر وتهم من [مون-شنجنغ] أيادي وأعراض من أشغال وترقيات, [أنك] يستبعد مطلعات أيّ فرصة من سيد [مبكي] يترجّح إقتراعات إلى الخلف في معروفته في المؤتمر. "الجيّدة هو استطاع أملت ل الآن [بوستبونمنت], غير أنّ قد لعب هو بطاقاته على نحو رديء وحتّى أنّ فرصة خارجيّة," واحدة مسؤولة علق.
قد أشار مدعيات أنّ هم استطاعوا ساكنة حشوة سيد [زوما] ثانية, غير أنّ يتلقّى [س فر] [فيلد] أن يحضر حالة هم يكونون واثقة نتج في قناعة. إن هو يأخذ ال [أنك] رئاسة هو مرتابة ما إذا جسر أيّ مدعية أن يحضر حشوات.
"سيتلقّى يعقوب [زوما] مناعة غيررسميّ رئاسيّة - هو أخذ رجل شجاعة جدّا أن يحمّل ال [أنك] رئيس. قال أنا يستطيع لا يرى هو يحدث," [ألّيستر] شرارات, المحارب قديم صحفية ومؤلفة. كثير [أنك] يصدق أعضاء أنّ سيد [زوما] كان ضحية من خطة ب [مبكي] مؤيدات. هم يجادلون أنّ عاملت سيد [زوما], الذي أنفق عشرة سنون على [روبّن] جزيرة وبعد ذلك أصبح الرأس من ال [أنك] جناح عسكريّة, كان على نحو رديء. هو أيضا منحت مع ينهي حرب أهليّة فاسدة في التسعينات بين [أنك] وال [زولو-دومينتد] [إينكثا] حرية حزب في [كوزولو-نتل].
استلم أخرى يحسب متورّطة في ال [أرمس] فضيحة كثير أكثر من ال £35,000 أنّ سيد [زوما] كان اتّهمت من استولى على. تتبّعت هم يتلقّى لم يكن, يقود إلى ادّعاءات أنّ الرئيس كان استعمل دولة أموال أن يقرّر [فندتّا] سياسيّة.
"[زوما] تقليدية [أفريكن]. هو يستطيع لا من المحتمل سلّمت إلى [ألّ ث] مجموعة ناخبين الذي قد سانده إن هو يصبح رئيس, غير أنّ [أت ث مومنت] لا يهتمّ الناس, هم فقط قد تلقّوا هو مع [مبكي] وخاصّتي يلاحظ تحفظ," سيد [سبركس] يقال.
في [سوتو] بالأمس كان هناك بعض تعاطف للرئيس. "تركت نحن [جوس] إلى قدم هو بينما ال [بيغويغس] يقودون حوالي في سيارات سريعة," قال [فيلمون], بناءة عاطل عن العمل, بما أنّ هو دلّ في [بموس] و [مرسدس] من النخبة جديدة سوداء - يدعى ماس سوداء - الذي قد جعل حظوظ في ال يزدهر اقتصاد. حوالي 40 يبقى نسبة مئويّة من البلد السّكان عاطل عن العمل ويرى بعض تحسين في معايير حيّة منذ الوصول من أغلبية قاعدة.
المرشحات
[ثبو] [مبكي] عمر 65
أسلوب كان مقترح [وسترن-فريندلي] من عقليّة "[أفريكن] نهضة"
طفولة والده معلمات و [أنك] مثقفات, بما أنّ [كلوس تو] [ميدّل كلسّ] تربية بما أنّ كان يمكن [أت ث تيم]
أسرة واحدة إبنة بعلاقة مراهقة, الذي كان قتلت بينما يحاول أن يهرب جنوب افريقيا. زوّج زوجته [زنل] في 1974
العزل عنصريّ سنون تلاقوا ال [أنك] يعتّق 14, غير أنّ يهرب بعد إعتقالات من والتر [سسولو] و [نلسن] [مندلا]. هو كسب [مستر دغر] في بريطانيا في الجامعة [سوسّإكس], ذهب أن يدرّب في [غرّيلّا] تكتيكات في موسكو, بعد ذلك يتحرّك إلى ال [أنك] مقرّ رئيسيّ في حالة نفي في زامبيا
يعقوب [زوما] عمر 65
أسلوب [أفريكن] "رجل كبيرة", مريحة في قبليّة ثوب
طفولة [بورن] داخل فقر, أبه يمات في طفولته. استلم ما من [فورمل دوكأيشن]
أسرة أربعة زوجات رسميّة و17 أطفال. "أخرى سياسيّة زعيمات جلد الحقيقة يتلقّى هم سيدات. . . أنا رجل [أفريكن] وفخورة من ثقافتي," قال
هو العزل عنصريّ سنون يوقف على حشوات من يتآمر أن يسقط الحكومة, [زوما] كان سجنت في [روبّن] جزيرة سجن لعشرة سنون. على إطلاقه ساعد هو أن يثبت فوق ال [أنك] مقاومة باطنيّة, قبل يتحرّك داخل حالة نفي بين 1975 و1990
مصدر: [أنك]
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| December 15, 2007 | 2:54 AM |
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BODY COUNT
Related to country: Iraq
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BODY COUNT. Global avoidable mortality since 1950
BODY COUNT. Global avoidable mortality since 1950
I am a highly published biological scientist and in 2003 published a huge pharmacological text entitled "Biochemical Targets of Plant Bioactive Compounds. A pharmacological reference guide to sites of action and biological effects" (Taylor & Francis, London & New York).
Over the last few years I have carefully researched, written, edited and finally published a science-based history book of very wide potential utility entitled “Body Count. Global avoidable mortality since 1950” (G.M. Polya, Melbourne, 2007; 220 pages, 24 tables; ISBN 1921377051). In the interests of Humanity I am sending copies of this big reference book to key scholars, writers, journalists, humanitarians, media and libraries around the world.
In 1998 I published a detailed book entitled “Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability” (G.M. Polya, Melbourne; second edition in preparation) (see: http://janeaustenand.blogspot.com/ ). This book dealt with the 2 century atrocity of British rule over India culminating in the man-made Bengal Famine of 1943/1944, The man-made, WW2 Bengal Famine killed 4 million people (it is similar in death toll magnitude to the WW2 Jewish Holocaust) but has been largely deleted from British historiography in a continuing process of sustained, racist holocaust denial. “Body count” documents the similarly non-reported avoidable death of 1.3 billion people since 1950 on Spaceship Earth with the First World in control of the flight deck.
“Body Count” is a carefully researched book by a 4 decade career biological scientist on a key social parameter “avoidable mortality” (excess death, deaths that should not have happened) which is nevertheless largely ignored by Mainstream media and for good reason – the post-1950 global avoidable mortality totals about 1.3 billion. Even in the United States, the richest country in the World, it can be estimated from publicly available UN demographic data that 0.14 million under-5 year old American infants have died avoidably over the last 7 years due to the warped Bush Administration priorities of international wars (that have so far caused 3.4 million excess deaths in the Occupied Iraqi and Afghan Territories alone, mostly of Women and Children) rather than of addressing urgent domestic priorities such as infant and maternal health.
I am a scientist and not an ideologue – my core humanitarian philosophy is simply that of the American Declaration of Independence, that all men are created equal and have an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
“Body Count” is a number of books efficiently packaged in a user-friendly way as a KEY REFERENCE WORK for laypersons, high school and college students, teachers, researchers, journalists, human rights activists and workers and other people in public life.
“Body Count”:
(a) summarizes, tabulates and analyzes avoidable mortality for every country in the world since 1950;
(b) uniquely provides a succinct and systematically organized history of every country in the world coupled with key avoidable mortality statistics (a fabulous resource for students, scholars, journalists and human rights activists);
(c) a systematic analysis of the actual causes of excess death in the world (noting that 16 million people die avoidably in the world every year, this including 10 million under-5 avoidable infant deaths); and
(d) finally, sets out a brief and systematic series of practical suggestions for halting the First World-complicit global avoidable mortality holocaust.
A picture says a thousand words. If you indeed become interested in my dispassionately scientific and scholarly but deeply humanitarian book you may also be interested in using the following huge paintings I have painted to spread a message of Peace, Love and Respect for Mother, Child and Woman e.g. “Sydney Madonna”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10865/26/ , “Manhattan Madonna”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10766/26/ , “Qana”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/9547/26/ , “Truelove”: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/11031/26/ , Isfahan Matisse: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14417/26/ , and Alhambra Pollock: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14082/42/ . Please forward these links to everyone you know in the interests of Peace, Love, Mother and Child – just as I am sending copies of my book to key writers, media and libraries around the world.
Peace is the only way but Silence kills and Silence is complicity. We are obliged to INFORM others about abuses of Humanity.
I have set out below a detailed outline of “Body Count” and its contents.
1. Statement of aims and rationale
Avoidable mortality (excess mortality) is the difference between the ACTUAL deaths in a country over a given period and the deaths EXPECTED for a peaceful, decently-run country with the same demographics. Avoidable mortality provides the bottom-line measure of the consequences of human actions and the success or otherwise of societal, regional and global policies.
UN demographic data enabled calculation of avoidable mortality (and corroborative, independent under-5 infant mortality estimates) for every country in the world since 1950. The 1950-2005 avoidable mortality has totaled 1.3 billion for the world and 1.2 billion for the non-European world, these horrendous estimates being consonant with 1950-2005 under-5 infant mortality estimates of 0.88 billion for the world and 0.85 billion for the non-European world. The data have been tabulated for every country together with other key demographic data and important social indicators, namely adult literacy and annual per capita income.
The avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality outcomes have been best in Overseas European countries (the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Israel) that have never been occupied but have frequently invaded other countries – and the worst outcomes have been for Non-Arab African countries that have variously been subject to centuries of invasion and occupation. Detailed, summarized histories of all countries of the world are accompanied by precise estimates of avoidable mortality in the post-1950 era due to war, occupation, genocide and passive genocide. Thus the post-invasion avoidable mortality (excess deaths) and under-5 infant mortality in Coalition-occupied Iraq now total 1.0 million and 0.5 million, respectively (as adjudged from the latest UN and medical literature data).
Rational global human risk management requires avoidable mortality information, scientific analysis and sensible systemic change. There is no public discussion of the actual human cost of First World policies. For example, the post-invasion avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality in Occupied Iraq and Afghanistan now total 3.4 million and 2.4 million, respectively – estimates directly derived from publicly-available UN Population Division data but which are comprehensively ignored by mainstream media.
Avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality correlate with war and foreign occupation, with the latter encompassing both explicit violent occupation and neo-colonial hegemony. An apocalyptic quartet of violence, deprivation, disease and LYING is responsible for the continuing carnage. The ruler is responsible for the ruled, death is equally final whether violent or non-violent and mass avoidable mortality of subject people is passive genocide in violation of the Geneva Conventions. Extensive analysis of the causes of avoidable mortality has revealed politically disparate successes (e.g. Cuba and Fiji) that point the way to rational, humane and low cost global solutions involving peace, independence, very low but sufficient incomes, high literacy, good primary health care and governance for the common good.
The three core sections of the book uniquely involve:
(1) detailed analysis and tabulation of avoidable mortality, infant mortality and linked demographic parameters for every country in the world in the period 1950-2005;
(2) a concise summary of the history of every country in the world in the context of avoidable mortality and its political causation; and
(3) a detailed analysis of the physical causes of avoidable mortality (thanatology) and detailed, scientific solutions to a continuing catastrophe that kills 16 million people a year (44,000 daily, about 60% of them infants).
It is a horrifying testament to Mainstream lying by omission and politically correct racism (PC racism) that there are, to my knowledge, NO books doing ANY of these three things in a systematic and comprehensive fashion.
2. Table of contents with listing of chapter headings & short description of each chapter/section
Preamble
Title, Publication Details, Table of Contents, Key Quotations, Detailed Contents, List of Tables & Preface.
Chapter 1. Introduction – global avoidable mortality
1.1 Science & history – history ignored yields history repeated;
1.2 Deleting history – the “forgotten”, man-made WW2 Bengal Famine;
1.3 Avoidable mortality (excess mortality), under-5 infant mortality and foreign occupation;
1.4 Global avoidable mortality (excess mortality);
1.5 Non-reportage of global avoidable mortality ensures its continuance;
1.6 Summary
Chapter 2. Global post-1950 excess mortality and under-5 infant mortality
2.1 Estimation of mortality and avoidable mortality (excess mortality);
2.2 Calculation of under-5 infant mortality;
2.3 Comparison of global and regional post-1950 total mortality and under-5 infant mortality;
2.4 Estimation of avoidable under-5 infant mortality;
2.5 Comparison of under-5 infant mortality and excess mortality;
2.6 “Humanizing” mortality;
2.7 “Humanizing” excess mortality;
2.8 The human aspect of under-5 infant mortality;
Tables 2.1-2.12;
2.9 Summary
Chapter 3. Correlates and causes of post-1950 avoidable global mass mortality
3.1 “Big picture” regional analysis of global post-1950 under-5 infant mortality and excess mortality;
3.2 Overseas Europe: domestic democracy, prosperity, peace and Anglo-American invasion of distant lands;
3.3 Western Europe: domestic bliss and colonial and neo-colonial wars abroad;
3.4 Eastern Europe: totalitarianism, Russian occupation, general peace and low mortality;
3.5 Latin America and Caribbean: colonial and US hegemony – increased violence yields increased mortality;
3.6 East Asia: remarkable resurgence from European wars and sanctions;
3.7 Turkey, Iran and Central Asia: European occupation, intervention and war;
3.8 Arab North Africa and the Middle East: decolonization, Anglo-American and Israeli wars and oil;
3.9 South East Asia – European-imposed colonialism, occupation, war and militarism; 3.10 The Pacific- mixed colonial occupation and post-colonial outcomes;
3.11 South Asia – crippled by the legacies from British imperialism;
3.12 Non-Arab Africa – colonialism, neo-colonialism, corruption, militarism, war and HIV-1;
3.13 To be or not to be - lowest mortality countries invading distant high mortality countries;
3.14 Quantitative assessment of the mortality consequences of occupation;
3.15 Summary
Chapter 4. Country-by-country analysis of avoidable mortality in European countries
4.1 Introduction – matching excess mortality with foreign occupation; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes:
4.2 Overseas Europe – internal democracy, external violence;
4.3 Western Europe – participation in colonial, neo-colonial and US-led “democratic imperialist” wars;
4.4 Eastern Europe – Communism, foreign occupation and tyranny but peace and good social services;
4.5 Summary
Chapter 5. Latin America and the Caribbean – from European invasion, genocide and slavery to US hegemony
5.1 Overview; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes:
5.2 Latin American and Caribbean histories;
5.3 Summary
Chapter 6. North Africa, Asia & Pacific – the impact of colonialism, neo-colonialism and war
6.1 Overview; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes:
6.2 East Asia – recovery from First World-imposed war and sanctions;
6.3 Turkey, Iran and Central Asia - Russian occupation, US interference, war and peace;
6.4 Arab North Africa and Middle East – Anglo-American, French and Israeli war and occupation;
6.5 South East Asia – colonialism, colonial wars, US-driven war and militarization; 6.6 The Pacific – colonialism, disease, war and maladministration;
6.7 South Asia – the disastrous legacy of rapacious British imperialism;
6.8 Summary
Chapter 7. Non-Arab Africa – colonialism, neo-colonialism, militarism, debt, economic constraint and incompetence
7.1 Overview of the continuing African tragedy; followed by detailed summaries of the histories of each country with quantitation of major avoidable mortality episodes: 7.2 Short histories of the countries of Non-Arab Africa;
7.3 Summary
Chapter 8. Synthesis, conclusions and suggestions
8.1 Finding causes and solutions;
8.2 Risk management;
8.3 Violent versus non-violent death;
8.4 The ruler is responsible for the ruled;
8.5 Passive genocide in Occupied Iraq and Afghanistan;
8.6 Genocide;
8.7 Famine;
8.8 Disease;
8.9 Human cost of occupation;
8.10 High technology war, horrendous civilian/invader death ratios and PC racism; 8.11 Killing by default – arms, debt, globalization and economic constraint;
8.12 Excuses for war and the War on Terror;
8.13 Feminist perspective - right to life, women and allo-mothering;
8.14 Academic, media, political and sectarian lying;
8.15 Conclusions and suggestions – how to save the world
Section 9. Notes
Notes for the Preamble and Chapters 1-8.
Section 10. Bibliography.
3. Brief description of each chapter/section:
The preamble contains title page, table of contents, detailed contents (chapter, sub-headings and tables), key quotes and a succinct preface.
Chapter 1 summarizes the overall thrust of the book, specifically that history ignored yields history repeated. The deadly consequences of tardy reportage of the WW2 Jewish Holocaust and the general non-reportage of the WW2 Bengal Famine (holocaust denial) (see Gideon Polya’s Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History), are used to support the argument that non-reportage of global avoidable mortality ensures its continuance. Thus the non-reported 1950-2005 avoidable mortality has totaled 1.3 billion for the world, 1.2 billion for the non-European world and 0.6 billion for the Muslim world – a Muslim Holocaust 100 times greater than the WW2 Jewish Holocaust (6 million victims) or the “forgotten” WW2 Bengal Famine in British-ruled India (4 million victims).
Chapter 2 deals with the methodology used and presents detailed Tables summarizing regional and national avoidable mortality, under-5 infant mortality and other key demographic parameters and social indicators. The tables are organized by region in ascending order of post-1950 avoidable mortality. The best avoidable mortality outcomes have been in European countries and the worst in South Asia and non-Arab Africa. A useful way of comparing avoidable mortality outcomes is by “1950-2005 avoidable mortality”/“2005 population” ratios expressed as a percentage e.g. 2.9% for Australia but an appalling 81.0% for East Timor. The average “1950-2005 avoidable mortality”/ “2000 population ratio” in increasing order for the major global groupings is as follows: 2.7% (Overseas Europe) < st="on">atin America and Caribbean) < style=""> 27.3% (the Pacific) < style="" lang="EN-US">
Chapter 3 specifically addresses the correlates and causes of post-1950 avoidable mortality. Avoidable mortality correlates with foreign occupation which simply ensures rulers with decreased intrinsic regard for the ruled. Avoidable mortality provides a key measure of how rulers regard their domestic and foreign subjects and has been used to quantify the intrinsic racism of past and present imperialist powers. The surprising result is that the worst avoidable mortality-based “intrinsic racism scores” for the major First World “occupiers” have been for the Netherlands, Israel and Portugal and the best score for Russia, with the results for the UK, France and the US in between.
Chapters 4 to 7 provide detailed, summary “occupation histories” of all the countries of the world together with precise estimates for each country of avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality for particular post-1950 periods. The reader will be shocked by the magnitude of the actual human cost of specific post-1950 wars, occupations and other events as illustrated by the following three examples.
The post-invasion avoidable mortality in the Occupied Palestinian, Iraqi and Afghan Territories totals 0.3, 1.0 and 2.4 million, respectively, and the post-invasion under-5 infant mortality totals 0.2, 0.5 and 1.9 million, respectively (as of mid-2007). Avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality reached a minimum in post-colonial Iraq but doubled after the return of Western forces with sanctions in 1990 and have remained high ever since – the post-1990 avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality in Iraq now total 2.7 million and 1.7 million, respectively.
Similar avoidable carnage but for reasons of First World-complicit incompetent indigenous governance has occurred in Southern Africa in the post-Apartheid era. Careful inspection of the dynamics of avoidable mortality reveals that avoidable mortality increased dramatically in South Africa and its neighbours in the mid-1990s due to the utterly preventable HIV/AIDS epidemic. The percentage of the population now HIV positive (2003) is 20.6% (Swaziland), 19.9% (Botswana), 17.9% (Lesotho), 14.1% (Zimbabwe), 11.9% (South Africa), 10.7% (Namibia), 8.6% (Zambia) and 7.0% (Mozambique).
At the other end of the scale, relative to other European countries there has been markedly higher than average avoidable mortality in some Central and Eastern European countries subject to post-war Soviet occupation (specifically Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Latvia and the Ukraine). Thus, while Hungary has one of the best post-1950 under-5 infant mortality outcomes in the world, it has the worst post-1950 avoidable mortality outcome for any European country (1.4 million avoidable deaths since 1950 and currently 35,000 annually). Possible explanations for the excessive avoidable mortality in Hungary (and these other “frontline” countries also subject to partial or complete Soviet occupation in the post-war era) include smoking, drinking, depression, pollution, economically depressed Roma minorities and non-reported deliberate or accidental radiological contamination.
Chapter 8 provides a detailed summary of the causes of avoidable mortality including war, occupation, deprivation, famine, disease, genocide and passive genocide. Avoidable mortality is fundamentally caused by violence, deprivation, disease and lying. Requisite responses to man-made mass mortality include Cessation, Acknowledgement, Apology, Amends and Assertion of non-repetition (acronym: CAAAA or C4A) as exemplified by post-Holocaust Germany; this book attempts to at least enable “Acknowledgment” of the ongoing, First World-complicit avoidable mortality holocaust (16 million avoidable deaths per year – 44,000 per day - due to deprivation-related causes). Carefully considered, low cost, practical and humanitarian suggestions are made for halting the global avoidable mortality holocaust.
A Chapter 8 Appendix composed of 12 detailed Tables 8.1-8.12 summarizes the roughly current state of play (2003) for all regions and countries of the World in relation to the following parameters: mortality, excess mortality, under-5 infant mortality, mortality/population, excess mortality/population, under-5 infant mortality/population, under-5 infants/population, “annual under-5 infant death rate”, and % HIV positive.
Each of the above sections commences with 5 carefully chosen quotations that capture the essence of the book or its specific chapters. Each chapter is split into numbered and entitled sub-sections and concludes with a carefully constructed summary. For ease of reading and efficiency, all documenting references and notes are indicated by superscript numbers and listed in Section 9. The Bibliography Section 10 lists all works quoted in Section 9 in a consistent fashion e.g. author(s), year, title, publisher, city (for books); author(s), year, title, journal, volume, pages (for journal articles); and similarly defined documentation for other references (notably URLs for Web-accessible documents).
There is no Subject Index because the book has been carefully designed with a comprehensive Detailed Contents section and with systematically Alphabetized historical contents. “Body Count” represents both a powerful humanitarian statement and a key reference work for students, scholars, journalists, the general public and humanitarian activists.
4. People who would benefit from the “Body Count” resource
This book is special, original and important in that it is the ONLY work available that comprehensively quantifies the horrendous global human avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality that has occurred over the last half century and is still occurring unchecked. It is also a very useful reference resource in that it is the only book currently available (as far as I know) that provides a detailed summary history for every country in the world from the Neolithic era to the present.
This book by a humanist biological scientist is a relatively dispassionate scientific catalogue and analysis of an appalling human reality that the world comprehensively ignores, namely global avoidable mortality. The book represents an encyclopaedic, quantitative resource for students, scholars, journalists and the general public and an unanswerable moral weapon for humanitarian activists in all countries.
People who would particularly benefit from Body Count” include senior high school students, undergraduate and postgraduate university students and scholars. The academic areas that this book relates to include history (general and specific areas), economics (environmental economics, world trade), commerce, management (risk management), business, law (international law), sociology (racism, feminism, conflict), women’s studies, biology (disease, human ecology, biological sustainability), medicine (epidemiology, risk management), journalism, media studies and politics (political science).
This book is designed for ordinary citizens in all walks of life. Thus I have recently given a 16 lecture course based on this book and entitled “Science, History and Avoidable Mortality” to a University of the Third Age (U3A) class of retired citizens from many former occupations – teaching, science, librarianship, secretarial, armed services, medicine, nursing, surgery, management, business and academia.
In addition to the UK and the British Commonwealth there would be a very large potential readership in North America in particular. Thus there is a wonderful, humane North American constituency that is committed to the “equality of man and the unalienable right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” and which is profoundly opposed to war.
Many in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific would find “Body Count” useful. In particular the huge population of educated, English-speaking Indians and Chinese should find utility in a detailed reference book quantitatively exposing the impact of the First World on the non-European world.
This book provides a wealth of quantitative data, thoughtful analysis and radical insights for students, scholars and humanitarian activists who demand humane global change but are enmeshed in a dominant global culture of comprehensive DENIAL. The dominant, prosperous, “politically correct racist” First World societies DENY their intrinsic racism, ignore the global carnage in which they are complicit and demonize their victims.
5. Related books
There are no such books about global avoidable mortality although there are many books dealing with specific conflict areas (e.g. the Iraq War) that constitute only a small part of my book. Thus Richard Hil and Paul Wilson have recently published “Dead Bodies Don’t Count: Civilian Casualties and the Forgotten Costs of the Iraq Conflict” (Zeus Publishing, Australia, 2007). Jared Diamond’s “Guns, Germs and Steel” deals in part with some major mass mortality events covered in parts of my book ( the Black Death and the effects of introduced disease in the Americas, Australasia and the Pacific).
Published books that come closest in subject matter to my book are some excellent books on past genocides [Chalk, F. & Jonassohn, K. (1990), The History and Sociology of Genocide. Analyses and Case Studies (Yale University Press, New Haven); Laqueur, W. (1980), The Terrible Secret. Suppression of the Truth about Hitler’s “Final Solution” (Penguin, London, 1982);
Wasserstein, B. (1979), Britain and the Jews of Europe 1939-1945 (Oxford University Press, 1988)], famine [Davis, M. (2001), Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World (Verso, London); Greenough, P.R. (1982), Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: the Famine of 1943-1944 (Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York); Polya, G.M. (1998), Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity, holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability (Polya, Melbourne)] and the historical genesis of genocidal European racism [Lindqvist, S. (1992), Exterminate All the Brutes (Granta Books, London, 2002)] – all matters summarized quantitatively in my book with reference to these and many other works. However NONE of these books even touch on the 1.3 billion post-1950 avoidable mortality holocaust.
Various recent books and articles by humane writers such as John Pilger, Arundhati Roy, Noam Chomsky, Tariq Ali, George Monbiot, Scott Ritter, Edward Said, Paul Roberts, John Perkins, Emmanuel Todd and William Blum reveal much about the dishonesty and violence of post-war US and related imperialism but do not provide comprehensive quantitation of the human cost. My book does not go into the details of violent deaths and political machinations – it is simply largely concerned with the war- and occupation-related avoidable mortality of which violent death can be a relatively small part. My book provides a detailed statistical and historical complement to the works of these other writers.
In writing Chapters 4-7 of this book I would have loved to have been able to refer to a succinct summary of world history from about 2000BC onwards [the best I could find, albeit an account that finished in mid-1952, was Langer, W.L. (1953), An Encyclopaedia of World History (Harrap, London)] and the best such compendium of more recent Third World history finished in about 1990 [Bissio, R.R. (1990), Third World Guide 91/92 (Instituto del Tercer Mondo, Montevideo)].
I am not aware of any other current history book that succinctly summarizes the history of all countries in the world from the Neolithic era to 2005 (as is achieved by Chapters 4-7 of my book). No other book even attempts to deal with post-1950 avoidable mortality and under-5 infant mortality, let alone in a comprehensive fashion.
6. Brief CV of Dr Gideon Polya
Gideon Polya was born in Melbourne, Australia in 1944 and raised in Hobart, Tasmania. A graduate of the University of Tasmania, he gained a PhD in Biochemistry from Flinders University in Adelaide, South Australia. After postdoctoral research at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, he returned to the Australian National University as a Queen Elizabeth II Fellow and thence took up a position at La Trobe University, Melbourne in 1972. In 2003 he retired from a senior position at La Trobe University but returned in 2007 to deliver a big second year science subject (Biochemistry for Agricultural Science students).
Dr Gideon Polya published some 130 works in a 4 decade scientific career (search Google Advanced Scholar for many of these publications), most recently a huge pharmacological reference text "Biochemical Targets of Plant Bioactive Compounds. A pharmacological reference guide to sites of action and biological effects" (860 pages; 500 pages of tables; 4 indexes; Taylor & Francis/CRC Press, London & New York, 2003). In 1998 he published “Jane Austen and the Black Hole of British History. Colonial rapacity, holocaust denial and the crisis in biological sustainability” (Polya, Melbourne).
In recent years, in addition to writing “Body Count”, Dr Polya has written extensively about global avoidable mortality (numerous articles on this and related matters can be found by a simple Google search for "Gideon Polya" and on his websites: http://members.optusnet.com.au/~gpolya/links.html , http://globalavoidablemortality.blogspot.com/ , http://mwcnews.net/content/view/1375/247/ , http://gpolya.newsvine.com/ and http://gideon.sulekha.com/default.htm ).
Gideon Polya is married with 3 children. A keen artist he has published numerous cartoons (including illustrations for a statistics textbook), has painted a thousand paintings (abstract figurative and landscapes) and has drawn thousands of portraits.
Humanitarian Words having evidently failed (16 million people die avoidably each year i.e. 44,000 each day) Gideon Polya recently turned to Painting for Peace, painting HUGE works to spread a message of Peace, Love and respect for Woman and for Mother and Child, including: Sydney Madonna: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10865/26/ , Manhattan Madonna: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/10766/26/ , Truelove: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/11031/254/ , Melbourne Madonna: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/13950/26/ , Qana (conceptually related to Pablo Picasso’s 1937 antiwar masterpiece Guernica about the Nazi bombing of the town of the same name): http://mwcnews.net/content/view/9547/26/ , Isfahan Matisse: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14417/26/ , and Alhambra Pollock: http://mwcnews.net/content/view/14082/42/ (that is explained by the Acronym PEACE – Pólya, Escher, Alhambra, Cultural Ecumenism). I would be delighted if you would pass on these links on to your friends, colleagues, associates and local media in the interests of Peace, Amity and respect for Woman, Mother and Child.
7 . Inquiries about “Body Count”
Inquiries about “Body Count” can be addressed to G.M. Polya at: gpolya@optusnet.com.au or to 29 Dwyer Street, Macleod, Melbourne, Victoria, 3085, Australia.
By Dr Gideon Polya
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Sentencing convicted felons in the United States
Related to country: United States
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Chapter 3
United States v. John M. Poindexter
Navy Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter was appointed as President Reagan's national security adviser on December 4, 1985, succeeding Robert C. McFarlane, whom Poindexter had served under as deputy for two years. Poindexter's White House career ended November 25, 1986, when he was forced to resign in the wake of the public disclosure of the Iran/contra diversion.
Poindexter, Lt. Col. Oliver North and McFarlane were the three individuals Attorney General Edwin Meese III identified on November 25, 1986, as knowledgeable of the diversion. Poindexter's supervision of North and his own participation in the Iran and contra operations were early focuses of Independent Counsel's investigation.
As in the case against North, criminal evidence against Poindexter had to be gathered quickly before he was compelled to testify on Capitol Hill in the summer of 1987 under a grant of limited immunity. Otherwise, the prosecution of Poindexter was likely to be challenged on the grounds that it was derived from or in some way influenced by his immunized congressional testimony.
On March 16, 1988, Poindexter was indicted on seven felony charges arising from his involvement in the Iran/contra affair, as part of a 23-count multi-defendant indictment. He was named with North, retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord and Albert Hakim as a member of the conspiracy to defraud the United States Government by effecting the Iran/contra diversion and other acts.
After the cases were severed and two of the original charges dismissed, Poindexter was tried and convicted in April 1990 of five felonies, including: one count of conspiring to obstruct official inquiries and proceedings, two counts of obstructing Congress, and two counts of false statements to Congress.1 U.S. District Judge Harold H. Greene sentenced him to a six-month prison term. In November 1991, Poindexter's convictions were overturned on appeal. In December 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case.
1 The Poindexter case was tried by Associate Counsel Dan K. Webb, Christian J. Mixter, Howard M. Pearl, and Louise R. Radin.
Poindexter joined the National Security Council staff in June 1981, following a distinguished naval career that included battleship command and high-ranking Pentagon posts. In October 1983 he became deputy to National Security Adviser McFarlane; among his subordinates was North. During Poindexter's one-year tenure as national security adviser, which began in December 1985, he oversaw the Iran/contra operations in which North was directly involved.
In November 1986, as the secret operations were becoming publicly exposed, Poindexter became the senior Administration official responsible for briefing the President's other top advisers about the Iran arms sales. In a series of White House meetings with other officials and members of Congress throughout the month, he repeatedly laid out a false version of the transactions that distanced President Reagan from the legally questionable 1985 arms shipments made through Israel, particularly the November 1985 HAWK-missile transaction.
Although Poindexter was the spokesman, he was not alone responsible for knowing the facts. Virtually every other senior official, including President Reagan, who heard his version of the arms sales in briefings throughout November 1986 had reason to believe it was wrong. Yet no one, according to contemporaneous notes of those briefings, spoke up to correct Poindexter.
Poindexter along with North and others in November 1986 attempted to shred and alter the paper trail reflecting their Iran/contra activities. Among other things, Poindexter destroyed the only existing signed presidential covert-action Finding that was intended to authorize retroactively CIA involvement in the November 1985 HAWKs shipment.
Poindexter and North were less successful in eradicating the computer-message trail of their Iran/contra activities. Poindexter and North often communicated through a special channel that Poindexter, a computer expert, had set up on the NSC computer system. This channel, known as ``Private Blank Check,'' allowed Poindexter and North to relay messages to each other without their being routed through channels in which others on the NSC staff could screen them.
Between November 22 to 29, 1986, North deleted from his computer file 736 messages, and Poindexter deleted 5,012 messages during the same period.2 Despite these deletions, the White House routinely saved back-up tapes containing all data in the system for two weeks to protect against inadvertent loss. When the Iran/contra affair was exposed in late November 1986, the White House Communications Agency, which manages the NSC computer system, retained the back-up tapes dating from November 15. Investigators, therefore, were able to retrieve copies of all messages that were in the Poindexter-North computer files in mid-November 1986 before most of the deletions occurred. These computer messages became important evidence in both the Poindexter and North trials.
2 Williams, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.
Poindexter admitted to many of his activities before the Select Committees in July 1987 under a grant of testimonial immunity, which prevented his admissions from being used against him in any criminal proceeding. Because President Reagan did not testify in that forum, Poindexter was called to answer the question that dominated the hearings: Did the President know about and approve the diversion of the Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras? Poindexter answered no, ``the buck stops here with me.'' 3 He said he deliberately withheld the information from President Reagan because ``I wanted the President to have some deniability so that he would be protected. . . .'' 4
3 Poindexter, Select Committees Testimony, 7/15/87, p. 95.
4 Ibid., p. 101.
Facing a criminal trial, Poindexter confronted a different dilemma: It was no longer a question of protecting the President but defending himself against five felony charges. Before Congress, Poindexter's most significant testimony corroborated President Reagan's repeated denials of awareness of the Iran/contra diversion. In the courtroom, Poindexter mounted a higher-authorization defense, attempting to convince the jury that the President had approved his actions, including those that resulted in criminal charges. Instead of taking the stand in his own defense, however, he called President Reagan to testify.
Pre-Trial Proceedings
U.S. District Judge Gerhard A. Gesell in June 1988 ordered that the multi-defendant case against Poindexter, North, Secord and Hakim be severed.5 Following severance, Poindexter's case was transferred to Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., and then to Judge Greene, who presided over further proceedings.
5 For a more detailed description of the severance of the multi-defendant case, see North chapter.
All of Poindexter's substantive challenges to the validity of the indictment were dismissed before trial. The remaining important issues concerned: (1) the preservation of the conspiracy charge; (2) the resolution of classified-information disputes; (3) the resolution of issues related to Poindexter's immunized congressional testimony, under the ruling known as Kastigar; and (4) the defendant's successful effort to secure trial testimony from former President Reagan.
Preserving and Narrowing the Conspiracy Charge
Problems with classified information led to the dismissal of the central conspiracy charges before the North trial, and similar problems were expected to arise in the case against Poindexter. On June 20, 1989, Independent Counsel moved to eliminate the original broad conspiracy charges based upon the supply of the contras and the diversion and to substantially narrow the charge of conspiracy to violate other substantive criminal statutes, forbidding false statements and obstruction. After filings and oral argument, the court granted the Government's motion.
The charge was refocused on the illegal act of conspiring with North and Secord to conceal activities from Congress. Independent Counsel argued successfully that this narrowing of the conspiracy charge would minimize the classified-information problems that plagued the North prosecution.
Classified Information Issues
The Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) allowed the trial court effectively to resolve issues involving the use of classified documents and testimony in Poindexter. Judge Greene's supervision of the CIPA process and fruitful negotiations between counsel for the Government and Poindexter resolved most disputes with a minimum of delay.
In contrast to North, there was no prolonged or significant litigation concerning the form or scope of Poindexter's CIPA notices to the court to disclose classified information at trial. Between November 27, 1989, and March 13, 1990, Poindexter served 11 such notices, including eight that listed classified documents he wanted to use at trial, two describing possible classified testimony, and one focused solely on information he wanted to elicit at the deposition of President Reagan.
Judge Greene ordered that all differences over classified information be negotiated between the parties before being brought before the court. Judge Greene held six closed CIPA hearings before the trial began and supplemented those with several shorter hearings during trial. Most of his rulings on the relevance and admissibility of classified information, and on the adequacy of substitutions proposed by the Government, were made from the bench.
Taken together, Poindexter's CIPA notices listed approximately 1,200 documents, only a small fraction of which were ultimately introduced at trial. Most classified information was covered by Government stipulations to certain facts and other unclassified substitutions. This allowed the trial to proceed smoothly, without the conflicts that complicated North or the case against former CIA station chief Joseph F. Fernandez, which was dismissed due to classified-information problems.6
6 See Fernandez chapter.
Kastigar Proceedings
Poindexter was compelled under a grant of use immunity to testify in 1987 before the Select Committees investigating Iran/contra. As did the other Iran/contra defendants who gave immunized testimony before Congress, Poindexter moved to dismiss the indictment on the theory that it violated the standards enunciated in Kastigar v. United States,7 arguing that his immunized testimony was used against him in the Grand Jury and at trial. This argument proved unsuccessful on the trial level but ultimately prevailed in the Court of Appeals.
7 406 U.S. 411 (1972).
Before their trials were severed, Poindexter moved jointly with North and Hakim, who also had received immunity to testify before Congress, to have the charges against them dismissed on the ground that the evidence against them was tainted by their immunized testimony. Judge Gesell denied that motion. However, in deference to defense claims that they would use one another's possibly exculpatory immunized testimony, Judge Gesell in June 1988 severed the trials.
Poindexter renewed his Kastigar motion before Judge Greene in August 1989. After briefing and argument,8 the court ordered that two evidentiary hearings be held. At the first, the court heard testimony from Associate Counsel Dan K. Webb and Howard M. Pearl concerning their exposure to Poindexter's immunized testimony before joining the Office of Independent Counsel. Webb and Pearl joined the OIC staff in 1989 and had not, before their appointments, been subject to OIC's procedures to insulate itself from Poindexter's immunized testimony. Judge Greene found their exposure to Poindexter's testimony to be insignificant and allowed both attorneys to participate in the trial.
8 The Poindexter case was tried before the Court of Appeals ruled in North that witness hearings were necessary to permit the trial of an immunized defendant.
The second set of court hearings concerned trial witnesses, whose testimony may have been tainted by Poindexter's immunized testimony. Judge Greene accepted Judge Gesell's earlier review of Grand Jury witnesses and declined to re-examine his findings. He also refused to dismiss the indictment on the basis of potential grand juror exposure to the immunized testimony.
Regarding trial witnesses, the court took extensive measures to ensure that Poindexter's immunized statements were not used against him. The court ordered the Government to make an ex parte submission (later disclosed to Poindexter) of all statements made by potential trial witnesses before Poindexter gave his immunized testimony before Congress in July 1987. The court found that all of the proposed testimony of most of the potential witnesses had been memorialized before Poindexter appeared publicly on July 15, 1987, and therefore was not tainted.
As for those witnesses whose expected trial testimony would not be limited to the evidence OIC had sealed with the court prior to Poindexter's immunized testimony, Judge Greene required additional information. He concluded that the Government had failed to establish that five of its potential witnesses were free of taint and ordered them to appear at a pre-trial hearing. Two of the three witnesses who ultimately appeared at trial credibly affirmed that their anticipated testimony would not be influenced in any way by Poindexter's immunized testimony; the third, North, refused to do so.
North stated at the pre-trial hearing that he was unable, with respect to any subject, to distinguish what he had personally done, observed or experienced from what he had learned from watching Poindexter's immunized testimony.9 As for Poindexter's destruction of the December 1985 presidential covert-action Finding -- important evidence in the obstruction of Congress -- North acknowledged that he had seen Poindexter destroy a piece of paper but insisted that he did not know it was a Finding until Poindexter stated that fact in his immunized testimony before Congress.
9 North Testimony, Poindexter Pre-trial Hearing, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.
The court rejected North's pre-trial testimony as not believable. North, the court found, ``appears to have been embarked at that time [at the hearing] upon the calculated course of attempting to assist his former colleague and co-defendant . . . by prevaricating on various issues . . .'' 10
10 Opinion, Poindexter, 3/8/90, p. 9.
In a separate post-trial ruling, the court added that as far as the destruction of the Finding was concerned, North's testimony at his own trial about the event was inconsistent with his claim that he could not remember it independent of Poindexter's immunized testimony. The court found it ``inherently incredible'' that North did not remember ``his participation in an event he witnessed first hand and that was as dramatic, indeed historic, as the tearing up of an extremely rare Presidential Finding.'' 11
11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.
The Reagan Subpoena
One of the most notable aspects of the Poindexter case was the defendant's successful attempt to call former President Reagan to testify at his trial by videotaped deposition.
Poindexter first sought presidential and vice presidential notes from OIC as part of his pre-trial discovery requests. In a pre-trial hearing on September 6, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys told the court that presidential notes would reflect that Poindexter informed the President of his denials to Congress in 1986 of NSC activity in support of the contras, and that the notes would ``show what the President was told about what was being done to support the contras in Central America, and the President's consent and ratification and approval of that activity.'' 12 In seeking vice presidential notes, Poindexter's attorneys told the court that ``anytime he [Bush] missed a meeting, Admiral Poindexter briefed him on it afterwards.'' 13
12 Robinson, Poindexter Pre-trial Hearing, 9/6/89, p. 18.
13 Ibid., p. 19.
The court, before making a decision on whether to compel OIC to produce these documents, on September 11, 1989, directed Poindexter to file an ex parte memo explaining precisely how these documents would assist his defense.14 It required from Independent Counsel a legal memorandum concerning its responsibility to produce presidential and vice presidential documents not in OIC's possession.
14 Opinion, Poindexter, 9/11/89, p. 22.
Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15
15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.
Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16
16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.
On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18
17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.
18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.
On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.
In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.
19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.
In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.
In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:
Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20
20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)
President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.
The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.
As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.
The Poindexter Trial
The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.
Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.
21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.
President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.
Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.
Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.
The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North
The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:
-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.
-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.
-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.
-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.
In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23
22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.
23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.
North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.
North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25
24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.
25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.
HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27
26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.
27 Ibid.
After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28
28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.
Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.
North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31
29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.
30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.
31 Ibid., p. 1111.
North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36
32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.
33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.
34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.
35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.
36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.
When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38
37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.
38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.
After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39
39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.
Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41
40 Ibid., p. 1191.
41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.
The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:
Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?
A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42
42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.
North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45
43 Ibid., p. 1218.
44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.
45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.
More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47
46 Ibid., 1252-54.
47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.
North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.
The Trial Testimony of President Reagan
Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48
48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.
In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.
Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52
49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.
50 Ibid., p. 21.
51 Ibid., p. 24.
52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55
53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.
55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59
56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
57 Ibid., p. 30.
58 Ibid., p. 28.
59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.
President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63
60 Ibid., p. 69.
61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.
64 Ibid., p. 116.
Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:
Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.
And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65
65 Ibid., p. 131.
In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:
Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?
A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.
Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?
A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.
Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?
A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66
66 Ibid., p. 121.
President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:
Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?
A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.
Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.
Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?
A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67
67 Ibid., p. 122.
President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68
68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.
In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.
The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:
Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69
69 Ibid., p. 151.
President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70
70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73
71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
73 Ibid., p. 158.
President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75
74 Ibid., p. 160.
75 Ibid., p. 252.
Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.
76 Ibid., p. 255.
On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:
77 Ibid., p. 170.
I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78
78 Ibid., p. 189.
In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:
And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79
79 Ibid., p. 155.
Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:
May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80
80 Ibid., p. 156.
Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81
81 Ibid., p. 157.
President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83
82 Ibid., p. 240.
83 Ibid., p. 243.
Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84
84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.
The Verdict and Sentencing
After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.
In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:
Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.
. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .
President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.
No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .
With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.
But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.
Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.
A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85
85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22
The Appeal
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86
86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87
87 Ibid.
In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89
88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).
89 Ibid., p. 10.
On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would
make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90
90 Ibid., p. 22.
Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling
. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91
91 Ibid., p. 29.
The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.
Conclusion
Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.
The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.
The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.
Condamner les criminels condamnés aux Etats-Unis
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
Chapitre 3
Etats-Unis v. John M. Vice
Adm de marine de Poindexter. John M. Poindexter a été nommé en tant que conseiller de sécurité nationale du Président Reagan le 4 décembre 1985, réussissant Robert C. McFarlane, que Poindexter avait servi dessous de député pendant deux années. La carrière de la Maison Blanche de Poindexter a fini le 25 novembre 1986, quand il a été forcé de démissionner à la suite de la révélation publique de l'Iran/contre la déviation.
Poindexter, lieutenant. Colonne Le nord et le McFarlane d'Oliver étaient l'Attorney General Edwin Meese III de trois individus identifié le 25 novembre 1986, comme bien informé de la déviation. La surveillance de Poindexter du nord et sa propre participation en Iran et contre des opérations étaient les centres tôt de la recherche de l'avocat-conseil indépendant.
Comme dans le point de droit contre le nord, l'évidence criminelle contre Poindexter a dû être recueillie rapidement avant qu'il ait été obligé de témoigner sur Capitol Hill en été de 1987 sous une concession d'immunité limitée. Autrement, la poursuite de Poindexter était susceptible d'être défiée parce qu'elle a été dérivée de ou d'une manière quelconque influencée par son témoignage congressionnel immunisé.
Le 16 mars 1988, Poindexter a été accusé sur sept frais de crime résultant de sa participation en Iran/contre l'affaire, en tant qu'élément d'un acte d'accusation de multi-défendeur de 23 comptes. Il a été appelé avec le nord, commandant retiré de l'Armée de l'Air. Générateur. Richard V. Secord et Albert Hakim en tant que membre de la conspiration à frauder le gouvernement des Etats-Unis en effectuant l'Iran/contre la déviation et autre agit.
Après que les cas aient été divisés et deux des frais originaux ont été écartés, Poindexter a été essayé et condamné en avril 1990 de cinq crimes, incluant : un compte de conspiration pour obstruer des enquêtes et des démarches officielles, deux comptes d'obstruer le congrès, et deux comptes de rapports faux à Congress.1 États-Unis Juge Harold H. de zone. Greene l'a condamné à une limite de six mois de prison. En novembre 1991, les convictions de Poindexter ont été retournées sur l'appel. En décembre 1992, les États-Unis Cour suprême refusée pour passer en revue le cas.
1 le cas de Poindexter a été essayé par des avocats-conseils Dan K. d'associé. Webb, chrétien J. Mixter, Howard M. Perle, et Louise R. Radin.
Poindexter a joint le personnel du Conseil de sécurité nationale en juin 1981, suivant une carrière navale distinguée qui a inclus la commande de cuirassé et les poteaux du haut rang du Pentagone. En octobre 1983 il est devenu député au conseiller McFarlane de sécurité nationale ; parmi ses subalternes était du nord. Pendant la tenure d'une année de Poindexter en tant que conseiller de sécurité nationale, qui a commencé en décembre 1985, il a surveillé l'Iran/contre les opérations dans lesquelles le nord a été directement impliqué.
En novembre 1986, pendant que les opérations secrètes devenaient publiquement exposées, Poindexter est allé bien au fonctionnaire aîné d'administration responsable de donner des instructions d'autres conseillers supérieurs du président au sujet des ventes d'armes de l'Iran. Dans une série de réunions de la Maison Blanche avec d'autres fonctionnaires et membres du congrès tout au long du mois, il a à plusieurs reprises présenté une version fausse des transactions qui ont distancé le Président Reagan des 1985 cargaisons des armes légalement incertaines faites par l'Israel, en particulier la transaction de Faucon-missile du novembre 1985.
Bien que Poindexter ait été le porte-parole, il n'était pas seul responsable de savoir les faits. Pratiquement chaque autre haut fonctionnaire, y compris le Président Reagan, qui a entendu que sa version des ventes d'armes dans les briefings tout au long du novembre 1986 a eu la raison de la croire avaient tort. Pourtant personne, selon les notes contemporaines de ces briefings, rai jusqu'à Poindexter correct.
Poindexter avec le nord et d'autres en novembre 1986 essayés pour déchiqueter et changer la traînée de papier reflétant le leur Iran/contre des activités. Entre autres, Poindexter a détruit la seule conclusion présidentielle signée existante de secret-action qui a été prévue pour autoriser rétroactivement la participation de CIA dans l'expédition de fauconx du novembre 1985.
Poindexter et nord étaient moins réussis en supprimant la traînée d'ordinateur-message du leur Iran/contre des activités. Poindexter et nord ont souvent communiqué par un canal spécial que Poindexter, un informaticien, avait établi sur le système informatique de NSC. Ce canal, connu sous le nom de « contrôle blanc privé, » Poindexter permis et nord pour transmettre par relais des messages entre eux sans leur étant conduits par les canaux en lesquels d'autres sur le personnel de NSC pourraient les examiner.
Entre le 22 au 29 novembre 1986, le nord a supprimé de ses messages du fichier électronique 736, et Poindexter a supprimé 5.012 messages pendant le même period.2 en dépit de ces suppressions, les bandes par habitude sauvées de support de la Maison Blanche contenant toutes les données dans le système pendant deux semaines pour se protéger contre la perte négligente. Quand l'Iran/contre l'affaire a été exposé dans le défunt novembre 1986, l'agence de communications de la Maison Blanche, qui contrôle le système informatique de NSC, a maintenu les bandes de secours datant à partir du 15 novembre. Les investigateurs pouvaient, donc, rechercher des copies de tous les messages qui étaient dans les fichiers informatiques de Poindexter-Nord dans le mi novembre 1986 avant que la plupart des suppressions se soient produites. Ces messages d'ordinateur sont devenus évidence importante dans le Poindexter et des épreuves du nord.
2 Williams, témoignage d'essai de Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.
Poindexter admis à plusieurs de ses activités avant que les comités choisis en juillet 1987 sous une concession d'immunité testimoniale, qui a empêché ses admissions d'être employé contre lui dans la démarche criminelle. Puisque le Président Reagan n'a pas témoigné du fait le forum, Poindexter s'est appelé pour répondre à la question qui a dominé les auditions : Le président a-t-il su et est-ce qu'approuver la déviation des ventes d'armes de l'Iran procède aux contras ? Poindexter a répondu au non, « les arrêts de mâle ici avec moi. » 3 qu'il a dits il a délibérément retenu l'information au Président Reagan parce que ``j'ai voulu que le président eût un certain deniability de sorte qu'il soit protégé. . . . '' 4
3 Poindexter, témoignage choisi de comités, 7/15/87, P. 95.
4 Ibid., P. 101.
Faisant face à une épreuve criminelle, Poindexter a confronté un dilemme différent : Ce n'était plus une question de protéger le président mais se défendre contre cinq frais de crime. Devant le congrès, le témoignage le plus significatif de Poindexter démentis répétés du Président Reagan corroboré de la conscience de l'Iran/contre la déviation. Dans l'auditoire de tribunal, Poindexter a monté une défense de haut-autorisation, essayant de convaincre le jury que le président avait approuvé ses actions, y compris ceux qui ont eu comme conséquence les frais criminels. Au lieu de prendre le stand dans sa propre défense, cependant, il a appelé le Président Reagan pour témoigner.
Démarches Pre-Trial
États-Unis Juge Gerhard A. de zone. Gesell a en juin 1988 commandé que la caisse de multi-défendeur contre Poindexter, nord, Secord et Hakim soit severed.5 après séparation, le cas de Poindexter a été transféré au juge en chef Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., et juger alors Greene, qui a présidé démarches d'excédent d'autres.
5 pour une description plus détaillée de la séparation de la caisse de multi-défendeur, voir le chapitre du nord.
Tous les défis substantifs de Poindexter à la validité de l'acte d'accusation ont été écartés avant épreuve. Les questions importantes restantes sont concernées : (1) la conservation de la charge de conspiration ; (2) la résolution des conflits de la classifier-information ; (3) la résolution des questions liées au témoignage congressionnel immunisé de Poindexter, selon régner connu sous le nom de Kastigar ; et (4) l'effort réussi du défendeur de fixer le témoignage d'essai de l'ancien Président Reagan.
La préservation et le rétrécissement des problèmes de charge
de conspiration avec des informations secrètes ont mené au renvoi des frais centraux de conspiration avant l'épreuve du nord, et on s'est attendu à ce que des problèmes semblables surgissent dans le point de droit contre Poindexter. Le 20 juin 1989, les avocats-conseils indépendants se sont déplacés pour éliminer les larges frais originaux de conspiration basés sur l'approvisionnement en contras et déviation et pour rétrécir sensiblement la charge de la conspiration pour violer les autres statuts criminels substantifs, rapports faux menaçants et obstruction. Après des classements et argument oral, la cour a accordé le mouvement du gouvernement.
La charge a été refocalisée sur l'acte illégal de la conspiration avec le nord et le Secord pour cacher des activités du congrès. Les avocats-conseils indépendants ont argué du fait avec succès que ce rétrécissement de la charge de conspiration réduirait au minimum les problèmes de la classifier-information qui ont infesté la poursuite du nord.
Les questions classifiées de l'information que
les procédures classifiées de l'information agissent (CIPA) ont permis à la cour d'essai efficacement de résoudre des questions comportant l'utilisation des documents et du témoignage classifiés dans Poindexter. Jugez la surveillance de Greene du processus de CIPA et les négociations fructueuses entre les avocats-conseils pour le gouvernement et le Poindexter résolus la plupart des conflits avec un minimum de retardent.
Contrairement au nord, il n'y avait aucune prolongée ou le litige significatif au sujet de la forme ou de la portée des notifications du CIPA de Poindexter à la cour de révéler a classifié l'information à l'épreuve. Entre les 27 novembre 1989 et 13 mars 1990, Poindexter a servi 11 telles notifications, y compris le témoignage huit que les documents classifiés énumérés il ont voulu employer à l'épreuve, deux classifié possible décrivant, et une concentrée seulement sur l'information qu'il a voulu obtenir au dépôt du Président Reagan.
Jugez Greene a commandé que toutes les différences que l'excédent a classifié l'information soient négociées entre les parties avant d'être apporté devant la cour. Jugez Greene a tenu six auditions clôturées de CIPA avant l'épreuve a commencé et a complété ceux avec plusieurs auditions plus courtes pendant l'épreuve. La plupart de ses actes sur la pertinence et l'admissibilité d'informations secrètes, et sur l'adéquation des substitutions proposées par le gouvernement, ont été faites à partir du mettre hors jeu.
Prises ensemble, les notices du CIPA de Poindexter ont énuméré approximativement 1.200 documents, seulement une petite fraction dont ont été finalement présentés à l'épreuve. La plupart des informations secrètes ont été couvertes par des conditions de Government à certains faits et à d'autres substitutions non classifiées. Ceci a permis à l'épreuve de procéder sans à-coup, sans conflits qui ont compliqué le nord ou le point de droit contre l'ancienne station Joseph en chef F. de CIA. Fernandez, qui était dû écarté à la classifier-information problems.6
6 voient le chapitre de Fernandez.
Des démarches Poindexter
de Kastigar ont été obligées sous une concession d'immunité d'utilisation de témoigner en 1987 devant les comités choisis étudiant l'Iran/contre. De même que l'autre Iran/contre les défendeurs qui ont donné le témoignage immunisé devant le congrès, Poindexter déplacé pour écarter l'acte d'accusation sur la théorie qu'elle a violé les normes déclarées dans Kastigar v. Les Etats-Unis, 7 arguant du fait que son témoignage immunisé a été employé contre lui dans le jury grand et à l'épreuve. Cet argument a prouvé non réussi au niveau d'essai mais a finalement régné dans la cour des appels.
les 7 406 États-Unis 411 (1972).
Avant que leurs épreuves aient été divisées, Poindexter s'est déplacé en commun avec le nord et Hakim, qui également avait reçu l'immunité pour témoigner devant le congrès, pour avoir les frais contre eux a écarté pour la raison que l'évidence contre eux a été corrompue par leur témoignage immunisé. Le juge Gesell a nié ce mouvement. Cependant, par la déférence pour la défense réclame qu'ils emploieraient probablement le témoignage immunisé justificatif de chacun, juge que Gesell ont en juin 1988 divisé les épreuves.
Poindexter a remplacé son mouvement de Kastigar avant juge Greene en août 1989. Après le briefing et l'argument, 8 la cour ont commandé que deux auditions probatoires soient tenues. Au premier, la cour a entendu le témoignage des avocats-conseils Dan K. d'associé. Webb et Howard M. Perlez au sujet de leur exposition au témoignage immunisé de Poindexter avant de joindre l'Office des avocats-conseils indépendants. Webb et perle ont joint le personnel d'OIC en 1989 et ne l'ont pas eu, avant leurs rendez-vous, été sujet aux procédures d'OIC pour s'isoler du témoignage immunisé de Poindexter. Jugez Greene a trouvé leur exposition au témoignage de Poindexter pour être insignifiant et a permis aux deux mandataires de participer à l'épreuve.
8 le cas de Poindexter ont été essayés devant la cour des appels régnés dans le nord que les auditions de témoin étaient nécessaires pour permettre l'épreuve d'un défendeur immunisé.
Le deuxième ensemble d'auditions de cour est concerné les témoins d'essai, dont le témoignage a pu avoir été corrompu par le témoignage immunisé de Poindexter's. Un examen plus tôt de Gesell de juge admis par Greene de juge des témoins de fortune grands et refusé pour examiner de nouveau ses résultats. Il a également refusé d'écarter l'acte d'accusation sur la base de l'exposition grande potentielle de juré au témoignage immunisé.
Concernant les témoins d'essai, la cour a pris des mesures étendues de s'assurer que les rapports immunisés de Poindexter n'ont pas été employés contre lui. La cour a commandé le gouvernement pour faire une soumission ex de parte (plus tard révélée à Poindexter) de tous les rapports faits par les témoins d'essai potentiels avant que Poindexter ait donné son témoignage immunisé devant le congrès en juillet 1987. La cour a constaté que tout les témoignage proposé de la plupart des témoins potentiels avait été memorialized avant que Poindexter soit apparu publiquement le 15 juillet 1987, et donc n'a pas été corrompu.
Quant à ces témoins dont ont prévu que le témoignage d'essai ne serait pas limité à l'évidence OIC avait scellé avec la cour avant le témoignage immunisé de Poindexter, l'information additionnelle requise par Greene de juge. Il a conclu que le gouvernement n'avait pas établi que cinq de ses témoins potentiels étaient exempts de traces et leur avait passé commande à apparaître à une audition pre-trial. Deux des trois témoins qui finalement sont apparus à l'épreuve credibly ont affirmé que leur témoignage prévu ne serait pas influencé de quelque façon par le témoignage immunisé de Poindexter's ; le troisième, nord, refusé pour faire ainsi.
Nord indiqué à l'audition pre-trial qu'il ne pouvait pas, en ce qui concerne n'importe quel sujet, distinguer ce qu'il avait personnellement fait, observé ou éprouvé de ce qu'il avait appris d'observer le testimony.9 immunisé de Poindexter quant à la destruction de Poindexter de la conclusion présidentielle de secret-action du décembre 1985 -- évidence importante dans l'obstruction du congrès -- Le nord a reconnu qu'il avait vu Poindexter détruire un morceau de papier mais insistée sur le fait qu'il n'a pas su lui était une conclusion jusqu'à ce que Poindexter ait déclaré ce fait dans son témoignage immunisé devant le congrès.
9 témoignage du nord, audition Pre-trial de Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.
La cour a rejeté le témoignage pre-trial du nord comme non crédible. Le nord, la cour trouvée, ``semble avoir été embarqué à ce moment-là [à l'audition] sur le cours calculé d'essayer d'aider son anciens collègue et Co-défendeur. . . par la tergiversation sur de diverses questions. . . opinion 10
, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. du '' 10. 9.
Dans une poteau-épreuve séparée régnant, la cour a ajouté qu'en ce qui concerne la destruction de la conclusion, le témoignage du nord à sa propre épreuve au sujet de l'événement était contradictoire avec sa réclamation qu'il ne pourrait pas se rappeler l'indépendant du témoignage immunisé de Poindexter. La cour l'a trouvé « en soi incroyable » que le nord ne s'est pas rappelé « sa participation à un événement qu'il était témoin de première main et cela était comme dramatique, en effet historique, en tant que déchirer d'une conclusion présidentielle extrêmement rare. » 11
11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.
La citation une
de Reagan des aspects les plus notables du cas de Poindexter était la tentative réussie du défendeur d'appeler l'ancien Président Reagan pour témoigner à son épreuve par le dépôt enregistré en vidéo.
Notes présidentielles présidentielles de Poindexter et vice d'abord cherchées d'OIC en tant qu'élément de ses demandes de découverte pre-trial. Dans une audition pre-trial le 6 septembre 1989, les mandataires de Poindexter ont dit à la cour que les notes présidentielles refléteraient ce Poindexter ont informé le président de ses démentis au congrès dans 1986 de l'activité de NSC à l'appui des contras, et que les notes « montreraient ce que le président a été informé sur ce qu'était fait pour soutenir les contras en Amérique Centrale, et le consentement du président et la ratification et l'approbation de cette activité. » 12 en cherchant les notes présidentielles vice, les mandataires de Poindexter ont dit la cour que « n'importe quand il [Bush] a manqué une réunion, amiral Poindexter l'ai donné des instructions là-dessus après. » 13
12 Robinson, audition Pre-trial de Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.
13 Ibid., P. 19.
La cour, avant de prendre une décision dessus si contraindre OIC pour produire ces documents, le 11 septembre 1989, a dirigé Poindexter pour classer une note ex de parte expliquant avec précision comment ces documents aideraient son defense.14 qu'elle a exigé des avocats-conseils indépendants un mémorandum légal au sujet de sa responsabilité de produire les documents présidentiels présidentiels et vice pas en possession d'OIC.
14 opinion, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.
Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15
15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.
Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16
16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.
On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18
17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.
18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.
On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.
In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.
19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.
In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.
In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:
Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20
20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)
President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.
The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.
As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.
The Poindexter Trial
The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.
Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.
21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.
President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.
Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.
Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.
The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North
The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:
-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.
-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.
-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.
-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.
In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23
22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.
23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.
North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.
North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25
24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.
25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.
HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27
26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.
27 Ibid.
After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28
28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.
Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.
North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31
29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.
30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.
31 Ibid., p. 1111.
North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36
32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.
33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.
34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.
35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.
36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.
When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38
37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.
38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.
After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39
39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.
Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41
40 Ibid., p. 1191.
41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.
The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:
Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?
A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42
42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.
North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45
43 Ibid., p. 1218.
44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.
45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.
More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47
46 Ibid., 1252-54.
47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.
North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.
The Trial Testimony of President Reagan
Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48
48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.
In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.
Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52
49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.
50 Ibid., p. 21.
51 Ibid., p. 24.
52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55
53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.
55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59
56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
57 Ibid., p. 30.
58 Ibid., p. 28.
59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.
President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63
60 Ibid., p. 69.
61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.
64 Ibid., p. 116.
Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:
Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.
And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65
65 Ibid., p. 131.
In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:
Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?
A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.
Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?
A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.
Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?
A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66
66 Ibid., p. 121.
President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:
Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?
A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.
Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.
Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?
A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67
67 Ibid., p. 122.
President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68
68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.
In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.
The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:
Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69
69 Ibid., p. 151.
President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70
70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73
71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
73 Ibid., p. 158.
President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75
74 Ibid., p. 160.
75 Ibid., p. 252.
Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.
76 Ibid., p. 255.
On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:
77 Ibid., p. 170.
I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78
78 Ibid., p. 189.
In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:
And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79
79 Ibid., p. 155.
Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:
May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80
80 Ibid., p. 156.
Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81
81 Ibid., p. 157.
President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83
82 Ibid., p. 240.
83 Ibid., p. 243.
Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84
84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.
The Verdict and Sentencing
After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.
In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:
Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.
. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .
President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.
No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .
With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.
But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.
Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.
A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85
85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22
The Appeal
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86
86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87
87 Ibid.
In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89
88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).
89 Ibid., p. 10.
On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would
make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90
90 Ibid., p. 22.
Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling
. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91
91 Ibid., p. 29.
The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.
Conclusion
Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.
The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.
The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.
Condenar criminales condenados en los Estados Unidos
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
Capítulo 3
Estados Unidos v. Juan M. Vicio
Adm de la marina de guerra de Poindexter. Juan M. Poindexter fue designado como consejero de la seguridad nacional de presidente Reagan el 4 de diciembre de 1985, teniendo éxito a Roberto C. McFarlane, que Poindexter había servido debajo como diputado por dos años. La carrera blanca de la casa de Poindexter terminó el 25 de noviembre de 1986, cuando lo forzaron dimitir como consecuencia del acceso público del Irán/contra la diversión.
Poindexter, teniente. Columna El norte y McFarlane de Oliver eran el Procurador General de la República Edwin Meese III de tres individuos identificado el 25 de noviembre de 1986, como bien informado de la diversión. La supervisión de Poindexter del norte y su propia participación en el Irán y contra operaciones eran focos tempranos de la investigación independiente del consejo.
Como en el caso en contra de la evidencia del norte, criminal contra Poindexter tuvo que ser recolectado rápidamente antes de que a le obligaran que atestiguara en Capitol Hill en el verano de 1987 bajo concesión de la inmunidad limitada. Si no, el procesamiento de Poindexter era probable ser desafiado considerando que fue derivado de o de cierta manera influenciado por su testimonio del congreso inmunizado.
El 16 de marzo de 1988, Poindexter fue procesado en siete cargas del crimen que se presentaban de su implicación en el Irán/contra asunto, como parte de una acusación del multi-demandado de 23 cuentas. Lo nombraron con el norte, comandante jubilado de la fuerza aérea. Generador. Richard V. Secord y Albert Hakim como miembro de la conspiración a defraudar el gobierno de Estados Unidos efectuando el Irán/contra la diversión y otra actúa.
Después de que los casos fueran separados y dos de las cargas originales fueron despedidos, Poindexter fue intentado y condenado en abril de 1990 por cinco crímenes, incluyendo: una cuenta de conspiración obstruir investigaciones y procedimientos oficiales, dos cuentas de obstruir a congreso, y dos cuentas de declaraciones falsas a Congress.1 los E.E.U.U. Juez Harold H. del districto. Greene lo condenó a un término de seis meses de la prisión. En noviembre de 1991, las convicciones de Poindexter fueron volcadas en súplica. En diciembre de 1992, los E.E.U.U. Tribunal Supremo declinado para repasar el caso.
1 el caso de Poindexter fue intentado por los consejos Dan K. del asociado. Webb, cristiano J. Mixter, Howard M. Perla, y Louise R. Radin.
Poindexter ensambló a personal del consejo de la seguridad nacional en junio de 1981, siguiendo una carrera naval distinguida que incluyó los postes del pentágono del comando y de la alto-graduación del acorazado. En octubre de 1983 él hizo diputado al consejero McFarlane de la seguridad nacional; entre sus subordinados era del norte. Durante el arrendamiento anual de Poindexter como consejero de la seguridad nacional, que comenzó en diciembre de 1985, él supervisó el Irán/contra las operaciones en las cuales el norte estuvo implicado directamente.
En noviembre de 1986, como las operaciones secretas se exponían público, Poindexter sintió bien al funcionario mayor de la administración responsable de resumir a otros consejeros superiores del presidente sobre las ventas de armas de Irán. En una serie de las reuniones blancas de la casa con otros funcionarios y miembros del congreso a través del mes, él presentó en varias ocasiones a una versión falsa de las transacciones que distanciaron a presidente Reagan de los 1985 envíos de brazos legalmente cuestionables hechos a través de Israel, particularmente la transacción del Halcón-misil del noviembre de 1985.
Aunque Poindexter era el portavoz, él no era responsable solo de saber los hechos. Virtualmente cada otro alto funcionario, incluyendo presidente Reagan, que oyó que su versión de las ventas de armas en informes a través del noviembre de 1986 tenía razón de creerla eran incorrectos. Con todo nadie, según las notas contemporáneas de esos informes, rayo hasta Poindexter correcto.
Poindexter junto con el norte y otros procurados en noviembre de 1986 para destrozar y para alterar el rastro de papel que refleja su Irán/contra actividades. Entre otras cosas, Poindexter destruyó único encontrar presidencial firmado existente de la secreto-acción que fue pensado para autorizar retroactivo la implicación de la Cia en el envío de los halcones del noviembre de 1985.
Poindexter y el norte eran menos acertados en la supresión del rastro del computadora-mensaje de su Irán/contra actividades. Poindexter y el norte se comunicaron a menudo a través de un canal especial que Poindexter, especialista en computadoras, había instalado en el sistema informático de NSC. Este canal, conocido como el “cheque en blanco privado,” Poindexter permitido y norte para retransmitir mensajes el uno al otro sin su siendo encaminado a través de los canales en los cuales otros en el personal de NSC podrían defenderlos.
Entre del 22 al 29 de noviembre de 1986, el norte suprimido de sus mensajes del fichero electrónico 736, y Poindexter suprimió 5.012 mensajes durante el mismo period.2 a pesar de estas canceladuras, el respaldo rutinariamente ahorrado blanco de la casa graba contener todos los datos en el sistema por dos semanas para proteger contra pérdida inadvertida. Cuando el Irán/contra asunto fue expuesto en el último noviembre de 1986, la agencia blanca de las comunicaciones de la casa, que maneja el sistema informático de NSC, conservó las cintas de reserva que fechaban a partir del 15 de noviembre. Los investigadores, por lo tanto, podían recuperar las copias de todos los mensajes que estaban en los ficheros informáticos del Poindexter-Norte en el noviembre de 1986 mediados de antes de que la mayor parte de ocurrieran las canceladuras. Estos mensajes de la computadora se convirtieron en evidencia importante en el Poindexter y los ensayos del norte.
2 Williams, testimonio de ensayo de Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.
Poindexter admitido a muchas de sus actividades antes de que los comités selectos en julio de 1987 bajo concesión de la inmunidad testimonial, que evitó que sus admisiones fueran utilizadas contra él en el procedimiento criminal. Porque presidente Reagan no atestiguó en que el foro, Poindexter fue llamado para contestar a la pregunta que dominó las audiencias: ¿El presidente sabía alrededor y aprobar la diversión de las ventas de armas de Irán procede a los contras? Poindexter contestó a no, “las paradas del buck aquí con mí.” 3 que él dijo él retuvo deliberadamente la información de presidente Reagan porque ``quisiera que el presidente tuviera algún deniability de modo que lo protegieran. . . . '' 4
3 Poindexter, testimonio selecto de los comités, 7/15/87, P. 95.
4 Ibid., P. 101.
Haciendo frente a un proceso penal, Poindexter enfrentó un diverso dilema: Era no más una cuestión de proteger al presidente pero de defenderse contra cinco cargas del crimen. Antes de congreso, el testimonio más significativo de Poindexter negaciones repetidas de presidente Reagan corroborado del conocimiento del Irán/contra la diversión. En la sala de tribunal, Poindexter montó una defensa de la alto-autorización, procurando convencer al jurado que el presidente hubiera aprobado sus acciones, incluyendo los que dieron lugar a cargas criminales. En vez de tomar el soporte en su propia defensa, sin embargo, él llamó a presidente Reagan para atestiguar.
Procedimientos Pre-Trial
los E.E.U.U. Juez Gerhard A. del districto. Gesell pidió en junio de 1988 que la caja del multi-demandado contra Poindexter, norte, Secord y Hakim sea severed.5 después de la separación, el caso de Poindexter fue transferido al principal juez Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., y entonces juzgar a Greene, que presidió otros procedimientos del excedente.
5 para una descripción más detallada de la separación de la caja del multi-demandado, vea el capítulo del norte.
Todos los desafíos substantivos de Poindexter a la validez de la acusación fueron despedidos antes de ensayo. Las ediciones importantes restantes trataron: (1) la preservación de la carga de la conspiración; (2) la resolución de la clasificar-información disputa; (3) la resolución de las ediciones relacionadas con el testimonio del congreso inmunizado de Poindexter, bajo decisión conocida como Kastigar; y (4) el esfuerzo acertado del demandado de asegurar el testimonio de ensayo de presidente anterior Reagan.
Preservar y enangostar los problemas de la carga
de la conspiración con la información clasificada condujeron al despido de las cargas centrales de la conspiración antes del ensayo del norte, y se esperaba que los problemas similares se presentaran en el caso en contra de Poindexter. El 20 de junio de 1989, los consejos independientes se movieron para eliminar las amplias cargas originales de la conspiración basadas sobre la fuente de los contras y de la diversión y para enangostar substancialmente la carga de conspiración para violar los otros estatutos criminales substantivos, declaraciones falsas de prohibición y obstrucción. Después de limaduras y de la discusión oral, la corte concedió el movimiento del gobierno.
La carga era refocused en el acto ilegal de la conspiración con el norte y Secord encubrir actividades del congreso. Los consejos independientes discutieron con éxito que el este enangostar de la carga de la conspiración redujera al mínimo los problemas de la clasificar-información que plagaron el procesamiento del norte.
La información clasificada publica
los procedimientos clasificados de la información actúa (CIPA) permitió que la corte de ensayo con eficacia resolviera las ediciones que implican el uso de documentos y del testimonio clasificados en Poindexter. Juzgue la supervisión de Greene del proceso de CIPA y las negociaciones fructuosas entre los consejos para el gobierno y Poindexter resueltos la mayoría de los conflictos con un mínimo de retrasan.
En contraste con el norte, no había haber prolongado o el pleito significativo referente la forma o al alcance de los avisos de CIPA de Poindexter a la corte de divulgar clasificó la información en el ensayo. Entre el 27 de noviembre de 1989 y 13 de marzo de 1990, Poindexter sirvió 11 tales avisos, incluyendo el testimonio clasificado posible que describía ocho que los documentos clasificados mencionados él desearon utilizar en el ensayo, dos, y uno centrado solamente en la información que él deseó sacar en la deposición de presidente Reagan.
Juzgue a Greene pidió que todas las diferencias que el excedente clasificó la información estén negociadas entre los partidos antes de ser traído antes de la corte. Juzgue a Greene llevó a cabo seis audiencias cerradas de CIPA antes del ensayo comenzó y suplió ésos con varias audiencias más cortas durante ensayo. La mayor parte de sus actos en la importancia y la admisibilidad de la información clasificada, y en la suficiencia de las substituciones propuestas por el gobierno, fueron hechos del banco.
Tomados juntos, los avisos de CIPA de Poindexter enumeraron aproximadamente 1.200 documentos, sólo una fracción pequeña de los cuales fue introducida en última instancia en el ensayo. La mayoría de la información clasificada fue cubierta por las estipulaciones de Government a ciertos hechos y a otras substituciones sin clasificar. Esto permitió que el ensayo procediera suavemente, sin los conflictos que complicaron el norte o el caso en contra de la estación anterior principal José F. de la Cia. Fernandez, que era despedido debido a la clasificar-información problems.6
6 ve el capítulo de Fernandez.
Se obligó a los procedimientos
Poindexter de Kastigar bajo concesión de la inmunidad del uso que atestiguaran en 1987 ante los comités selectos que investigaban Irán/contra. Al igual que el otro Irán/contra los demandados que dieron testimonio inmunizado antes de congreso, Poindexter movido para despedir la acusación en la teoría que violó los estándares declarados en Kastigar v. Estados Unidos, 7 que discuten que su testimonio inmunizado fuera utilizado contra él en el jurado magnífico y en el ensayo. Esta discusión probó fracasado en el nivel de ensayo pero prevaleció en última instancia en el tribunal de apelación.
los 7 406 E.E.U.U. 411 (1972).
Antes de que sus ensayos fueran separados, Poindexter se movió en común con el norte y Hakim, que también había recibido inmunidad para atestiguar antes de congreso, para tener las cargas contra ellos despidió en la tierra que la evidencia contra ellos fue corrompida por su testimonio inmunizado. El juez Gesell negó ese movimiento. Sin embargo, en respeto a la defensa demanda que utilizarían uno - posiblemente el testimonio inmunizado justificativo de otra persona, juez Gesell separó en junio de 1988 los ensayos.
Poindexter renovó su movimiento de Kastigar antes del juez Greene en agosto de 1989. Después del informe y de la discusión, 8 la corte pidieron que dos audiencias evidentiary estén llevadas a cabo. En el primer, la corte oyó testimonio de los consejos Dan K. del asociado. Webb y Howard M. Aljofare referente a su exposición al testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter antes de ensamblar la oficina de consejos independientes. Webb y la perla ensamblaron a personal de OIC en 1989 y no lo tenían, antes de sus citas, sido conforme a los procedimientos de OIC aislarse del testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter. Juzgue a Greene encontró su exposición al testimonio de Poindexter para ser insignificante y permitió que ambos abogados participaran en el ensayo.
8 el caso de Poindexter fueron intentados antes del tribunal de apelación gobernada en el norte que las audiencias del testigo eran necesarias permitir el ensayo de un demandado inmunizado.
El segundo sistema de audiencias de corte se refirió a los testigos de ensayo, que testimonio se pudo haber corrompido por el testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter. El juez Greene aceptó la revisión anterior de Gesell del juez de testigos del jurado magníficos y declinó reexaminar sus resultados. Él también rechazó despedir la acusación en base de la exposición magnífica potencial del miembro del jurado al testimonio inmunizado.
Con respecto a los testigos de ensayo, la corte tomó medidas extensas de asegurarse de que las declaraciones inmunizadas de Poindexter no fueron utilizadas contra él. La corte pidió el gobierno para hacer una sumisión ex del parte (divulgada más adelante a Poindexter) de todas las declaraciones hechas por los testigos de ensayo potenciales antes de que Poindexter diera su testimonio inmunizado antes de congreso en julio de 1987. La corte encontró que todo el testimonio propuesto la mayor parte de de los testigos potenciales había estado memorialized antes de que apareciera Poindexter público el 15 de julio de 1987, y por lo tanto no fue corrompido.
En cuanto a esos testigos que esperaron que el testimonio de ensayo no fuera limitado a la evidencia OIC había sellado con la corte antes del testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter, información adicional requerida Greene del juez. Él concluyó que el gobierno no había podido establecer que cinco de sus testigos potenciales estaban libres de la corrupción y les había ordenado a aparecer en una audiencia pre-trial. Dos de los tres testigos que aparecieron en última instancia en el ensayo credibly afirmaron que su testimonio anticipado no sería influenciado de ninguna manera por el testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter; el tercer, del norte, rechazado hacer tan.
Norte indicado en la audiencia pre-trial que él no podía, con respecto a cualquier tema, distinguir lo que él había hecho personalmente, observado o experimentado de lo que él había aprendido de mirar testimony.9 inmunizado de Poindexter en cuanto a la destrucción de Poindexter de encontrar presidencial de la secreto-acción del diciembre de 1985 -- evidencia importante en la obstrucción del congreso -- El norte reconoció que él había visto Poindexter destruir un pedazo de papel pero insistido que él no sabía le era el encontrar hasta que Poindexter indicó ese hecho en su testimonio inmunizado antes de congreso.
9 testimonio del norte, audiencia Pre-trial de Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.
La corte rechazó el testimonio pre-trial del norte como no believable. Del norte, la corte encontrada, ``aparece haber sido emprendida en aquel momento [en la audiencia] el curso calculado de procurar asistir a su colega y co-demandado anteriores. . . tergiversando en varias ediciones. . . opinión 10
, Poindexter del '' 10, 3/8/90, P. 9.
En un poste-ensayo separado que gobernaba, la corte agregó que por lo que la destrucción de encontrar, el testimonio del norte en su propio ensayo sobre el acontecimiento era contrario con su demanda que él no podría recordarla independiente del testimonio inmunizado de Poindexter. La corte lo encontró “intrínsecamente increíble” que el norte no recordó “su participación en un acontecimiento que él atestiguó de primera mano y eso estaba como dramático, de hecho histórico, como el rasgado para arriba de encontrar presidencial extremadamente raro.” 11
11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.
La citación una
de Reagan de los aspectos más notables del caso de Poindexter era la tentativa acertada del demandado de llamar a presidente anterior Reagan para atestiguar en su ensayo por la deposición grabada.
Notas presidenciales presidenciales de Poindexter y vice primero buscadas de OIC como parte de sus peticiones del descubrimiento pre-trial. En una audiencia pre-trial el 6 de septiembre de 1989, los abogados de Poindexter dijeron a corte que las notas presidenciales reflejaran ese Poindexter informaran al presidente sus negaciones al congreso en 1986 de la actividad de NSC en apoyo de los contras, y que las notas “demostrarían lo que hablaron el presidente de lo que era hecho para apoyar los contras en America Central, y el consentimiento del presidente y la ratificación y la aprobación de esa actividad.” 12 en buscar vice notas presidenciales, los abogados de Poindexter dijeron la corte que “en caulquier momento él [Bush] faltó una reunión, almirante Poindexter lo resumieron en ella luego.” 13
12 Robinson, audiencia Pre-trial de Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.
13 Ibid., P. 19.
La corte, antes de tomar una decisión encendido si obligar a OIC que elabore estos documentos, el 11 de septiembre de 1989, ordenó Poindexter para archivar una nota ex del parte que explicaba exacto cómo estos documentos asistirían a su defense.14 que requirió de consejos independientes un memorándum legal referente a su responsabilidad de elaborar documentos presidenciales presidenciales y vice no en la posesión de OIC.
14 opinión, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.
Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15
15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.
Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16
16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.
On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18
17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.
18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.
On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.
In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.
19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.
In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.
In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:
Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20
20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)
President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.
The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.
As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.
The Poindexter Trial
The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.
Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.
21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.
President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.
Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.
Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.
The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North
The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:
-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.
-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.
-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.
-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.
In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23
22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.
23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.
North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.
North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25
24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.
25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.
HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27
26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.
27 Ibid.
After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28
28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.
Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.
North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31
29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.
30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.
31 Ibid., p. 1111.
North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36
32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.
33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.
34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.
35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.
36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.
When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38
37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.
38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.
After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39
39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.
Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41
40 Ibid., p. 1191.
41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.
The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:
Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?
A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42
42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.
North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45
43 Ibid., p. 1218.
44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.
45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.
More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47
46 Ibid., 1252-54.
47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.
North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.
The Trial Testimony of President Reagan
Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48
48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.
In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.
Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52
49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.
50 Ibid., p. 21.
51 Ibid., p. 24.
52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55
53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.
55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59
56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
57 Ibid., p. 30.
58 Ibid., p. 28.
59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.
President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63
60 Ibid., p. 69.
61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.
64 Ibid., p. 116.
Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:
Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.
And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65
65 Ibid., p. 131.
In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:
Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?
A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.
Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?
A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.
Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?
A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66
66 Ibid., p. 121.
President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:
Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?
A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.
Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.
Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?
A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67
67 Ibid., p. 122.
President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68
68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.
In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.
The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:
Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69
69 Ibid., p. 151.
President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70
70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73
71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
73 Ibid., p. 158.
President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75
74 Ibid., p. 160.
75 Ibid., p. 252.
Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.
76 Ibid., p. 255.
On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:
77 Ibid., p. 170.
I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78
78 Ibid., p. 189.
In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:
And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79
79 Ibid., p. 155.
Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:
May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80
80 Ibid., p. 156.
Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81
81 Ibid., p. 157.
President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83
82 Ibid., p. 240.
83 Ibid., p. 243.
Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84
84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.
The Verdict and Sentencing
After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.
In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:
Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.
. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .
President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.
No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .
With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.
But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.
Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.
A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85
85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22
The Appeal
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86
86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87
87 Ibid.
In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89
88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).
89 Ibid., p. 10.
On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would
make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90
90 Ibid., p. 22.
Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling
. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91
91 Ibid., p. 29.
The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.
Conclusion
Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.
The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.
The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.
Sentenziare i felons condannati negli Stati Uniti
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
Capitolo 3
Stati Uniti v. John M. Vizio
Adm del blu marino di Poindexter. John M. Poindexter è stato nominato come consigliere di sicurezza nazionale del presidente Reagan il 4 dicembre 1985, riuscendo Robert C. McFarlane, quale Poindexter aveva servito sotto da delegato per due anni. La carriera della Casa Bianca del Poindexter si è conclusa il 25 novembre 1986, quando è stato costretto a dimettersi come conseguenza della rilevazione pubblica dell'Iran/contra la diversione.
Poindexter, tenente. Colonna Il nord e McFarlane del Oliver erano il Attorney General Edwin Meese III dei tre individui identificato il 25 novembre 1986, come informato della diversione. Il controllo del Poindexter del nord e la sua propria partecipazione nell'Iran e contra i funzionamenti erano fuochi in anticipo di ricerca del consulente legale indipendente.
Come nell'argomento contro prova del nord e criminale contro Poindexter ha dovuto essere riunitoe rapidamente prima che fosse costretto a testimoniare su Capitol Hill di estate di 1987 sotto una concessione di immunità limitata. Altrimenti, il processo di Poindexter era probabile essere sfidato considerando che è stato derivato da o in qualche modo è stato influenzato dalla sua testimonianza congressuale immunizzata.
Il 16 marzo 1988, Poindexter è stato incriminato su sette spese di crimine in seguito alla sua partecipazione nell'Iran/contra l'affare, come componente di un atto d'accusa del multi-difensore di 23 conteggi. È stato chiamato con il nord, maggiore pensionato dell'aeronautica. Generatore. Richard V. Secord ed Albert Hakim come membro della cospirazione da defraudare il governo degli Stati Uniti effettuando l'Iran/contra la diversione ed altra si comporta.
Dopo che i casi si dividano e due delle spese originali siano allontanati, Poindexter è stato provato e condannato stato nell'aprile 1990 di cinque crimini, includendo: un conteggio di cospirazione ostruire le inchieste ed atti ufficiali, due conteggi di ostruzione del congresso e due conteggi delle dichiarazione false a Congress.1 Stati Uniti Giudice Harold H. del distretto. Greene lo ha sentenziato ad un termine di sei mesi della prigione. Nel novembre 1991, le convinzioni del Poindexter sono state capovolte su appello. Nel dicembre 1992, gli Stati Uniti Corte suprema rifiutata per rivedere il caso.
1 il caso di Poindexter è stato provato dai consulenti legali Dan K. del socio. Webb, cristiano J. Mixter, Howard M. Perla e Louise R. Radin.
Poindexter ha unito il personale del Consiglio di sicurezza nazionale nel giugno 1981, seguendo una carriera navale distinta che ha incluso gli alberini di pentagono di ordine e di alto-posto del battleship. Nell'ottobre 1983 è diventato delegato al consigliere McFarlane di sicurezza nazionale; fra i suoi subalterni era del nord. Durante il possesso di un anno del Poindexter come consigliere di sicurezza nazionale, che ha cominciato nel dicembre 1985, ha sorvegliato l'Iran/contra i funzionamenti in cui il nord direttamente è stato coinvolto.
Nel novembre 1986, mentre i funzionamenti segreti stavano essendo esposti pubblicamente, Poindexter ha stato bene al funzionario maggiore della gestione responsabile dell'impartire le direttive ad altri consiglieri più importanti del presidente circa le vendite di armi dell'Iran. in serie di riunioni della Casa Bianca con altri funzionari e membri del congresso durante il mese, ha presentato ripetutamente una versione falsa delle transazioni che distanced il presidente Reagan dalle 1985 spedizioni legalmente discutibili di armi fatte attraverso l'Israele, specialmente la transazione del HAWK-missile del novembre 1985.
Anche se Poindexter era il portavoce, non era responsabile solo del conoscere i fatti. Virtualmente ogni altro funzionario, compreso il presidente Reagan, che si è sentito che la sua versione delle vendite di armi nelle istruzioni durante il novembre 1986 ha pensata esso erano errati. Tuttavia nessuno, secondo le note contemporanee di quelle istruzioni, spoke fino a Poindexter corretto.
Poindexter con il nord ed altri nel novembre 1986 tentati per tagliuzzare ed alterare la traccia di carta che riflette il loro Iran/contra le attività. Tra l'altro, Poindexter ha distrutto l'unica individuazione presidenziale firmata esistente di segreto-azione che è stata intesa per autorizzare con effetto retroattivo la partecipazione di CIA alla spedizione dei HAWKs del novembre 1985.
Poindexter ed il nord riuscivano meno in lo sradicamento della traccia del calcolatore-messaggio del loro Iran/contra le attività. Poindexter ed il nord hanno comunicato spesso attraverso una scanalatura speciale che Poindexter, uno specialista in materia di computer, aveva installato sul sistema di elaborazione di NSC. Questa scanalatura, conosciuta come “il controllo in bianco riservato,„ ha permesso che Poindexter ed il nord trasmettessero l'un l'altro i messaggi senza il loro che è diretto attraverso le scanalature in cui altre sul personale di NSC potrebbero selezionarle.
Fra dal 22 al 29 novembre 1986, il nord ha cancellato dai suoi messaggi dell'archivio elettronico 736 e Poindexter ha cancellato 5.012 messaggi durante lo stesso period.2 malgrado queste omissioni, i nastri ordinariamente conservati di sostegno della Casa Bianca che contengono tutti i dati nel sistema affinchè due settimane proteggesse da perdita eventuale. Quando l'Iran/contra l'affare è stato esposto nel novembre 1986 tardo, l'agenzia di comunicazioni della Casa Bianca, che controlla il sistema di elaborazione di NSC, ha mantenuto i nastri di sostegno che datano dal 15 novembre. I ricercatori, quindi, potevano richiamare le copie di tutti i messaggi che erano negli archivi informatici di Poindexter-Nord nel metà di novembre 1986 prima che la maggior parte delle omissioni accadessero. Questi messaggi del calcolatore si sono trasformati in in prova importante sia nel Poindexter che nelle prove del nord.
2 Williams, testimonianza di prova di Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.
Poindexter ammesso a molte delle sue attività prima che i comitati ristretti nel luglio 1987 sotto una concessione di immunità testimonial, che ha impedito le sue ammissioni usando contro di lui nel procedimento affatto criminale. Poiché il presidente Reagan non ha testimoniato in quanto la tribuna, Poindexter è stata denominata per rispondere alla domanda che ha dominato le udienze: Il presidente ha saputo circa ed approvare la diversione le vendite di armi dell'Iran continua ai contras? Poindexter ha risposto a no, “gli arresti del buck qui con me.„ 3 ha detto che ha ritenuto deliberatamente le informazioni dal presidente Reagan perché ``ho desiderato il presidente avere certo deniability in modo che sia protetto. . . . '' 4
3 Poindexter, testimonianza prescelta dei comitati, 7/15/87, P. 95.
4 Ibid., P. 101.
Di fronte ad una prova criminale, Poindexter ha confrontato un dilemma differente: Non era più una questione di protezione del presidente ma difendersi contro cinque spese di crimine. Prima del congresso, testimonianza più significativa del Poindexter smentite ripetute del presidente Reagan confermato di consapevolezza dell'Iran/contra la diversione. Nell'aula di tribunale, Poindexter ha montato una difesa di alto-autorizzazione, tentante di convincere la giuria che il presidente aveva approvato le sue azioni, compreso quelle che hanno provocato le spese criminali. Invece di testimoniare nella sua propria difesa, tuttavia, ha denominato il presidente Reagan per testimoniare.
Atti Pre-Trial
Stati Uniti Giudice Gerhard A. del distretto. Gesell nel giugno 1988 ha ordinato che la cassa del multi-difensore contro Poindexter, nord, Secord e Hakim è severed.5 dopo la separazione, caso del Poindexter è stato trasferito al giudice principale Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. ed allora giudicare Greene, che ha presieduto ulteriori atti dell'eccedenza.
5 per una descrizione più dettagliata della separazione della cassa del multi-difensore, veda il capitolo del nord.
Tutte le sfide sostanziali del Poindexter alla validità dell'atto d'accusa sono state allontanate prima della prova. Le edizioni importanti restanti si sono interessate: (1) la conservazione della carica di cospirazione; (2) la risoluzione delle classific-informazioni disputa; (3) la risoluzione delle edizioni relative alla testimonianza congressuale immunizzata del Poindexter, secondo il regolamento conosciuto come Kastigar; e (4) lo sforzo riuscito del difensore assicurare testimonianza di prova dall'ex presidente Reagan.
La conservazione e limitare dei problemi della carica
di cospirazione con le informazioni classificate hanno condotto allo scioglimento delle spese centrali di cospirazione prima della prova del nord ed i problemi simili si sono pensati che presentassero nell'argomento contro Poindexter. Il 20 giugno 1989, i consulenti legali indipendenti si sono mossi per eliminare le vaste spese originali di cospirazione basate sul rifornimento dei contras e della diversione e per limitare sostanzialmente la carica della cospirazione per violare gli altri statuti criminali sostanziali, dichiarazione false ostili ed ostruzione. Dopo le limature e la discussione orale, la corte ha assegnato il movimento del governo.
La carica era refocused sull'atto illegale della cospirazione con il nord e Secord celare le attività dal congresso. I consulenti legali indipendenti hanno sostenuto con successo che questo stringimento della carica di cospirazione minimizzerebbe i problemi delle classific-informazioni che hanno contagiato il processo del nord.
Le informazioni classificate pubblicano
le procedure classificate delle informazioni si comportano (CIPA) hanno permesso che la corte di prova efficacemente risolvesse i problema che coinvolgono l'uso dei documenti e della testimonianza classificati in Poindexter. Giudichi il controllo del Greene del processo di CIPA e le trattative fruttuose fra i consulenti legali per il governo e Poindexter risolti la maggior parte delle dispute con un minimo di fa ritardare.
Contrariamente al nord, non ci era prolungato o la controversia significativa riguardo alla forma o alla portata degli avvisi di CIPA del Poindexter alla corte rilevare ha classificato le informazioni alla prova. Fra il 27 novembre 1989 e 13 marzo 1990, Poindexter ha servito 11 tali avviso, compreso la testimonianza classificata possibile di descrizione otto che i documenti classificati elencati lui hanno desiderato usare alla prova, due ed uno messo a fuoco solamente sulle informazioni che ha desiderato trarre al deposito del presidente Reagan.
Giudichi Greene ha ordinato che tutte le differenze che eccedenza ha classificato le informazioni sono negoziate fra i partiti prima di essere portato davanti alla corte. Giudichi Greene ha tenuto sei udienze chiuse di CIPA prima della prova ha cominciato e completato quelli con parecchie udienze più corte durante la prova. La maggior parte delle sue decisioni sull'attinenza e sull'ammissibilità delle informazioni classificate e sull'adeguatezza delle sostituzioni proposte dal governo, sono state fatte dal banco.
Presi insieme, gli avvisi di CIPA del Poindexter hanno elencato circa 1.200 documenti, solo una piccola frazione di cui infine è stata introdotta alla prova. La maggior parte delle informazioni classificate sono state coperte dalle stipulazioni del Government a determinati fatti e ad altre sostituzioni non classificate. Ciò ha permesso che la prova continuasse uniformemente, senza i conflitti che hanno complicato il nord o l'argomento contro la stazione precedente Joseph principale F. di CIA. Fernandez, che era allontanato dovuto le classific-informazioni problems.6
6 vede il capitolo del Fernandez.
Gli atti Poindexter
di Kastigar sono stati costretti sotto una concessione di immunità di uso a testimoniare in 1987 prima dei comitati ristretti che studiano l'Iran/contra. Come l'altro Iran/contra i difensori che hanno dato la testimonianza immunizzata prima del congresso, Poindexter spostato per allontanare l'atto d'accusa sulla teoria che ha violato i campioni enunciati in Kastigar v. Gli Stati Uniti, 7 che sostengono che la sua testimonianza immunizzata è stata usata contro di lui nella grande giuria ed alla prova. Questa discussione ha dimostrato infruttuoso al livello di prova ma infine è prevalso nella Corte d'Appello.
i 7 406 Stati Uniti 411 (1972).
Prima che le loro prove si dividano, Poindexter spostato insieme con il nord e Hakim, che inoltre avevano ricevuto l'immunità per testimoniare prima del congresso, per avere le spese contro di loro ha allontanato sulla terra che la prova contro di loro è stata alterata dalla loro testimonianza immunizzata. Il giudice Gesell ha negato quel movimento. Tuttavia, nella deferenza a difesa sostiene che userebbero uno - possibilmente la testimonianza immunizzata giustificativa di un altro, il giudice Gesell nel giugno 1988 ha diviso le prove.
Poindexter ha rinnovato il suo movimento di Kastigar prima del giudice Greene nell'agosto 1989. Dopo l'istruzione e la discussione, 8 la corte hanno ordinato che due udienze probatorie sono tenute. Al primo, la corte ha sentito la testimonianza dai consulenti legali Dan K. del socio. Webb e Howard M. Imperli riguardo alla loro esposizione alla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter prima di unire l'ufficio dei consulenti legali indipendenti. Webb e la perla hanno unito il personale di OIC in 1989 e non hanno avuti, prima dei loro appuntamenti, stato conforme alle procedure del OIC isolarsi dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter. Giudichi Greene ha trovato la loro esposizione alla testimonianza del Poindexter per essere insignificante ed ha permesso che entrambi gli avvocati partecipassero alla prova.
8 il caso di Poindexter sono stati provati prima della Corte d'Appello regolati nel nord che le udienze del testimone erano necessarie da consentire la prova di un difensore immunizzato.
Il secondo insieme delle udienze di corte ha interessato i testimoni di prova, di cui la testimonianza può essere alterata dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter. Il giudice Greene ha accettato la revisione più iniziale del Gesell del giudice di grandi testimoni Jury ed ha rifiutato di riesaminare i suoi risultati. Inoltre ha rifiutato di allontanare l'atto d'accusa in base a grande esposizione potenziale del juror alla testimonianza immunizzata.
Per quanto riguarda i testimoni di prova, la corte ha approntato le vaste misure accertarsi che le dichiarazione immunizzate del Poindexter non fossero usate contro di lui. La corte ha ordinato il governo per fare un'ex presentazione del parte (più successivamente rilevata a Poindexter) di tutte le dichiarazione rilasciate dai testimoni di prova potenziali prima che Poindexter desse la sua testimonianza immunizzata prima del congresso nel luglio 1987. La corte ha trovato che tutta la testimonianza proposta di la maggior parte dei testimoni potenziali era stata memorialized prima che Poindexter comparisse pubblicamente il 15 luglio 1987 e quindi non è stata alterata.
Per quanto riguarda quei testimoni di cui hanno previsto che la testimonianza di prova non fosse limitata alla prova OIC aveva sigillato con la corte prima della testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter, le informazioni supplementari richieste Greene del giudice. Ha concluso che il governo non era riuscito a stabilire che cinque dei relativi testimoni potenziali erano esenti da segno ed aveva ordinato loro da comparire ad un'udienza pre-trial. Due dei tre testimoni che infine sono comparso alla prova credibly hanno affermato che la loro testimonianza prevista non sarebbe influenzata in nessun modo dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter; il terzo, del nord, rifiutato di fare così.
Nord dichiarato all'udienza pre-trial che non poteva, riguardo a tutto l'oggetto, distinguersi che cosa aveva fatto personalmente, osservato o sperimentato da che cosa aveva imparato dal guardare testimony.9 immunizzato del Poindexter per quanto riguarda distruzione del Poindexter dell'individuazione presidenziale di segreto-azione del dicembre 1985 -- prova importante nell'ostruzione del congresso -- Il nord ha riconosciuto che aveva visto Poindexter distruggere pezzo di carta ma insistita che non ha saputo esso era un'individuazione fino a che Poindexter non dichiarasse quel fatto nella sua testimonianza immunizzata prima del congresso.
9 testimonianza del nord, udienza Pre-trial di Poindexter, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.
La corte ha rifiutato la testimonianza pre-trial del nord come non believable. Del nord, la corte trovata, ``sembra essere intrapresa a quel tempo [all'udienza] il corso calcolato di tentare di aiutare il suoi ex collega e co-difensore. . . tergiversando sulle varie edizioni. . . opinione 10
, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. del '' 10. 9.
In una alberino-prova separata che regola, la corte ha aggiunto che per quanto la distruzione dell'individuazione, la testimonianza del nord alla sua propria prova circa l'evento era contradditoria con il suo reclamo che non potrebbe ricordarselo indipendente dalla testimonianza immunizzata del Poindexter. La corte lo ha trovato “inerentemente incredibile„ che il nord non si è ricordato “della sua partecipazione ad un evento ch'ha testimoniato firsthand e quello era come drammatico, effettivamente storico, come lo strappo in su di un'individuazione presidenziale estremamente rara.„ 11
11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.
Il Subpoena uno
del Reagan delle funzioni più notevoli del caso di Poindexter era il tentativo riuscito del difensore di denominare l'ex presidente Reagan per testimoniare alla sua prova tramite il deposito registrato.
Poindexter in primo luogo ha cercato le note presidenziali presidenziali e vice da OIC come componente delle sue richieste di scoperta pre-trial. In un'udienza pre-trial il 6 settembre 1989, gli avvocati del Poindexter hanno detto alla corte a che le note presidenziali riflettessero quel Poindexter informassero il presidente delle sue smentite al congresso in 1986 di attività di NSC a sostegno dei contras e che le note “mostrerebbero a che cosa il presidente si è detto circa che cosa stava facendo per sostenere i contras in America Centrale ed il consenso del presidente e ratifica e l'approvazione di quell'attività.„ 12 nella ricerca delle note presidenziali vice, gli avvocati del Poindexter hanno detto alla corte che “in qualunque momento [Bush] ha mancato una riunione, l'ammiraglio Poindexter gli ho impartito le direttive su esso in seguito.„ 13
12 Robinson, udienza Pre-trial di Poindexter, 9/6/89, P. 18.
13 Ibid., P. 19.
La corte, prima di prendere una decisione sopra se costringere OIC per redigere l'11 settembre 1989 questi documenti, ha diretto Poindexter per archiviare un ex appunto del parte che spiega precisamente come questi documenti aiuterebbero il suo defense.14 che ha richiesto dai consulenti legali indipendenti un memorandum legale riguardo alla relativa responsabilità di redigere i documenti presidenziali presidenziali e vice non in possesso del OIC.
14 opinione, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.
Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15
15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.
Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16
16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.
On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18
17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.
18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.
On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.
In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.
19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.
In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.
In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:
Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20
20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)
President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.
The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.
As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.
The Poindexter Trial
The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.
Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.
21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.
President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.
Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.
Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.
The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North
The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:
-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.
-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.
-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.
-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.
In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23
22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.
23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.
North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.
North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25
24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.
25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.
HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27
26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.
27 Ibid.
After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28
28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.
Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.
North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31
29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.
30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.
31 Ibid., p. 1111.
North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36
32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.
33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.
34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.
35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.
36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.
When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38
37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.
38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.
After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39
39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.
Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41
40 Ibid., p. 1191.
41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.
The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:
Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?
A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42
42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.
North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45
43 Ibid., p. 1218.
44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.
45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.
More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47
46 Ibid., 1252-54.
47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.
North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.
The Trial Testimony of President Reagan
Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48
48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.
In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.
Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52
49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.
50 Ibid., p. 21.
51 Ibid., p. 24.
52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55
53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.
55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59
56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
57 Ibid., p. 30.
58 Ibid., p. 28.
59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.
President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63
60 Ibid., p. 69.
61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.
64 Ibid., p. 116.
Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:
Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.
And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65
65 Ibid., p. 131.
In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:
Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?
A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.
Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?
A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.
Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?
A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66
66 Ibid., p. 121.
President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:
Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?
A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.
Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.
Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?
A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67
67 Ibid., p. 122.
President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68
68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.
In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.
The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:
Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69
69 Ibid., p. 151.
President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70
70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73
71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
73 Ibid., p. 158.
President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75
74 Ibid., p. 160.
75 Ibid., p. 252.
Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.
76 Ibid., p. 255.
On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:
77 Ibid., p. 170.
I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78
78 Ibid., p. 189.
In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:
And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79
79 Ibid., p. 155.
Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:
May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80
80 Ibid., p. 156.
Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81
81 Ibid., p. 157.
President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83
82 Ibid., p. 240.
83 Ibid., p. 243.
Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84
84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.
The Verdict and Sentencing
After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.
In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:
Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.
. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .
President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.
No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .
With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.
But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.
Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.
A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85
85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22
The Appeal
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86
86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87
87 Ibid.
In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89
88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).
89 Ibid., p. 10.
On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would
make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90
90 Ibid., p. 22.
Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling
. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91
91 Ibid., p. 29.
The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.
Conclusion
Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.
The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.
The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.
Verurteilen der überführten Täter in den Vereinigten Staaten
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Kapitel 3
Vereinigte Staaten V. John M. Poindexter
Marine-Laster Adm. John M. Poindexter wurde als Präsident Reagans Staatssicherheit Berater am 4. Dezember 1985 ernannt und folgte Robert C. McFarlane, dem Poindexter darunter als Abgeordnetes für zwei Jahre gedient hatte. Poindexters beendete Hauskarriere 25. November 1986, als er gezwungen wurde, unmittelbar nach der allgemeinen Freigabe des Irans/gegen Ablenkung abzufinden.
Poindexter, Leutnant. Spalte Oliver Norden und McFarlane waren der drei Einzelpersonen Attorney General Edwin Meese III am 25. November 1986 gekennzeichnet, wie kenntnisreich von der Ablenkung. Überwachung Poindexters des Nordens und seine eigene Teilnahme am Iran und gegen Betriebe waren frühe Foki der Untersuchung des unabhängigen Ratschlags.
Wie im Argument gegen Nord-, kriminellen Beweis gegen Poindexter mußte schnell erfaßt werden, bevor er gezwungen wurde, auf dem Capitol Hill am Sommer von 1987 unter einer Bewilligung der begrenzten Immunität zu bezeugen. Andernfalls war die Verfolgung von Poindexter wahrscheinlich herausgefordert zu werden, mit der Begründung daß sie von abgeleitet wurde oder auf gewisse Weise durch sein immunisiertes Kongreßzeugnis beeinflußt.
Am 16. März 1988 wurde Poindexter auf sieben Kapitalverbrechenaufladungen angeklagt, die aus seiner Miteinbeziehung im Iran/gegen Angelegenheit, als Teil einer das 23 Zählimpuls Multibeklagte Anklage entstehen. Er wurde mit Norden, pensionierter Luftwaffe Major genannt. Generator. Richard V. Secord und Albert Hakim als Mitglied der Verschwörung, zum die Vereinigte Staaten Regierung, indem sie den Iran/gegen Ablenkung und andere, zu betrügen bewirken fungiert.
Nachdem die Fälle getrennt wurden und zwei der ursprünglichen Aufladungen entlassen, wurde Poindexter im April 1990 fünf Kapitalverbrechen versucht und überführt und schloß ein: ein Zählimpuls des Verschwörens, amtliche Anfragen und Verfahren, zwei Zählimpulse des Versperrens des Kongresses und zwei Zählimpulse der falschen Aussagen zu Congress.1 US zu versperren Bezirk Richter Harold H. Greene verurteilte ihn zu einer Sechsmonatsgefängnisbezeichnung. Im November 1991 wurden überzeugungen Poindexters auf Anklang umgeworfen. Im Dezember 1992 die US Höchstes Gericht gesunken, um den Fall zu wiederholen.
1 der Poindexter Fall wurde durch Teilnehmer-Ratschläge Dan K. versucht. Webb, Christ J. Mixter, Howard M. Perle und Louise R. Radin.
Poindexter verband den Staatssicherheit Ratpersonal im Juni 1981 und folgte einer bemerkenswerten Marinekarriere, die Linienschiff Befehl und Hochklassifizierung Pentagonpfosten einschloß. Im Oktober 1983 er wurde Abgeordneter zum Staatssicherheit Berater McFarlane; unter seinen Untergebenen war Nord. Während Poindexters des einjährigen Besitzes als Staatssicherheit Berater, der im Dezember 1985 anfing, beaufsichtigte er den Iran/gegen Betriebe, in denen Norden direkt miteinbezogen wurde.
Im November 1986 während die geheimen Betriebe öffentlich herausgestellt wurden, stand Poindexter dem älteren Leitung Beamten, das für die Besprechung anderer oberer Berater des Präsidenten über die der Iran Waffenverkäufe verantwortlich ist. In einer Reihe von Haussitzungen mit anderen Beamten und Mitgliedern des Kongresses während des Monats, breitete er wiederholt eine falsche Version der Verhandlungen, die Präsidenten Reagan vom erlaubterweise fraglichen 1985 Armversand überholten, der durch Israel gebildet wurde, besonders die November 1985 Falke-Flugkörperverhandlung aus.
Obgleich Poindexter der Wortführer war, war er nicht für das Kennen der Tatsachen alleinverantwortliches. Praktisch jeder andere höhere Beamte, einschließlich Präsidenten Reagan, der hörte, daß seine Version der Waffenverkäufe in den Anweisungen während November 1986 Anlaß zur Annahme ihn hatte, waren falsch. Dennoch keine, entsprechend gleichzeitigen Anmerkungen jener Anweisungen, Speiche bis zu korrektem Poindexter.
Poindexter zusammen mit Norden und andere im November 1986 versucht, um die Papierspur zu zerreißen und zu ändern, die ihren Iran/reflektiert, gegen Tätigkeiten. Unter anderem zerstörte Poindexter das einzige bestehende unterzeichnete Präsidentenc$verborgentätigkeit Finden, das CIA Miteinbeziehung im November 1985 Falkeversand rückwirkend autorisieren sollte.
Poindexter und Norden war weniger erfolgreich, wenn sie die Computeranzeige Spur von ihrem Iran/gegen Tätigkeiten ausrotteten. Poindexter und Norden standen häufig durch eine spezielle Führung in Verbindung, die Poindexter, ein Computerexperte, auf das NSC Computersystem aufgestellt hatte. Diese Führung, bekannt als „der private Blankoscheck,“ ließ Poindexter und Norden Anzeigen ohne ihr miteinander neu legen, der durch Führungen verlegt wurde, in denen andere auf dem NSC Personal sie aussortieren konnten.
Zwischen 22. bis 29. November 1986 löschte Norden aus seinen Anzeigen der Datei 736, und Poindexter löschte 5.012 Anzeigen während des gleichen period.2 trotz dieser Auslassungen, die gespeicherten Unterstützungklebebänder des Weißen Hauses routinemäßig, die alle Daten im System enthalten, damit zwei Wochen gegen unbeabsichtigten Verlust sich schützen. Als der Iran/gegen Angelegenheit in spätem November 1986 herausgestellt wurde, behielt die das Haus-Kommunikationen Agentur, die das NSC Computersystem handhabt, die Unterstützungsklebebänder, die ab dem 15. November datieren. Forscher waren folglich in der Lage, Kopien aller Anzeigen zurückzuholen, die in den Poindexter-Norden Dateien mittleres November 1986 waren, bevor die meisten Auslassungen auftraten. Diese Computeranzeigen wurden wichtiger Beweis im Poindexter und in den Nordversuchen.
2 Williams, Poindexter Probezeugnis, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.
Poindexter zugelassen worden zu vielen seiner Tätigkeiten bevor die auserwählten Ausschüsse im Juli 1987 unter einer Bewilligung der testimonial Immunität, die seine Aufnahmen an gegen ihn im irgendwie kriminellen Verfahren verwendet werden verhinderte. Weil Präsident Reagan nicht dadurch bezeugte, daß Forum, Poindexter benannt wurde, um die Frage zu beantworten, die die Hörfähigkeiten beherrschte: Wußte der Präsident ungefähr und die Ablenkung die der Iran Waffenverkäufe zu genehmigen fährt zu den contras fort? Poindexter beantwortete Nr., „die Dollaranschläge hier mit mir.“ 3, die er sagte, daß er absichtlich die Informationen vom Präsidenten Reagan zurückhielt, weil ``ich den Präsidenten irgendein deniability haben wünschte, damit er geschützt würde. . . . '' 4
3 Poindexter, auserwähltes Ausschuss-Zeugnis, 7/15/87, P. 95.
4 Ibid., P. 101.
Einen kriminellen Versuch gegenüberstellend, konfrontierte Poindexter ein anderes Dilemma: Es war nicht mehr eine Frage des Schützens des Präsidenten aber des Verteidigens gegen fünf Kapitalverbrechenaufladungen. Vor Kongreß Poindexters bedeutendstes Zeugnis bekräftigten Präsident Reagans wiederholte Ablehnungen des Bewußtseins des Irans/gegen Ablenkung. Im Gerichtssaal brachte versuchte Poindexter eine Hochermächtigung Verteidigung an und, die Jury, daß der Präsident seine Tätigkeiten genehmigt hatte, einschließlich die zu überzeugen, die kriminelle Aufladungen ergaben. Anstatt, den Standplatz in seiner eigenen Verteidigung zu nehmen jedoch an rief er Präsidenten Reagan, um zu bezeugen.
Vorverfahren
US Bezirk Richter Gerhard A. Gesell bestellte im Juni 1988, daß der Multibeklagtes Kasten gegen Poindexter, Norden, Secord und Hakim severed.5 nach Abtrennung ist, Fall Poindexters wurde gebracht auf Hauptrichter Aubrey E. Robinson, jr. und Greene dann beurteilen, der weitere Verfahren des überschusses vorsaß.
5 für eine ausführlichere Beschreibung der Abtrennung des Multibeklagtes Kastens, sehen Sie Nordkapitel.
Alle Poindexters substantivische Herausforderungen zur Gültigkeit der Anklage wurden vor Versuch entlassen. Die restlichen wichtigen Ausgaben betroffen: (1) die Bewahrung der Verschwörungaufladung; (2) die Auflösung der Einstufeninformationen Debatten; (3) die Auflösung der Ausgaben bezogen auf Poindexters immunisiertem Kongreßzeugnis, unter dem Anordnen bekannt als Kastigar; und (4) die erfolgreiche Bemühung des Beklagten, Probezeugnis vom ehemaligen Präsidenten Reagan zu sichern.
Das Konservieren und das Verengen der Verschwörung-Aufladung
Probleme mit eingestuften Informationen führten zu die Entlassung der zentralen Verschwörungaufladungen vor dem Nordversuch, und ähnliche Probleme wurden erwartet, um im Argument gegen Poindexter zu entstehen. Am 20. Juni 1989 bewogen unabhängige Ratschläge, um die ursprünglichen ausgedehnten Verschwörungaufladungen zu beseitigen, die nach dem Versorgungsmaterial der contras und der Ablenkung und die Aufladung der Verschwörung im wesentlichen zu verengen, um andere substantivische kriminelle Gesetze, verbietende falsche Aussagen und Hindernis zu verletzen gegründet wurden. Nach Archivierungen und Mundargument bewilligte das Gericht die Bewegung der Regierung.
Die Aufladung war refocused auf der ungültigen Tat des Verschwörens mit Norden und Secord, Tätigkeiten vom Kongreß zu verbergen. Unabhängige Berater argumentierten erfolgreich, daß dieses Verengen der Verschwörungaufladung die Einstufeninformationen Probleme herabsetzen würde, die die Nordverfolgung quälten.
Eingestufte Informationen geben
die eingestuften Informationen Verfahren fungieren (CIPA) ließen das Probegericht effektiv die Ausgaben beheben heraus, die den Gebrauch von eingestuften Dokumenten und Zeugnis in Poindexter mit einbeziehen. Beurteilen Sie überwachung Greenes des CIPA Prozesses und fruchtbare Vermittlungen zwischen den Ratschlägen für die Regierung und Poindexter, die den meisten Debatten mit einem Minimum von behoben werden, verzögert.
Im Gegensatz zu Norden gab es kein ausgedehnt, oder der bedeutende Rechtsstreit hinsichtlich ist der Form oder des Bereichs der Nachrichten CIPA Poindexters zum Gericht freizugeben stufte Informationen am Versuch ein. Zwischen 27. November 1989 und 13. März 1990 diente Poindexter 11 solche Nachrichten, einschließlich beschreibendes mögliches eingestuftes Zeugnis acht, daß aufgeführte eingestufte Dokumente er am Versuch verwenden wollten, zwei und eine, die nur auf Informationen gerichtet wurde, die er an der Absetzung des Präsidenten Reagan herausbekommen wollte.
Beurteilen Sie Greene bestellte, daß über alle Unterschiede, die überschuß Informationen einstufte, zwischen den Parteien verhandelt werden, bevor man vor dem Gericht geholt wird. Beurteilen Sie Greene hielt sechs geschlossene CIPA Hörfähigkeiten vor dem Versuch anfing und ergänzte die mit einigen kürzeren Hörfähigkeiten während des Versuches. Die meisten seinen Regelungen auf der Bedeutung und der Zulässigkeit der eingestuften Informationen und auf der Angemessenheit des Ersatzes, der durch die Regierung vorgeschlagen wurde, wurden von der Bank gebildet.
Verzeichneten die zusammen genommen, Nachrichten CIPA Poindexters ungefähr 1.200 Dokumente, nur dessen kleiner Bruch schließlich am Versuch eingeführt wurden. Die meisten eingestuften Informationen wurden durch Government Bedingungen zu bestimmten Tatsachen und zu anderem nicht klassifiziertem Ersatz abgedeckt. Dieses ließ den Versuch, ohne die Konflikte glatt fortfahren, die Norden oder das Argument gegen ehemalige CIA Station Hauptjoseph F. erschwerten. Fernandez, der an den Einstufeninformationen problems.6 6 entlassenes
lag, sehen Fernandez Kapitel.
Kastigar Verfahren
Poindexter wurden unter einer Bewilligung der Gebrauchimmunität gezwungen, 1987 vor den auserwählten Ausschüssen zu bezeugen, die den Iran/gegen nachforschen. Wie der andere Iran/gegen Beklagte, die immunisiertes Zeugnis vor Kongreß gaben, Poindexter verschoben, um die Anklage auf der Theorie zu entlassen, daß sie die Standards verletzte, die in Kastigar V. ausgesprochen wurden. Vereinigte Staaten, 7 argumentierend, daß sein immunisiertes Zeugnis gegen ihn in der großartigen Jury und am Versuch verwendet wurde. Dieses Argument prüfte, erfolgloses auf dem Probeniveau aber herschte schließlich im Gericht von Anklänge vor.
7 406 US 411 (1972).
Bevor ihre Versuche getrennt wurden, entließ Poindexter, das zusammen mit Norden und Hakim verschoben wurde, die auch Immunität empfangen hatten, um vor Kongreß zu bezeugen, um die Aufladungen gegen sie zu haben aus den Grund, daß der Beweis gegen sie durch ihr immunisiertes Zeugnis verdorben wurde. Richter Gesell verweigerte diese Bewegung. Jedoch in der Achtung zur Verteidigung behauptet, daß sie ein verwenden würden - eines anderen vielleicht rechtfertigendes immunisiertes Zeugnis, Richter Gesell trennten im Juni 1988 die Versuche.
Poindexter erneuerte seine Kastigar Bewegung vor Richter Greene im August 1989. Nach Anweisung und Argument bestellten 8 das Gericht, daß zwei überzeugende Hörfähigkeiten gehalten werden. Am ersten hörte das Gericht Zeugnis von den Teilnehmer-Beratern Dan K. Webb und Howard M. Perlen Sie hinsichtlich ihrer Aussetzung zu Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis, bevor Sie das Büro der unabhängigen Ratschläge verbinden. Webb und Perle verbanden den OIC Personal 1989 und hatten nicht, vor ihren Verabredungen, gewesen abhängig von Verfahren OICS, sich von Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis zu isolieren. Beurteilen Sie Greene fand ihre Aussetzung zum Zeugnis Poindexters, um bedeutungslos zu sein und erlaubte beiden Rechtsanwälten, am Versuch teilzunehmen.
8 der Poindexter Fall wurden vor dem Gericht der Anklänge versucht, die im Norden angeordnet wurden, daß Zeugehörfähigkeiten notwendig waren, um den Versuch eines immunisierten Beklagten zu ermöglichen.
Der zweite Satz von Gerichtsterminen betraf Probezeugen, deren Zeugnis durch Poindexters immunisiertes Zeugnis verdorben worden sein kann. Richter Greene nahm Richter Gesells früheren Bericht der großartigen Jury Zeugen an und sank, seine Entdeckungen nachzupruefen. Er lehnte auch ab, die Anklage auf der Grundlage von mögliche großartige Geschworenaussetzung zum immunisierten Zeugnis zu entlassen.
Betreffend Probezeugen ergriff das Gericht umfangreiche Maßnahmen, sicherzugehen, daß Poindexters immunisierte Aussagen nicht gegen ihn verwendet wurden. Das Gericht bestellte die Regierung, um eine ex parte Unterordnung (später freigegeben zu Poindexter) von allen Aussagen zu bilden, die durch mögliche Probezeugen abgegeben wurden, bevor Poindexter sein immunisiertes Zeugnis vor Kongreß im Juli 1987 gab. Das Gericht fand, daß alles vorgeschlagene Zeugnis der meisten möglichen Zeugen memorialized, bevor Poindexter öffentlich am 15. Juli 1987 erschien, und folglich wurde nicht verdorben gewesen war.
Was jene Zeugen anbetrifft deren erwarteten, daß Probezeugnis nicht auf den Beweis OIC begrenzt würde, hatte mit dem Gericht vor Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis, erforderliche zusätzliche Informationen des Richters Greene versiegelt. Er stellte fest, daß die Regierung hatte herstellen nicht gekonnt, daß fünf seiner möglichen Zeugen von der Färbung frei waren und ihnen bestellt, zum an einer vorbereitenden Hörfähigkeit zu erscheinen. Zwei der drei Zeugen, die schließlich am Versuch credibly erschienen, bestätigten, daß ihr vorweggenommenes Zeugnis nicht in keiner Weise durch Poindexters immunisiertes Zeugnis beeinflußt würde; das dritte, Nord, abgelehnt, so zu tun.
Norden angegeben an der vorbereitenden Hörfähigkeit, daß er, in Bezug auf jedes mögliches Thema nicht imstande war, zu unterscheiden was er persönlich getan hatte, beobachtet oder erfahren von, was er vom Aufpassen Poindexters von immunisiertem testimony.9 was Zerstörung anbetrifft Poindexters des Dezember 1985 Präsidentenc$verborgentätigkeit Findens erlernt hatte -- wichtiger Beweis im Hindernis des Kongresses -- Norden bestätigte, daß er Poindexter gesehen hatte, einen Papierstreifen zu zerstören, aber, daß er nicht wußte, ihm ein Finden beharrt war, bis Poindexter diese Tatsache in seinem immunisierten Zeugnis vor Kongreß angab.
9 Nordzeugnis, Poindexter vorbereitende Hörfähigkeit, 12/13/89, pp. 374-77.
Das Gericht wies vorbereitendes Nordzeugnis zurück, wie nicht glaubwürdig. Nord, scheint das gefundene Gericht, ``, [an der Hörfähigkeit] nach dem errechneten Kurs des Versuchens zu dieser Zeit eingeschifft worden zu sein, seinen ehemaligen Kollegen und Cobeklagtes zu unterstützen. . . durch prevaricating auf verschiedenen Ausgaben. . . '' 10
10 Meinung, Poindexter, 3/8/90, P. 9.
In einem unterschiedlichen anordnenden Pfostenversuch, fügte das Gericht hinzu, daß, insoweit die Zerstörung des Findens, Nordzeugnis an seinem eigenen Versuch über den Fall mit seinem Anspruch inkonsequent war, daß er nicht an ihn sich erinnern könnte Unabhängiges von Poindexters immunisiertem Zeugnis. Das Gericht fand es „in sich selbst unglaublich“, daß Norden sich nicht „an seine Teilnahme an einem Fall erinnerte, den er aus erster Hand zeugte und das war, wie drastisch, in der Tat historisch, als eines extrem seltenen Präsidentenc$findens oben heftig zerreißen.“ 11
11 Ibid., 5/29/90, pp. 32-40.
Die Reagan Vorladung unter Strafandrohung
eine der bemerkenswertesten Aspekte des Poindexter Falles war der erfolgreiche Versuch des Beklagten, ehemaligen Präsidenten Reagan anzurufen, um an seinem Versuch durch videotaped Absetzung zu bezeugen.
Poindexter zuerst gesuchte Präsidenten- und Vizepräsidentenanmerkungen von OIC als Teil seiner verfahrensvorbereitende Tatsachenfeststellung Anträge. In einer vorbereitenden Hörfähigkeit am 6. September 1989, erklärten Rechtsanwälte Poindexters dem Gericht, daß Präsidentenanmerkungen dieses Poindexter informierten den Präsidenten über seine Ablehnungen zum Kongreß 1986 der NSC Tätigkeit zur Unterstützung der contras reflektieren würden und daß die Anmerkungen „zeigen würden, was dem Präsidenten erklärt wurde über, was getan wurde, um die contras in Mittelamerika zu stützen und des die Zustimmung Präsidenten und die Bestätigung und die Zustimmung dieser Tätigkeit.“ 12, wenn sie Vizepräsidentenanmerkungen suchten, erklärten Rechtsanwälte Poindexters das Gericht, dem „jederzeit er [Bush] eine Sitzung vermißte, Admiral Poindexter unterwiesen ihn auf ihr danach.“ 13
12 Robinson, Poindexter vorbereitende Hörfähigkeit, 9/6/89, P. 18.
13 Ibid., P. 19.
Das Gericht, bevor es an eine Entscheidung traf, ob man OIC zwingt, um diese Dokumente am 11. September 1989 zu produzieren verwies Poindexter, um ein ex parte Protokoll einzuordnen, das genau erklärt, wie diese Dokumente sein defense.14 unterstützen würden, das es von den unabhängigen Ratschlägen ein zugelassenes Protokoll hinsichtlich ist seiner Verantwortlichkeit, die Präsidenten- und Vizepräsidentendokumente nicht im Besitz OICS zu produzieren erforderte.
14 Meinung, Poindexter, 9/11/89, P. 22.
Independent Counsel in a filing on September 18, 1989, told the court that the office did not have in its possession presidential notes, but rather had been granted access to notes and allowed to copy only a portion of them with special permission. As far as President Reagan's diary was concerned, Independent Counsel had been allowed to review typed extracts of portions deemed relevant by White House counsel, but the President had retained custody of his diary, which both he and the national archivist regarded as personal records, making them unaccessible under the Presidential Records Act unless their production were compelled by subpoena.15
15 Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice Presidential Documents that Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/18/89.
Attached to Independent Counsel's filing was a declaration by John Fawcett, assistant archivist for the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration. Fawcett stated that President Bush's vice presidential records were transferred to the archives at the end of the Reagan Administration, but, ``No personal diary of former Vice President Bush has been specifically identified as being included in the Vice Presidential records. However, these Vice Presidential records have not yet been processed.'' 16
16 Ibid., Exhibit A. President Bush in December 1992 for the first time informed Independent Counsel that he had kept a diary as vice president from 1986 to 1988. See Bush chapter.
On September 25, 1989, Poindexter's attorneys informed the court that ``the defendant is willing to seek access to the personal diaries and notes of former President Reagan and former Vice President Bush pursuant to a . . . subpoena.'' 17 After reviewing Poindexter's ex parte submission on the materiality of presidential and vice presidential documents, the court on October 24, 1989, ruled that there was sufficient likelihood that President Reagan's documents would be material to the defense. Judge Greene differentiated between Reagan and Bush documents, however, because ``the Vice President had no operational authority with respect to Poindexter,'' because the information contained in vice presidential papers may be largely cumulative, and because of deference to the sitting President Bush.18
17 Defendant's Response to Government's Memorandum Concerning Presidential and Vice President Documents That Are Not in the Possession of Independent Counsel, 9/25/89, p. 2.
18 U.S. v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 28-31 (D.D.C. 1989). Judge Greene added that with respect to Bush documents, he would reevaluate the matter if Poindexter at a later date showed a more pressing need for them.
On November 3, 1989, Poindexter filed with the court a classified petition for leave to serve subpoenas on former President Reagan and the National Archives, seeking materials and testimony relevant to Iran/contra activities in 67 categories. On November 16, Judge Greene granted Poindexter's petition. Both President Reagan and the National Archives moved to quash the subpoena for documents.
In a pre-trial hearing December 4 the court stated that its order covered only documents, and not the President's possible trial testimony. On December 18 Poindexter sought the court's leave to subpoena President Reagan to testify at trial. In deciding whether Poindexter could subpoena President Reagan's testimony, Judge Greene asked Poindexter to submit a list of specific questions he intended to ask. Poindexter submitted a list of 183 questions, which were not made available to Independent Counsel.19 The court ruled that the questions directly related to the charges in the indictment and to Poindexter's anticipated defense.
19 In 1993, during preparation of this report, Independent Counsel obtained copies of these questions and other ex parte submissions from Poindexter's case.
In his February 5, 1990, ruling upholding the testimonial subpoena of Reagan, Judge Greene described Poindexter's proposed questions as falling into 12 categories. These included: (1) the frequency and occasions on which President Reagan and Poindexter met; (2) the President's view of the Boland Amendment and how it applied to contra support; (3) whether the President authorized Poindexter to seek foreign support for the contras; (4) what instructions the President gave Poindexter regarding meetings with Central American officials, and what information Poindexter subsequently relayed back to the President; (5) presidential discussions with Central American leaders concerning contra support; (6) presidential discussions with Poindexter regarding actions to be taken if Congress did not renew contra aid; (7) presidential knowledge of North's relationship to Iran/contra figures; (8) Poindexter's briefings of the President regarding a congressional inquiry in 1986 into North's activities; (9) Poindexter's communications with Congress at the direction of the President; (10) whether Poindexter informed the President about Secord's status; (11) discussions Poindexter had with the President regarding a chronology of the Iran arms sales prepared in November 1986; and (12) the President's knowledge of the arms shipments to Iran.
In his opinion explaining his decision to uphold Poindexter's subpoena of President Reagan, Judge Greene concluded:
Former President Ronald Reagan is claimed by Admiral Poindexter to have direct and important knowledge that will help to exonerate him from the criminal charges lodged against him. In view of the prior professional relationship between the two men, and defendant's showing discussed above, that claim cannot be dismissed as fanciful or frivolous. That being so, it would be inconceivable -- in a Republic that subscribes neither to the ancient doctrine of the divine right of kings nor to the more modern conceit of dictators that they are not accountable to the people whom they claim to represent or to their courts of law -- to exempt Mr. Reagan from the duty of every citizen to give evidence that will permit the reaching of a just outcome of this criminal prosecution. Defendant has shown that the evidence of the former President is needed to protect his right to a fair trial, and he will be given the opportunity to secure that evidence.20
20 U.S. v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 142, 159-60 (D.D.C. 1990)
President Reagan did not claim executive privilege once he was ordered to testify.
The seven-hour videotaped deposition of the former President was taken February 16 and 17, 1990, in the Los Angeles federal courthouse, near his residence. The public and the press were not allowed to attend the deposition. Transcripts and the opportunity to view the videotape were made available to members of the press before the trial.
As for Poindexter's subpoena for documents from the former President, Judge Greene ordered President Reagan to make diary entries available for the court's in camera review. After its review, the court ordered President Reagan to produce the relevant diary entries to Poindexter in the absence of a claim of executive privilege. President Reagan, joined by the Bush Administration, claimed executive privilege as to the diary entries on February 5, 1990. On March 21, the court granted the Reagan-Bush motions to quash the subpoena for the diary entries, concluding that Poindexter's defense would be adequately served by the President's testimony.
The Poindexter Trial
The month-long Poindexter trial, which resulted in a five-count conviction on April 7, 1990, centered largely on the testimony of two witnesses: Oliver North for the prosecution and former President Reagan for the defense.
Both men attempted to help the defendant in their appearances on the witness stand, but each had given prior testimony harmful to Poindexter, and they could not deviate from that under threat of perjury charges.21 North could not abandon his earlier defense stance that he dutifully reported his activities -- including those found to be crimes -- to his superior, Poindexter. President Reagan was compelled at trial to state, as he had previously, that he repeatedly told his aides to obey the law and that he was unaware of their criminal acts.
21 Before taking the witness stand in Poindexter, North had testified before the Select Committees in July 1987, at his own trial in 1989, and at a Poindexter pre-trial hearing in 1990.
President Reagan was questioned by his Tower Commission on two occasions in early 1987. More significantly, the President in November 1987 answered 53 written interrogatories from Independent Counsel, which were submitted as sworn testimony to the federal Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra affair.
Poindexter chose not to testify at his trial.
Although Poindexter and North had destroyed and altered official papers and computer messages, the prosecution offered convincing documentary evidence that Poindexter was kept apprised of North's efforts to provide military aid to the Nicaraguan contras while it was outlawed from October 1984-October 1986 by the Boland Amendment; that Poindexter adopted false statements McFarlane and North made to Congress; and that Poindexter had been fully aware of the ill-fated November 1985 HAWK missile shipment to Iran, which he subsequently tried to conceal from Congress.
The Trial Testimony of Oliver L. North
The testimony of North, named as a co-conspirator in the case, was important to proving each of the five charges against Poindexter:
-- Count One, that Poindexter conspired with North and Secord to obstruct congressional inquiries of Iran- and contra-related matters, to make false statements to Congress, and to falsify, remove and destroy official documents.
-- Count Two, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in 1986 when it was investigating media allegations that North was raising funds and providing military aid to the contras. In letters to three committees, Poindexter answered questions by repeating denials McFarlane made before Congress in 1985 of North's involvement in contra-support activities, even though Poindexter knew the denials to be false. He set up a meeting with the House Intelligence Committee in August 1986 in which he knew North would have to give false testimony, and afterward congratulated North on his performance.
-- Count Three, that Poindexter obstructed Congress in November 1986 by participating with North in the preparation of false chronologies of the secret U.S. arms sales to Iran and by making false statements to the House and Senate intelligence committees. Specifically, Poindexter falsely asserted that no U.S. official knew before January 1986 that HAWK missiles had been shipped to Iran in November 1985. The indictment stated that North as early as November 20, 1985, told Poindexter about the shipment in advance and advised him of it again after the fact in late 1985.
-- Counts Four and Five, that Poindexter made false statements about the HAWK shipment to the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986. As in Count Three, the false statement charges were based on North's informing Poindexter about the shipment in 1985.
In four days of trial testimony, North reluctantly recounted his central operational role in the Iran/contra affair. He described the extensive contra-resupply network he ran with Secord and Hakim,22 his contra fund-raising efforts, and the military advice he gave the contras. He testified that he kept his bosses McFarlane and Poindexter fully informed of his activities and that he acted only with their approval.23
22 North objected to the prosecutor's use of the word ``Enterprise'' to describe the profit-making web of contra- and Iran-related operations he undertook with Secord and Hakim. He also objected to the use of the word ``testimony'' in reference to the false statements he made before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in August 1986, and the word ``diversion'' to describe the scheme in which he, Poindexter and others diverted Iran arms sales proceeds to the contras.
23 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1275-76.
North, who was forced to testify for the prosecution under a grant of immunity, frequently claimed that he could not recall many of the incidents in question, some of which had occurred several years before. North admitted a wide range of contra-support and Iran-related actions only when confronted with prior testimony in which he had provided extensive details.
North admitted that he lied in August 1986 when he told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) he was not engaged in raising funds or providing military support to the Nicaraguan contras.24 North described exchanges with Poindexter before and after the meeting that directly implicated Poindexter in a scheme to frustrate the congressional investigation.25
24 Ibid., 3/9/90, pp. 1042-43.
25 Ibid., 3/12/90, p. 1083.
HPSCI was one of three congressional committees pursuing a House inquiry into reports of North's contra-aid activities. North testified that prior to appearing before the committee in the White House Situation Room, he told Poindexter he would be asked about ``things that I had been told never to reveal.'' 26 In response, Poindexter told him, ``You can handle it, you can take care of it,'' according to North.27
26 Ibid., 3/9/90, p. 1033.
27 Ibid.
After receiving reports of North's statements to HPSCI, which Poindexter knew were false, Poindexter by way of his computer sent North a terse congratulatory message: ``Well done.'' 28
28 PROFs Note from Poindexter to North, 8/11/86, AKW 018921.
Based on the statements of North and Poindexter, HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton informed other members of Congress that the media allegations about North could not be proven. North's false testimony, in combination with Poindexter's perpetuation of McFarlane's previous lies, successfully frustrated the congressional oversight process. It was not until Nicaraguan soldiers on October 5, 1986, shot down a contra-resupply plane carrying American Eugene Hasenfus that Congress renewed its investigation into North's activities.
North testified that he kept Poindexter apprised of his involvement in the covert sales of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986, including the operation's most secret aspect: the Iran/contra diversion. He sent Poindexter five or six memos stating that overcharges to the Iranian buyers would generate millions of dollars for diversion to the contras.29 North said Poindexter told him the diversion should never be revealed.30 North said he reported the diversion plan to Poindexter because he thought that projects funded by it ``ought to have the authority of the President behind them.'' 31
29 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, pp. 1107-11.
30 Ibid., pp. 1103-05.
31 Ibid., p. 1111.
North testified that in November 1985, he became directly involved in an Israeli shipment of U.S. HAWK missiles to Iran at McFarlane's behest.32 North said he got permission from both McFarlane, who was then the national security adviser, and Poindexter, then deputy national security adviser, to enlist Secord's help in resolving logistical problems surrounding the shipment.33 He also got McFarlane and Poindexter's permission to supply the Israelis with the name of a CIA-connected airline to assist.34 North outlined the details of the planned HAWK shipment in a computer note to Poindexter on November 20, 1985.35 By memoranda on December 4 and on December 9, 1985, North informed Poindexter that the Iranians were unhappy with the shipment and wanted the missiles to be retrieved.36
32 Ibid., pp. 1118-20.
33 Ibid., pp. 1121-22.
34 Ibid., pp. 1122-27.
35 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 11/20/85, AKW 002066.
36 PROFs Note from North to Poindexter, 12/4/85, AKW 002070-73; Memorandum from North to McFarlane and Poindexter, 12/9/85, AKW 002088-91.
When CIA officials insisted after the HAWK shipment that the President should retroactively authorize the agency's participation in the operation, CIA Director William J. Casey on November 26, 1985, gave Poindexter a covert-action Finding for President Reagan's signature.37 North testified that he saw the signed Finding either in Poindexter's office safe or in the safe of NSC counsel Paul Thompson.38
37 Memorandum from Casey to Poindexter, 11/26/85, AMY 000651-52.
38 North, Poindexter Trial Testimony, 3/12/90, p. 1245.
After public exposure of the Iran arms sales in November 1986, North -- at Poindexter's request -- prepared a chronology of U.S. involvement in the Iran arms sales, which underwent a series of re-writes. North testified that McFarlane removed from the chronology North's factual account of the November 1985 HAWKs shipment and substituted a cover story: that although the CIA became involved in the November 1985 shipment after Israel encountered logistical difficulties, U.S. officials at the time believed the cargo to be oil-drilling parts and did not learn until January 1986 that the true cargo was weapons.39
39 Ibid., pp. 1188-98.
Asked whether the McFarlane revision was part of a plan to ``cover up'' the existence of the November 1985 Finding, North answered: ``I don't know that cover up is the right word. I listened to the President's press conferences, I listened to statements being made by people and they just didn't talk about it.'' 40 North said McFarlane told him the cover story should be incorporated into the chronology because the 1985 Finding authorizing the weapons shipment described too directly an arms-for-hostages swap, which, if exposed, would politically embarrass the President.41
40 Ibid., p. 1191.
41 Ibid., pp. 1190-91.
The same oil-drilling-parts cover story was part of a CIA-prepared chronology that Casey and his deputy, Robert Gates, brought to a White House meeting on November 20, 1986, with Poindexter, North, Meese, Cooper and Thompson. The purpose of the meeting was to prepare Casey and Poindexter for their congressional testimony the following day. North was asked at trial:
Q: . . . did it become clear to you by the time McFarlane tells you that [the finding was too close to an arms-for-hostage swap] and by the time you see the CIA show up with this phony chronology, then at least did it appear to you that there was some effort or plan going on to cover up with U.S. involvement because of that finding?
A: Well, there is no doubt in my mind that I came to realize that finding was a disaster, and I understood that.42
42 Ibid., pp. 1208-09.
North testified that he altered and destroyed numerous documents in October and November 1986 that would have revealed details of the Iran and contra operations. He said he assured Poindexter that he had ``taken care of'' the documents that reflected his activities.43 He said he told Poindexter all the documents describing the Iran/contra diversion were destroyed, after learning from Poindexter on November 21, 1986, that Attorney General Meese would be conducting a weekend investigation into the Iran arms sales.44 North also testified that he altered other original NSC documents, after receiving Poindexter's permission to retrieve them from the NSC document-archiving system.45
43 Ibid., p. 1218.
44 Ibid., pp. 1120-21.
45 Ibid., pp. 1224-27.
More important, North reluctantly testified that he saw Poindexter destroy the only known copy of the signed presidential Finding that sought to authorize retroactively the November 1985 shipment of HAWK missiles to Iran.46 North's eyewitness account of the destruction of the Finding provided significant proof of Poindexter's intent to conceal facts about the HAWK missile shipment from Congress in November 1986.47
46 Ibid., 1252-54.
47 The destruction of the 1985 Finding was not charged as a separate crime in the indictment of Poindexter because Independent Counsel did not learn of it until North testified about it at his own trial in April 1989. Poindexter had told the Select Committees in 1987 that he destroyed the only signed copy of the 1985 presidential Finding. Independent Counsel did not learn of this statement at the time, however, because the OIC had taken measures to insulate itself from all immunized testimony. Even if Independent Counsel had been aware of the Poindexter testimony, OIC could not have used it in any criminal proceeding against Poindexter under the terms of immunity grant.
North's wide-ranging testimony enabled the prosecution to streamline its witness list to only nine other individuals, many of whom supplemented the central details provided by North.
The Trial Testimony of President Reagan
Before the trial of Poindexter, President Reagan had not testified publicly about Iran/contra. On February 16 and 17, 1990, he gave a seven-hour videotaped deposition as a defense witness. No classified matters were discussed and executive privilege was not invoked in response to any question. The videotaped deposition was shown in full, therefore, to the Poindexter jury during the trial on March 21 and 22, 1990.48
48 Immediately after each tape was shown to the jury, a copy was given to the television networks, allowing the public to see President Reagan's only courtroom testimony on the Iran/contra affair.
In direct examination, defense counsel sought to show presidential knowledge and approval of Poindexter's activities. But President Reagan frequently claimed memory lapses when questioned about specific exchanges he may have had with Poindexter and about his knowledge of individuals and details involved in the Iran and contra operations.
Although President Reagan exhibited virtually no detailed knowledge of the Iran/contra matter, he made clear to the jury that it had his imprimatur, calling it ``a covert action that was taken at my behest.'' 49 President Reagan said North was the only person he remembered being involved in the arms initiative.50 He could not recall being briefed by Poindexter on the May 1986 trip by McFarlane and North to Tehran, but he said he did recall signing a Bible for Iranians.51 President Reagan testified that the amount of weapons sold to Iran totaled $12.2 million.52
49 Reagan, Poindexter Trial Deposition, 2/16/90, p. 9.
50 Ibid., p. 21.
51 Ibid., p. 24.
52 Ibid., pp. 154-55.
Asked specifically about the November 1985 HAWK shipment to Iran, President Reagan said he recalled a plan in which the Israelis would turn their plane around in mid-delivery of the weapons if no hostages were released.53 He did not recall when he became aware of the November 1985 HAWK shipment; 54 he did not recall Poindexter telling him in November 1986 that others in the White House were having trouble remembering when they learned of it.55
53 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
54 Ibid., pp. 33-36.
55 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
President Reagan also claimed virtually no memory of the November 1986 period in which his top advisers were scrambling to limit public exposure of the Iran arms sales. He only generally recalled telling members of Congress about the arms sales on November 12, 1986.56 He could not remember receiving any information from Poindexter for any of his presentations on the matter in that time.57 The former President could not remember asking Poindexter to assemble the facts on the arms sales.58 He could not recall that Poindexter briefed the House and Senate intelligence committees on November 21, 1986.59
56 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
57 Ibid., p. 30.
58 Ibid., p. 28.
59 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
Defense counsel's questions suggested that their client had significant exchanges with the President during the arms-sale period and its aftermath. But Reagan's lack of recollection, and lack of specificity when he did remember events or individuals, left those questions unresolved.
President Reagan provided more helpful testimony for the defense on the subject of contra-support operations. Calling the Boland prohibition on contra funding a ``disaster,'' 60 Reagan testified that he urged his aides to do what they could to support the contras, while staying ``within the law.'' 61 Reagan recalled that Saudi Arabia's King Fahd pledged millions of dollars for the contras.62 He said he told his aides not to solicit contributions for the contras directly but to tell people how they could contribute if they wanted to help.63
60 Ibid., p. 69.
61 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
62 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
63 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
Asked whether Poindexter briefed him on the contras, President Reagan said: ``Oh yes, I depended on him for that.'' 64 He said he had no reason to believe that Poindexter was not keeping him fully informed.
64 Ibid., p. 116.
Asked to describe what he knew about North's responsibilities in the White House, President Reagan said:
Well, he was mainly performing tasks, as I understand it, for the NSC, but he -- his background and record had been one of being decorated for heroism and so forth in the Vietnamese conflict, and that he had been a very bold and brave soldier -- Marine.
And -- so, he was -- it was my impression, not from any specific reports or anything, that in through all of this that he was communicating back and forth between on the need for the support of the Contras and so forth.65
65 Ibid., p. 131.
In addition to professing a benign view of North and his activities, President Reagan indicated general knowledge of and support for the contra-resupply operation in Central America:
Q: Do you recall any discussions that he [Poindexter] may have had with you about the construction of an airstrip down there in Central America?
A: Well, I did hear -- we had learned that there was a rather primitive lane in there in the jungle near the border of Costa Rican [sic], and that was then being put into better shape as a usable airstrip.
Q: Did you have any -- do you recall any discussion about who was constructing the airstrip?
A: Well, no. I assume it was the Costa Rican government.
Q: And do you know what that airstrip was going to be used for?
A: Well, I know that -- I hoped that it would be used in the delivery of when once again we could supply, keep the Contras supplied, that it could be involved in the -- used there, if there was need for a refueling or anything of that kind of a plane.66
66 Ibid., p. 121.
President Reagan was then asked whether he knew who would be using the Costa Rican airstrip for contra resupply. His answer reflected knowledge of the operation supposedly being funded and run by private citizens -- the so-called ``private benefactors'' -- that was in fact being run by Secord at North's direction:
Q: Do you know who it was that was going to be using the airstrip? It was going to be used for supplying the Contras, but do you know who it was that was actually going to be doing the supplying and using the airstrip?
A: No, I do not on that. I don't think -- I don't think I ever considered that it would be military planes of ours. So, possibly some of those that weren't officially planes of ours that had been helping in the past in deliveries to the Contras and so forth.
Q: Earlier this morning or earlier today, I should say, you mentioned General Secord. That you knew that he was involved in the Contra supply effort.
Was it part of his operation you thought that he might be using the airstrip?
A: I can't say that I actually recall that, but it seems to me logical that he would have been involved in that.67
67 Ibid., p. 122.
President Reagan, who winked and smiled at Poindexter from the witness stand, did not hide his contempt toward congressional inquiries into NSC staff contra-support activities. Shown misleading letters written by Poindexter in July 1986 to the committees of Congress that were investigating allegations of North's contra efforts, Reagan said: ``I am in total agreement. If I had written it myself, I might have used a little profanity.'' 68
68 Ibid., pp. 146-47.
In cross-examination, the prosecution was able to impeach much of President Reagan's testimony. This was possible because Reagan late in 1987 had answered, under oath, 53 written interrogatories for Independent Counsel and the Grand Jury investigating the Iran/contra matter.
The July 21, 1986, letters -- in which Poindexter embraced and perpetuated the lies McFarlane had told Congress about North's contra-support activities a year earlier -- were a key element in the obstruction charges against the defendant. Under cross-examination by the prosecution, President Reagan was asked whether he was aware that the Poindexter letters repeated McFarlane's previous lies. The former President equivocated:
Well, I simply -- no, I did not have this information, but I have a great deal of confidence in the man who was quoted as sending these letters, McFarlane. And I have never -- I have never caught him or seen him doing anything that was in any way out of line or dishonest. And so, I was perfectly willing to accept his defense.69
69 Ibid., p. 151.
President Reagan said he did not know that McFarlane had pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress in connection with the false letters.70
70 Ibid., pp. 220-21.
Asked whether he approved either the McFarlane or Poindexter letters to Congress, the former President said he had no recollection of doing so, adding that his memory could be faulty.71 Asked directly whether he would approve of sending false information to Congress, President Reagan conceded that he would not.72 Would he have authorized Poindexter to make false statements to Congress? President Reagan again attempted to assist his former aide: ``No. And I don't think any false statements were made.'' 73
71 Ibid., pp. 150-51.
72 Ibid., pp. 151-52.
73 Ibid., p. 158.
President Reagan also testified that he did not approve the destruction of Iran/contra documents by Poindexter, and that he was not told about their destruction.74 But the former President, in response to subsequent questioning, described the dilemma in which he placed his aides in November 1986 by instructing them that certain information could not be revealed because ``it will bring to risk and danger to people that are held and with the people that we were negotiating with.'' 75
74 Ibid., p. 160.
75 Ibid., p. 252.
Asked again whether he approved the destruction of alteration of any Iran/contra records, President Reagan said: ``And this, I cannot answer. I cannot recall because it is the possibility that there were such papers that would violate the secrecy that was protecting those individuals' lives.'' 76 President Reagan had denied in response to the earlier written interrogatories that he approved the destruction and alteration of documents; when confronted with his previous testimony he stated that it was truthful.
76 Ibid., p. 255.
On the issue of the contras, President Reagan said he ``never had any inkling'' that North was guiding their military strategy.77 But Reagan muddied the issue in a later statement about North:
77 Ibid., p. 170.
I know that he [North] was very active, and that was certainly with my approval, because I yesterday made plain how seriously I felt about the Contra situation and what it meant to all of us here in the Americas. And, so, obviously, there were many things that were being done. But, again, as I say, I was convinced that they were all being done within the law.78
78 Ibid., p. 189.
In questioning about the Iran/contra diversion, President Reagan surprisingly asserted that he had no proof that a diversion had occurred:
And to this day, I still with all of the investigations that have been made, I still have never been given one iota of evidence as to who collected the price, who delivered the final delivery of the weapons, or what was -- whether there was ever more money in that Swiss account that had been diverted someplace else. I am still waiting to find those things out and have never found them out.79
79 Ibid., p. 155.
Asked whether he had approved a diversion, Reagan again stated:
May I simply point out that I had no knowledge then or now that there had been a diversion, and I never used the term. And all I knew was that there was some money that came from some place in another account, and that the appearance was that it might have been a part of the negotiated sale. And to this day, I don't have any information or knowledge that that wasn't the total amount that -- or that there was a diversion.80
80 Ibid., p. 156.
Asked again whether he would have approved a diversion, President Reagan said he would not. But, he added, ``No one has proven to me that there was a diversion.'' 81
81 Ibid., p. 157.
President Reagan said he did not recall that the Tower Commission concluded in March 1987 that, in fact, a diversion had occurred. ``I, to this day, do not recall ever hearing that there was a diversion,'' he said.82 Shown that portion of the Tower Commission report describing the diversion, Reagan said: ``This report -- this is the first time that I have ever seen a reference that actually specified there was a diversion.'' 83
82 Ibid., p. 240.
83 Ibid., p. 243.
Asked whether Poindexter should have told him about an Iran/contra diversion, Reagan said: ``Yes. Unless maybe he thought he was protecting me from something.'' 84
84 Ibid., pp. 243-44.
The Verdict and Sentencing
After six days of deliberation, the jury on April 7, 1990, found Poindexter guilty of each of the five felony charges against him. Judge Greene on June 11, 1990, sentenced Poindexter to six months imprisonment on each of the five counts, to be served concurrently.
In imposing the sentence, Judge Greene noted complaints by Poindexter's supporters that the most he was guilty of was having become embroiled in a political quarrel between the White House and Congress. Judge Greene stated:
Whatever may have been the nature of the original dispute, what the defendant and his associates did was emphatically not a part of the normal political process.
. . . When Admiral Poindexter and his associates obstructed the Congress, what were they seeking to accomplish? In a word, it was to nullify the decision that body had made on the issue of supplies to the Contras. . . .
President Reagan did not, or for parliamentary reasons he could not, veto the bill [which contained the Boland prohibition on contra aid]. He did not attempt to assert his own constitutional powers or take the issue to the people, and at the conclusion of the political process the Boland Amendment thus became law.
No problem. What the president was unwilling or unable to do -- to defeat this law -- Admiral Poindexter, together with Oliver North and others, did on their own. They decided that the policy embodied in the Boland Amendment was wrong, and they went about to violate it on a large scale and for a lengthy period, and then to lie about their activities to prevent the Congress and the public from finding out. . . .
With all due respect to the distinguished military records of Admiral Poindexter, Colonel North, General Secord, and the others, they have no standing in a democratic society to invalidate the decisions made by elected officials . . . As I said several times during the trial, it is immaterial to this criminal case who was right and who was wrong about the wisdom of the Contra policy. That is not what this trial was about. The jury and this court were not competent to decide for this nation whether resistance forces in Nicaragua should or should not have been supplied with weapons.
But more importantly for present purposes, neither was Admiral Poindexter. When he and his associates took it upon themselves to make that decision anyway, to implement it on a broad scale, and to work actively to keep what they were doing from the Congress and the public, they not only violated various statutes. They were also in violation of a principle fundamental to this constitutional Republic -- that those elected by and responsible to the people shall make the important policy decisions, and that their decisions may not be nullified by appointed officials who happen to be in positions that give them the ability to operate programs prohibited by law. It is unfortunate that, whatever may be his view of his own purposes and actions, the defendant still gives no evidence of recognizing that principle and the seriousness of its violation.
Given the nature of the offenses, the sentencing principle that is primarily applicable here is that of deterrence, and as a practical matter, deterrence means meaningful penalties. If the court were not to impose such a penalty here, when the defendant before it was the decision-making head of the Iran-contra operation, its action would be tantamount to a statement that a scheme to lie to and obstruct Congress is of no great moment, and that even if the perpetrators are found out, the courts will treat their criminal acts as no more than minor infractions.
A message of that kind could not help but encourage others in positions of authority and secrecy to frustrate laws that fail to accord with their notions of what is best for this country, and to carry out their own private policies in the name of the United States. . . .85
85 Judge Greene, Poindexter Transcript of Sentencing, 6/11/90, pp. 18-22
The Appeal
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in a 2-1 decision on November 15, 1991, reversed Poindexter's convictions on the grounds that his trial was impermissibly tainted by his immunized congressional testimony. The Poindexter ruling was based on the appeals court decision in the North case, which extended the protections of the use immunity statute to prohibit use of any witness whose testimony has been refreshed or shaped in any way by the defendant's immunized testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Abner Mikva noted that the majority ruling ``tells future defendants that all they need to evade responsibility [to testify at trial] is a well timed case of amnesia.'' 86
86 U.S. v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
The Poindexter appeals panel also overturned the two obstruction convictions on the grounds that the statute was ``unconstitutionally vague'' in its proscription of ``corruptly'' endeavoring to impede a congressional inquiry. The appeals panel ruled that a defendant's lying to Congress does not constitute obstruction unless the defendant corruptly influences someone else to do so. Again, Chief Judge Mikva dissented, finding it ``obvious . . . that Poindexter 'corruptly' obstructed the congressional investigation when he lied to Congress.'' 87
87 Ibid.
In October 1992, Independent Counsel petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Poindexter case. Independent Counsel said the appeals court ruling that the obstruction statute was unconstitutional ``leaves a large gap in the criminal law, while endorsing a method of analyzing constitutional vagueness challenges that could prove enormously destructive to a substantial body of federal legislation.'' 88 The petition noted that at least 17 other laws besides the obstruction statute at issue use the word ``corruptly'' to define an element of the offense.89
88 U.S. v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080-01, Petition for Writ of Certiorari by United States of America, at 9 (October 1992).
89 Ibid., p. 10.
On immunized testimony, Independent Counsel in its petition to the Supreme Court said the appeals ruling in Poindexter would
make almost impossible the prosecution of any case involving public immunized statements that requires testimony by persons sympathetic to the accused, such as co-conspirators or other associates. And the dangers of abuse and manipulation are magnified by the court of appeals' view, expressed in North, that a witness inclined to assist the defense may become disqualified from testifying at trial by the simple expedient of soaking himself in the defendant's immunized statements. 90
90 Ibid., p. 22.
Independent Counsel also noted that the appeals ruling
. . . will have its most profound impact on cases involving public immunized testimony before Congress -- cases that, by definition, involve issues of the most fundamental import. If the court of appeals has erred, this Court should right that error before significant further damage is done to the legislative oversight function. 91
91 Ibid., p. 29.
The U.S. Supreme Court in December 1992 declined, without comment, to review the Poindexter case.
Conclusion
Poindexter was responsible for providing President Reagan with advice on national-security matters of highest importance. What his conviction showed was that a jury of ordinary citizens can sort and weigh complex evidence and agree that obstructing and lying to Congress is a serious act worthy of felony conviction.
The Poindexter trial served the public interest in another sense. Poindexter's determination to call President Reagan as a witness allowed the public the rare opportunity to see him testify for seven hours about the Iran/contra matter.
The completion of the Poindexter trial in April 1990, two years after the original indictment was returned, necessitated the re-activation of the criminal investigation into Iran/contra. For the first time, Poindexter and North were available for questioning by Independent Counsel. Although this decision was questioned by some, Independent Counsel determined that his Iran/contra investigative mandate could not be fulfilled until the central operational figures were interrogated to find out whether other high-ranking officials helped support and cover up their activities.
Sentenciando criminosos convicted nos Estados Unidos
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
Capítulo 3
Estados Unidos v. John M. Vice
Adm da marinha de Poindexter. John M. Poindexter foi apontado como o conselheiro da segurança nacional do presidente Reagan dezembro em 4, 1985, sucedendo Robert C. McFarlane, a quem Poindexter tinha servido abaixo como o deputado por dois anos. A carreira branca da casa de Poindexter terminou novembro 25, 1986, quando foi forçado a renunciar na vigília da divulgação pública do Irã/contra a diversão.
Poindexter, tenente. Coluna O norte e McFarlane de Oliver eram o Attorney General Edwin Meese III de três indivíduos identificado novembro em 25, 1986, como knowledgeable da diversão. A supervisão de Poindexter do norte e sua própria participação no Irã e contra operações eram focos adiantados da investigação do conselho independente.
Como no argumento de encontro à evidência norte, criminal de encontro a Poindexter teve que ser recolhido rapidamente antes que estêve compelido testify no monte de Capitol no verão de 1987 sob uma concessão de immunity limitado. Se não, o prosecution de Poindexter era provável ser desafiado nas terras que estêve derivado ou em alguma maneira influenciada por seu testimony congressional immunized.
Março em 16, 1988, Poindexter foi processado em sete cargas do felony que levantam-se de sua participação no Irã/contra o caso, como parte de um indictment do multi-réu de 23 contagens. Foi nomeado com norte, major aposentado da força aérea. Gerador. Richard V. Secord e Albert Hakim como um membro do conspiracy a defraudar o governo de Estados Unidos efetuando o Irã/contra a diversão e a outra agem.
Depois que os casos severed e duas das cargas originais foram demitidas, Poindexter foi tentado e convicted em abril 1990 de cinco felonies, incluindo: uma contagem de conspiring obstruir inquéritos e continuações oficiais, duas contagens de obstruir o Congress, e duas contagens de indicações falsas a Congress.1 ESTADOS UNIDOS. Juiz Harold H. do distrito. Greene sentenciou-o a um termo de seis meses da prisão. Em novembro 1991, as convicções de Poindexter foram viradas na apelação. Em dezembro 1992, os ESTADOS UNIDOS. Corte suprema declinada rever o caso.
1 o exemplo de Poindexter foi tentado por conselhos Dan K. do associado. Webb, cristão J. Mixter, Howard M. Pérola, e Louise R. Radin.
Poindexter juntou a equipe de funcionários do conselho de segurança nacional em junho 1981, seguindo uma distinta carreira naval que incluísse bornes do Pentagon do comando e do elevado-ranking do cruzador de batalha. Em outubro 1983 transformou-se deputado ao conselheiro McFarlane da segurança nacional; entre seus subordinados era norte. Durante o tenure one-year de Poindexter como o conselheiro da segurança nacional, que começou em dezembro 1985, oversaw o Irã/contra as operações em que o norte foi envolvido diretamente.
Em novembro 1986, enquanto as operações secretas se estavam tornando expostas publicamente, Poindexter assentou bem no oficial sênior da administração responsável para instruir outros conselheiros superiores do presidente sobre as vendas de braços de Irã. Em uma série das reuniões brancas da casa com outros oficiais e membros do Congress durante todo o mês, colocou repetidamente para fora uma versão falsa das transações que distanced o presidente Reagan dos 1985 shipments de braços legalmente questionáveis feitos através de Israel, particularmente a transação do Falcão-míssil de novembro 1985.
Embora Poindexter fosse o spokesman, não era responsável sozinho para saber os fatos. Virtualmente cada outro oficial sênior, including o presidente Reagan, que se ouviu que sua versão das vendas de braços nas instruções durante todo novembro 1986 teve a razão a acreditar eram errados. Contudo ninguém, de acordo com as notas contemporaneous daquelas instruções, raio até Poindexter correto.
Poindexter junto com o norte e outro em novembro 1986 tentaram shred e alterar a fuga de papel que reflete seu Irã/contra atividades. Entre outras coisas, Poindexter destruiu único encontrar presidencial assinado existente da secreto-ação que foi pretendido autorizar retroactively a participação do CIA no shipment dos falcões de novembro 1985.
Poindexter e o norte eram mais menos bem sucedidos em eradicating a fuga da computador-mensagem de seu Irã/contra atividades. Poindexter e o norte comunicaram-se frequentemente através de uma canaleta especial que Poindexter, um perito de computador, ajustasse acima no sistema computatorizado de NSC. Esta canaleta, sabida como “a verificação em branco confidencial,” permitiu que Poindexter e o norte serelay as mensagens sem seu que estão sendo distribuídas através das canaletas em que outra na equipe de funcionários de NSC poderia as selecionar.
Entre novembro 22 a 29, 1986, norte suprimiu de suas mensagens da lima de computador 736, e Poindexter suprimiu 5.012 mensagens durante o mesmo period.2 apesar destes apagamentos, as fitas adesivas rotineiramente conservadas brancas do back-up da casa que contêm todos os dados no sistema por duas semanas para proteger de encontro à perda inadvertida. Quando o Irã/contra o caso foi exposto em novembro atrasado 1986, a agência branca das comunicações da casa, que controla o sistema computatorizado de NSC, reteve as fitas adesivas alternativas que datam novembro de 15. Os Investigators, puderam conseqüentemente recuperar cópias de todas as mensagens que estavam nas limas de computador do Poindexter-Norte no mid-November 1986 antes que a maioria dos apagamentos ocorreram. Estas mensagens do computador transformaram-se evidência importante no Poindexter e nas experimentações nortes.
2 Williams, Testimony experimental de Poindexter, 3/15/90, pp. 1752-65.
Poindexter admitido a muitas de suas atividades antes que os comitês seletos em julho 1987 sob uma concessão do immunity testimonial, que impedisse que suas admissões estejam usadas de encontro a ele na continuação criminal. Porque o presidente Reagan não testify que o forum, Poindexter estêve chamado para responder à pergunta que dominou os hearings: O presidente soube aproximadamente e aprovar a diversão das vendas de braços de Irã prosegue aos contras? Poindexter respondeu ao No., “os batentes do buck aqui com mim.” 3 que disse que reteve deliberadamente a informação do presidente Reagan porque ``eu quis o presidente ter algum deniability de modo que fosse protegido. . . . '' 4
3 Poindexter, Testimony seleto dos comitês, 7/15/87, P. 95.
4 Ibid., P. 101.
Enfrentando uma experimentação criminal, Poindexter confrontou um dilemma diferente: Era já não uma pergunta de proteger o presidente mas de defender-se himself de encontro a cinco cargas do felony. Antes do Congress, o testimony o mais significativo de Poindexter negações repetidas do presidente Reagan corroborated da consciência do Irã/contra a diversão. No courtroom, Poindexter montou uma defesa da elevado-autorização, tentando convencer o júri que o presidente tinha aprovado suas ações, including aquelas que resultaram em cargas criminal. Em vez de fazer exame do carrinho em sua própria defesa, entretanto, chamou o presidente Reagan para testify.
Continuações Pre-Trial
ESTADOS UNIDOS. Juiz Gerhard A. do distrito. Gesell em junho 1988 requisitou que a caixa do multi-réu de encontro a Poindexter, norte, a Secord e a Hakim fosse severed.5 depois da separação, caso de Poindexter foi transferido ao juiz principal Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., e para julgar então Greene, que presided umas continuações mais adicionais do excesso.
5 para uma descrição mais detalhada da separação da caixa do multi-réu, veja o capítulo norte.
Todos os desafios substantivos de Poindexter à validez do indictment foram demitidos antes da experimentação. As edições importantes restantes concerniram: (1) a preservação da carga do conspiracy; (2) a definição da classific-informação disputa; (3) a definição das edições relacionadas ao testimony congressional immunized de Poindexter, sob governar sabido como Kastigar; e (4) o esforço bem sucedido do réu fixar o testimony experimental do presidente anterior Reagan.
Preservar e estreitar os problemas da carga
do Conspiracy com informação classificada conduziram ao dismissal das cargas centrais do conspiracy antes da experimentação norte, e os problemas similares esperaram-se levantar-se no argumento de encontro a Poindexter. Junho em 20, 1989, os conselhos independentes moveram-se para eliminar as cargas largas originais do conspiracy baseadas na fonte dos contras e da diversão e para estreitar substancialmente a carga de conspiracy para violate os outros statutes criminal substantivos, indicações falsas proibindo e obstrução. Após arquivamentos e o argumento oral, a corte concedeu o movimento do governo.
A carga era refocused no ato ilegal de conspiring com norte e Secord esconder atividades do Congress. Os conselhos independentes discutiram com sucesso que este se estreitar da carga do conspiracy minimizaria os problemas da classific-informação que flagelaram o prosecution norte.
A informação classificada emite
os procedimentos classificados da informação age (CIPA) permitiu que a corte experimental eficazmente resolvesse as edições que envolvem o uso de originais e do testimony classificados em Poindexter. Julgue a supervisão de Greene do processo de CIPA e as negociações fruitful entre os conselhos para o governo e o Poindexter resolvidos a maioria de disputas com um mínimo de atrasam.
No contraste ao norte, não havia nenhum prolongado ou o litigation significativo a respeito do formulário ou do espaço de observações de CIPA de Poindexter à corte divulgar classificou a informação na experimentação. Entre novembro 27, 1989, e março 13, 1990, Poindexter serviu a 11 tais observações, including o testimony oito que os originais classificados listados ele quiseram se usar na experimentação, dois classificado possível de descrição, e a uma focalizada unicamente na informação que quis eliciar no deposition do presidente Reagan.
Julgue Greene requisitou que todas as diferenças que o excesso classificou a informação estejam negociadas entre os partidos antes de ser trazido antes da corte. Julgue Greene prendeu seis hearings fechados de CIPA antes da experimentação começou e suplementou aqueles com diversos hearings mais curtos durante a experimentação. A maioria de seus rulings na relevância e no admissibility da informação classificada, e no adequacy das substituições propostas pelo governo, foram feitos do banco.
Feitas exame junto, as observações de CIPA de Poindexter alistaram aproximadamente 1.200 originais, only uma fração pequena de que foi introduzida finalmente na experimentação. A maioria de informação classificada foi coberta por estipulações de Governo a determinados fatos e a outras substituições unclassified. Isto permitiu que a experimentação proseguisse lisamente, sem os conflitos que complicaram o norte ou o argumento de encontro à estação anterior Joseph principal F. do CIA. Fernandez, que era demitido devido à classific-informação problems.6
6 vê o capítulo de Fernandez.
As continuações Poindexter
de Kastigar foram compelidas sob uma concessão do immunity do uso testify em 1987 antes dos comitês seletos que investigam Irã/contra. Como o outro Irã/contra os réus que deram o testimony immunized antes do Congress, Poindexter movido para demitir o indictment na teoria que violated os padrões enunciated em Kastigar v. Estados Unidos, 7 que discutem que seu testimony immunized estêve usado de encontro a ele no júri grande e na experimentação. Este argumento provou mal sucedido no nível experimental mas prevaleceu finalmente na corte de apelações.
7 406 ESTADOS UNIDOS. 411 (1972).
Antes que suas experimentações severed, Poindexter movido conjuntamente com norte e Hakim, que tinham recebido também o immunity para testify antes do Congress, para ter as cargas de encontro a eles demitiu na terra que a evidência de encontro a eles tainted por seu testimony immunized. O juiz Gesell negou esse movimento. Entretanto, no deference à defesa reivindica que usariam um - possivelmente o testimony immunized exculpatory another, juiz Gesell em junho 1988 severed as experimentações.
Poindexter renovou seu movimento de Kastigar antes do juiz Greene em agosto 1989. Após a instrução e o argumento, 8 a corte requisitaram que dois hearings evidentiary estivessem prendidos. No primeiro, a corte ouviu o testimony dos conselhos Dan K. do associado. Webb e Howard M. Pearl a respeito de sua exposição ao testimony immunized de Poindexter antes de juntar o escritório de conselhos independentes. Webb e a pérola juntaram a equipe de funcionários de OIC em 1989 e não a tiveram, antes de suas nomeações, sido sujeitos aos procedimentos de OIC isolar-se do testimony immunized de Poindexter. Julgue Greene encontrou sua exposição ao testimony de Poindexter para ser insignificante e permitiu que ambos os advogados participassem na experimentação.
8 o exemplo de Poindexter foram tentados ant | |